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ABSTRACT
Jürgen Habermas has argued that democracy depends on all citizens recognizing the 
legitimacy of the law. Therefore, political argument must appeal only to public reason 
which is secular. Religious citizens must translate their reasons into a secular language 
accessible to the public. This dissertation argues that religious arguments are justified in 
public discourse if they refrain from dogmatism. Moreover, there is nothing inherent in 
secular reasons that make them publicly accessible or likely to generate consensus among 
members of a pluralistic society. If we treat religious arguments as simply arguments 
with controversial premises, it becomes less clear why religious arguments are singled 
out as particularly problematic for liberal democracies, since many secular political 
arguments share this feature. Granted, religious reasons are unlikely to secure consensus, 
but this does not count against them if consensus is not the goal of democratic discourse. 
This dissertation makes the case that Habermas, and other liberal theorists such as Rawls, 
have placed too much emphasis on consensus as the goal of democracy. Moreover, what 
they refer to is not practical consensus achieved pragmatically through compromise, but 
an idealized consensus that is the achievement of secular reason. This is problematic for 
two main reasons: there is no normative reason to think we ought to attain such 
consensus and such consensus is unlikely to be achieved in practice. Thus, there seems to 
be no normative force to the claim that religious citizens ought to translate their 
arguments into secular language. 
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Introduction: Charting the Territory
This project is an examination of the place of religious language in public discourse. 
There are very few settled questions in philosophy; however, one might be tempted to say 
that the question of the proper relationship between religion and politics is one of them. 
The consensus seems to be that it is good for both religion and politics if the two of them 
remain separate. The state should remain secular, neutral with respect to the competing 
claims of sectarian faiths. This arrangement prevents any particular faith from exercising 
a monopoly on public power and affords individuals the freedom to practice any faith or 
none at all. Although this principle is an idealization, it is a general principle which most 
proponents of liberal democracy would affirm, although perhaps with qualification. 
However, within this general, idealized framework, the practical details of the often 
complex interplay between religion and public discourse need to be worked out. To say 
that the state must remain secular is not a very useful statement, since ‘secular’ could 
mean many different things. Furthermore, to separate the business of religion 
conceptually from the business of the state is quite different from doing so in practice. To 
say that a person’s religious faith will not influence her political actions is naive. To say 
that it ought not is a substantive normative claim that would require some justification. 
So beneath the thin veneer of consensus lie many deep and complex issues upon which 
people with a robust commitment to democracy can and do disagree. This project is 
concerned with just such issues. 
More specifically, I will engage these issues in conversation, as it were, with the 
works of Jürgen Habermas. He is well known, at least in philosophical circles, for 
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advocating his theory of communicative action, which is a sophisticated articulation and 
defense of the principles of the Enlightenment – as well as a diagnosis of where it went 
wrong and how to rehabilitate it. Habermas is impressed by the power of giving reasons, 
the capacity of human rationality to build consensus through the forceless force of the 
better argument. For Habermas, rational argument is the only legitimate force in political 
decision making. However, for rationality to do its work it has to be publicly accessible – 
its legitimacy must be recognized by all citizens, irrespective of particular faith positions. 
Therefore, a consequence of Habermas’s theory of communicative action is that the 
secular language of Enlightenment rationality is the only normative language in which we 
can conduct political discourse and decision making. 
In recent years, however, Habermas has begun to soften his position with respect 
to the legitimacy of religious language in public life. To what extent his newer writings 
represent continuity with or departure from his earlier work is a matter of debate and will 
be taken up in this volume. Suffice it to say, that whether religious language can play a 
legitimate role in the public sphere is now an open question for Habermas. He has, over 
the last decade or so, been working out some of the details of his modified position. My 
project, in large part, is to chart this progress and extrapolate my own conclusions from it. 
I often go further than Habermas seems willing to go, but nevertheless believe that my 
conclusions in most cases represent the logical entailments of his statements to date. To 
that end, I have also placed Habermas in conversation with several interlocutors in the 
following chapters. These interlocutors, in my judgment, push the argument in interesting 
directions, some of which Habermas is reticent to take, but nevertheless are often fruitful 
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paths for our exploration. With that in mind, let us turn to a more detailed outline of the 
chapters themselves. 
The first chapter deals in some depth with the narrative of the Enlightenment and 
secularization. There are several reasons for devoting the first chapter to the historical 
background of our subject. Firstly, it is where Habermas himself begins. His first major 
published work, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, is an important 
examination of the cultural background in which our modern notion of “public” was 
formed. Indeed, his magnum opus, The Theory of Communicative Action, assumes much 
of the history addressed in the previous volume. 
Secondly, the narrative is important with respect to assessing Habermas’s thesis 
about the normativity of secular public language. The traditional narrative that describes 
the rise of liberal political structures during the Enlightenment as purely the result of 
disinterested, secular reason may be challenged. The narrative as standardly told has a 
tendency to ignore or drastically underplay the role that Christianity played in shaping the 
principles that became the bedrock of modern liberal democracies. Retelling the story of 
secularization does not necessarily undercut the normativity of secular reason, but it does 
allow us to infer that the exclusive normativity of secular language was not assumed at 
the birth of the modern liberal nation state. This observation may also cast doubt on 
whether we must affirm the normativity of secular language in functioning democracies 
today. 
Thirdly, Habermas’s conclusions are indebted to a certain interpretation of 
Western intellectual history called the secularization thesis. As an empirical thesis, it 
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predicts that religion will inevitably decline in the face of challenges from secular reason, 
such as the explanatory power of science. However, this prediction does not seem to be 
coming to pass. Certainly, something that merits the name “secularization” has happened 
since the modern period, at least in most industrialized Western nations, but religion has 
experienced a resurgence in recent history that the secularization theory did not 
anticipate. Indeed, there is a growing suspicion that the Enlightenment narrative is not 
simply a neutral description of the march of reason. Rather, it may be argued that it is a 
value-laden description, an attempt to derive an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’. The empirical 
version of the secularization thesis, now largely discredited, quickly gives way to a 
normative version: the language of secularism is simply the normative, public language 
of Western democracies. To be clear, I am not disputing the necessity of giving reasons 
and arguing for the political positions that we hold. Rather, I am questioning the 
substantive secularism that claims exclusive access to the public domain. I believe that it 
is legitimate to look for another idiom in which to cast public arguments. 
However, it is important to do more than simply critique the standard narrative of 
secularization. Therefore, I offer a positive narrative that I believe provides a corrective 
to the one-sided history that too often forms the background of our contemporary 
political debates. In contrast to the disenchantment account of secularization that 
Habermas inherits from Weber, in which religious ways of thinking fall away as they are 
replaced by scientific modes of thought, I argue that factors within Christianity itself 
facilitated the secularization process and that a secular worldview was made possible by 
preconditions within Christian thought. Moreover, secularism is not simply a matter of 
4
eliminating religious modes of thinking, but is itself a positive philosophical position that 
serves many of the same functions as the religion it allegedly replaces. In these respects, I 
am indebted to Charles Taylor’s massive study in A Secular Age. More specifically, I 
argue that figures like John Locke, who is often portrayed as a progenitor of the modern 
secular state, borrowed many of his arguments, especially in his Letter Concerning 
Toleration, from Christian sources. Thus, it is plausible that the foundations of the 
modern liberal state in the seventeenth century are deeply Christian; they may not arrive 
as the invention of an inherently secular philosophy. It is also plausible to see the 
emergence of secularization in the seventeenth century as a practical response to religious 
pluralism, rather than a process of disenchantment. This reconstructed narrative can help 
us make an important distinction between secularization and secularism that is useful in 
discussing our contemporary political situation. 
The second chapter deals in greater detail with Habermas’s reevaluation of the 
secularization thesis and his translation requirement – the requirement that religious 
citizens translate their potential contributions to public debate from a private, religious 
idiom into a publicly accessible, secular language. This translation requirement, however, 
can be construed in stronger and weaker terms. Part of the aim of this chapter is not only 
to explore what Habermas means given his re-evaluation of the secularization thesis and 
his diagnosis that we live in a postsecular society, but also to show that stronger 
formulations of the translation requirement are problematic.  
To be fair, Habermas now acknowledges that the overreaching predictions of the 
secularization thesis need to be pruned back. He recognizes that we live in a postsecular 
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society, which means not only that we must anticipate the continued existence of religion, 
but that we must also acknowledge that religious language has meaning that can be 
appropriated by secularists. However, in order to appropriate that meaning, such 
language, according to Habermas must be translated into the language of public reason. 
While he is sensitive to the fact that this places a burden on religious citizens that has no 
counterpart for secular citizens, he nevertheless maintains that there is an epistemic 
difference between claims that rest on religious presuppositions, on one hand, and 
statements that any rational person would accept on the basis of secular reason, on the 
other. 
As a pragmatic method of brokering agreement in a pluralistic context, the 
translation requirement makes good sense. However, the claim that religious reasons 
must be translated into secular ones, because only the latter count as epistemically 
normative, is a more problematic position. The implication that secular reasons are 
simply based on empirical givens can be challenged through understanding the 
substantive philosophical positions underlying contemporary secularism. Again, Taylor’s 
study provides a helpful assessment of what we might call a phenomenology of 
secularism. If ‘secular reason’ is not simply reasoning without the metaphysical baggage 
of religion, but carries substantive philosophical baggage of its own, then we might 
question its alleged epistemic primacy in matters of public debate. Moreover, Habermas 
has come to recognize that secular language may not have the philosophical resources 
necessary to sustain a robust commitment to the human rights we all wish to affirm. 
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Indeed, he has stated that religious language still has semantic power in this domain that 
to this point has resisted translation into secular terms.1 
The third chapter deals in greater depth with the notion of ‘public reason’ and 
compares Habermas’s position with that of Rawls. The latter argues that citizens owe 
each other a duty of civility which includes offering only secular reasons, or reasons that 
any rational person would accept regardless of whatever comprehensive doctrines they 
may hold. Rawls considers religious rationales to be merely promissory notes for these 
public reasons.2 In my judgment, this position differs from that of Habermas, who has 
come to see that religious reasons may in fact contain cognitive insights from which 
secularists can learn. Needless to say, Rawls’s contention that public reason consists of 
reasons that any rational person would accept is problematic. Rational people disagree 
about many issues, and in political argumentation especially there are very few premises 
that compel rational assent. Nevertheless, it is vital in a liberal democracy that everybody 
understands the reasons for legislation; the citizens must understand themselves as both 
authors and addressees of the law. For this reason, Habermas, while allowing the 
exchange of religious reasons at the level of the informal public sphere, believes that 
religious reasons must be kept out of the official chambers of political will-formation, 
such as parliaments. Therefore, Habermas introduces an institutional translation proviso: 
at the level of law-making, one must translate any religious insight into exclusively 
secular language. In other words, all coercively enforceable political decisions must be 
1 “[T]he unbelieving sons and daughters of modernity seem to believe that they owe more to one another, 
and need more for themselves, than what is accessible to them, in translation, of religious tradition – as if 
the semantic potential of the latter was still not exhausted.” Jürgen Habermas, “Faith and Knowledge,” in 
The Frankfurt School on Religion, ed. Eduardo Mendieta (New York: Routledge, 2005), 334. 
2 John Rawls, Political Liberalism (Columbia University Press, 1993), li – lii.
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justifiable in a language accessible to all citizens. I agree that any liberal state must 
protect citizens from a religious majority gaining a monopoly on public power. 
Democratic citizenship, therefore, places certain restraints on the kind of legislation one 
advocates. Nicholas Wolterstoff calls such constrictions “restraints of content.”3 
However, it is less clear that one should advocate epistemic restraints on the decisions 
and debates of citizens, i.e. the reasoning by which they arrive at conclusions about what 
is best for the polity. Wolterstorff argues that this is true at the formal, as well as the 
informal, level. Again, reasons to which all rational persons would assent are hard to 
come by in political discourse. According to Wolterstorff, to single out religious reasons 
in these contexts is a red herring. The distinction is between reasons that would be 
accepted by all informed and rational people and those that would not be so accepted. 
However, when one looks at political arguments on controversial subjects, one finds very 
few, if any, premises that would qualify as ‘public reasons’; they are simply not 
acceptable to all rational persons. I therefore argue, following Wolterstorff, that there is 
no justification for imposing epistemic restraints on political debate. 
What then of the issue of protecting minorities from a sectarian monopoly on 
public power? In other words, how does one preserve the neutrality of the state? I 
propose a modification to Habermas’s institutional translation proviso that allows a 
diversity of epistemic considerations but nevertheless preserves religiously neutral 
language in the legislation as drafted. For example, when debating prospective laws in 
both the informal and formal public spheres, we should be willing to let a thousand 
3 Nicholas Wolterstorff, “The Role of Religion in Decision and Discussion of Political Issues,” in Robert 
Audi and Nicholas Wolterstorff, Religion in the Public Square: The Place of Religious Convictions in 
Political Debate (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1996), 69.
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epistemic flowers bloom. But the genuine insight behind the institutional translation 
proviso is a good one: the official language of state should be translated into as neutral a 
language as possible in order to preserve its legitimacy for all citizens. The secular state 
must not be officially Christian or Jewish or Muslim, although the laws, though neutral in 
language, will likely reflect the views of actual citizens who may well credit religious 
rationales in their political decision making. In my judgment, this modified institutional 
translation proviso ensures the neutral character of the state, while allowing religious 
citizens to fully participate in public debate. I conclude the chapter with some reflections 
on the pragmatics of argumentation and consensus-building which, in my judgment will 
sometimes require translation, sometimes immanent critique, and other times religious 
premises. I make a case for being open to a multilateral approach to public discussion that 
avoids the flat, monochromatic insistence on an abstraction called “public reason.” 
Since my approach to public deliberation is indebted to pragmatism, the question 
arises: do pragmatists object to allowing religious arguments into the public sphere? In 
order to address this question, chapter four deals with Richard Rorty, who has raised 
objections to religious arguments in public, notably in an essay called “Religion As 
Conversation-stopper.” Rorty contends that raising religious considerations in public 
contexts is in “bad taste”4 because politics is the domain of public arguments, not private 
feelings. In addition, he claims that religion, at least in the American context, already 
receives more public respect than it deserves. However, I suggest that one should not 
reduce the issue to whether or not certain private considerations should receive more 
respect in public than other private considerations. I argue that Rorty, in setting up the 
4 Richard Rorty, “Religion As Conversation-stopper,” in Philosophy and Social Hope (Penguin, 2000), 169.
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problem in such a way, misconstrues the real issue. I would agree with him that 
arguments should not receive more respect simply by virtue of being religious. Rather, 
they must vie for respect critically and dialectically like all other arguments. But to say 
that religious arguments should not be afforded more respect is not tantamount to saying 
that they should be excluded from the dialetical process at the outset. Rorty frames the 
issue correctly, though perhaps unintentionally, when he says that “voices claiming to be 
God’s, or reason’s, or science’s are put on par with everybody else’s.”5 Of course, putting 
voices that claim to be God’s on par with everybody else’s is not identical with 
eliminating voices that claim to be God’s. The former is the more democratic option, 
though not the one Rorty takes in developing his argument. Rather, like Rawls, he talks 
about religion limiting itself to the private domain and religious citizens limiting 
themselves to premises held in common. 
Even if one grants Rorty’s premise that religion is a conversation stopper, it is by 
no means clear that it has a monopoly on doing so. He acknowledges that the 
conversation has to stop somewhere, and that his Darwinian, pragmatic, antirealist 
reasons beg all the important questions, as do his opponents’ Platonist, idealist, and 
realist reasons. The reason these appeals stop conversation has nothing to do with being 
public or private. Rather, it is simply the nature of argument. Eventually, we all appeal to 
what Rorty calls ‘final vocabularies’. Thus, religion is not unique in this regard. As 
Wolterstorff says, it is not that religious reasons “are ‘private’ in any clear sense of that 
term, but that they are not shared by the citizenry in general.”6 However, such consensus 
5 Rorty, 172. 
6  Wolterstorff, “An Engagement with Rorty,” Journal of Religious Ethics, 31.1 (2003): 132.
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is seldom achieved. Even in the best democracies, conversation always ends before 
consensus has been achieved which is why all democracies observe majority rule. 
Rorty has since reconsidered some of his more critical statements about religion, 
however he still wants to make a case for translation, namely that religious citizens 
should find another language in which to express their convictions. He admits that he 
cannot find a general principle in which to couch this requirement. I would agree; 
translation is largely a matter of the pragmatics of concrete situations, rather than being a 
philosophically justifiable principle. Rorty has a point, which Jeffrey Stout also makes, 
when he says that religious citizens should refrain from faith-claims or mere appeals to 
authority. These simply do not advance democratic debate. However, given what Rorty 
says about the vacuity of epistemological foundationalism, it is unclear what practical, 
discursive purpose translation would serve. Simply switching moral rubrics from, say, 
divine commands to natural law would not likely convince a utilitarian like Rorty. He 
does not see one as more rational than the other. He simply hopes that the dominant 
language of public morality will continue to be couched in utilitarian terms and is 
committed to waging that rhetorical battle. At least for Habermas, who has a stronger 
conception of reason and the objectivity achieved by language, the discursive, pragmatic 
point of translation is clearer. Nevertheless, I look for a more pragmatically viable way to 
keep the conversation going than that of either Rorty or Habermas. 
I conclude chapter four by looking at Stout’s suggestion of “immanent critique.”7 
Immanent critique attempts to make translation a two-way street, not due to any 
obligation on the part of either religious or secular citizens to translate their arguments, 
7 Jeffrey Stout, Democracy and Tradition (Princeton University Press, 2005), 73. 
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but for reasons of facilitating ‘abnormal conversations’ at precisely those places where 
we have reached an impasse due to differences in worldviews. Such an approach 
considers, as Habermas has recently suggested, that traditional perspectives might offer a 
critique of secularism that might have force for secular interlocutors. This approach 
suggests that nothing inherent in pragmatism disqualifies religious contributions to public 
debates. Rather, the utility of religious premises largely depends on the discursive 
situation. 
In the final chapter, I continue to press the point that Habermas, despite his 
careful distinction between form and content, adopts many substantive philosophical 
commitments. One such commitment is foundational to Habermas’s political theory; the 
autonomy of rational agency. Moreover, he recognizes that many substantive 
commitments of a secular worldview, what he calls ‘hard naturalism’, seriously 
undermine the reality of rational agency. Therefore, Habermas is quite critical of the 
reductionism and determinism inherent in scientism. Through exploring his recent 
thoughts on freedom and determinism, I contend that his commitment to rational agency 
is ultimately a fiduciary commitment. Regardless of how post-metaphysical we are in our 
thinking, we run up against the limits of our procedural apparatus and must make more 
substantive assumptions, whether our worldviews are religious or secular at their core. 
In the remainder of the chapter, I try to articulate how we might understand our 
substantive commitments in a postmetaphysical rubric. I suggest, in agreement with 
Habermas, that metaphysics is not a useful rubric to bring to political discourse. If we see 
the presence of religion in the public sphere as the presence of metaphysical beliefs that 
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secular citizens lack, then the subtraction narrative implicit in Habermas’s translation 
requirement forces itself on our discourse. However, if we are to be post-metaphysical 
and recognize that religion should not be so narrowly construed and also recognize that 
secularists have substantive commitments, then we can see the presence of religion in the 
public sphere, not as the presence of ‘metaphysical baggage’ that we must shed, but as 
the presence of religious citizens who may have arguments that we ought to consider. 
Again, if we pay attention to the substantive claims that function as premises in 
arguments, the distinction is not between religious premises and secular ones, but 
between universally accepted premises and particular ones. I don’t think we have 
universally accepted premises, nor for that matter a methodology that would lead us to 
them. All we can do, in my judgment, is work pragmatically, which may entail translation 
or immanent critique or some recognition of the substantive commitments we all bring to 
the table. 
In this final chapter, I also attempt to offer a post-metaphysical understanding of 
transcendence which Habermas might recognize as providing a redemptive critique of 
some of the pathologies of modernity. Drawing upon Moltmann and also the first 
generation of critical theorists, I articulate an understanding of the future as a ‘paradigm 
of transcendence’. In the background once again is Taylor’s historical narrative which 
chronicles the phenomenological shift in our experience of what might be called ‘the 
boundary’ between the immanent frame and transcendence. Although this experience has 
been cast in largely metaphysical terms (along a vertical axis, shall we say), it is now 
understood by moderns as located within the unfolding of time and history. This is 
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plausibly also true for secularists as evidenced by the many utopian narratives of progress 
that have emerged since the Enlightenment that function as secular eschatologies. 
However, with the failure of these secular narratives, it is more difficult to conceptualize 
hope for the future as simply an expansion of the immanent order. Rather, hope must 
transcend the limitations of our immediate horizon of experience. Habermas also wishes 
to transcend the limitations of our experience and realize a better future through the ideal 
speech situation. His goal is a harmonious community of communicative individuals 
which transcends the currently antagonistic public sphere and culminates in perfect 
rational consensus. However, I argue that the reconciliation Habermas hopes for cannot 
be achieved by simply projecting the failed promise of modernity into the future, and 
indeed, he recognizes this. But to think of the future as a horizon of hope and possibility 
as Habermas does, is precisely to conceive of it transcendently upon Moltmann’s schema. 
Thus, I detect an inherent eschatology in Habermas that does not fit comfortably within 
the naturalism of the immanent frame. 
The relevance of the foregoing to religion in political discourse is to understand 
how it might offer a genuinely critical assessment of secularism and a genuinely hopeful 
articulation of progress. That is to say, religious modes of thinking might well perform 
both a critical and redemptive function in politics that transcends the boundaries of an 
often moribund political discourse. In saying this, however, I shoulder the burden of 
suggesting some practical ways this might be worked out in our contemporary political 
situation. For example, how does one export the Western achievements of human rights 
and liberal democracy in a way that respects rational communication and does not rely on 
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the coercive power of military and market? Habermas is quite sensitive to this issue and I 
suggest that understanding the global citizen as a post-secular citizen is crucial to 
accomplishing this task. In my judgment, the post-secular citizen should not only be able 
to translate religious language into the widest possible discourse, but should also be able 
to equalize the burden that religious persons bear in public discourse, thereby allowing 
them to participate without naive secularism being a requirement of admission. This point 
is also relevant to the increased saliency of religious diversity within Western 
democracies. Here, again, I think that a pragmatic understanding of secularization, which 
admits of the resiliency of religion despite its weakening institutional presence, will serve 
us better than an ideological secularism that sees itself as diametrically opposed to 
religion in principle. In summary, I present a role for religious language that moves 
beyond Kulturkampf rhetoric; a religiosity that neither enforces orthodoxy on a pluralistic 
public nor claims for itself immunity from argument and rational criticism.
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Chapter 1
Modernity and Its Discontents 
As stated in the introduction, my project is a close engagement with Habermas on the 
issue of religious language in the public sphere. Thus, the first chapter concerns 
prolegomena to this central task. There are a number of preliminary objections to my 
project that I must address, such as its seeming violation of the public/private distinction 
that is in many ways sacrosanct to liberalism. In this chapter, I argue that this is not a 
formidable challenge to my thesis. In doing so, I also address concerns about the alleged 
epistemic differences between public knowledge and private belief. I argue that this 
distinction is vastly overstated. In the words of Richard Rorty, “[i]nsofar as pragmatists 
make a distinction between knowledge and opinion, it is simply the distinction between 
topics on which agreement is relatively easy to get and topics on which agreement is 
relatively hard to get.”8 Unlike Rorty, however, I argue that the simple lack of consensus 
is not a good prima facie reason to exclude claims, including religious claims, from the 
public domain. In making this case, I also explore the hidden epistemic assumptions that 
underlie this objection and argue that it is based on a naive evidentialism. 
After dealing with these preliminary objections, I proceed with the central task of 
this chapter: providing a corrective to the ‘subtraction story’ (to use Taylor’s term) of 
modern secularization.9 I argue that secularization should not be equated with the 
8 Richard Rorty, “Solidarity or Objectivity” in The Rorty Reader, Christopher J. Voparil and Richard J. 
Bernstein, eds. (Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 229.
9Charles Taylor. A Secular Age (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), 22.
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disenchantment narrative that Habermas receives from Weber. Rather, I suggest that 
secularization is best understood as a pragmatic response to the fact of religious 
pluralism.
In order to make this case more concrete, I take the reader on an historical 
excursus through the early modern period, where Habermas and other scholars locate the 
rise of the public sphere. In this section, I interact with Habermas’s own dissertation, The 
Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, in which he chronicles the rise of the 
modern public sphere as a major factor in social and political evolution.10 Although 
Habermas deftly covers the relevant historical territory, he arguably overstates the extent 
to which the progenitors of secularization contributed to disenchantment, or the decline 
of belief in God or religious practice. This historical point is instructive, insofar as it has 
implications for Habermas’s larger political theory. Since Habermas sees himself in the 
tradition of Enlightenment secularism, it is useful to ask whether or not the secularist 
criterion that he advocates for political participation emerges from the Enlightenment. I 
argue that it does not, and that the interpretation that sees secularism emerging from the 
Enlightenment, and indeed sees the Enlightenment itself as having facilitated the retreat 
of religion from the public sphere, must understate or ignore several facts about the 
founders of Enlightenment thought and its political progeny, liberalism. 
One such founder is John Locke. Through engagement with recent Locke 
scholarship, I contend that the most plausible interpretation of Locke’s project is a 
pragmatic response to religious pluralism. Moreover, tolerance does not arrive on the 
10  Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, Thomas Burger, trans. 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991). 
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scene as the invention of a liberalism that is inherently and ideologically secular; rather 
its origins are deeply Christian. Only a forced reading of Locke would conclude that his 
goal is a secular, that is to say disenchanted, consensus. Perhaps modern liberal theory, 
along the lines of Habermas and Rawls, has overestimated the importance of consensus 
for the smooth functioning of democracy. In fact, if one looks to the writings of J.S. Mill, 
particularly On Liberty, one finds a trenchant critique of consensus. For these modern 
thinkers, we do not need a consensus, either religious or secular, in order to have a stable 
democracy. I suggest that contemporary liberal theorists, having correctly perceived that 
the search for a religious consensus in the early modern period failed, enthusiastically 
attempt to replace it with a secular — conceived of as disenchanted — consensus. But 
secularization, as a cultural phenomenon, is arguably not the result of disenchantment — 
the decline of religious belief in the face of reason and science — but rather a practical 
response to religious pluralism and the recognition that, contrary to the predictions of the 
secularization thesis, religion is here to stay. 
None of this refutes Habermas’s normative claim that religious citizens must 
translate their religious language into a secular idiom for political purposes. That will be 
the goal of subsequent chapters. However, if I can complicate the subtraction story of 
secularization inherent in Habermas’s narrative of the rise of the public sphere, this will 
also problematize the lessons he allegedly draws from the modern period and applies to 
our contemporary political discourse. 
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Exploring the Secularization Thesis 
Modernity fostered optimism regarding the potential of non-sectarian, value neutral, 
critical reason to build genuine consensus among free persons.  Consequently, the role of 
religion in the public sphere has become marginalized if not excluded.  This relegation of 
religion to the private sphere often accompanies the attitude that only an enlightened, 
secular citizenry is worthy of democracy.  For example, following the 2004 U.S. 
presidential elections, an article appeared in the New York Times called “The Day the 
Enlightenment Went Out” in which the author asks rhetorically: “Can a people that 
believes more fervently in the Virgin Birth than in evolution still be called an enlightened 
nation?”  He goes on to say, “America, the first real democracy in history, was founded 
on Enlightenment values.”11  This statement serves to underscore both points above: the 
marginalization or even hostility in this case, toward religion, coupled with the 
assumption that ‘enlightenment’ is necessary for the preservation of democracy. It also 
serves to underscore that such strongly stated defenses of modernity, which often see 
modernity as monolithic, are becoming increasingly common in reaction to perceived 
religious fundamentalism, in this case evangelical Christianity.  But this article also 
reveals a waning confidence in what has conventionally been called the secularization 
thesis.  There are various versions of this thesis, but in broad strokes it denotes the 
historical processes, since the Enlightenment, of rationalization and differentiation that 
have marginalized religion from the public sphere, and which are expected to spell the 
end of religion as a publicly significant phenomenon, at least in industrialized nations.  
As a predictive hypothesis, the secularization theory has not come to pass and the 
11 Gary Wills, “The Day the Enlightenment Went Out,” New York Times, November 4, 2004. 
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article’s lament for enlightenment betrays frustration that such processes of secularization 
have not fully come to fruition by now.  But in addition to the empirical aspect of the 
secularization thesis, it also has a normative component: religious claims must surrender 
claims to public legitimacy and adopt secular language.  However, given that religion 
does not appear to be going away any time soon, the question of religion in the public 
sphere is rapidly gaining a relevance that could not have been foreseen even two decades 
ago. 
Perhaps more than any other theorist, Jürgen Habermas has analyzed the 
emergence of the secular public sphere during the Enlightenment and its subsequent 
transformation into mass media.  Habermas’s early work, The Structural Transformation 
of the Public Sphere, deals with many of the themes he would later take up in his 
magnum opus, The Theory of Communicative Action (TCA).  Chief among these themes, 
are the normative conditions of discourse and agreement.  According to this theme: 1) all 
claims must be publicly accessible or rationally defensible and 2) any agreement that 
emerges from discourse within the public sphere must be critical consensus as opposed to 
mere convergence, or what pollsters often refer to as “public opinion” in our 
contemporary political lexicon.  With these criteria in place, there is little room for 
religious citizens to speak the language of faith within the public sphere.  However, the 
post-TCA Habermas, while still defending an idealized public discourse, may be 
allowing more latitude for religious citizens within a democracy to unlock the semantic 
potential of religious language within public discourse. 
20
Under globalization, such issues have acquired increased saliency.  Commenting 
upon the contemporary relevance of Habermas’s early work on the public sphere, 
Nicholas Garnham argues that global markets and private corporations are eclipsing the 
power of the traditional nation-state.  As such, he insists that “[w]e are thus being forced 
to rethink …. the nature of citizenship in the modern world. What new political 
institutions and new public sphere might be necessary for the democratic control of a 
global economy and polity?”12  Furthermore, James Bohman claims that globalization 
and new information technologies “make it at least possible to consider whether 
democracy is undergoing another great transformation, of the order of the invention of 
representative democracy and its institutions of voting and parliamentary assemblies in 
early modern European societies.”13  These features of contemporary society facilitate the 
possibility of a globalized public discourse in which global citizens participate. 
In addition to the relevant sociological considerations invoked by Garnham and 
Bohman, I want to add the re-emergence of religion to the list of features in our 
contemporary society that might well render attempts to globalize the public discourse 
problematic.  I am not necessarily referring to religious radicalism although the 
challenges it poses to democracy are obvious.  I refer mainly to the massive movement 
across international borders, mainly from the south to the north.  With the exception of 
the United States, the historically Christian Western democracies have undergone a 
thoroughgoing secularization since the Enlightenment.  However, the introduction of 
12 Nicholas Garnham, “The Media and the Public Sphere,” in  Habermas and the Public Sphere, ed. Craig 
Calhoun (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992), 362.
13 James Bohman, “Expanding dialogue: the Internet, the public sphere and prospects for              
transnational democracy” in After Habermas: New Perspectives on the Public Sphere, ed. Nick Crossley 
and John Michael Roberts, (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), 131.
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people with robust faith commitments has challenged the complacency with which such 
democracies dismiss religion in public discourse.  Again, this does not necessarily have 
to do with radical demands or violence on the part of religious citizens or landed 
immigrants.  However, the secularism of the liberal state may risk political unrest if it 
cannot find a way to enfranchise an increasingly religious population.  Like Habermas, I 
would like to find a way to maintain the ideals of modernity, the formal secularism of the 
state and human rights, but combine these insights with the recognition that we must find 
a reasonable way to include religious voices in that discourse. 
In my judgment, Habermas is correct in saying that the liberal ideals that emerge 
from the Enlightenment represent an advance over earlier methods of societal 
organization.  And Habermas is also correct in rejecting the postmodern narrative that 
sees modernity as simply a source of oppression. It is instructive to note that the 
eighteenth century, or Enlightenment, is roughly bounded for philosophical purposes by 
two very important publications: Locke’s A Letter Concerning Toleration (1689) and 
Kant’s On Perpetual Peace (1795).14  Since these works do not prima facie seem like 
tools of oppression, the burden of proof is on those who characterize the Enlightenment 
in this way. 
The goal of classical liberalism is to reach some semblance of rational consensus 
amid a plurality of competing religious and metaphysical beliefs. In the background, of 
course, are the intramural wars of religion (Christianity) that plagued Europe, which 
parenthetically, account for why French, British, and Dutch colonial expansion was 
14 Peter Loptson, Philosophy, History, and Myth: Essays and Talks (University Press of America, 2002), 
76.
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negligible during the eighteenth century. The major imperial forces of the time were 
Spain and Portugal, which were entirely outside the Enlightenment culturally.15  More to 
the point, the universality the Enlightenment fostered was an effort to make peace with 
others despite religious or metaphysical differences.  The motivations, as evidenced by 
the titles of the above works, were toleration and peace. Over time, this had the effect of 
secularizing the public sphere; in order to have one’s voice heard one needed to speak the 
dominant language of that sphere, an argumentative, rational language.  The pluralities of 
private beliefs were invited to speak this language and gain a hearing.  This public/private 
schema, which has been oversimplified here, has its shortcomings, which will be taken up 
below, but it also has its contemporary defenders, such as Richard Rorty.  While critics 
would likely argue that insistence upon speaking the public language denies a voice to 
excluded minorities, Rorty sees this as symptomatic of the fact that the ‘franchise’ simply 
has not been adequately extended.  We simply need more liberals and liberally-minded 
people.  There is no doubt that Rorty’s faith in liberalism is somewhat naïve.  And it is 
true that modernity is not without its pathological elements which must be constantly 
criticized and reformed.  However, it is also true that the link between the Enlightenment 
and imperialism and oppression is tenuous at best.  The ethics of the Enlightenment, with 
liberal democracy being one of its political offspring, represent much more than a modest 
advance over the existing state of affairs.  All of these points I happily grant, and 
therefore situate myself as part of the “loyal opposition” to use Charles Taylor’s phrase.16 
Nevertheless, in my judgment, it is necessary to foster solidarity among religious and 
15 Loptson, 78. 
16 Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2007), 745.
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secular citizens, and the standard liberal model for doing so is quickly becoming 
antiquated as the predictions of the secularization thesis do not come to pass.  I do not 
believe the solution to these challenges is to return to even more antiquated methods of 
societal organization as proposed by those whom Jeffrey Stout calls “the new 
traditionalists,” thinkers such as Stanley Hauerwas, Alisdair MacIntyre, and John 
Milbank.17  Therefore, I seek a middle ground between secularization and nostalgia for 
Christendom. 
Despite the goods inherent in liberalism, challenges for social organization 
remain, not the least of which is the emerging religious voices mentioned above.  The 
narrative of globalization may not enable us to meet the above challenges.  For example, 
the goal of globalization is, ostensibly, to unify. We want to build consensus, tolerance, 
and stability. We tend to think that this paradigm is in everyone’s best interests.  The 
universalizing discourse of modernity is still with us, despite its more radical postmodern 
critics.  The global citizen, as a part of this totalizing discourse, is optimistic about the 
prospects of enlightened self-interest and rational communication to build a better world.  
The question remains, however, whether such a totalizing discourse can accommodate 
particularity of the kind found in religious communities.  Can we foster universality at the 
expense of particularity as the traditional Enlightenment model advocates, or is it 
hopelessly outmoded in dealing with current challenges to solidarity within liberal 
democracies?  In other words, can we promote solidarity without losses to liberty? 
In venturing answers to these questions, some historical background about the rise 
of the secular public sphere is helpful.  Thus, my first chapter will draw upon Habermas’s 
17 Jeffrey Stout, Democracy and Tradition (Princeton University Press, 2005), 11.
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Structural Transformation and its subsequent commentators, so that we may glean some 
of the definitive features of the public sphere and its implications for secularization. 
The factors that contributed to the rise of the public sphere in the eighteenth century are 
numerous and the narrative is complex.  Expertise in a variety of fields is required to 
adequately map it, making Habermas’s contribution all the more impressive despite being 
published in 1962.  However, my approach will be more modest, focusing on his 
assessment of the rise of the public sphere in England, particularly the contributions of 
Locke and John Stuart Mill to the concept of ‘public opinion’ as a means of brokering 
rational consensus within a liberal framework.  My purpose in reviewing this narrative is 
to problematize the standard secularization thesis, particularly the concept of publicly 
accessible reason that is alleged to emerge from it. It is debatable, however, whether and 
to what extent the concept of public opinion – which Habermas takes to be synonymous 
with critical discourse or even achieved consensus – that emerges from the 
Enlightenment conforms to Habermas’s stringent criterion of communicative rationality. 
Although he has arguably nuanced his position recently, Habermas has insisted on 
exclusively secular reasons within the public sphere because religious beliefs, in his view, 
do not admit of communicative redemption.  Specifically, I want to correct what Taylor 
calls “subtraction stories” which he defines as “stories of modernity in general, and 
secularity in particular, which explain them by human beings having lost, or sloughed off, 
or liberated themselves from certain earlier, confining horizons, or illusions, or 
limitations of knowledge.”18  I will argue that Habermas’s conception of public opinion 
as a critically achieved rational consensus is not the unequivocal stance of modern 
18 Taylor, 22.
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liberalism nor is it now necessary for the smooth functioning of deliberative democracy. 
These considerations do not necessarily refute the normativity of Habermas’s construal of 
publicly accessible reason, but they do complicate any effort to derive a univocal 
definition of ‘publicly accessible reason’ from the Anglo-American liberal tradition. 
Such a counter narrative has implications for my larger project: challenging the 
default status of secular reasons within public discourse in liberal democracies and the 
alleged duty of religious citizens to ‘translate’ their contributions to public debate from a 
religious idiom to a secular one.  Indeed, it would concede too much to the normative 
aspect of the secularization thesis to dispense with historical reconstruction for a strictly 
systematic approach.  This is so because the standard narrative of secularization de facto 
establishes the default status of secular, ‘publicly accessible reason’ without doing the 
hard philosophical work that would otherwise be necessary for establishing such a 
criterion as normative.  This is not to say that Habermas does not go to great lengths to 
justify his epistemic stance with respect to what reasons count as good reasons.  But the 
cultural acceptance of the standard secularization thesis makes such philosophical 
legwork almost superfluous within public discourse – the actual public discourse rather 
than Habermas’s ideal speech situation.  The narrative as it has been told establishes the 
priority of secular reasons largely by default.  Secular reasons are simply regarded as 
prima facie plausible and any other interpretations of the world that are not purely 
immanent, naturalistic ones must bear an asymmetrical burden.  That is to say, they must 
work harder to simply pull level with secular reasons in public discourse.  Likening 
public discourse to a game of chess, religious arguments always play as black. Unlike 
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chess, however, the rules of contemporary public discourse make it almost impossible for 
religious reasons to match their secular counterparts, much less gain an advantage.  And 
in my judgment, the standard subtraction story of secularization is largely responsible for 
this asymmetrical exchange.  The secularization thesis is a story, not a neutral 
description, and by challenging that story of how we got to where we are, one also 
challenges the default status of secular reasons in the public sphere; this situation is 
shown to be contingent upon certain identifiable historical developments rather than 
purely the result of the deliverances of reason. 
Preliminary Objections to Religious Discourse in Public
In what follows, I contend that secularization does not necessarily imply secularism in 
dealing with religious reasons in the public sphere.  But what are religious reasons?  One 
can specify at least two ways of understanding the term that are often conflated: 1) 
secular reasons that independently support a religious position on an issue or 2) reasons 
that are themselves based wholly or in part on religious premises.  The first category is 
relatively unproblematic. It is the second that gives many liberal theorists pause.19  So 
perhaps we might ask more precisely, would religious reasons in this second sense count 
as publicly accessible within a pluralistic public sphere?  Obviously, in a pluralistic 
society all members cannot be expected to find the same reasons compelling.  This is 
precisely the problem of consensus and it afflicts secular reasons as surely as it does 
religious ones.  Despite this, secularists often allege that secular reasons are more 
acceptable to a pluralistic public.  Furthermore, they may extend this line of argument by 
19 See for example, John Rawls, Political Liberalism (Columbia University Press, 1993).
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saying that all appeals to religion are politically illegitimate because they appeal to 
sources of authority that not all citizens recognize.  The question of political legitimacy 
as it is formulated here – as relying explicitly on publicly accessible or secular reasons – 
begs all the important questions I wish to raise in the remainder of my project.  But there 
is a point to be made here: on the surface, religious reasons lack scope in public debate. 
The authorities which they credit are often regarded as sacred and thus immune to 
criticism.  At this point, rational argument, opponents say, is a moot point.  The 
religionists have already made up their minds. Habermas too wants to disallow appeals to 
the sacredness of holy texts and other sources of religious authority.  All public claims 
must admit of critical scrutiny.  Dogmatism is not permitted. 
I would agree that religious arguments should not be accorded additional respect 
simply by virtue of being religious.  Moreover, all public claims must submit to critical 
scrutiny and discursive challenge.  However, to set the rules of the game such that 
religious claims can never, simply by virtue of being religious, meet such a burden is to 
beg the question of rationality.  Does secular thinking have a monopoly on rational 
communication?  Why should we uncritically assume that it does?  I will delve further 
into this subject in a subsequent chapter, but first I want to address what kinds of 
religious arguments I will be primarily defending.  I will also deal with some of the 
epistemic nuances attached to evaluating the rationality of claims, particularly religious 
ones in a public context.  
As mentioned, I am broadly in agreement with Habermas and other liberal 
theorists who limit, albeit to varying degrees, dogmatic religious claims to the private 
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domain (the important term here is dogmatic – claims that do not admit fallibility and are 
closed to revision in principle).  This is the classical liberal compromise forged in the 
seventeenth century, especially in England, for safeguarding religious tolerance.  We will 
be exploring some aspects of this narrative in what follows and its implications for 
secularization.  For the time being, however, I will concede that stability and peace at that 
time did require, and perhaps still does, certain concessions by religious citizens.  As 
Nicholas Wolterstorff admits, in seventeenth century England, “social peace did depend 
on getting citizens to stop invoking God, canonical scriptures, and religious authorities 
when discussing politics in public – to confine such invocations to discussions within 
their own confessional circles.”20  However, he doubts that the foundations of 
constitutional democracy will crumble if religious reasons are readmitted into the 
debate.21
Again, dogmatic claims seem prima facie incompatible with liberal democracy as 
a form of government that is perpetually open to revision at the demand of the citizenry. 
This is not to say that religious citizens cannot exercise their legal right to make dogmatic 
claims in the public sphere – excepting perhaps within formally public institutions such 
as parliaments.  Rather, such claims, though not disallowed by law, are frowned upon by 
social convention.22  Some liberal theorists, such as Rawls, have gone even further and 
alleged that citizens have an ethical obligation to offer exclusively secular reasons when 
20 Nicholas Wolterstorff, “The Role of Religion in Decision and Discussion of Political Issues,” in Robert 
Audi and Nicholas Wolterstorff, Religion in the Public Square: The Place of Religious Convictions in 
Political Debate (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1996), 79.
21 Arguably, in America, they were never fully barred, despite the Jeffersonian tradition of “separation of 
church and state.”
22 Appeals to religion are in “bad taste.” See Richard Rorty, “Religion As Conversation-stopper,” in 
Philosophy and Social Hope (Penguin, 2000), 169.
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justifying coercive legislation.  Whatever the case, such religious claims achieve no 
consensus within a pluralistic society.  Thus, expediency alone would seem to require 
some effort at translation.  Indeed, to the extent that I accept Habermas’s translation 
requirement, it is along pragmatic rather than ethical or legal lines. 
However, when I admit that dogmatic religious claims cannot practically inform 
political decision making in pluralistic democracies, do I not eliminate any space for 
religious reasons in the public sphere?   In other words, are all religious reasons 
dogmatic?  Do they all rest on some allegedly sacred foundation and thus brook no 
dissent or criticism?  For practical purposes, they need not.  Take, for example, what 
philosophers frequently refer to as divine command theory.  On the basis of purely 
anecdotal evidence, I think it highly likely that most Christians subscribe to some version 
of divine command theory, whether they know it or not.  In the last resort, if pressed to 
give an account of their moral convictions, they would likely say that God commands 
that they act in such and such a way.  This is not the place to rehearse all of the familiar 
philosophical objections to divine command theory summarized by the “Euthyphro 
dilemma” and the theological disputes over realism versus voluntarism.  Moreover, one 
can be a Christian and reject divine command theory.  For my purposes, however, it 
suffices to ask the question: are such arguments – that appeal to God’s alleged commands 
– dogmatic or sacred in Habermas’s sense of being immune from communicative 
redemption?  Not necessarily. 
As mentioned, even Christians disagree regarding divine command theory, but 
this fact alone does not necessarily affect the ethical claims they make in practice.  In 
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fact, there may be convergence even among those who disagree, because divine 
command theory, in philosophical terms, is a meta-ethical theory.  Practically, we can 
agree on a particular set of moral truths without agreeing on what makes them true. 
Indeed, liberalism depends on the ability of people to come to this kind of practical 
convergence despite religious or metaphysical differences.  Moreover, it is very unusual, 
in practice, for religious citizens to appeal directly to God’s will in making ethical, and 
by extension, political, judgments.  Notwithstanding contemporary ‘enthusiasts’ who 
allegedly receive private revelations from on high, the vast majority of religious citizens 
see their ethical and political decisions as mediated in various ways: through canonical 
scriptures, church tradition, conscience, moral exemplars, clerical authorities, etc.  Not all 
religionists agree on how to prioritize these various strands and are free to amend or 
curtail the list as they see fit. In addition, they also disagree as to how ‘sacred’, or 
susceptible to criticism, each of these sources is.  But to say that a source of ethical 
guidance is sacred, or emanates from a sacred authority, need not imply that one cannot 
give independent arguments in its favor.  Habermas does not deny this point; in fact the 
thrust of his translation requirement is to get religious citizens to give reasons.  My qualm 
with Habermas’s way of putting the translation requirement has nothing to do with his 
insistence that we offer reasons for any public claim, rather my disagreement lies with his 
insistence that religious reasons be translated into a secular language that is presumably 
accessible to all rational people.  I doubt there is such a language, thus the translation 
requirement strikes me as onerous. Nevertheless, religious persons can surely see the 
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pragmatic value in trying to make their reasons accessible to a given audience in a 
pluralistic society. 
Returning to appeals to religious authority, however, in what form, if any, can 
they inform public debate?  Perhaps it is helpful to take a concrete example.  Stephen 
Carter, in the Culture of Disbelief, an apologia for the inclusion of religion in the 
American political climate, suggested that a good way to end a conversation is to say that 
“you hold a political position (preferably a controversial one, such as being against 
abortion or pornography) because it is required by your understanding of God’s will.”23 
This admission inspired Rorty to write an essay called “Religion As Conversation-
stopper” in which he argues that appeals to religious authority, in Carter’s case, God’s 
will, stop conversation.  For Rorty, dragging one’s private religious views into political 
debate does no real work.  The reasons one offers for one’s opposition to abortion or 
pornography have to be public reasons and he cites Rawls and Habermas in support.24 
While Carter may be right that, in the grand scheme of things, the will of God is relevant 
to moral decision making, Rorty argues that “moral decisions that are to be enforced by a 
pluralist and democratic state’s monopoly on violence are best made by public discussion 
in which voices claiming to be God’s, or reason’s, or science’s are put on a par with 
everybody else’s.”25  I certainly agree that voices claiming to be God’s should be on par 
with everybody else’s, and equally open to criticism, but that is a far cry from saying that 
voices that claim to be God’s ought to be excluded from the public sphere at the outset, as 
23 Quoted in Rorty, "Religion As Conversation-stopper," 171.
24 Rorty, 173.
25 Rorty, 172.
32
Rorty alleges,26 though to be fair, he has since nuanced his position.27  My point is simply 
that denying special privilege to religious claims is not tantamount to excluding them 
from public deliberation provided they remain open to criticism.  In the last resort, their 
justification may indeed boil down to the will of God and the conversation may end there, 
although religion by no means has a monopoly on stopping conversation.  But as 
Wolterstorff notes in his engagement with Rorty, there is much one can do between the 
time the conversation begins and when it ends.  Rather than simply state our fundamental 
convictions, we can look for arguments that our interlocutor might find persuasive.  In 
commenting on Carter’s above-cited example, Wolterstorff notes, “I think that Carter has 
here offered an unusually flat-footed example of a religious argument for a political 
position. The speeches of Martin Luther King, Jr., were suffused with religion; I would 
be surprised if he ever said anything quite so flat-footed as that integration was required 
by his understanding of God’s will, period – though in the last resort, that was his 
view.”28  Regarding the political efficacy of nuanced religious language, he observes, 
“Not all who heard King’s ‘I Have a Dream’ speech shared his religion; those who did 
not, made allowances. They were moved and inspired along with everyone else.”29  I will 
have more to say about the accessibility and rhetorical power of religious language in a 
subsequent chapter, but suffice it to say that religious language need not be dogmatic nor 
exclude those who do not subscribe to the speaker’s theological convictions; a point 
Habermas is increasingly recognizing.  
26 Rorty, 170.
27 Rorty, “Religion in the Public Sphere: A Reconsideration,” Journal of Religious Ethics, 31.1 (2003): 
141-49. 
28 Nicholas Wolterstorff, “An Engagement with Rorty,” Journal of Religious Ethics, 31.1 (2003): 132.
29 Wolterstorff, 135.
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In a poignant example of how the ‘semantic potential’ still latent in religious 
language might be realized, he takes up the issue of genetic engineering.30  Religionists 
who have qualms about experimenting on human embryos often speak of them as bearing 
‘the image of God’.  Habermas, a secularist, recognizes that one need not accept the 
theological underpinnings of the claim to grasp its point: that the first human to 
genetically reprogram another human being without consent would violate the inherent 
equality and autonomy of all human beings.  Although offering a translation of sorts, he 
is careful to say that the power of the religious way of speaking is not lost on him, or 
even on those who might otherwise be tone-deaf to religious arguments.  Thus, I do not 
think that all religious arguments are dogmatic in the sense of being insulated from 
criticism or necessarily inaccessible to a pluralistic polity. 
But there is another argument for the exclusion of religious arguments from the 
public sphere, namely, that public claims must meet a higher evidentiary burden than 
private claims.  Because political decisions, especially those that restrict liberty and 
involve the coercive power of the state, impact citizens, we owe them good reasons for 
why we hold the particular positions or support the policies that we do.  These reasons 
have to be reasons that any rational person would accept independently of whatever 
comprehensive doctrines, to use Rawls’s term, they might hold.  Religious beliefs are 
comprehensive doctrines which not all rational people accept precisely because such 
beliefs fail to meet the evidentiary burden that public claims must meet, i.e., ideal rational 
acceptability.  Of course, a claim that all rational people would accept is an ideal type; 
30 Habermas, “Faith and Knowledge,” in  The Frankfurt School on Religion: Key Writings by the Major 
Thinkers, ed. Eduardo Mendieta (Routledge, 2005), 336.
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rational people frequently disagree about many things and there are very few arguments 
that rationally compel consent.  In other words, the ideal is never, to my knowledge, 
instantiated in working political discussion.  Be that as it may, one might still think that 
religious beliefs, since they are based on faith and are thus highly uncertain, make bad 
public reasons.  This line of thinking in the liberal tradition goes back at least as far as 
Locke and is a species of the ‘ethics of belief’, although in the case of contemporary 
liberals, such as Rawls, the ethics of belief is modified.  People are entitled to believe 
whatever they like within the private domain, but they have an ethical obligation to 
refrain from appealing to the whole truth as they see it when they enter the public 
domain.  They must, in effect, suspend judgment on their religious beliefs.  We might call 
this view the ‘public ethics of belief’.  Habermas has also spoken of public agnosticism as 
the default position for political debate, but has since changed his view.  Nevertheless, an 
ethics of belief of the type outlined above is problematic. 
Although ‘faith’ is part of any religious orientation to the world, it would be 
mistaken to say that it is the only available means by which to understand religious 
arguments, particularly those that might have public import.  As Stout reminds us: 
[A] claim can be religious without being a faith-claim. It is possible to assert a 
premise that is religious in content and stand ready to demonstrate one’s 
entitlement to it. Many people are prepared to argue at great length in support of 
their religious claims. So we must distinguish between discursive problems that 
arise because religious premises are not widely shared and those that arise 
because the people who avow such premises are not prepared to argue for them.31 
31 Stout, 87.
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Although some or perhaps many religious people are unprepared to argue for their 
premises, it does not follow that it cannot be done.  There is, in my judgment, a middle 
ground between unqualified fideism on the one hand and modern epistemic 
foundationalism or ‘ethics of belief’ on the other.  Nevertheless, one must be careful not 
to capitulate to modernity’s flat understanding of ‘faith’ as a species of unjustified belief. 
One might instead argue that one is rationally justified in believing something without 
meeting the kind of evidentiary burden mandated by modern foundationalism.  The view 
that there is an indubitable starting point from which to engage one’s interlocutor and an 
infallible method which will lead everyone ineluctably along to a conclusion which is 
universally acceptable has fallen on hard times and for good reason.  It is not only 
‘relativists’ like Rorty who acknowledge “the vacuity of epistemological 
foundationalism.”32  Christian philosophers like Wolterstorff have also offered critiques 
of foundationalism.  Reformed epistemology, to which he is a major contributor, argues 
that one is rationally justified in believing in God, for example, without necessarily 
offering valid arguments (although one may have them) for that belief.  It is beyond the 
scope of this treatment to fully defend this claim, but suffice it to say that if one rejects 
foundationalism, there may be at least some religious beliefs that believers are entitled to 
have.  In other words, belief need not bear a heavier burden in public discourse than 
unbelief.  That Reformed epistemology has implications for one’s assessment of the 
legitimacy of religious arguments in public is clear from Wolterstorff’s writings on the 
subject.  Of course, one is not epistemically entitled to any and all religious beliefs, 
especially those that qualify as dogmatic on our above definition.  But if at least some 
32 Rorty, 144.
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religious beliefs are beliefs people are rationally entitled to have, it becomes difficult to 
impose a presumption regarding what all rational people would assent to for political 
discourse which, in the case of Rawls, not coincidentally resembles a secularist 
conception of religion – according to which religious beliefs that are, at best, held in 
tension with beliefs that a rational person would be entitled to hold. 
Again, we see an implicit ‘ethics of belief’ at play in Rawls’s position. But the 
problem with such an ethics of belief is that what one sincerely believes is rarely 
something one can switch on and off; it is not like behavior, which one can (usually) 
refrain from doing if one judges it unethical.  One cannot simply divest oneself of beliefs 
at will. And if one cannot be expected to do so, it would seem that any ethics of belief 
violates the principle that ‘ought implies can’.  To put the point another way, many 
people find belief in God to be what we might call primitively compelling.  In other 
words, it is difficult not to believe in God.  Taylor has argued recently that our 
intellectual milieu in the West has made it more difficult to find belief in God primitively 
compelling; rather it is now one option among many, albeit a live option in Taylor’s 
view.33  Nevertheless, I take it to be the case that there are many people who find belief in 
God compelling in the way that we all find belief in other minds to be compelling; we 
cannot help but believe it, despite the absence of an iron-clad argument.  I suppose a 
defender of an ethics of belief, call him Cliff, would say that religious people have a duty 
to investigate even those claims that they find primitively compelling.  They should 
perhaps take a philosophy course, acquire a healthy dose of skepticism, and then 
reexamine their belief to see whether it is still primitively compelling.  Of course, there 
33 Taylor, 3.
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are philosophically sophisticated religious people who persist in finding their belief 
compelling, although academia is often offered as an antidote for a religious sensibility. 
Nevertheless, I might retort that Cliff has a corresponding duty to place himself in an 
environment in which he might find belief in God primitively compelling, the way one 
might advise the tone-deaf individual to at least try and acquire an appreciation of music. 
Indeed, Taylor counsels the non-religious to try to inhabit a space in which they can at 
least consider belief a live option.34  The religiously unmusical, however, seldom 
acknowledge their simple, usually unreflective, rejection of religiosity. Again, belief is 
not simply a matter of the will. William James, in his response to W.K. Clifford, was 
unfortunately misunderstood on this point.  The ‘will to believe’ in that famous essay of 
the same name, might have been better rendered the ‘right to believe’.  Persons, for 
whom religious belief is a live option, are entitled to believe. 
But, Cliff might reply, although a religious person may be entitled to believe 
something privately, when one steps into the public domain in a pluralistic democracy, 
one has a duty to present one’s arguments and justify one’s political decisions on the 
basis of secular reason.  This is roughly the line that Rawls takes and some have alleged 
Habermas too, although in my judgment he differs in important respects.  Rorty also falls 
in line with Rawls and Habermas and even attempts to recruit James to his side.  In 
Rorty’s reading of “The Will to Believe,” James is actually saying “we have a right to 
believe what we like when we are, so to speak, on our own time.  But we abandon this 
right when we are engaged, for example, in a scientific or political project.”35  But, if 
34 Taylor, 551.
35 Rorty, “Pragmatism as Romantic Polytheism,” in Pragmatism and Religion, ed. Stuart Rosenbaum 
(University of Illinois Press, 2003), 120 – 21. 
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religious citizens are entitled to their beliefs, and if they are unable to simply switch them 
off, why should we insist that they divest themselves of their beliefs in public?  As we 
shall see, Habermas has recently taken this question very seriously.  Some have argued, 
such as Robert Audi, that religious citizens can keep their religious beliefs in public but 
must, in addition, offer at least one secular reason for their position on a policy or law if it 
enjoins the coercive power of the state to restrict individual liberty.36  Most religious 
citizens (although not all) have the capacity to offer at least one secular reason for their 
position on a given issue and understand the pragmatic value in doing so.  Whether one 
can obligate them to do so, however, is another question, which I will deal with below. 
But the difficulty with Audi’s seemingly generous proposal is that the religious citizen 
cannot offer just any secular reason whatsoever, but she must offer a reason that she finds 
motivationally sufficient apart from any additional religious reasons she might also have. 
This requirement is quite different from adopting a secular argument for practical 
purposes.  For example, on the abortion issue, I might argue on utilitarian grounds that 
late-term abortion is wrong because the fetus has a fully developed nervous system, and 
is thus sentient, and has, if not rights, at least an interest in avoiding pain and staying 
alive.  It would therefore be wrong to kill it.  But I am unsure whether or not I would find 
this argument compelling, or motivationally sufficient, in the absence of other beliefs I 
hold about the sanctity of life that stem at least in part from my religious tradition.  It 
seems impossible to discount the influence of religious beliefs when evaluating the 
motivational sufficiency of secular arguments for religious persons.  Indeed, this is why 
36 Robert Audi, “Liberal Democracy and the Place of Religion in Politics,” in Religion in the Public Square, 
25. 
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secularists often suspect that when religious persons offer secular arguments in public, 
they do so to obfuscate their ‘real’ reasons.  Far better, in my view, to be up front about 
what one’s real reasons are and then work pragmatically from there, rather than place 
undue restrictions on what religious persons may be permitted to say.  As for the issue of 
state coercion that Audi raises and the danger of it being utilized to enforce a majority 
religious view, I would suggest that at the level of official public institutions, laws and 
policies be stated in neutral language.  But this is not to say, as Habermas does, that 
religious language must be kept out of political institutions and debate altogether; only 
that, after the ensuing debate, the neutrality of language is maintained in the laws as 
drafted. 
The preceding section has served as prolegomena for many of the issues that will 
be taken up in greater detail in what follows.  As such, the argument at this stage is still 
incomplete.  Although I argue that secularization does not necessarily imply secularism 
when dealing with religious voices in the public sphere, I acknowledge that historically 
and contemporaneously, religious voices have posed a challenge to liberalism.  The 
liberal state has had to find ways to maximize freedom within the boundaries of law that 
can be fully justified to a pluralistic polity, at least ideally.  In practice, religion has 
usually played a significant role in shaping the constitutions and laws of existing liberal 
democracies, religious freedom being one the chief values liberalism has sought to secure 
since its inception. But in order to do so, it was thought necessary, as early as the 
seventeenth century, to strike a compromise between religious liberty and social 
cohesion.  This process, which involved the privatization of religion, is part of 
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secularization, and the narrative itself provides practical justification for suspicion of 
religion in the public sphere and the liberal insistence on ‘public reason’.   In what 
follows, I want to review the narrative and offer some critical commentary that might 
warrant some modification to our conception of secularization and ‘public reason’.   In 
what follows, I will make the case that these terms are best understood within modernity 
as pragmatic responses to religious pluralism, rather than responses to widespread decline 
in religious belief and practice.  
Secularization and the Public Sphere: A Historical Excursus
So how are we to assess the processes of secularization in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries?  Ironically, as we shall see, those who are generally thought to be the 
progenitors of secularization did not necessarily understand the process to which they 
were contributing in the way that many contemporary commentators do, that is to say, 
along the lines of a subtraction story.  In fact, the vocabulary of secularism as denoting an 
alternative to religion – as opposed to ‘secular’ in the largely neutral sense of ‘temporal’ 
– is of nineteenth century coinage.  According to Michael J. Buckley, George Jacob 
Holyoake coined the term ‘secularist’ at the end of the nineteenth century to denote one 
who is without belief in any god but not without morality.37  The charge of atheism was 
certainly bandied about liberally, especially during the seventeenth century, but this term 
was not used with any precision; it frequently functioned polemically.38  It is true, 
however, that the seeds of secularism as a mass phenomenon were planted during the 
37 Michael J. Buckley, At the Origins of Modern Atheism (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1987), 
10.
38 Buckley, 27.
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eighteenth century among elites.  It took roughly another century for conditions of 
secularism to permeate European culture more thoroughly, yielding conditions of 
secularity “which takes us from a society in which it was virtually impossible not to 
believe in God, to one in which faith, even for the staunchest believer, is one human 
possibility among others.”39  The abandonment of belief in God on a large scale, 
however, is only one aspect of the processes of secularization, though by no means an 
insignificant one.  It contributes to the aspect of secularization on which I focus, namely, 
the transformation of religion from a publicly significant phenomenon to an increasingly 
marginalized one.  Habermas argues that any religion is a worldview or comprehensive 
doctrine that does not conform to the criterion of publicly accessible reason. As 
mentioned, my project hopes to complicate what such a criterion actually means for 
political praxis.  One way of doing so, is to show that no general account of such a 
criterion, much less one as stringent as Habermas’s, emerges from the Enlightenment in 
which the secular public sphere arguably emerges as a novel cultural phenomenon. 
Although the seeds of mass secularization were planted much earlier than the 
eighteenth century, the Enlightenment is generally credited, at the very least, with 
expediting the process.  The Enlightenment, however, is not itself a secular age.  As 
Buckley observes, “[i]t would be false to tax the Enlightenment with indifference to 
religion. It would be more discerning to say that it was obsessed with it.”40  Indeed, 
indifference to religion is largely incompatible with any self-understanding of secularism. 
As Taylor explains:
39 Taylor, 3.
40 Buckley, 37.
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Unbelief for great numbers of contemporary unbelievers, is understood as an 
achievement of rationality. It cannot have this without a continuing historical 
awareness. It is a condition which can’t only be described in the present tense, but 
which also needs the perfect tense: a condition of “having overcome” the 
irrationality of belief. It is this perfect-tensed consciousness which underlies 
unbelievers’ use of ‘disenchantment’ today. It is difficult to imagine a world in 
which this consciousness might have disappeared.41 
Following Max Weber, ‘disenchantment’ means “that there are in principle no 
mysterious, incalculable powers at work, but rather that one could in principle master 
everything through calculation.”42  The disenchantment of the world as a key component 
of secularization is, for Taylor, only one aspect of the processes of secularization, and its 
explanatory power has been overstated within various versions of the subtraction story. 
Although it may not be possible to understand secularization without some account of 
disenchantment, it is certainly possible to view it as one factor among many, and perhaps 
not even the most decisive one. As we shall see, we might better understand 
secularization as a pragmatic response to religious pluralism, rather than a response to a 
world cleansed of the supernatural. The contested nature of religion, manifested by 
pluralism, necessitated a criterion other than religion in order to broker consensus. Thus 
secularization – the process of finding discursive grounds for agreement – should not 
necessarily be identified with secularism, which takes the ‘disenchantment’ of the world 
as simply a given. However, even if we give disenchantment a greater role in our account 
of secularization, it does not follow that disenchantment is accomplished from ‘outside’ 
as it were. For Taylor and Buckley, it is less a product of scientific rationality and more a 
41 Taylor, 269. 
42 Max Weber, “Science as a Vocation,” in Max Weber's 'science as a vocation'  ed. Peter Lassman, Irving 
Velody, and Herminio Martins (Routledge, 1989), 13. 
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consequence of Christianity’s own ‘self-alienation’43 or ‘excarnation’.44  In Buckley’s 
estimation, Christian theologians, such as Leonard Lessius (1554 – 1623), made a fateful 
move when they suggested that the Christian faith could justify itself on the basis of 
natural reason alone.  It is then a short step from the sufficiency of reason to the deism 
and then atheism of the modern period.  The Enlightenment, in moving away from 
confessional religion, often expanded upon elements already nascent within Christianity 
thereby setting a trajectory for secularization. Although it is beyond the scope of this 
project to delve into the many Christian precedents of modern unbelief – here I 
recommend Buckley’s fine study – I believe that the unintended consequences of 
religious modes of thinking have more to do with secularization than the disenchantment 
theory of secularization usually appreciates. This will be apparent in many of the modern 
thinkers taken up below. 
In another more concrete sense, Christianity was also the instrument of its own 
alienation from the modern public sphere.  I refer principally to the infamous wars of 
religion.  Buckley ably summarizes:
Catholics and dissenters were hunted out of England; France revoked the Edict of 
Nantes and expelled thousands of Huguenots into the Dutch Republic; heretics 
were burned by the Spanish Inquisition and witches in the German principalities, 
the United Kingdom, and the early American religious colony of Massachusetts. 
Each major nation could tell of its slaughters in the wars of religions whose hatred 
had turned great portions of the earlier centuries into horror for Germany and 
France and the Netherlands. As the Enlightenment developed, first in England, 
then in France and Germany, and finally in the British colonies, the Western 
conscience found itself deeply scandalized and disgusted by confessional 
43 Buckley, 341.
44 Taylor, 554.
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religions …. Religious warfare had irrevocably discredited confessional primacy 
in the growing secularized sensitivity of much of European culture.45 
For this reason, among others, the progenitors of the Enlightenment taken up below 
decried religious fanaticism and enthusiasm and called for “a simpler, doctrinally less 
elaborated religion, and one more accessible to reason.”46  Accompanying the loss of 
credibility by confessional religion was the need to replace it with something else. If 
consensus could no longer be secured by a common religious confession, it would have 
to be accomplished by an appeal to public opinion. The phenomenon of public opinion 
acting as a legitimate political arbiter depended upon the newly emerging public sphere, 
facilitated by print, which effectively extended the franchise of the ‘republic of letters’ 
from elite circles to the emergent bourgeois class. This phenomenon, the rise of the 
public sphere as a novelty within modernity, is the subject of Habermas’s Structural 
Transformation. He reads the emergence of the public sphere in the eighteenth century as 
bringing about a fundamental shift from confessional public self-understanding – which 
does not admit of communicative redemption – to a communicative public based on 
discursive reason. But importantly, public opinion is not an unambiguous, unequivocal 
conception during this period. Moreover, its limitations as a means of building rational 
consensus were recognized by those, like Locke, who advocated it.  
45 Buckley, 39. 
46 Taylor, 224.
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Habermas on the Rise of the Public Sphere in England
David Zaret suggests that “the liberal model of the political public sphere can best be 
described as a historical accretion of print culture, lay bible reading, actuarial 
calculations, experimental science, and capitalist enterprise.”47  As succinct descriptions 
go, this one is quite accurate.  In Zaret’s estimation, as well as Habermas’s, England in 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries serves as the model for this convergence of 
factors.  Craig Calhoun agrees: 
Britain serves Habermas as the model case of the development of the public 
sphere. It was there, for example, that the elimination of the institution of 
censorship first marked a new stage in the development of public discourse. The 
free provision of information was, alongside education, crucial to putting the 
public sphere in a position to arrive at a considered, rather than merely a common, 
opinion.48
The elimination of censorship in England with the Licensing Act of 1695 is difficult to 
overestimate as an impetus for the rise of the public sphere.  The demise of censorship 
allowed the British press to enjoy unique liberties compared to the rest of Europe. 
Habermas also cites the appointment of the first cabinet government as a major 
achievement of representative democracy.  The public sphere was greatly facilitated by 
the parliamentary system in which perennial debate between the government and the 
opposition became the model for political discourse in the public sphere. In the English 
case, the importance of critical reason serving as the arbiter in political matters emerged 
as the aristocratic conception of Parliament evolved into one in which the opinion of the 
citizenry had a legitimate place. As Habermas summarizes: “Until then political 
47 David Zaret, “Religion, Science and Printing in the Public Spheres in Seventeenth-Century England” in 
Habermas and the Public Sphere, 230.
48 Craig Calhoun, “Introduction: Habermas and the Public Sphere,” in Habermas and the Public Sphere, 14.
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opposition had been possible only as the attempt to push one’s interests by resorting to 
violence …. Now through the critical debate of the public, it took the form of a 
permanent controversy between the governing party and the opposition.”49 
Furthermore, one might suggest another reason for focusing this analysis on 
England.  In addition to the elements enumerated above, this rise of the public sphere was 
also nurtured by a number of intellectual developments, notably the political theory that 
flows out of British empiricism.  And while the Kantian architecture of Habermas’s 
conception of public reason is so well established in the literature that it is routinely taken 
for granted, his indebtedness to the British liberal tradition from Locke through Mill is 
underdeveloped.  By focusing upon what he draws from the British tradition in political 
philosophy, I hope to supplement this lack in Habermas scholarship.  In addition to 
uncovering some previously underappreciated connections between Habermas and the 
English political tradition, this strategy enables me to place the Continental and Anglo-
American traditions into conversation with each other.  Ideally, such conversation will, in 
a modest way, make Habermas more accessible to an Anglophone audience.  In my 
judgment, the challenges confronting democracy in the United States and Canada, which 
trace their political lineage to Britain, could greatly benefit from Habermasian insights. 
Anglo-American political philosophy has been unduly influenced by Rawls, in my 
judgment, and although he and Habermas are often mentioned in the same breath as 
though their positions are interchangeable, Habermas, especially recently, has sufficiently 
differentiated himself from a Rawlsian stance that he can provide a fresh perspective on 
49 Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of 
Bourgeois Society, trans. Thomas Burger and Frederick Lawrence (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991), 64.
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the North American political landscape.  This is crucial, because those moderate 
religionists who feel marginalized from public discourse need to hear a sympathetic 
secular alternative to the false dilemma of Rawlsian liberalism and the new 
traditionalism.50 
Returning to our narrative, Habermas credits Locke with liberating the conception 
of opinion “from its polemically devalued association with pure prejudice.”51  Locke 
placed the “‘Law of Opinion’ as a category of equal rank beside divine and state law.”52 
In so doing, Locke cleansed ‘opinion’ of its association with vulgarity.53 In contrast with 
Rousseau, Locke viewed legislation “to be the result not of a political will, but of rational 
agreement.”54  According to Habermas, “Public debate was supposed to transform 
voluntas into a ratio that in the public competition of private arguments came into being 
as the consensus about what was practically necessary in the private interests of all.”55 
Such a perspective resonates with Habermas’s later theory of communicative action 
which sets out criteria for formal argumentation with the aim of building consensus. 
Locke’s epistemological fallibilism, for example, is also concerned with determining 
what claims count as good reasons in public debate.  As mentioned briefly, Locke is 
50 This is Stout’s term for the movement represented by thinkers such as Hauerwas, MacIntyre, and 
Milbank. See Democracy and Tradition, 11. 
51 Habermas, 92. 
52 Habermas, 91.
53 It retained this connotation in France. Pierre Bayle, for example, differentiated between ‘opinion’ and 
‘critique’. The Encyclopedists adopted the polemical connotations of ‘opinion’ identifying it with “a mental 
condition of uncertainty and vacuousness” (Habermas, 92). As such, ‘opinion’ in the French case – even 
given Rousseau’s adoption of the term – never enjoyed the same public authority or recognition it did in 
England following Locke. Indeed, Habermas contrasts Locke and Rousseau on their respective valuations 
of opinion. Rousseau does not rehabilitate the term, but simply takes a position against the Encyclopedists 
that preserves its polemical charge. Rousseau’s public opinion, associated with the general will, “was more 
a consensus of hearts and minds than of arguments” (98).
54 Habermas, 82.
55 Habermas, 83, italics in original. 
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generally interpreted as saying that religious beliefs, due to their high degree of 
uncertainty, do not make good public reasons.  In other words, we should proportion the 
publicity of our claims to the degree of certainty they enjoy. Indeed, recent scholarship 
has situated Locke within the ethics of belief tradition.56 
Thus, Locke’s conception of the “Law of Opinion” encouraged the devaluation of 
religion in public discourse.  In Locke’s A Letter Concerning Toleration, for example, the 
exercise of reason is seen to be a more promising avenue to the resolution of public 
differences than appeal to religion.  Although Locke is often pigeon-holed as an 
empiricist, his rationalist methodology in the Letter is quite clear.  Patrick Romanell 
states: “Like a typical rationalist of the seventeenth century, he uses throughout the Letter 
the deductive method of drawing conclusions from definitions and axioms.”57  Moreover, 
the definitions Locke offers are not simply empirical ones, reflecting their ordinary use in 
the culture of his time.  Rather, Locke is offering normative definitions.  As Jay Newman 
explains: “Locke does not pretend that he is simply reporting to us how people ordinarily 
use such terms as commonwealth and church, nor does he pretend that he is merely 
reporting how most people conceive of the proper spheres of political and religious 
authority.”58  As such, Locke is self-consciously attempting to change the way religious 
authority is exercised in the public sphere, replacing it with appeals to publicly accessible 
reason, asserting that “to this crying up faith in opposition to reason, we may, I think, in 
56 Nicholas Wolterstorff, John Locke and the Ethics of Belief (Cambridge University Press, 1996).
57 Patrick Romanell, introduction to A Letter Concerning Toleration by John Locke (New Jersey: Prentice 
Hall, 1950), 8.
58 Jay Newman, On Religious Freedom (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1991), 118.
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good measure ascribe those absurdities that fill almost all the religions which possess and 
divide mankind.”59  
It is not only in the Letter, however, that Locke gives priority to reason.  Recent 
scholarship on the Essay also gives us reason to reevaluate Locke’s contribution to 
epistemology.  In Nicholas Wolterstorff’s estimation, the traditional interpretation of the 
Essay, which places emphasis on Book II, must be rejected.  Rather, the focal point, 
according to Locke himself, is Book IV.  As Wolterstorff maintains, “[w]hen Book IV is 
given its due and intended weight, it becomes clear that Locke is one of the great 
rationalists of the Western tradition.”60  Only such a rationalist methodology could 
overcome the great crisis of uncertainty generated by the collapse of traditional sources 
of authority.  Reason, then, must be the arbiter of which opinions we hold.61  And, again, 
we should proportion the firmness of our beliefs to the weight of evidence.62  Such a 
principle was certainly intended to exclude the religious enthusiasts of Locke’s day from 
public influence.  The solution to the intramural wars of religion, for Locke, was to 
conduct one’s opinion or belief forming activities – or to use Wolterstorff’s term, 
“doxastic practices” – critically and cautiously.63  From this it follows that a vibrant 
public debate, conducted on the basis of sound doxastic practices, is essential for the 
maintenance of the civil order.  If we abandon such an ethics of belief, we are left with 
the conflicting, uncertain opinions of enthusiasts who do not proportion their beliefs to 
59 Quoted in Zaret, 225. 
60 Wolterstorff, xv. 
61 See also Chapter 1 of Ronald A. Kuipers, Critical Faith: Toward a Renewed Understanding of Religious 
Life and its Public Accountability (Rodopi, 2002).
62 Wolterstorff states the “principle of proportionality” as follows: “Adopt a level of confidence in the 
proposition which is proportioned to its probability on one’s satisfactory evidence,” 79. 
63 Wolterstorff, xvii. He borrows the term from William Alston. 
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the evidence or fanatics who threaten to upset the civil order.  Such an ethics of belief led 
to the galvanization of public opinion as the result of rational-critical processes and 
further facilitated the increasing marginalization of religious rationales which in turn 
helped to enshrine secular reasoning as public knowledge. 
Of course, the way had been prepared for this stance by developments within 
religion itself.  Habermas argues that the Reformation, in identifying opinion and 
conscience, had paved the way for the role opinion would later play in the public sphere. 
Both conscience and opinion were considered to be accessible to the lay person, and thus 
constituted a common basis for faith.  But the model of consensus within Protestant 
Christianity differed from the liberal model of the public sphere.  Michael Warner states: 
“Its (religion’s) model of the public sphere presupposed an ideal of determinate truth and 
collective agreement.  But the usual means of brokering such a consensus were already 
strained in the period of the Glorious Revolution.  And by the 1730s and 1740s they 
suffered considerable erosion in the face of the Great Awakening.”64  The problem for 
religion, as Warner diagnoses it, was that formerly professional issues among clergy now 
became publicly debatable.  This anti-clericalism undermined the authority of religion in 
the public sphere.  The impact of this shift may have affected the British colonies in 
America more rapidly than the mother country.  To quote Warner once again: “No matter 
how much religious contention the colonists experienced during the Awakening, religion 
continued to pull against the normalization of social division, eventually requiring a 
64 Michael Warner, The Letters of the Republic: Publication and the Public Sphere in Eighteenth-Century 
America (Harvard University Press, 1992), 56 -- 57.
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separation of church and state that would mark a key victory for the cultural forces of the 
public sphere.”65 
But to whatever extent the revival of Protestant Christianity created space for 
convicted opinion to trump authority in religious matters, so-called Natural Religion in 
England played a much greater role.  Natural Religion removed the limits that traditional 
Protestantism placed on the exercise of reason, namely the idea that fallen reason had to 
be corrected by revelation.  According to proponents of Natural Religion, there were no 
such limits on the free exercise of reason.  On the contrary, “[t]here could be nothing in 
religion that was not compatible with reason – so argued leading members of the Royal 
Society, the Latitudinarian Churchmen, and the Cambridge neo-Platonists. So did the 
Whig ideologues, such as Locke, Shaftesbury, and Sidney, who had complex ties to the 
scholars and scientists.”66  Indeed, Locke was greatly indebted to the Latitudinarian 
Churchmen, such as William Chillingworth, John Tillotson, Thomas Sprat and fellow 
members of the Royal Society, John Wilkins and Joseph Glanville; he owed much of his 
theory of limited certainty to these predecessors, many of whom were moderate Anglican 
theologians and key proponents of Natural Religion.  
In 1649, Wilkins, warden of Wadham College, Oxford, created a group called the 
Invisible College, which would evolve into the Royal Society in 1662. This group 
consisted of such luminaries as Robert Boyle and Christopher Wren and others who were 
interested in the relationship between the new science and religion.  Wilkins most 
important work, Of the Principles and Duties of Natural Religion (1675), sought to 
65 Warner, 58. 
66 Zaret, 225. 
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provide “a basis for reasonable religion, science, and law.”67  The ideas contained in this 
work, published posthumously, would be popularized by Glanville, to whom Richard 
Popkin refers as “a propagandist for the Royal Society.”68  Locke’s principle of 
proportionality – that we must proportion the firmness of our belief to the degree of 
probability based on the available evidence – is certainly indebted to Wilkins and 
Glanville.  As Wolterstorff notes: 
The Royal Society group.... argued that since assent to the content of revealed 
religion did not and could not have the highest degree of truth-likelihood – at best 
it could have ‘moral certainty’ – we ought to hold such assent with an 
appropriately tempered firmness. Such tempered firmness, they insisted, is quite 
sufficient for religious life; and it would stimulate such social virtues as love and 
toleration, thereby promoting social peace.69
The differentiation of moral certainty from the indubitable certainty furnished by the 
sciences further marginalized religious arguments from the public sphere.70  However, in 
order to do justice to the complex narrative of the rise of the public sphere, we require 
more than an account of the marginalization of religion. In Taylor’s words, we need more 
than a “subtraction story.”  We need to add to our story the success of experimental 
science to fully explain the enthusiasm concerning the public exercise of reason to build 
consensus.  The well-publicized successes of experimental science produced confidence 
that critical debate, such as that modeled by the Royal Society, could be extended to 
political and religious debate.  The scientific community, then as now, served as the 
model of an idealized discourse which produced consensus due to the community’s 
67 Richard H. Popkin, The History of Scepticism: From Savonarola to Bayle, Rev. Exp. (Oxford University 
Press, USA, 2003), 209.
68 Popkin, 209. 
69 Wolterstorff, 82. 
70 See also Henry G. Van Leeuwen, The Problem of Certainty in English Thought 1630-1690 (Springer, 
1970). 
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adherence to the dictates of reason and evidence.  The knowledge that came out of the 
Royal Society, for example, was more than mere conviction or opinion; according to 
Thomas Sprat (1635 – 1713), a clerical supporter of the Royal Society, it was “public 
knowledge.”71  As Taylor points out, Restoration theologians, such as Sprat and Tillotson 
frequently appealed to reason, resulting in a less theologically elaborate conception of 
religion, stripped of many of the superfluous doctrines of the enthusiasts.  In conjunction 
with this development, these clerics understood the exercise of public reason, as modeled 
by the new science, as an effective tool to rebut the spurious claims of religious fanatics 
and enthusiasts of both Protestant and Catholic persuasions.  Thus, the Anglican 
establishment thought the deliverances of the sciences to be compatible with so-called 
Natural Religion.  Sprat, for instance, argued that those who put their trust in “implicit 
faith and enthusiasm” should fear scientific progress, but “our church …. can never be 
prejudiced in the light of reason, not by the improvements of knowledge, or the works of 
men’s hands.”72  Here we see the ideal of knowledge that is accessible in principle to 
everyone and that should carry more weight in the open forum of political debate than 
appeals to conscience or faith.  The impulse toward a doctrinally unelaborated religion 
eventually manifested itself in works of a more explicitly deistic orientation, such as John 
Toland’s Christianity Not Mysterious (1696) and Matthew Tindal’s Christianity as Old 
as the Creation (1730).73  Although most members of the Royal Society, such as 
Glanville and Boyle, and their clerical allies, would not carry the argument this far, their 
emphasis on reason as a hedge against enthusiasm and fanaticism laid the groundwork for 
71 Zaret, 228. 
72 Quoted in Taylor, 226. 
73 Buckley, 38. 
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the theological minimalism seen in what Taylor calls “Providential Deism” and 
eventually, “exclusive humanism.” 
The accretion of these historical factors produced a respect for rational debate 
and, among parliamentarians, respect for the considered opinion of the public.  The 
public sphere became an independent check on the governing power.  In the context of 
representative government and social contract theory, the public sphere became an 
important venue for political discussion.  The government needed the continual consent 
of the governed; the social contract was seen, in effect, as always open to review at the 
demand of the citizenry.  Again, the parliamentary paradigm of government and 
opposition served as the model for debate in the informal public sphere.
It is instructive to note, as Habermas points out, to what extent the legitimacy of 
“public opinion” was largely created, not by liberal philosophers, but by Tory opposition 
under Henry St. John Bolingbroke in the first decades of the eighteenth century.  Since 
the sympathies of the major newspapers were with the Whigs, it became politically 
necessary for the opposition to publish journals and pamphlets, such as the Craftsman 
and the Gentleman’s Magazine.  Bolingbroke’s innovation did more than simply tap into 
latent public sentiments: it established public opinion as a legitimating force recognized 
by the government.  Bolingbroke used the term “public spirit” to denote the opinions of 
the public which held the government to account.  This term did not yet embody the ideal 
public sphere which Habermas alleges emerged in the eighteenth century, but it was 
certainly a forerunner.  Habermas says that in Bolingbroke’s notion of public spirit “a 
piece of anticipated Rousseauism was strangely fused with the principles of public 
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criticism.  Both were still united in the ‘public spirit’; the direct, undistorted sense for 
what was right and just and the articulation of ‘opinion’ into ‘judgment’ through the 
public clash of arguments.”74  Habermas, following convention, treats Edmund Burke as 
the major conservative philosopher of the time although unlike Bolingbroke, Burke 
served Parliament as a Whig.75  He clarified and refined the notion of “general opinion” 
as he called it, which would evolve into “public opinion.”  Habermas explains that for 
Burke, “The opinion of the public that puts its reason to use was no longer just opinion; it 
did not arise from mere inclination but from private reflection upon public affairs and 
from their public discussion.”76  The sovereignty of the state depended upon the 
considered opinion of the public.  For Burke, “Only publicity inside and outside the 
parliament could secure the continuity of critical political debate and its function, to 
transform domination, as Burke expressed it, from a matter of will into a matter of 
reason.”77  Thus, by the end of the eighteenth century one finds Burke arguing that all 
citizens in a free country have a legitimate interest in public matters.  These sentiments 
exerted considerable force until the importance of public opinion was formally 
introduced in Parliament in 1792 by Charles Fox, a Whig member, who claimed that “it 
is certainly right and prudent to consult the public opinion.”78  This represented a 
significant departure from earlier conceptions of government, and the transformation of 
74 Habermas, 93 – 94. 
75 Burke’s relationship to Bolingbroke is quite a bit more complicated than Habermas’s account suggests. 
Burke wrote his Vindication of Natural Society in parody of Bolingbroke shortly after the latter’s death. 
Burke was not a Tory, even after falling out with leading members of the Whig party, including Charles 
Fox, over his views on the French Revolution. 
76 Habermas, 94. 
77 Habermas, 100.
78 Quoted in Habermas, 65. 
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public opinion from a place of vulgarity to one of esteem happened gradually.  But, as 
Habermas explains: 
[B]y the turn of the nineteenth century, the public’s involvement in the critical 
debate of political issues had become organized to such an extent that in the role 
of a permanent critical commentator it had definitively broken the exclusiveness 
of Parliament and evolved into the officially designated discussion partner of the 
delegate. Fox’s speeches were made with the public in mind; “they,” the subjects 
of public opinion, were no longer treated as people whom, like “strangers,” one 
could exclude from the deliberations. Step by step the absolutism of Parliament 
had to retreat before their sovereignty.79
Thus, in the English case the transformation of the public sphere into an extra-political, 
independent, constant check on the accountability and legitimacy of the government 
simply confirmed the importance of critical debate and publicly accessible reason to the 
exercise of democracy.  This atmosphere of increased public debate was indebted to the 
‘republic of letters’ that had been created in both England and on the Continent.  Now, 
the discussion of the savants was effectively extended to the general reading public 
through the proliferation of print media. 
 At this juncture, an important feature of the public sphere emerges: its meta-
topicality.  Of course, issues had been debated in coffee houses, salons, and the more 
formally public space of Parliament, but in the eighteenth century the discourse became 
more abstract.  Through print media it became possible to participate in a larger 
discourse, not limited to the common spaces mentioned above. Taylor calls this non-local 
common space “meta-topical.”80  Warner calls it a “meta-discourse.”81  Both terms 
convey the novelty of the public sphere in the modern period.  Although it is true, as 
79 Habermas, 66. 
80 Taylor, 187. 
81 Warner, 65. 
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Taylor notes, that the Church had existed as a meta-topical space in previous centuries, 
the novelty of modern meta-topicality lies in the separation of the public sphere from 
power, or the separation of state and society in Habermasian terms.  It therefore allows 
the public sphere to speak to power as an independent observer: the ideal of freedom and 
impartiality of the press is central here.  Moreover, the voices within the public sphere are 
often anonymous.  Warner takes up both of these features in some detail.  For example, 
the Spectator in England embodied the abstraction of the public discourse.  Addison and 
Steele often used the fictional literary character, called the “Spectator,” to convey ironic 
detachment from the events they commented upon.  In the modern public sphere, a self-
conscious effort is made at “a certain impersonality, a certain impartiality, and eschewing 
of party spirit.”82  This aspect of the public sphere, an abstract discussion among impartial 
citizens linked by print, is unique to the modern secular public sphere.  It is meta-topical 
in that it transcends local spaces in which discussion of this kind occurred previously.  It 
is also a meta-discourse in that it transcends the ‘official’ political discourse and 
hopefully keeps it honest.  It is outside the political, properly speaking.  As mentioned, it 
keeps power in check.  Again, this is not new in and of itself.  Rather, its novelty comes 
from the means by which power is regulated and by whom it is regulated.  Prior to the 
public sphere, power was allegedly kept in check by the will of God or the Church or 
natural law.  However, in the modern period the people themselves are the ones who hold 
the rulers to account.  Moreover, they do so, not through an appeal to the will of God or 
natural law, but via an appeal to reason.  This formally secular dimension of the public 
sphere is what differentiates it from earlier meta-topical spaces, like the Church.  And it 
82 Taylor, 190. 
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is this secular dimension that Habermas considers to be essential to any genuinely public 
discourse. 
This provisional analysis, though far from exhaustive, allows us to glean a 
number of features of the public sphere as it emerged in the modern period: 1) the public 
sphere denotes a critical consensus rather than a mere convergence of opinion; 2) it is 
extra-political and independent and serves to regulate power; 3) it is a meta-topical 
discourse that is in principle universal; 4) it is secular in the sense that power is not kept 
in check by God, Church, or natural law but by an enlightened citizenry.  This idealized 
conception of the public sphere embodies the Habermasian virtue of publicly accessible, 
secular rationality. 
However, is the ascendancy of publicly accessible reason, defined in Habermas’s 
sense, as straightforward as his account suggests?  In my judgment, it is more 
complicated.  The thinkers to whom he appeals are rather more ambivalent with respect 
to their evaluation of ‘public opinion’ and the secularity of the public sphere.  In what 
follows, I want to develop a counter-narrative that supplements the ‘subtraction story’ 
implicit in Habermas’s account.  
Rethinking the Secularity of the Public Sphere in the Modern Period
Despite Locke’s aforementioned contributions to the modern public sphere, he has an 
ambivalent attitude, at best, toward opinion.  For example, in the Essay, Locke claims 
that “there cannot be a more dangerous thing to rely on” than “the opinions of others.”83  
83 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Peter H. Nidditch (Oxford University 
Press, USA, 1979), IV. xv. 6.
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Of course, one could argue that Locke is referring to de facto opinion rather than the 
idealized opinion derived from a process of rational debate.  And, indeed, the context 
makes such an interpretation plausible.  However, Habermas may overstate Locke’s 
“Law of Opinion” as being of equal rank with divine and state law.  Indeed, Habermas 
may well be confusing two separate projects within Locke’s epistemology.  For example, 
Wolterstorff notes that while the application of Locke’s ethics of belief to revealed 
religion, such as that alleged by the enthusiasts, has been widely received and adopted by 
Western intellectuals, his moral project has not.84  And it is precisely this project in which 
Locke’s distinction between the divine law, the civil law, and the law of opinion is 
embedded.  In Locke’s view “[b]y the relation they bear to the first of these, men judge 
whether their actions are sins, or duties; by the second, whether they be criminal, or 
innocent; and by the third, whether they be virtues or vices.”85  According to Wolterstorff, 
Locke’s theory of moral obligation is a divine command theory.86  The law of opinion, far 
from being of equal rank, is a much weaker conception denoting the force of social 
approval and disapproval.  Although conventional morality of this kind can be quite 
effective in regulating our conduct, it is by no means the source of moral obligation.  To 
be sure, Locke is a key figure in the rise of what Taylor calls the “order of mutual 
benefit”87: an extensive process of reform designed to bring about a well-ordered, “polite” 
society.  And this process, probably contrary to the intentions of its progenitors, made 
grounding morality on human, rather than allegedly divine sources possible, thereby 
paving the way for exclusive humanism.  However, Locke does not adopt such a stance; 
84 Wolterstorff, 148.
85 Locke, II. xxviii. 7. 
86 Wolterstorff, 136. 
87 Taylor, 256. 
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quite the contrary.  Although utility is an important factor for Locke – God’s providential 
design makes morality beneficial for us – the primary source of moral obligation resides 
in divine law.  And although Locke differentiates divine law from civil law, and in the 
Letter certainly objects to the civil magistrate prosecuting alleged breaches of divine law, 
he does not necessarily rule out appeal to divine law in public discourse.  To quote 
Wolterstorff again: “That there are civil and social laws is obvious. Locke took it as 
scarcely less obvious that there is divine law … Both reason and revelation tell us that we 
have obligations to God.”88  Of course, it is difficult to imagine such an overt appeal to 
divine law in our contemporary political discourse – certainly Habermas would object – 
but Locke does not consider himself in violation of his epistemic responsibilities in 
invoking it.  Publicly accessible reason obviously meant something quite different to 
Locke than it does to Habermas.89
Furthermore, Locke does not profess any confidence in opinion in religious 
matters.  In the Essay, for example, Locke states: “And if opinions and persuasions of 
others, whom we know and think well of, be a ground of assent, men have reason to be 
heathens in Japan, Mahumetans in Turkey, Papists in Spain, Protestants in England, and 
Lutherans in Sweden.”90  Moreover, not all of these opinions are to be tolerated.  When 
we turn to the Letter, we find more ambivalence with respect to the value of opinion and 
public accessibility in the narrow sense.  Here Locke does not so much insist upon 
88 Wolterstorff, 139. 
89 One may argue that intellectual and social conditions have changed since Locke such that Habermas’s 
interpretation is justified. However, it may be equally the case that Habermas tacitly subscribes to the 
disenchantment version of the subtraction story and thus sees religious modes of language as less than live 
options in our current situation. Habermas has arguably softened his position here, which will be taken up 
in the next chapter. 
90 Locke, IV. xv. 6.
61
rational criteria for regulation of our beliefs but, like Hobbes and Spinoza, subordinates 
religious authority to that of the state.  It is also far from obvious that Locke’s state is 
ideally neutral with respect to competing religious conceptions.  For example, it is 
evident that Locke’s definition of church – “a voluntary society of men, joining 
themselves together of their own accord in order to the public worshiping of God in such 
a manner as they deem acceptable to Him, and effectual to the salvation of their souls”91 – 
is not a neutral description of ‘church’ but clearly reflects a repudiation of the historic 
Catholic position.92  If this is to be the civil authority’s definition of ‘church,’ it has the 
practical consequence of extending religious liberty only to those denominations – 
whether Anglican or nonconformist – with which the magistrate is sympathetic. 
Moreover, Locke’s functionalist definition of church with its implications for the 
privatization of religion “treats the attainment of salvation as if it were some mysterious 
technical exercise that has little, if anything, to do with the business of living a good 
life.”93  These weaknesses notwithstanding, the Letter does represent an advance over the 
religious enthusiasm and fanaticism that Locke criticizes, although at times he is heavy-
handed in his exclusion of religious orientations with which he disagrees. 
However, I want to return to the issue of state neutrality with respect to religion in 
the Letter.  Many readers – not the least of whom were the framers of the U.S. 
Constitution – have interpreted Locke as advocating the separation of church and state. 
And while he does conceptually distinguish between their respective functions, it is not 
clear that he is opposed to the established Church of England, although he maintains that 
91 Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration, ed. Patrick Romanell (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1950), 20. 
92 Newman, 118.
93 Newman, 120. 
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no religion should wield civil authority in the name of orthodoxy.  Locke, like many of 
his Royal Society fellows, was an Anglican Whig who had a certain agenda in excluding 
those he deemed fanatics or enthusiasts.  The Anglican clergy, cited above, in their 
support of reason and Natural Religion functioned as a defense against the alleged 
revelations of the enthusiasts who, according to Locke, were shirking their epistemic 
duties and fanatics who were willing to resort to violence to defend and promote 
dogmatic claims for which we could at best marshal “moral certainty.”  As such, the 
established church was a great ally of Locke’s program and the rhetoric of clerics like 
Wilkins, Tillotson, and Sprat was certainly not neutral with respect to other 
denominations and Locke’s principle of tolerance was in effect withheld from the latter. 
Nevertheless, there is a tension here between Locke’s professed Anglicanism and 
his sympathy for dissenters and, from an Anglican perspective, heterodox views.  He had 
sympathy for the plight of persecuted minorities, such as Quakers and Unitarians.  Some 
members of these groups, in turn, saw Locke as a great ally.  For example, William 
Popple, who translated Locke’s Letter from Latin to English in 1689, was a Unitarian.94  
Moreover, Locke may not have been a Trinitarian either.  The aforementioned effort to 
articulate a less doctrinally elaborate Christianity, one more amenable to reason, brought 
many of the Latitudinarians, including Locke, under suspicion of Socinianism, a 
movement founded in Italy by Faustus Socinus (1539 – 1607).  Among the tenets it 
denied were: the Trinity, original sin, predestination, eternal punishment, and the 
atonement.95  Regardless of the orthodoxy of Locke’s Christianity, scholars have noted 
94 Romanell, 6.
95 Kim Ian Parker, The Biblical Politics of John Locke (Wilfrid Laurier Univ. Press, 2004), 17.
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that many of the arguments for tolerance he employs in the Letter were borrowed from 
dissenters, such as Anabaptists, Socinians, and Dutch Arminians.96  As one might expect, 
these arguments are religious, rather than secular, in character.  Locke employs many of 
these biblically derived arguments throughout the Letter, which are by no means original 
to him.97  According to Perez Zagorin, the modern foundations of religious tolerance in 
the seventeenth century are deeply Christian; they do not arrive as the invention of a 
liberal philosophy that is inherently secular.98  This point not only serves as  a corrective 
to the ‘wars of religion’ narrative that usually accompanies the secularization thesis, but 
also demonstrates that Locke felt free to appeal to explicitly religious sources, in addition 
to secular reason. 
From these considerations, it becomes clear that purely secular reason and 
separation of church and state – key components of modern political organization and 
crucial for Habermas’s understanding of public accessibility – are lacking in Locke’s 
theory.  Although Locke’s subordination of religious to political authority makes possible 
the kind of shift the standard secularization thesis describes, it is safe to say that Locke’s 
subsequent interpreters are more responsible for this shift than Locke himself.  This is not 
to say that we are not justified in modifying or expanding Locke’s insights and 
appropriating them pragmatically in our contemporary political context, but any honest 
96 Perez Zagorin, How the Idea of Religious Toleration Came to the West (Princeton University Press, 
2003), 258.
97 By my count Locke explicitly appeals to Scripture no less than eight times, citing chapter and verse, and 
alludes to it many more times. 
98 Zagorin, 289. 
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interpretation should take into account his religious motivations even if we do not share 
them.99  
Likewise, the religious motivations of the natural theologians of the Royal Society 
are quite complex and do not support a straightforwardly secularist interpretation of 
public reason arising in the modern period.  On the contrary, it was almost taken for 
granted by these thinkers that the new science, represented most perfectly by Newtonian 
mechanics, is eminently compatible with religion.  Indeed, many of the most recognized 
members of the Royal Society were intent to show that the new science proved the 
existence of God and refuted the claims of materialists and atheists usually identified 
with the likes of Hobbes and Spinoza.100  Boyle, for example, left a large sum of money 
upon his death for an annual series of lectures “to prove the truth of the Christian religion 
against the infidels, without descending to any controversies among Christians.”101 
Wilkins claimed that astronomy in particular “proves of a God and a providence and 
incites our hearts to a greater admiration and fear of his omnipotency.”102  And Samuel 
Clarke, an apologist for Newton, staunchly defended the claim that Natural Religion 
provides no succor for the materialists.  The most religiously eccentric member of the 
Royal Society, however, was Glanville who made a case for the existence of witches that 
served as a major authority for witch hunters in England and New England.103  Glanville 
99 For a fuller exploration of the theological underpinnings of Locke’s political theory, see Jeremy Waldron, 
God, Locke, and Equality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).  Waldron says the following 
with regard to the liberal value of equality, but one might well substitute “tolerance”: “Equality cannot do 
its work unless it is accepted among those whom it consecrates as equals. Locke believed this general 
acceptance was impossible apart from the principle’s foundation in religious teaching. We believe 
otherwise. Locke, I suspect, would have thought we were taking a risk” 243.
100 For example, in Clarke’s 1704 Boyle lectures, Buckley, 170.
101 Quoted in Buckley, 170. 
102 Buckley, 129.
103 Popkin, 211. 
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was concerned to prove not only the existence of witches, but the existence of a spiritual 
world more generally, and thereby to refute materialism.  Whatever one makes of 
Glanville’s religious eccentricities, the common thread running throughout the early 
Society’s publications is their confidence in the harmony between theism and science and 
the apologetic use of Newton to refute materialism.  This is especially true of Clarke, 
who was to take Newton’s fragmentary thoughts on natural theology and develop an 
elaborate apologetic project.  The public use of reason for these thinkers included 
theology in no uncertain terms.  Granted, as Buckley points out, the unintended 
consequences of these developments aided and abetted Christianity’s self-alienation and 
contributed to, rather than refuted, modern atheism.  Nevertheless, the apologetic intent 
of these thinkers is undeniable.  This complicates the narrative of the standard 
secularization thesis that has religion retreating in the modern period before the advance 
of science. 
The preceding narrative is intended to show that the evaluation of public opinion 
by relevant modern thinkers is rather more ambivalent than Habermas maintains. 
Moreover, the association of public accessibility with secularism is likewise less obvious 
upon closer examination.  To his credit, Habermas allows that the golden age of public 
opinion as critical discourse in England was short-lived, effectively coming to an end in 
the nineteenth century.  I merely contend that the demotion of public opinion among 
elites happened earlier; a case could even be made that ‘public opinion’ never quite lost 
its “polemically devalued association with pure prejudice.”  Successors, such as J.S. Mill, 
whom Habermas sees as primarily facilitating the demotion of public opinion in the 
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nineteenth century, were simply extending the liberal tradition they inherited.  Indeed, the 
currency “public opinion” enjoyed during the eighteenth century was largely the 
achievement of the conservative opposition.  It is more than a little ironic, then, that 
aspects of the public sphere such as its meta-topicality and its role as an independent 
check on power, so often associated with liberal political theory and secularization more 
generally, were largely the product of Tory opposition and conservative elements within 
the Whig party, like Burke.  Habermas, again to his credit, recognizes this quite clearly. 
Despite the conservative origins of the term ‘public opinion’ in the English case, 
it would be a mistake to construe public opinion as denoting a singular voice in the 
eighteenth century.  The opinion of the public does not acquire a monolithic 
understanding until the nineteenth century and it is during this time, especially under the 
pen of Mill that ‘public opinion’ comes under criticism for being oppressive and stifling 
genuine critical debate rather than facilitating it.  According to Habermas, the demotion 
of public opinion is roughly coextensive with Mill, although once again, it is possible to 
locate it earlier.  But Mill does offer a more developed critique of ‘public opinion’ than 
his predecessors in the liberal tradition, largely because public opinion came to enjoy 
such a prominent place. 
Mill’s utilitarian predecessor, Jeremy Bentham, for example, held that “the 
greater the number of temptations to which the exercise of political power is exposed” the 
more the government requires “the superintendence of the public.”104  Thus Bentham 
spoke of the “regime of publicity.”  The legitimacy of the public opinion was, for him, 
104 Habermas, 100.
67
simply a given.105  For Bentham, then, as his utilitarianism would suggest, majority 
opinion served as the criterion for whether a political decision was made in the public 
interest.  By contrast, Mill saw public opinion as oppressive.  Laws passed under ‘public’ 
pressure did not necessarily reflect a reasonable consensus of private individuals, but 
often served the competing interests of the powerful.  In other words, public opinion 
represented only a narrow public, that of propertied individuals; the franchise was still 
effectively withheld from a wider population that did not count as constituting the 
‘public’ under the existing definition.  So while Bentham could perhaps complacently 
understand public opinion as identical to the general interest, Mill spoke of the “yoke of 
public opinion”106 as something to be thrown off.  According to Mill scholar, Alan Ryan, 
“public opinion is a valuable ally of utilitarianism, but may be simply despotic …. Unlike 
Bentham, he (Mill) thinks the pressure of public opinion so dangerous that we need a 
countervailing doctrine of individuality and independence of mind to ensure that social 
pressure is kept within bounds.”107  Thus Mill condemns public opinion as a “yoke” and a 
“means of coercion.”108 
One can interpret Mill’s On Liberty, which makes a plea for tolerance of a 
diversity of opinions in the public sphere, in light of his aversion to the dominant opinion. 
He offers four basic arguments that no opinion should be suppressed: 1) the opinion that 
is compelled to silence might nevertheless be true; 2) even though an opinion may be in 
error, we might nevertheless learn from it; 3) the common opinion, even if true, will only 
105 Habermas, 100. 
106 Habermas, 133.
107 Alan Ryan, introduction to  Utilitarianism and Other Essays by John Stuart Mill and Jeremy Bentham 
(Penguin Classics, 1987).
108 Habermas, 133. 
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be considered mere prejudice if not vigorously contested to uncover its rational grounds; 
4) if unchallenged, the meaning of the prevailing opinion will be lost and it will become 
an empty dogma.  Habermas asserts that Mill’s argument proceeds by analogy with 
religious tolerance; he is not very confident in the efficacy of rational criticism among the 
masses to vindicate minority opinions.  Therefore, On Liberty represents a plea, not for 
criticism, but for tolerance.  In other words, Mill does not aim for consensus which may 
well be dangerous, but, as the title suggests, for liberty.  However, Mill does not throw 
reason to the wind; he speaks of the rational grounds of the majority opinion and argues 
that such grounds should be challenged if for no other reason than to convince those who 
disagree with the dominant opinion that it is not a mere prejudice.  The arbiter for Mill is 
still reason, but not the calculating reason of the ‘public’ which can function as a tool of 
private interests.  He recognizes the power of majority opinion and the power that 
rhetoric plays in manipulating that opinion, to the extent that the ‘majority opinion’ was 
no longer necessarily in the interests of the majority.  The bourgeois class did not 
constitute the majority in nineteenth century England, but it still constituted the ‘public’. 
Mill sought to separate reason from private competing interests and make it truly public. 
But doing so entailed allowing equal voice for all opinions, even those deemed 
unconventional or harmful to majority interests.  In Mill’s estimation, when faced with a 
compromise between consensus and liberty, liberalism should err on the side of liberty. 
For Habermas, Mill’s appeal to liberty, ironically, spells the end of an era in liberalism; 
the golden age of public opinion as rational-critical discourse was over, assuming it ever 
existed.  Of course, this reading of Mill can no doubt be questioned, but it suffices for my 
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purposes to establish Habermas’s position on consensus vis-à-vis liberty.  Habermas 
follows Locke, for whom rational consensus is not only possible but desirable, rather than 
Mill for whom it is arguably neither.  
However, one could also question the extent to which Mill’s eschewing of public 
opinion within a liberal context provides any succor to those who want to bring religious 
arguments into public, since he was certainly no friend to religion.  Indeed, he is often 
credited with reinforcing the public/private distinction that has become a hallmark of 
contemporary liberalism.  For example, Rorty comments, “[it] is never an objection to a 
religious belief that there is no evidence for it. The only possible objection to it can be 
that it intrudes an individual project into a social and cooperative project, and thereby 
offends against the teachings of On Liberty.”109  However, this understanding of the 
requirements of democracy has been challenged by Rorty’s fellow pragmatist Jeffrey 
Stout.  Like Rorty, Stout also eschews the notion of a common basis upon which all 
reasonable people must agree.  But he questions the reliance in many liberal theories, 
Habermas’s included, on social contract theory.  Why should we expect to be able to find 
up front, as it were, a common basis for politics which is contractually binding on all 
rational people?  Stout takes a Hegelian direction on the development of social norms; 
they are not discovered ‘up front’ but are developed dialectically.  He invites us to 
consider any social practice such as art, science, or sport.  Norms, as products of social 
practices, constrain behavior, but they also allow, upon a Hegelian interpretation, for 
novel performances that have the potential to transform the practice, and thus, its norms. 
This opens the door to expressive freedom within norms.  Once this dialectical point is in 
109 Rorty, “Pragmatism as Romantic Polytheism,” 120 – 21. 
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place, it is “no longer clear why we need to tether our social and political theory to the 
search for a common basis.”110  We are not all likely to agree on which principles to 
accept or reject because we occupy different dialectical locations depending upon the 
social practices in which we have been able to participate:
Among these practices will be religious practices, which carry with them their 
own styles of reasoning, their own vocabularies, and their own possibilities of 
expressive freedom. If the thoroughly dialectical view of epistemic entitlement is 
correct, why expect all socially cooperative, respectful persons to have reason to 
accept the same set of explicitly formulated norms, regardless of dialectical 
location?111  
Stout sees no reason to expect such a basis to be forthcoming.  The problem with social 
contract theory is that it feels the need to police the expressive freedom of citizens.  It 
seeks to avoid both the communitarian threat to individual autonomy and the anarchist 
threat of war of all against all.  The former achieves stability but at too steep a cost and 
the latter fails to achieve it at all.  So the social contract theorist wants to fix the rules of 
public expression.  But this is problematic from the standpoint of expressive freedom, 
including religious expression.  The expressivist would never be tempted, says Stout, to 
consider King’s speeches, for example, as mere IOUs for secular reasons and, 
accordingly, sees no reason for self-censorship or restraint on religious expression in 
public.  Without stretching too much, I believe it is possible to see Mill, despite his 
secularism, in the tradition of expressivist freedom along with the American examples 
Stout cites such as Walt Whitman and Ralph Waldo Emerson.  The above quotation from 
110 Stout, 79.
111 Stout, 79. 
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Rorty comes in his essay “Pragmatism as Romantic Polytheism,” so perhaps it is fitting 
to note the Romantic influences on Mill that provide a counterbalance to his secularism. 
Like other figures of the nineteenth century such as Carlyle, Mill rebelled against 
the order of mutual benefit with its leveling out of humanity.112  They felt cross-
pressured, in Taylor’s term, between the rational world order and a Romanticism that 
allowed for heroism and greatness.  This rebellion against the order of mutual benefit can 
be seen as a major cause of Mill’s breakdown at the age of twenty and his subsequent 
disaffection from Bentham and father James Mill.  What saved Mill, according to his own 
account, was Romanticism, particularly that of Coleridge.  Raised a religious skeptic, 
Romantic sources of meaning took the place of traditional religious ones for Mill.  Ryan 
provides insight into Mill’s assessment of a thoroughly secularized society:
Mill contrasted the men of the eighteenth century and the men of the nineteenth. 
The men of the eighteenth century were skeptical, unemotional, objective in their 
outlook. They saw the folly and superstition of the ancien régime but they did not 
see the emotional supports which tradition and religious sentiment had provided 
…. what Coleridge asks of an institution is ‘what does it mean?’ – looking, of 
course, not at the literal meaning, but looking to uncover the attachment which it 
sustains. Mill resolved to try to combine the virtues of the eighteenth century and 
the insights of the nineteenth.113 
Taylor recognizes this same impulse to reconcile skepticism and Romanticism in many of 
the poets of the era, such as Arnold and Hardy.  They embodied the tension between 
unbelief and nostalgia for what had been lost through disenchantment.  Through the 
112 For Taylor, the order of mutual benefit is based upon the idea of providential order, later impersonalized 
in deism. Socially, the order of mutual benefit is expressed in the virtues of “civilization”: politeness, 
discipline, and benevolence. However, some thinkers chaffed under the disciplinary requirements of such a 
social order (Taylor mentions Friedrich Nietzsche, 256) and sought to recapture the greatness and heroism 
of the past.
113 Ryan, 36. 
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creation of a “subtler language”114 they attempted to replace the meaning lost by 
abandoning traditional religious language.  Without straying too far into a fuller 
exposition of Romanticism, it suffices to say that secularization in the form of the 
rationalization of the public sphere and the order of mutual benefit was not without its 
countervailing responses, culminating in what Taylor calls the immanent counter-
enlightenment. 
Habermas does not make room for such aesthetic counterpoints to modernity, 
because the aesthetic, like the religious in his judgment, is non-rational and non-
communicative.  Indeed, Habermas denies, unlike Weber, that modernity and 
disenchantment has occasioned a loss of meaning.  In a fully rationalized society, for 
Habermas, the ‘malaise of modernity’ would disappear because all three forms of 
rationality would be fully unleashed: the normative and expressive, as well as the 
instrumental.115  Nevertheless, he has recently allowed that not all of human experience 
can be adequately captured through the monopoly of secular language within the public 
sphere.  Hence religious language still has great semantic power, a power that has, at least 
as of yet, no secular counterpart.  It suffices for now to note that the historical wellsprings 
of modernity to which Habermas appeals are not without religious and Romantic 
undercurrents. 
114 Taylor, 353. 
115 See Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, Vol. 1: Reason and the Rationalization of Society, 
trans. Thomas McCarthy (Beacon Press, 1985), 238 – 39. 
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Secularization: So What Happened? 
The foregoing discussion enables us to modify our understanding of the secularization 
thesis.  I have been arguing that Habermas, at least in his early work, adopts a version of 
the secularization thesis that amounts to a subtraction story.  In effect, the rationalization 
of society brought about a decline in religious worldviews, or the disenchantment of the 
world; religious belief was forced to retreat from the public sphere.  More recently, 
however, Habermas has questioned the disenchantment narrative of secularization he 
received from Weber.  There are a number of reasons for thinking such a narrative 
inadequate, both from a purely historical point of view and from the perspective of its 
potential for political praxis. 
In general, such a narrative describes religious ideas, such as God, retreating from 
the public sphere and being replaced by a rationalistic, scientific worldview.  This is a 
classic subtraction story.  Although Taylor does deal with the notion of disenchantment in 
his narrative of secularization, he is scrupulous to avoid describing it in terms of 
humanity having divested itself of certain confining religious perspectives.  Indeed, such 
an account does not do justice to the complexity of the processes of secularization.  To be 
sure, Taylor is concerned with how belief in God lost its default status and came to be 
regarded as one option among many, and perhaps not even the most plausible possibility. 
But he does not interpret this decline in belief as human beings simply outgrowing the 
notion of a supreme being when faced with a scientific, rationalized worldview.  Rather, 
traditional religious sources of meaning are replaced with other, secular sources.  There 
will be more on this in the next chapter. 
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Stout provides additional insights into the meaning of secularization.  According 
to him, the primary cause of secularization is not that religiosity declined in the modern 
period, or that the world was disenchanted, or the public sphere emptied of God as some 
have contended.116  Rather, it was the intensity and plurality of religious devotion that 
made secularization a practical necessity.  He cites historian Christopher Hill’s study of 
the use of the Bible in seventeenth century English politics.  He argues that by the 1650s, 
the Bible had lost its authority as a public arbiter: “Twenty years of frenzied discussion 
had shown that text-swapping and text-distortion solved nothing: agreement was not to be 
reached even among the godly on what exactly the Bible said and meant.”117  Importantly, 
the dethroning of Scripture as a public arbiter had little to do with the Bible losing its 
credibility among the majority of the citizenry.  Stout distinguishes between two 
meanings of ‘authority’ in relation to Scripture: its authority over an individual’s 
conscience and its public discursive authority.  The Bible maintained the former but lost 
the latter.  Authority over an individual’s conscience, however, is an inadequate basis for 
public persuasion.  Since the authority of churches were demoted following the 
Reformation, individuals were left with private interpretations of the Bible, or even 
private “revelations” as in the case of Locke’s “enthusiasts,” upon which there could be 
no consensus. 
There is a connection here with Warner’s discussion of anti-clericalism in the 
English colonies in America.  Since popular Protestant revivals, such as the Great 
Awakening, encouraged ordinary believers to read and interpret Scripture for themselves, 
116 Stout, 98.
117 Quoted in Stout, 94. 
75
theological discussion began to take place among lay persons in the meta-topical space, 
rather than exclusively among professional clergy in seminaries and disseminated in 
churches.  As a result, religious authority became decentralized.  In such a climate of 
religious pluralism – or one might even say individualism – appeals to Scripture become 
far less useful for brokering consensus than appeals to shared public reason.  It is not that 
Scripture lost its authority in the minds of the citizenry or that religious devotion 
declined; quite the opposite.  Rather, it simply became impossible to build political 
consensus on the basis of contested readings of the Bible.  So while the Great Awakening 
may have increased religious devotion in America, it decreased religion’s utility as a 
consensus builder.  Thus, citizens realized that fruitful public discourse could not 
presuppose any specific theological framework.  Secularization, in the American case, 
was not a process of disenchantment but a function of pragmatism; citizens had to find a 
way to broker agreement in the absence of a presupposed theology.  Given the plurality 
of American religiosity, political arguments had to be sufficiently generalized or 
secularized, in order to achieve wide support, but that is not to say that they lost all ties to 
the religious imagination and moral outlook of the citizenry. 
Thus, Stout’s account of secularization sees it as primarily a practical political 
consequence of religious pluralism, rather than a process of disenchantment.  Moreover, 
in Stout’s estimation, the contemporary secular public sphere does not presuppose or 
produce citizens who have no robust theological commitments.118  Secularized public 
discourse involves the pragmatic efforts of citizens as they engage in actual 
118 Stout, 98. 
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communication and has nothing whatsoever to say about humanity having outgrown 
religious worldviews or a cosmos devoid of religious significance. 
The narrative I have been telling above is certainly compatible with this thesis. 
One can see clearly in Locke’s Letter, for example, that the impetus for tolerance is the 
plurality of religious interpretations that lacked the practical means of brokering 
consensus by appealing to religion itself.  Locke almost certainly did not make his 
arguments on the basis of the alleged disenchantment of the world occasioned by the 
march of science.  As we have seen, Locke and his Royal Society fellows were optimistic 
about the prospects of reconciling science and religion.  But in offering this narrative, I 
am not merely aiming to correct a mistaken historical thesis, but to challenge the way in 
which the subtraction version of the secularization thesis has been employed to exclude 
religious language from public discourse. 
Like Stout, I see public discourse happening at the level of praxis rather than in an 
ideal speech situation or a Rawlsian contractarian framework.  The only account of 
secularization we need is a pragmatic one which allows citizens to understand each other, 
while suspending judgment on the epistemic status of religious worldviews.  This is a 
weak account of secularization as opposed to a strong account, which makes epistemic 
judgments regarding the rationality of religious worldviews.  We might also describe this 
distinction as the difference between secularization and secularism. The former need not 
entail any presuppositions regarding the plausibility of religious claims, whereas the latter 
usually does.119  In my judgment, such a weak account of secularization is preferable to a 
strong account that marginalizes religious citizens from the public sphere by placing upon 
119 Stout, 97. 
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them a deontological requirement to translate their language into strongly secular terms 
as in some interpretations of Rawls and Habermas, although both thinkers have been 
careful to nuance their respective positions.  In my judgment, and that of pragmatists such 
as Stout, there is no normative restriction on religious arguments; it is simply the case 
that in pluralistic contexts, it does not often advance one’s rhetorical purposes to appeal 
to them.  However, sometimes it does.  Stout has talked about secularists engaging in 
imminent critique with religious interlocutors in a pragmatic effort to persuade them 
using arguments religious citizens would find convincing.  I will have more to say about 
pragmatist responses to Habermas below, and admittedly, I have not refuted the 
normative status of publicly accessible, secular reason, strongly conceived. That will be 
the project of the following chapters. For the meantime, however, it is instructive to note 
that secularization does not imply secularism historically. If this is the case, the secularist 
cannot rely on a subtraction story of secularization as disenchantment to justify the 
exclusion of religion from the public sphere. In my judgment, the secularist’s narrative 
simply cannot perform that kind of philosophical heavy lifting, as I have argued above. In 
this chapter, I have sought to complicate efforts to arrive at an unequivocally secularist 
conception of publicly accessible reason from the modern period. Since the publication of 
Structural Transformation, Habermas has also reevaluated the subtraction story implicit 
in his account of the rise of the public sphere. Through interweaving the historical 
counter-narrative in this chapter with Habermas’s early thinking on the public sphere, I 
have tried to give us a sense of where Habermas has come from and where he is going in 
thinking about religion and the secularization thesis. This historical background will 
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position us to pursue these questions in more detail and to closely engage Habermas’s 
more recent contributions to the debate over religion in the public sphere. 
In the next chapter, I will examine Habermas’s reevaluation of the secularization 
thesis and his translation requirement – the requirement that religious citizens translate 
their potential contributions to public debate from a private, religious idiom into a 
publicly accessible, secular language. Continuing the theme of this chapter, I will argue 
that the translation requirement, construed as a normative requirement, gains its purchase 
from the subtraction story of secularization that Taylor criticizes. Insofar as one can offer 
a plausible alternative description of the phenomenological conditions of contemporary 
secularism, one can weaken the rationale behind the translation requirement. This 
translation requirement, however, can be construed in stronger and weaker terms. In what 
follows, I will explore not only what Habermas means given his reevaluation of the 
secularization thesis, including his diagnosis that we live in a postsecular society, but also 
show that stronger formulations of the translation requirement are problematic. I will 
attempt to show that Habermas’s requirement is better construed as a pragmatic move to 
broker practical agreement, not a normative rule to create an idealized consensus. I will 
also examine the semantic potential of religious language that remains in a secularized 
context. As we shall see, Habermas is very sensitive to this semantic potential and fears 
that something important may be ‘lost in translation’ as it were. I suspect Habermas’s 
worry is justified and I look at some examples, including one from Habermas himself, 
that illustrate the semantic potential of religious language especially in the context of 
human rights discourse. Here Habermas stands in the tradition of the Frankfurt School in 
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attempting to salvage the resources of religious language in a secular age. In what 
follows, we will look more closely at how Habermas understands his secular project and 
how it might actually accommodate religious sources.
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Chapter 2
Competing Narratives of Secularization: Habermas and Taylor
We have seen in the previous chapter that Habermas’s early critical theory subsumes a 
subtraction narrative of secularization. In what follows, I continue to explore this theme, 
particularly as his account of secularization impinges on his translation requirement. The 
translation requirement is the requirement that religious citizens translate their 
particularistic faith language into an allegedly universal secular language.120 Religious 
citizens must satisfy this criterion if they are to participate in public discourse. Before 
offering a critique of this requirement, it is important to understand what Habermas 
means by ‘secular’ and his rationale for assuming it to be publicly accessible. In what 
follows, I treat this subject in depth, tracing what Habermas says about secularism, and 
post-secularism, in his writings. In brief, Habermas contends that secular language 
commits us to fewer beliefs, thus offering a better chance at consensus within the public 
sphere. Because of the religionists’ additional substantive commitments, they have 
heavier metaphysical baggage, making their epistemic or justificatory predicament more 
difficult than that of the secularist. However, I argue that this position assumes a 
subtraction narrative of secularization that underestimates the weighty substantive 
commitments that the secularist has. In making the case that one ought not to assign 
epistemic advantage to ‘secular’ substantive commitments in the public sphere, I continue 
120 As I explore in chapter 3, Habermas later modifies his position, such that he restricts this requirement to 
the ‘formal’ public sphere, i.e., legislatures and the like, as opposed to the ‘informal’ public sphere, i.e., 
public opinion, the press, etc. 
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to utilize Taylor’s sophisticated analysis of the phenomenological conditions of 
secularism. If my thesis concerning this lack of epistemic advantage for secular 
substantive commitments is true, it also casts doubt on the rationale behind the translation 
requirement, because it casts doubt on one of the primary motivations for recommending 
it in the first place.
Whether or not the translation requirement is normative has far-reaching 
implications for political discourse. Through a detailed study of Habermas’s writings on 
the subject, I adduce two interpretations of the requirement: in the first, the requirement is 
construed as normative in a Kantian sense, but in the second it is construed pragmatically. 
I make a case that the first sense, although plausibly interpreted to capture Habermas’s 
meaning in many contexts, is overwrought and unworkable when it comes to applying it 
to political praxis. Here I look at Maeve Cooke’s critique of Habermas along pragmatic 
lines and extrapolate some further criticisms. In my judgment, if the translation 
requirement is to function usefully in democratic discourse at all, it must be construed 
pragmatically. But this suggestion seriously weakens, if not completely undermines, any 
normative force Habermas claims for it. Moreover, construing the translation requirement 
pragmatically entails giving up consensus as the main goal of democratic discourse. 
However, I argue that this is consistent with what Habermas wants to say about discourse 
in a postmetaphysical context. Here, in my judgment, a pragmatic interpretation of the 
translation requirement is more consistent with Habermas’s project than the stronger 
construal. 
Finally, toward the end of this chapter, I look at problems inherent in the task of 
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translation, regardless of which construal we choose. There are several cognitive contents 
that are arguably ‘lost in translation’. In this context, I use the recent work of Nicholas 
Wolterstorff to illustrate the public accessibility that yet remains in religious language, 
and the violence it suffers when translated into the reigning secular idiom. Habermas has 
expressed similar sentiments in his recent writings. In this final section, I explore the 
ways in which what I call ‘transcendent moral sources’ might still have public import. In 
addition, I argue that religious belief is never purely private; it is fair to subject it to 
scrutiny and, hence, there is no reason for excluding it from public discourse on the 
grounds that it’s insufficiently ‘accessible’ to reason. I conclude the chapter by showing 
how theistic and pragmatic approaches to the question of religion’s public accessibility, 
despite their differences, dovetail nicely, as seen in the work of Wolterstorff and Stout. 
While I will go into greater depth on all of these issues in this chapter, first we 
must start, as they say, at the beginning, with Habermas’s early accounts of 
secularization. We will then be in a position to appreciate how his understanding of the 
term ‘secular’ informs his statement of the translation requirement. 
Secularization as Disenchantment: Empirical and Normative Aspects 
We have seen in the previous chapter that Habermas’s account of the rise of the public 
sphere, though constructive in many ways, implicitly subsumes a subtraction narrative of 
secularization.  He continues this disenchantment narrative more explicitly through his 
work in TCA, particularly volume two, in which he takes up “the linguistification of the 
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sacred.”121  By this he means the process whereby the authority of the sacred, usually 
mediated through rituals and non-linguistic symbols, gives way to the authority of an 
achieved consensus through communicative action.  Habermas closely follows Weber 
and Durkheim in linking this process with secularization conceived as disenchantment. 
As Habermas says: “the aura of rapture and terror that emanates from the sacred, the 
spellbinding power of the holy, is sublimated into the binding/bonding force of 
criticizable validity claims and at the same time turned into an everyday occurrence.”122  
He recognizes that the monotheistic, or Axial, religions were a stage in the 
“rationalization of worldviews,” as does Weber, but this process of rationalization 
culminates in “shrinking down the domain of the sacred” and leaving “behind a nature 
bereft of gods.”123  Thus, “rationalized worldviews have to compete with the authority of 
a fully secularized science.”124  Again, this is a classic subtraction story.  We have already 
noted some flaws in Habermas’s historical reconstruction of this narrative, but his 
normative arguments for the priority of secular reason merit closer attention, which is the 
purpose of this chapter. 
However, we will not be leaving the socio-historical questions behind entirely as 
the normative and descriptive halves of the secularization thesis, although conceptually 
distinct, often mutually support each other.  It is slightly misleading to speak of the 
secularization thesis in the singular; there are different versions and determining precisely 
what secularization as a phenomenon entails in any detail is a daunting task.  I suggested 
121 Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, Vol 2: Lifeworld and System: A Critique of 
Functionalist Reason, trans. Thomas McCarthy (Beacon Press, 1985), 77.
122 Habermas, 77.
123 Habermas, 83.
124 Habermas, 83.
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above, following Stout, that secularization, which nobody seriously denies is a real 
phenomenon, should be conceived as a pragmatic response to pluralism rather than the 
pronouncement that science has revealed a universe “bereft of gods.”  Such a 
materialistic assumption is no more necessary for the smooth exercise of discursive 
democracy than are the theistic assumptions of previous generations.  If Taylor is correct, 
secularization is not primarily a matter of materialistic assumptions replacing theistic 
ones, but of a proliferation of positions along this axis.  Of course, difficulties 
surrounding definitions of “secularization” are analogous to those surrounding definitions 
of “religion.”  There seems to be a great deal of latitude when it comes to defining these 
terms, and given a sufficiently wide definition of religion we can make secularization 
seem like a marginal phenomenon and vice versa.  I do not want to minimize the extent to 
which something that merits the name “secularization” has occurred, but I suggest we ask 
anew the “how” and “why” questions. 
Generally, the secularization thesis, at least in its orthodox version, contends, at 
the very minimum, that religious belief and practice have declined under conditions of 
modernity broadly conceived (the Enlightenment, and the Scientific and Industrial 
Revolutions).  Again, we must be wary of construing religion too broadly, for example as 
one’s ultimate concern, lest we conclude that nothing meriting the description 
“secularization” has actually happened.  Although it is the case that religion is a resilient 
phenomenon and has changed in response to pressures from the challenges of exclusive 
humanism and a plethora of other options along the axis, it would be disingenuous to 
claim that religion is so infinitely malleable that it can withstand any conceivable 
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revision. Taylor settles upon Roy Wallis’s and Steve Bruce’s definition of religion: 
“actions, beliefs, and institutions predicated upon the assumption of the existence of 
either supernatural entities with powers of agency, or impersonal powers or processes 
possessed of moral purpose, which have the capacity to set the conditions of, or to 
intervene in, human affairs.”125  
Wallis and Bruce are defenders of an “orthodox” theory of secularization against 
what could be called “revisionist” theories which contend that, while secularization may 
have occurred, it is a more marginal phenomenon, even in the West, than orthodox 
theorists contend.  In some cases, revisionism also entails the suspicion that orthodox 
secularization theory is ideologically over-determined, that is to say, motivated by the 
very materialist assumptions that (allegedly) neutral social science is supposed to 
describe.  Again, I have no interest in contending that secularization is a marginal 
phenomenon; neither, for that matter, is religion, in my judgment.  The ideologically 
over-determined line of some revisionists is, in my view, a gross overstatement. 
Nevertheless, as Taylor rightly points out, scholarship in this area is often circumscribed 
by certain kinds of “unthought”126 or hidden substantive assumptions on both sides of the 
debate.  This observation is a cautionary one and should not be equated with a 
postmodern hermeneutics of suspicion, despite Taylor’s unfortunate use of that 
Foucauldian term.  Indeed, awareness of our substantive assumptions, and those of our 
interlocutors, should allow us to widen our sympathies and vocabularies rather than 
attribute ideological blindness to one another. 
125 Roy Wallis and Steve Bruce, “Secularization: The Orthodox Model,” in Bruce, ed., Religion and 
Modernization, 10 – 11, cited in Taylor, 429.
126 Taylor, 427.
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Returning to the decline of religion that orthodox secularization theory describes 
and predicts in Western society, Taylor distinguishes three overlapping explanations for 
religion’s decline: “a) because it (religion) is false, and science shows this to be so; or b) 
because it is increasingly irrelevant now that we can cure ringworm by drenches; or c) 
because religion is based on authority, and modern societies give an increasingly 
important place to individual autonomy; or some combination of the above.”127  At this 
point, it is instructive to ask which explanatory option(s) Habermas favors.  In TCA, it 
seems, on the basis of the above quotations, that he favors combining all three, with 
special emphasis on (a) and (c). In his more recent writings, however, he has backed 
away from (a), which is to say, the descriptive half of the secularization thesis, but has 
maintained emphasis on (c) which I see as roughly coextensive with the normative half of 
the secularization thesis.  Religion’s loss of authority comes from its inability to 
legitimize itself discursively.  Thus, authority shifts to consensus which is achieved 
communicatively.  The dilemma facing religious worldviews, in the face of 
communicative rationality, is to either submit to discursive reason, with the erosion of 
credibility such a move entails from the perspective of science, or to place religious 
worldviews beyond discursive reason, thereby forfeiting any claim to public legitimacy 
under conditions of secular morality and law.  In addition to Weber, Habermas depends 
upon Emil Durkheim’s sociological analysis. Durkheim describes the linguistification of 
the sacred as follows: “One begins by putting articles of faith beyond discussion; then 
discussion extends to them. One wishes an explanation of them; one asks for their 
127 Taylor, 429.
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reasons for existing, and, as they submit to this search, they lose part of their force.”128  
Habermas further cements the point: 
The structural aspects of the development of religious worldviews, which 
Durkheim and Weber sketched in complementary ways, can be explained by the 
fact that the validity basis of tradition shifts from ritual action over to 
communicative action. Convictions owe their authority less and less to the 
spellbinding power and the aura of the holy, and more and more to a consensus 
that is not merely reproduced but achieved, that is, brought about 
communicatively …. The validity basis of norms of action changes insofar as 
every communicatively mediated consensus depends on reasons. The authority of 
the sacred that stands behind institutions is no longer valid per se.129
Although Habermas is operating here in the descriptive mode, echoing the sociological 
research of Durkheim and Weber, there is clearly a normative substratum to his 
description of the consensus achieved by communicative rationality.  It is not simply the 
case that in the course of societal development the authority of the sacred will recede 
before secular reason, but it should recede, precisely because religious worldviews do not 
admit of communicative redemption.  Therefore, they cannot serve as a legitimate basis 
for consensus once the disenchantment of the world is fully accomplished. 
Notwithstanding arguments that question the emphasis on disenchantment in his account 
of secularization, the normative core of Habermas’s case for the priority of discursive 
reason in a fully rationalized society remains.  I do not necessarily disagree with 
Habermas that discursive reason, the ability to validate one’s claims via reason, is a 
practical necessity within a pluralistic democracy.  However, I do not necessarily agree 
that one’s reasons must be limited to Habermas’s stringent definition of publicly 
accessible, i.e. secular, reasons.  In my judgment, it is precisely the prioritizing of secular 
128 Quoted in Habermas, 84.
129 Habermas, 89.
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reasons that assumes the broad contours of the subtraction narrative of secularization that 
needs to be challenged.  I shall return to this point in more detail in what follows. 
Secularization, Postsecular Society and the Translation Requirement
In my judgment, Habermas, despite caveat, still assumes the broad contours of the 
subtraction story of secularization.  Although he has been careful to qualify his position 
on religious language vis-à-vis public reason, there is a latent subtraction story which still 
needs to be confronted.  To clarify, I am not charging Habermas with being ideologically 
motivated in marginalizing religious worldviews in public debate.  On the contrary, I 
think this would be unfair at best and mistaken at worst.  Despite those who would 
characterize Habermas as an unqualified Enlightenment secularist, he has always been 
exceedingly modest in his construal of secularization (process) and even secularism 
(outcome), and he is aware of the latter’s potential for ideological distortion.  His 
understanding of secularism has arguably evolved, albeit in a manner consistent with his 
work in TCA, in which he argues for the formal secularism of the public sphere and, by 
extension, that the state be based upon profane sources of morality and law.  This is a 
natural outworking of a societal discourse based upon communicative action which draws 
upon the eclectic philosophical resources of Kantian autonomous reason and morality, 
speech act theory, and pragmatism.  Importantly, however, Habermas is extremely 
reticent to specify the content of his secularism; it remains simply a formal requirement 
for genuine consensus.  This reluctance to specify content has not changed, but it has 
broadened in his more recent work.  Indeed, his secularism has evolved into something 
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called “postsecularism” which we will explore below.  Habermas’s rigid adherence to the 
form/content distinction – in addition to ample textual evidence that could be marshaled – 
suffices to dispel the notion that he is an ideological secularist who is opposed to religion 
in principle.  To be sure, Habermas has self-identified as a “methodological atheist,” but 
this label simply means that as a matter of philosophical procedure, he does not 
presuppose a theological framework.  Whether or not he subscribes to a more substantive 
secularist or atheological position is a matter of debate, but such a position is certainly 
not necessary for achieving intersubjective consensus in his view.  Nevertheless, citizens 
must agree upon some common ground, a shared basis upon which to broker consensus. 
Thus, beliefs or claims that fall under the purview of discursive reason or admit of 
communicative redemption in principle are allowed, otherwise they are not.  In 
Habermas’s judgment, religious claims, as they stand, do not meet this criterion.  As 
such, if they are to achieve public legitimacy, they must be translated into the public, 
secular language.  This translation requirement is controversial, and is precisely what I 
want to challenge by closely engaging both Habermas and Taylor.  Although he does not 
address Habermas directly in this context, Taylor suggests that something like the 
translation requirement is an unreasonable constraint upon religious citizens:
Democracy requires that each citizen or group of citizens speak the language in 
public debate that is most meaningful to them. Prudence may urge us to put things 
in terms which others relate to, but to require this would be an intolerable 
imposition on citizen speech. As the sense of living in Christendom fades, and we 
recognize that no spiritual family is in charge, or speaks for the whole, there will 
be a greater sense of freedom to speak our own minds, and in some cases these 
will inescapably be formulated in religious discourse.130
130 Taylor, 532.
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Here Taylor, like Stout, suggests that it may be expedient for citizens to engage in some 
mode of translation in order to be understood by others, but to formulate this pragmatic 
move as a requirement, and a one-way requirement from religious to secular language, 
would be contrary to the democratic spirit.  Given the normative weight Habermas 
imputes to public, discursive reason his translation requirement is generally interpreted 
strongly: religious citizens are normatively bound or obligated to translate their 
particularistic language into the shared public language if they wish to gain access to 
public debate.  In other words, Habermas’s translation requirement is generally 
understood in a Kantian rather than a pragmatic sense.  I think there is room for 
reinterpretation on this matter, which I will address below.  For present purposes, 
however, I will defer to the standard interpretation and point out, through insights 
gleaned from Taylor, reasons why the translation requirement as outlined above stands in 
need of revision.  In my judgment, the translation requirement, strongly construed, is too 
heavily indebted to the mainstream secularization thesis inherited from Weber and 
Durkheim, insofar as it presupposes the priority and authority of exclusively secular 
reasons in a rationalized society. 
As we have seen, Taylor disputes the mainstream secularization thesis and this 
may well influence his evaluation of something akin to the translation requirement. 
Lately, Habermas has also questioned the subtraction story as received through Weber, 
and has acknowledged criticism of too readily accepting the secularization thesis in TCA 
and other earlier work:
I would also admit that I subsumed rather too hastily the development of religion 
in modernity with Max Weber under the “privatization of the powers of faith” and 
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suggested too quickly an affirmative answer to the question as to “whether then 
from religious truths, after the religious world views have collapsed, nothing more 
and nothing other than the secular principles of a universalist ethics of 
responsibility can be salvaged, and this means: can be accepted for good reasons, 
on the basis of insight.”131
This confession has its limits, of course: Habermas still sees religious language as 
needing to satisfy the translation requirement; in other words, religious persons must 
translate their particularistic faith language into more generally accessible secular or 
public language.  Although Habermas makes many qualifications to this position, it is a 
fair statement of his position to date. 
It is important to note, however, that the translation requirement is a salvage 
operation rather than a demolition.  In other words, Habermas follows Kant’s project of 
grounding the valuable aspects of religion, not in a particularistic tradition, but in a 
shared universal, public reason.  As Habermas points out, I think correctly, the Kantian 
“critique of religion is bound up with the motive of saving appropriation.”132  Habermas 
expresses interest in Kant’s philosophy of religion “from the perspective of how one can 
assimilate the semantic legacy of religious traditions without effacing the boundary 
between the universes of faith and knowledge.”133  For Kant, religious and metaphysical 
statements must surrender all claims to knowledge.  He famously said in his first Critique 
that he must “remove knowledge to make room for faith.”134  This means that dogmatic 
131 Jürgen Habermas, "Transcendence from Within, Transcendence in this World," in Religion and 
Rationality: Essays on Reason, God and Modernity, ed. Eduardo Mendieta (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
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religious claims must retreat from the public sphere, but in turn, religion is insulated from 
the corrosive effects of science which has a monopoly on knowledge. Although religious 
claims qua religious claims must withdraw from the public sphere, their rational content 
may well be salvaged.  Habermas sees this project as essential to Kant’s moral 
philosophy which “can be understood in general terms as an attempt to reconstruct the 
categorical ought of divine imperatives in discursive terms.”135  Elsewhere, he goes even 
further, arguing that “Kant cannot be understood without recognizing the motive of 
conceiving the essentially practical contents of the Christian tradition in such a way that 
these could perdure before the forum of reason.”136  According to Habermas, Kant sees 
religion as both a “heritage and opponent,”137 salvaging those semantic contents that 
admit of rational justification while removing the obscurantism and dogmatism that 
attaches to many religious claims.  Habermas continues in this Kantian tradition and the 
tradition of critical theory; as he points out, Adorno, Benjamin and Bloch138 also 
translated the semantic potential of religious language into secular terms.139  Kant’s 
skepticism regarding metaphysics, which brought about the “death of metaphysics” in 
subsequent German philosophy, for Habermas, is a fait accompli.  We are now living in a 
“postmetaphysical” age.  Habermas understands “postmetaphysical” as both an important 
methodological or procedural principle for all post-Kantian philosophy, and “to describe 
agnostic positions that make a sharp distinction between belief and knowledge without 
135 Habermas, 228.
136 Habermas, “Transcendence,” 68.
137 Habermas, “The Boundary between Faith and Knowledge,” 227. 
138 Habermas’s interpretation is debatable. Jacob Taubes, for example, argues that Benjamin’s messianism 
was much more substantial and less secularized than that of Adorno or Bloch. See Jacob Taubes, The 
Political Theology of Paul, trans. Dana Hollander (Stanford University Press, 2004), 74 – 76. 
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assuming the validity of a particular religion (as does modern apologetics) or without 
denying the possible cognitive content of these traditions (as does scientism).”140  In my 
judgment, this statement is also very close to what he means by “postsecular,” which we 
will take up shortly.141  Furthermore, he says: “All semantic contents count as ‘cognitive’ 
in this sense which can be translated into a form of discourse decoupled from the 
ratcheting effect of truths of revelation.  In this discourse, only ‘public’ reasons count, 
hence reasons that have the power to convince also beyond the boundaries of a particular 
religious community.”142  As mentioned in the last chapter, the Kantian architectonics of 
Habermas’s thought is widely acknowledged, and there is nothing particularly novel 
about these observations.  It is instructive to note, however, that Habermas views 
translation as non-destructive of religious meaning, even if the formal language must 
change to accommodate a wider public.143  
We are now in a better position to unpack Habermas’s understanding of 
“postsecular” vis-à-vis secularization.  Regarding the latter, he has arguably nuanced his 
position since TCA with respect to the subtraction narrative.  He argues that the two 
models of secularization – which we can roughly equate with the “orthodox” and 
“revisionist” positions outlined above – are both misguided: either secularization is 
construed by its defenders as the legitimate replacement of religious authority in the 
public sphere or it is construed by its critics as the illegitimate appropriation of resources 
which properly reside in a substantive faith tradition.  Both views treat secularization as a 
140 Habermas, 245.
141 Habermas, 245.
142 Habermas, 245.
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zero-sum game in which gains by one side can only be achieved at the expense of the 
other. Habermas contends that “this image is inconsistent with a postsecular society 
which adapts to the fact that religious communities continue to exist in a context of 
ongoing secularization.”144  In my judgment, this is a significant revision of Habermas’s 
position on the disenchantment narrative.  Indeed, he suggests that the replacement view 
of secularization sees disenchantment and the subsequent decline of religion as simply a 
given.  However, he is no longer prepared to accept even a qualified version of 
secularism which sees nothing of value in religious worldviews. That is to say, 
Habermas, in his recent work, does not affirm the ontological validity of either 
substantive religious worldviews or a purely materialistic, disenchanted worldview.  In 
our postmetaphysical context, dogmatic claims on behalf of either view warrant our 
suspicion.  Nevertheless, for practical purposes in a pluralist society, we need to get on 
with the job of discursive democracy.  Therefore, we need to position ourselves, as a 
matter of methodology, as agnostic about such matters in public and employ public 
reason – arguing from premises any rational person would accept – in making our claims. 
The above reading suggests that Habermas sees postsecular society as a condition 
necessitated by pluralism.  Under postsecular conditions, “religious consciousness must, 
first, come to terms with the cognitive dissonance of encountering other denominations 
and religions.”145  The consequences of such cognitive dissonance seems to be roughly 
equivalent to Taylor’s third sense of secularity – conditions under which belief in God 
comes to be seen as one option among many.  Habermas would probably agree with this 
144 Habermas, 329.
145 Habermas, 329.
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definition as reflecting postsecular societal conditions.  Moreover, he says that believers 
must come to terms with the fact that they are no longer the dominant voice in society, 
just as nonbelievers must contend with the fact that religion is not fading away, despite 
the predictions of the secularization thesis.  Nostalgia for either condition does not serve 
citizens of a discursive democracy well.  For Habermas, postsecular society does not 
merely mean that we must anticipate the continued existence of religious communities, 
but has normative implications for discursive democracy as well: namely, both sides must 
take each others’ cognitive claims seriously in a “complementary learning process” that 
will reflexively transform all participants, religious and secular.146  Religious 
communities must take seriously the consequences of secularization such as religious 
pluralism, the authority of the sciences, and purely secular foundations for public 
morality.  The secular liberal state, however, must also acknowledge its indebtedness to 
that religious discourse which belongs to the genealogy of human rights.  Although 
Habermas sees religious citizens as having additional burdens, not shared by their secular 
counterparts, as we shall see, he nevertheless advises non-religious citizens of liberal 
democracies to be similarly cautious in their adoption of the secularization thesis and 
especially wary of specifying the content of secularism lest it become ideological and 
incapable of learning from the religious traditions that continue to shape our discourse.  
For example, Habermas states:
As long as secular citizens are convinced that religious traditions and religious 
communities are, as it were, archaic relics of premodern societies persisting into 
the present, they can understand freedom of religion only as the cultural 
equivalent of the conservation of species threatened with extinction.  Religion no 
146 Habermas, “Prepolitical Foundations of the Constitutional State?” in Between Naturalism and Religion, 
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longer has any intrinsic justification in their eyes …. In the secularist reading, it 
can be anticipated that religious views will ultimately dissolve in the acid of 
scientific criticism and that religious communities will not be able to withstand 
the pressures of advancing cultural and social modernization. Clearly, citizens 
who adopt such an epistemic stance toward religion can no longer be expected to 
take religious contributions to contentious political issues seriously or to 
participate in a cooperative search for truth to determine whether they may 
contain elements that can be expressed in a secular language and justified by 
rational arguments.147
Habermas’s use of the term ‘postsecular’ arguably fleshes out his earlier formal 
definition of ‘secular’ and his hesitance to specify the content of secularism. 
Postsecularism ostensibly reserves judgment about the ontological validity of religious 
claims and is more modest in its assessment of the extent to which modernity has eroded 
any possible foundations for a religious worldview.  As such, Habermas continues to be a 
methodological atheist rather than a metaphysical one.  But, importantly, postsecularism 
also remains open to the possibility that religious language can fund public debate if it 
can be translated into more publicly accessible language.  This burden of translation – at 
least ideally – falls equally on all citizens: religious citizens must translate their 
particularistic language into a more universal one and secular citizens must be open to the 
semantic potential of religious language to disclose the world in a manner that purely 
philosophical language cannot (yet?) accomplish.  Such mutual translation is Habermas’s 
way of avoiding the charge made by some of his critics that translation places an 
asymmetrical burden on religious citizens.  Although postsecularism is ostensibly more 
modest in what it claims ontologically for modernity – for example, modernity should not 
be simply equated with metaphysical naturalism – Habermas maintains that there is an 
147 Habermas, “Religion in the Public Sphere: Cognitive Presuppositions for the ‘Public Use of Reason’ by 
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epistemic asymmetry among secular and religious claims.  In other words, “Under the 
conditions of postmetaphysical thinking, whoever puts forth a truth claim today must, 
nevertheless, translate experiences that have their home in religious discourse into the 
language of a scientific expert culture – and from this language retranslate them back into 
praxis.”148  
Thus, religious citizens bear a burden of translation in such contexts that secular 
citizens do not.  Moreover, religious citizens must adopt a stance of public agnosticism 
which stands in contradiction to their private religious convictions, whereas public 
agnosticism, in the case of secular citizens, will likely not be substantially different from 
their deeply held beliefs.  For example, Habermas states: “To date, only citizens 
committed to religious beliefs are required to split up their identities, as it were, into their 
public and private elements.  They are the only ones who have to translate their religious 
beliefs into a secular language before their arguments have any chance of gaining 
majority support.”149   Habermas recognizes this asymmetry of burdens but argues that it 
is justified insofar as it parallels an epistemic asymmetry between religious and secular 
claims.150  That is to say, religious claims do not have the same epistemic status – status 
as knowledge – as do secular claims.  Nevertheless, he argues that secularists must be 
sensitive to the “force of articulation inherent in religious languages”151 and warns that 
secular society, in excluding religion from the public sphere, runs the risk of cutting itself 
off from important sources of meaning.  He suggests that even secular citizens engage in 
148 Habermas, “Transcendence,” 76. 
149 Habermas, “Faith and Knowledge,” 332. 
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the process of translation and, like Kant and the critical theorists, find a way to 
appropriate the cognitively salvageable aspects of religious language while uncoupling it 
from its metaphysical moorings.  For example, we can reformulate the language of 
humans’ bearing the image of God into the language of the equal dignity of all human 
beings, without serious loss of cognitive content or damage to the spirit of religious 
language. 
‘Mutual translation’ is the shorthand I will use to designate Habermas’s approach 
to secular vis-à-vis religious language.  He indicates that there has been a double standard 
in secular society which militates against religious rationales being taken seriously in the 
public sphere.  Rather than insist unilaterally that religious rationales be translated into 
secular rationales, he appears open to mutual translation among members of the 
postsecular society.  As he notes, often the “boundaries between secular and religious 
reasons are fluid.”152  Secular society runs the risk of denying itself important resources, 
or meaning potentials, if it rejects out of hand religious rationales, especially when such 
rationales can mediate intercultural, and sometimes hostile, narratives.  The religious 
believer might be tempted to see the repudiation of such a double standard as opening up 
space for the legitimacy of faith commitments within the broader intellectual and cultural 
discourse.  However, religious citizens must be careful not to read Habermas’s modified 
liberalism as an unqualified endorsement of the legitimacy of religious worldviews. 
There is still an “asymmetry of epistemic claims” between religion and secular 
philosophy and science.  In other words, the dichotomy between faith and knowledge 
survives in the postsecular context.  Moreover, the purpose of mutual translation, such as 
152 Habermas, 332. 
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rendering the insights of religious language publicly accessible, is not to promote a 
particular religious worldview within the public sphere, but rather to open up paths of 
communication within a pluralistic society and to build consensus – the same task public 
reason assumes in old-fashioned secular societies – among citizens, both religious and 
secular.  The backdrop of this process is the neutrality of the liberal state which also 
survives in the postsecular society, but in a more self-conscious way; there is to be no 
generalization of a broadly secularist worldview either.  The place of religious 
worldviews in the postsecular context, though expanded, will not be expansive enough to 
satisfy those religionists who insist upon employing religious arguments in the public 
sphere.  Nevertheless, the disallowance of ideological secularism and the potential for 
religious sources of meaning to inform the public discourse is an attractive feature of the 
postsecular condition for the moderate religionist.  It should be noted, however, that 
although Habermas encourages mutual translation, secular citizens are not required to 
translate religious beliefs into secular beliefs as are religious citizens.  In other words, 
Habermas, while thinking it prudent for secular citizens to participate in translation, does 
not say they are obligated to do so.  Assuming for the time being that the translation 
requirement be read strongly as a normative obligation, it is borne by religious citizens 
alone. 
The burden of translation that religious citizens uniquely bear is related to the 
epistemic burden they bear in secularized societies.  This additional burden is justified 
because believers have additional beliefs, namely religious beliefs in addition to the thin, 
minimal presuppositions of public reason.  Sometimes, these additional beliefs can come 
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into conflict with even the minimal assumptions of the secular state.  For example, 
liberalism is predicated on the priority of the right over the good.  One’s rights, construed 
from the vantage point of a public conception of justice, take priority over any 
substantive notion of the good.  This fact alone can bring about unequal burdens for 
believers, but such a situation seems impossible to avoid precisely because religious 
citizens have heavier metaphysical baggage than their secular counterparts.  As Habermas 
points out: “For the consciousness of the secularized citizen traveling with light 
metaphysical baggage who can accept a morally ‘free-standing’ justification of 
democracy and human rights, the ‘right’ can without difficulty be accorded priority over 
the ‘good.’”153  By contrast, “for the believer who travels with heavy metaphysical 
baggage, the good enjoys epistemic primacy over the right”154 precisely because the 
believer draws her ethical self-understanding from religious beliefs that claim universal 
validity.  These additional beliefs, such as the authority of holy texts in addition to public 
conceptions of justice, make it more difficult for the believer to accept the priority of the 
right over the good and, therefore, the believer bears an additional cognitive burden, 
namely that of reconciling her religious beliefs with those of a wider public.  Such 
cognitive dissonance is not likely to haunt the secular citizen who travels light.  For 
example, Habermas suggests that “liberal regulations on abortion place a greater burden 
on devout Catholics or on any supporter of a pro-life position based on a religious 
worldview than on secular citizens, who, even if they do not share the pro-choice 
position, can live more easily with the idea that the right to life of an embryo may be 
153 Habermas, “Equal Treatment of Cultures and the Limits of Postmodern Liberalism,” in Between 
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trumped by the right to self-determination of the mother under certain circumstances.”155  
The unequal burdens religious citizens bear in the public sphere are simply the price 
religious citizens pay for tolerance – a compromise that has always been at the heart of 
liberalism – although Habermas admits that it is debatable whether or not such a price is 
too high.156 When it comes to tolerance of practices in a liberal democracy, religious 
citizens bear the heavier burden, and reconciling one’s substantive conception of the 
good with the liberal conception of the right is not something all religious citizens are 
able to do successfully. As Habermas says, religious citizens are the only ones required to 
split their respective identities into a religious and a secular ethos.  To be fair, he does 
acknowledge the existential pull of religious identities and the practical difficulties that 
result from attempting to unload one’s metaphysical baggage, nevertheless, asymmetry 
remains a practical consequence of secularization.  But perhaps measures can be taken to 
remedy this inequity to some extent:
This asymmetry between the burdens borne by believers and by unbelievers is 
counterbalanced at most by the fact that religiously tone-deaf citizens confront an 
expectation of tolerance of a different kind …. For the expectation of an ongoing 
lack of agreement between rational factual knowledge and religious tradition 
deserves the predicate “reasonable” only when religious convictions are accorded 
an epistemic status that is not merely irrational from the perspective of secular 
knowledge.157
However, “factual knowledge” is accorded a prima facie plausibility upon my reading of 
Habermas that “religious tradition” must work harder to achieve.  This caveat seems to be 
simply a given under postsecular conditions.  Therefore, Habermas has not strayed from 
his concern in TCA to establish the validity – one might more properly say ‘truth’ in 
155 Habermas, “Equal Treatment of Cultures,” 286.
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formal pragmatic terms – of all public claims, including religious ones in this context.  In 
his view, religious claims do not meet his criteria for validity, hence the translation 
requirement.  Therefore, Habermas, though his position has evolved to one of more 
openness toward religious language informing public debate, remains consistent with 
many of his themes in TCA and maintains the formal secularism of the public sphere as 
outlined above. 
I would contend that even this modified position too readily assumes the broad 
contours of the secularization thesis.  Taylor’s study of secularism is quite helpful in 
offering a corrective to the mainline story of secularization.  He argues that we have 
moved, in the last five centuries, from a context in which unbelief, or what Taylor calls 
exclusive humanism, was unimaginable, to one in which belief must be justified, a 
context in which secularism is seen as the default position, at least among well educated 
people in industrialized North Atlantic countries.  Habermas’s translation requirement 
and the “epistemic asymmetry” of religious claims vis-à-vis secular ones, also tacitly 
assumes that non-belief is the default position and that religious claims, in order to be 
fairly assessed, must work harder to equal the prima facie plausibility of secular claims. 
Despite Habermas’s caveat that all citizens, regardless of religious adherence, must work 
together to make the resources of religious language available to a wider audience, 
religious believers do bear an asymmetrical epistemic burden under conditions of what 
Taylor calls naïve secularism.  
But it is not sufficient to translate the resources of religion into secular language; 
one must also “dissipate the false aura of the obvious”158 that surrounds secular 
158 Taylor, 551. 
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worldviews. Habermas is quite right that the formal secularism of the public sphere 
should not be identified with scientific materialism, but he may not go far enough.  One 
must also offer, as has Taylor, a phenomenology of secularism: an examination of the 
ways in which secularism has become the default position in the modern public sphere.  
If one can show that a secular, functionalist interpretation of religion is not obviously 
true, the necessity of the translation requirement is thereby called into question as well.  I 
can do no more than suggest a mere sketch of such a project here, but it is important, in 
my judgment, to expand what Habermas means by postsecular: not only should we 
remain open to the semantic potential of religious language, translating its resources into 
the prevailing public discourse, but we should also question the default status of 
secularism as the obvious language of that discourse. The ‘obviousness’ of secularism is 
a major assumption of the subtraction story; secularization is described as a divestment of 
certain ‘metaphysical baggage’ as though secularism is simply a matter of subtraction and 
does not, through the dialectical process, acquire some baggage of its own.  Only an 
‘addition story’ can help us understand how and why exclusive humanism has become 
the default position that religious belief must overcome – the burden of proof being on 
the believer. If we reconstruct our current “social imaginary” and question the default 
status of secularism we may be able to avoid placing an asymmetrical burden upon 
religious persons.  Taylor’s account of the rise of naïve secularism suggests a significant 
modification to Habermas’s translation requirement in the dialogue between secular and 
religious citizens. 
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Taylor’s Phenomenology of Secularism
One of the ways Taylor wants to describe the shift from 1500 – 2000 is a fundamental 
change in social imaginary that begins in the Age of Reason, but expands exponentially 
in the twentieth century.  A social imaginary refers to the intellectual space that we 
inhabit, or the conditions for belief or unbelief. In the 1500s, for example, the social 
imaginary had no room for exclusive humanism – it simply was not a live option; that is 
to say, there was no intellectual space for it.  Of course, this has changed, though not 
necessarily as a result of blatant unbelief.  As we have seen, a number of Christian 
thinkers contributed to the shift without so intending.  As both the spatial and temporal 
expanse of the universe gradually became known, people, like Giordano Bruno already in 
the sixteenth century could imagine an infinite universe of countless worlds, a departure 
from the orthodox cosmology.  Likewise in the seventeenth century, people began to 
imagine alternative accounts of human origins, although ironically, sometimes in an 
effort to rescue the Genesis narrative.  For example, Thomas Burnet, although willing to 
amend the biblical account, believed he could capture the main contours of the story, 
including Creation, Flood, and Apocalypse, in a ‘scientific’ account.  In order to do so, he 
maintained that the world that science observes is not the one that came from the hand of 
the Creator, but one that has been punctuated by divine judgments, the latest of which 
was the Genesis Flood.  Humanity’s origin thus recedes into the distant and quite murky 
past, which goes a long way toward setting the conditions for evolutionary theory.  Vico 
plays a similar role in the eighteenth century.  In defending Scripture against Chinese 
chronologies, he argued that many postdiluvian peoples regressed into a bestial state and 
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rebuilt civilization only after many years.  Their chronologies were thus based on dubious 
memories and mythology.  However, once one engages in such historical-critical 
theorizing, it becomes difficult to resist extending it to all histories, even those favored by 
religious orthodoxy.  We can see how these accounts of human origins, although intended 
to safeguard orthodoxy, opened the intellectual space for ideas like “the state of nature” 
and, of course, evolutionary explanations up to and including Darwin’s.  Regardless of 
how orthodox their belief, Bruno, Burnet and Vico – and one could no doubt multiply 
examples – began to imagine ways in which the world might be construed differently 
than the received biblical narrative.  In other words, they began to imagine alternatives to 
the Christian story, to open up space for unbelief that would expand greatly to include not 
only elites, but also society at large.  Taylor wants to reopen intellectual space for the 
Christian story amid subtraction stories and a social imaginary that has opened up a 
plethora of spiritual alternatives to Christianity.  However, he admits that this task is 
difficult for a number of reasons: even devout believers, regardless of the orthodoxy of 
their propositional beliefs, can feel cross-pressured by the modern social imaginary, they 
can feel its pull, and through exposure to various options, begin to imagine the world 
differently, whether or not they explicitly change their fundamental commitments.
Furthermore, religion has also been co-opted by the modern, secular social 
imaginary.  For example, religion is seen by many people, whether they profess to be 
religious or not, as a source of meaning.  However, Taylor notes that this understanding 
of the primary role of religion exists within the modern social imaginary.  It has not 
always been the case that religion has served primarily, let alone solely, as a source of 
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meaning. In an enchanted, or better, teleological world, meaning was simply inherent.  It 
is only in the age of instrumental reason that we keenly feel disenchantment as a loss and 
seek some way to give our lives meaning.  But this view of religion presupposes the 
modern, secular social imaginary.  And again, we all, regardless of the strength of our 
religious commitment – or lack thereof – participate unawares in the modern social 
imaginary.  Indeed, we would be hard-pressed not to participate in some capacity.  In a 
secular age, one has to be aware of our current social imaginary’s preoccupation with 
meaning, without acquiescing to a merely functionalist account of religion, reducing it to 
a provider of private meaning. 
Closely related to this preoccupation with meaning is the search for adequate 
sources for morality.  At this juncture, it becomes important to give an “addition story” of 
secularization. This is important for two reasons: 1) it supplements and corrects the 
distorted ‘progress’ narrative which sees religion receding before the power of modern 
science; 2) it locates the primary reasons for the shift in social imaginary in ethical 
arguments rather than empirical givens about the nature of the world. In tandem, these 
have the consequence of challenging the default status of secularism; it is no longer seen 
as simply obvious or inevitable.  Let us examine these points in more detail.
Central to Taylor’s discussion of secularization is the creation of the ‘immanent 
frame’ which can be best defined by briefly exploring how it comes about.  Firstly, we 
must contend with the buffered identity that comes to the fore in the modern period.  This 
is basically the Cartesian subject, the interior world within which reality is bounded. 
Taylor contrasts this with the porous self of earlier times which was more open to 
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external influence.  From the standpoint of the buffered self, however, the idea of 
external spirits, causal powers, supernatural agents, etc. becomes increasingly 
incomprehensible.  The richness of the enchanted world retreats into our inner world, the 
depths of our psyches.  As moderns, we find this general account convincing and quite 
natural.  Another consequence of the buffered identity is the reversal of the field of fear. 
Within the enchanted world, unbelief was unimaginable at least in part because of the 
porous nature of the self.  Abandoning belief in God was not to go it alone in an empty 
cosmos, as the modern narrative goes, but to go it alone in a world populated by non-
human agents, influences to which one was vulnerable without divine protection. 
However, once this fear recedes, it becomes somewhat easier to relinquish faith in God. 
This is part of what is meant by the immanent frame: reality is considered explicable in 
immanent terms. 
Another facet is the rigid, as opposed to porous, distinction between natural and 
supernatural ushered in by the buffered self.  Ironically, Christian philosophers had a 
hand in this development.  Taylor, and Buckley in his fine study,159 has convincingly 
argued that the move toward exclusive humanism or atheism was unintentionally aided 
by the efforts of the very apologists that were trying to make room for the supernatural. 
However, once the buffered identity arose it was no longer inconceivable to dispense 
with the supernatural altogether.  These two aspects, the buffered identity and the 
sufficiency of nature, come to form the immanent frame in which we experience the 
world.  It also accounts for why unbelief comes to be seen as natural, or obvious within 
certain contexts; in other words, as bearing lighter metaphysical baggage.  Taylor offers 
159 Michael J. Buckley S.J, At the Origins of Modern Atheism (Yale University Press, 1990).
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the following summary: “The buffered self feels invulnerable before the world of spirits 
and magic forces, which still can haunt us in our dreams, particularly those of childhood.  
Objectification of the world gives a sense of power, and control, which is intensified by 
every victory of instrumental reason.”160  Of course, there are echoes here of the coming-
of-age narrative of secularization, which Taylor argues is motivated more by ethical 
considerations than empirical facts.161  Moreover, the growth of civilization is seen as 
synonymous with establishing an immanent frame, within which human flourishing, 
aided by instrumental reason, can occupy its central place.  However, Taylor contends 
that the immanent frame, as part of the modern social imaginary, is something we all 
inhabit.  It is “not usually, or even mainly a set of beliefs which we entertain about our 
predicament, however it may have started out: rather it is the sensed context in which we 
develop our beliefs.”162  As such, the immanent frame does not necessarily, for Taylor, 
lead to exclusive humanism; it is not, in principle closed to transcendence – Habermas 
claims to reserve judgment here too – although it is more difficult to think one’s way to 
transcendence with the immanent frame in place.  Nevertheless, belief, in William 
James’s terminology, is still a live option. In fact, both open and closed orientations to the 
immanent frame are possible; however, the prevailing secular narrative makes it difficult 
to fully inhabit this Jamesian space, and takes the closed perspective as simply given. 
Both the open and closed options within the immanent frame, of course, are not 
obvious in any usual sense.  We may not be able to fully understand or imagine another 
person’s point of view, but this has more to do with phenomenology than the givens of 
160 Taylor, 548.
161 Taylor, 562 – 63.
162 Taylor, 549.
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experience.  In adopting either perspective, a leap of faith is required, or in Taylor’s 
words, “anticipatory confidence.”163 To quote Taylor: “And so full lucidity would involve 
recognizing that one’s confidence is at least partly anticipatory, and hence being aware of 
the Jamesian open space.  What I am calling ‘spin’ is a way of avoiding entering this 
space, a way of convincing oneself that one’s reading is obvious, compelling, allowing of 
no cavil or demurral.”164  So in his view, proponents of the mainstream secularization 
thesis have been successful in putting a closed spin on the immanent frame, making their 
perspective seem rather obvious, even if the available reasons are not compelling one 
way or another. 
But let us return to the standard secular narrative for more concrete examples of 
closed “spin.”  For example, the coming-of-age narrative, that faith belongs to the infancy 
of humanity and our maturity entails coming to grips with reality.  The courageous 
individual must go it alone in an indifferent, if not hostile, universe.  This picture of the 
world, we are told, is ratified by the deliverances of science.  However, as told above – 
and this is hardly a straw man – it is clearly a ‘virtue’ narrative.  The virtue extolled is 
courage, taking one’s destiny into one’s own hands, having Stoic resolve in the face of 
adversity, ignoring the comforts of religion.  In short, this narrative is based on ethical 
considerations, primarily, rather than purely empirical ones.  There may be some who 
claim that this is not the case and that the empirical realities stand alone, quite 
independent of any implied moral outlook.  But this is precisely what one would expect 
from the perspective of anticipatory confidence, though not recognized as such, in the 
163 Taylor, 550.
164 Taylor, 551. 
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closed spin.  For the believer, who looks at the same world, the facts allow for a different 
interpretation.  Often the believer argues this way: there aren’t any convincing arguments 
from science that militate against transcendence, so the unbeliever must ground his 
closed perspective on moral considerations, later bringing in a secular interpretation of 
the facts to ratify that perspective.  However, both sides are getting it wrong to some 
extent.  Both are in effect offering a subtraction account of secularization.  The secularist 
sees religion as something that stands in need of explanation; how is it that people 
continue to cling to faith despite ‘overwhelming’ evidence to the contrary?  However, 
this perspective may not seem so obvious from the perspective of our deconstructed 
social imaginary.  This is why a phenomenology of secularism is so important: once the 
secular position is deconstructed it loses its default status.  But the religionist too, makes 
a mistake in saying that rebellion against the Christian moral outlook alone is at the heart 
of making the necessary leap of faith from open to closed world systems. 
There have been those, especially in the nineteenth century, (Darwin, Hardy, and 
Arnold) who seem to have sincerely felt the demise of faith as a loss, to be looked upon 
with a sense of nostalgia and regret.  According to these thinkers, they preferred the 
Christian moral outlook, but felt they had to bow to the facts.  This is more in keeping 
with the heroic narrative of naturalism outlined above.  But I want to resist attributing to 
these thinkers open rebellion against a Christian moral outlook.  This is why the 
subtraction story will not do.  Rather than one model of morality falling away 
(subtraction) the model switched sides, as it were, under the new conditions of belief. 
Perhaps this is why the loss of childlike faith on the part of poets like Hardy and Arnold 
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is seen as a tragedy; however, one can see their commitment to various Victorian virtues 
pulling them in the direction of closed world systems.  As Taylor says, “[i]t has been 
noted how many of the crop of great Victorian agnostics came from Evangelical families. 
They transposed the model of the strenuous, manly, philanthropic concern into the new 
secular key.  But the very core of that model, manly self-conquest, rising above the pain 
of loss, now told in favour of the apostasy.”165  These Victorian, neo-Stoic virtues which 
had formerly been cast within the Christian framework, were now seen as fitting more 
appropriately within a closed world system.  The deliverances of the sciences, 
particularly Darwinian evolution, had a part, but moral motivations would appear to 
predominate.  Indeed, Darwin’s own concerns about the moral implications of his theory 
and Tennyson’s lament about “nature red in tooth and claw” seem to bolster this 
interpretation.  Rather than lose their moral moorings, these men translated them into 
closed terms, and indeed the conditions for belief including the buffered identity, 
instrumental reason and the priority of human flourishing made this transition seem quite 
natural, albeit painful.  Nevertheless, it is not the case, as the standard narrative goes, that 
“the whole thrust of modern science has been to establish materialism.  For people who 
cling to this idea, the second order of conditions, the contemporary moral predicament, is 
unnecessary or merely secondary.”166  In fact, the reverse is true: the moral stance 
preceded the rise of materialism, and indeed was primary. 
There are several themes that emerge from Taylor’s analysis.  Firstly, believers 
must address modernity’s preoccupation with meaning and moral sources.  Though it 
165 Taylor, 564. 
166 Taylor, 561. 
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may be wrongheaded to see the essence of religion, or open perspectives, as bound up 
with answers to the question of meaning, this is nevertheless an important aspect of 
religion in our secular age, within the modern social imaginary.  Part of the quest for 
meaning is modernity’s continuing quest for adequate sources for morality.  Problems 
facing particularly immanent moral sources include our failure, on a large scale, to 
universalize sympathy or solidarity due in part to our culture’s valorization of a heroic 
misanthropic stance that emerges from the immanent counter-Enlightenment, those who, 
like Nietzsche, could not accept the disciplinary requirements of “polite society.”167  
Recall Taylor’s thesis that the move toward exclusive humanism is primarily motivated 
not by facts, scientific or otherwise, but by an ethical orientation to the world, which 
expresses itself in the immanent frame through the order of mutual benefit.  Against this 
stands the narrative of the heroic individual who, in some cases, rages against the 
established order.  Insofar as this deconstruction of secularization is accurate, and given 
that many of the promises of modernity remain unfulfilled – something Habermas would 
concede – I believe there is ample room for the exploration of other moral sources, 
sources that are open to the transcendent.  Therefore, religious citizens are justified in 
criticizing the default status of closed world systems, thereby opening up space for 
transcendence to break through the closed spin of the immanent frame.  Of course, this 
requires argumentation.  We cannot expect our interlocutors to simply ‘see’ that their 
view is not the only rational option: we have to make that case.  But the argumentation 
will be along historical rather than metaphysical lines.  I believe that Habermas is correct 
in suspending judgment on the truth of metaphysical propositions, religious or otherwise.  
167 Taylor, 184 – 85. 
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Yet we cannot claim that only one side is encumbered with metaphysical baggage.  
Dissipating the false aura of the obvious that surrounds secular worldviews – those with 
substantive rather than merely procedural commitments – facilitates the postsecular 
stance that Habermas encourages.  
Secondly, following Taylor, we must have a phenomenology of secularism. There 
has been a phenomenology of religion for some time, but no phenomenology of 
secularism, largely because religion is seen as an idiosyncrasy, or perhaps a neurosis, to 
be explained away from the within the closed perspective, which is taken for granted as 
needing no justification.  Religious citizens, in a liberal democracy, must be allowed to 
publicly challenge the default status of this framework, deconstruct the secular narrative, 
and encourage the open orientation.
Finally, one of Taylor’s goals is to bring his interlocutors into a space where 
belief can be considered a live option, not to translate religious arguments into the 
language of the closed spin, but to help his secular interlocutors break out of this closed 
spin and inhabit the Jamesian space.  However, this means that we must enter the 
Jamesian space ourselves in a genuine, and not a contrived, way.  This involves an 
element of risk: we risk feeling cross-pressured between the open and closed perspective, 
and risk feeling the pull of our interlocutor’s position.  We are often so averse to this risk 
that we never fully occupy that Jamesian space.  We must actively engage in discursive 
reasoning, without allowing various types of ‘spin’ to foreclose from the outset opposing 
points of view.  This does not mean that we enter a kind of ‘no spin zone’, some neutral 
space.  The Jamesian space is not the view from nowhere, but the capacity to see, or 
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imagine the world, from another person’s point of view.  It is to relinquish the ‘obvious’ 
standing of your own position and stand in someone else’s shoes.  So translation into a 
universal, neutral language is not what Taylor is offering here. 
Needless to say, Taylor’s strategy has met with criticism.  He relies quite heavily 
on describing a phenomenology that secular readers will recognize as more or less their 
own, and also helping them imagine the world otherwise, thereby letting them appreciate 
the semantic potential of religious language to disclose the world in a way that secular 
language cannot.  In addition to his critique of the immanent frame, he argues that 
secularization is not simply a matter of materialistic assumptions replacing theistic ones, 
but of a proliferation of what could be loosely called spiritual options along this axis.  He 
goes to great pains to present these different, mostly immanent, spiritual options and what 
might be attractive about them against the background of the ‘malaise of modernity’, 
assuming that many or most people experience modernity as a ‘malaise’.  Of course, this 
way of framing the issue is problematic, because it can lead to the criticism that upon his 
view everybody is, in effect, religious.  Although Taylor may find it difficult to imagine 
the absence of some form of religious consciousness, even under conditions of secularism 
– which often sees itself as emancipation from religion and thus preserves at least a 
minimal historical memory of religious consciousness – he recognizes that not everybody 
finds the absence of religion unimaginable.  For example, he quotes Steve Bruce who 
argues that “the widespread, taken-for-granted and unexamined Christianity of the pre-
Reformation period [will be] replaced by an equally widespread, taken-for-granted and 
unexamined indifference to religion.”168  Although Taylor concedes that such an outcome 
168 Taylor, 434. 
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is possible, he does not consider it very likely.  Rather, he wants to predict, extrapolating 
from empirical evidence, that the semantic potential of religious language will continue 
to be relevant in the future since the predictions of the secularization thesis have not 
come to pass.  He has been criticized for offering what is essentially a theological or 
apologetic critique of secular culture and arguing that everyone in modernity experiences 
it as a malaise and that all of us, religious and secular, are looking for a sense of 
“fullness.”169  Taylor explores this territory in the final chapter of A Secular Age, entitled 
“Conversions.”  Here he highlights some recent examples of people who have ‘broken 
out’ of the immanent frame, and have felt the pull of transcendent ways of speaking.  
Without going into the details, suffice it to say that Taylor’s sympathies clearly lie with 
this trajectory in understanding religious orientations to the immanent frame.  This full-
disclosure, in large measure, leaves him open to the above criticism.170 
Jonathan Sheehan, for example, raises this criticism in his review of A Secular 
Age arguing that the book is an explicit theological critique of secularism.171  Apparently, 
he is unable to appreciate the semantic potential of the religious language Taylor uses, 
thinking that the whole preceding argument represents a sleight of hand, leading the 
reader along by appearing to say something universal and then springing a particularistic 
faith language on him at the end.  Although I do not think such a criticism is fair, it does 
show the persistence of the inability of many secular thinkers to hear the “potential” in 
religious language.  The extent to which secular readers fail to appreciate this, I think, has 
169 Taylor, 729. 
170 Ronald A. Kuipers, “An Inteview with Charles Taylor,” in ‘God Is Dead’ and I Don't Feel So Good 
Myself: Theological Engagements With the New Atheism, ed. Andrew David, Christopher J. Keller, and Jon 
Stanley (Cascade Books, 2010), 122 - 23.
171 Jonathan Sheehan, “Framing the Middle,”
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much to do with the ubiquity of the assumption that there is one neutral language, that of 
secular reason, in which one can properly engage in philosophy or history or whatever, 
and then there are a plethora of particularistic faith languages that have very little to say 
to this larger universe of discourse.  Taylor has since written more explicitly in criticism 
of this claim to neutral reason, of which Habermas, at least in his early career, has been a 
prime exponent.172  Perhaps raising people’s consciousness of their own latent 
particularistic assumptions is the best one can do to help them overcome initial resistance 
to occupying that Jamesian space and recognizing the potential inherent in religious 
language. Habermas, to his credit, has begun to do so. 
But Taylor has confessed the limited success of his strategy.  In a recent 
interview,173 he remarks that his attempt at full-disclosure polluted the book for some 
people, although he does not regret being open about where he stands in the continuum of 
spiritual options.  He also acknowledges that he settled on the term “fullness” to describe 
in a more or less generic way, something to which even non-religious people might be 
open.  Now, he recognizes that trying to label what he wants to describe and affirm in a 
universally acceptable language is probably “mission impossible.”174  Perhaps this is a 
good reason to think that translation has limits and that we should be open, wherever our 
place on that continuum, to the semantic potential of religious language.  
If Taylor is correct, there is nothing particularly normative about the default status 
of secular language in the public sphere.  It is contingent rather than essential.  This is not 
to say that reason is unimportant for practical political discourse – far from it.  But it does 
172 Taylor, “Secularism and Critique,” http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/2008/04/24/secularism-and-critique/.
173 Kuipers, “An Interview with Charles Taylor.” 
174 Kuipers, 122. 
117
suggest that the types of reasons to which we appeal are conditioned by the prevailing 
closed interpretation of the immanent frame within secularism (which is not itself a 
reason, but a form of anticipatory confidence); other reasons may well be legitimate.  
This analysis, if correct, has implications for the translation requirement.  If the closed 
interpretation is not obvious and if, according to Habermas, we are not to identify 
secularism with reductive materialism, then the translation requirement would seem to be 
an overly stringent criterion.  In order to equalize the respective burdens of religious and 
secular participants in public discourse, he needs to go further than suspending judgment 
on the truth of closed worldviews and salvaging the useful flotsam of religious traditions; 
he should, in the interest of fairness, also require that secular citizens question the priority 
of their own reasons and even give some serious consideration to what these reasons are. 
Nevertheless, Habermas insists upon the priority of secular reasons in the public 
sphere and equates secular reasons with publicly accessible ones, perhaps because, unlike 
Taylor, Habermas thinks that the reasons supporting closed worldviews justify 
agnosticism, at least within the public sphere.  This public agnosticism also applies to 
religious believers.  They must “develop an epistemic stance toward the internal logic of 
secular knowledge and toward the institutionalized monopoly on knowledge of modern 
scientific experts.”175  Consequently, “religious citizens must develop an epistemic stance 
toward the priority that secular reasons also enjoy in the political arena.”176  I have 
suggested, using Taylor’s phenomenology of secularism, that this priority should be 
questioned.  However, Habermas himself has acknowledged some problematic aspects of 
175 Habermas, “Religion in the Public Sphere,” in Between Naturalism and Religion, 137. 
176 Habermas, 137. 
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deference to scientific expert cultures, and their latent metaphysical naturalism, and 
suggests that religious resources may be necessary in order to preserve liberal ideals.  For 
example, he states:
This form of radical naturalism devalues all types of statements that cannot be 
traced back to empirical observations, statements of law, or causal explanations, 
hence, moral, legal and evaluative statements no less than religious ones. As the 
revived discussion of freedom and determinism shows, advances in biogenetics, 
brain research, and robotics, provide stimuli for a kind of naturalization of the 
human mind that places our practical self-understanding as responsibly acting 
persons in question and preempts calls for a revision of criminal law. However, 
the permeation of everyday life by a naturalistic self-objectification of speaking 
and acting subjects is incompatible with any conception of political integration 
that imputes a normative background consensus to citizens.177
For these reasons, Habermas contends that secular society is well advised not to sever 
itself from religious sources of meaning which underwrite the presuppositions of the 
liberal state that make political integration and consensus possible in principle.  
Therefore, religious conceptions of identity may well have public utility.  Moreover, it 
seems difficult, if not impossible, to translate these conceptions into the languages of 
scientific expert cultures without doing violence to the semantic power of these 
conceptions in their native context.  But Habermas is ambivalent.  On the one hand, he 
wants to withhold judgment on the ontological commitments required by a thoroughly 
secularized naturalism, which sees all truth claims in terms of the language of scientific 
expert cultures and which threatens moral, legal and evaluative claims – indeed, threatens 
our self-understanding as autonomous beings capable of rational action.  On the other 
hand, he makes translation from religious to secular language a requirement of political 
praxis, arguably placing an asymmetrical burden on religious persons, and takes the 
177 Habermas, 141. 
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priority of secular reasons as a given, equating ‘publicly accessible’ with ‘secular’ and 
seeking only to salvage the politically expedient elements of religious language in the 
hopes that even this project will be temporary.  In my judgment, Habermas’s ambivalent 
stance toward the secularization thesis makes his postsecular conception of an ethics of 
citizenship both promising and problematic for social cohesion.  He seems to recognize 
the tension between his sacrosanct liberal principles and the practical task of getting 
along in society. Such tension characterizes his recent reflections on the translation 
requirement:
The guarantee of equal ethical liberties calls for the secularization of state power, 
but it forbids the political overgeneralization of the secularized worldview. 
Insofar as they act in their role as citizens, secularized citizens may neither 
fundamentally deny that religious worldviews may be true nor reject the right of 
devout fellow-citizens to couch their contributions to public discussions in 
religious language. A liberal political culture can even expect its secularized 
citizens to participate in efforts to translate relevant contributions from the 
religious language into a publicly accessible language.178
However, if the right to couch contributions to public discussion in religious language 
cannot be denied religious citizens, what remains of the translation requirement?  Is it an 
obligation incumbent upon religious citizens as part of the social contract?  Or can it be 
interpreted more loosely as a pragmatic gesture in which all citizens can be expected, 
though not necessarily required, to participate?  Although developed answers to these 
questions will have to wait until the next chapter, I want to suggest here why the standard 
Kantian interpretation of the translation requirement is problematic.  In addition, I want 
to explore what a philosophical expansion of what Taylor calls transcendent moral 
178 Habermas, “Equal Treatment of Cultures,” 310. 
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sources might look like while fleshing out the practical implications such a project might 
have for both religious and secular citizens in a deliberative democracy. 
Rethinking the Translation Requirement
I want to continue to question the translation requirement construed strongly, that is to 
say, as an asymmetric burden borne by religious citizens.  As we move forward it will be 
important to bear in mind Taylor’s reconstructed phenomenology of secularization and 
the implications it has toward our public openness to transcendent moral sources. 
Religious citizens who allegedly travel with heavier “metaphysical baggage” may have 
difficulty reducing their moral sources to purely immanent ones.  Habermas recognizes 
this existential difficulty clearly.  What he may not sufficiently recognize, however, is the 
extent to which the translation requirement leaves religious citizens without a language, 
rendering suspect his claim that secular language is simply accessible; evidently not all 
citizens find it to be so.  Maeve Cooke, however, does recognize this problem and 
provides some salient criticisms of the translation requirement along what I would call 
pragmatic lines. 
Although we must reserve judgment on the truth or falsity of metaphysical claims 
under postmetaphysical conditions, Habermas has not given up on truth conceived as 
context-transcending validity claims.  Therefore, truth is at stake in democratic 
deliberation. Indeed, he claims that a “post-truth” democracy would no longer be a 
democracy.179  However, as Cooke points out, Habermas understands context-
179 Maeve Cooke, “A Secular State for a Postsecular Society? Postmetaphysical Political Theory and the 
Place of Religion,” Constellations, 14.2 (2007): 224.
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transcending validity claims as “transcendence from within” and rules out what Cooke 
calls “otherworldly” points of reference.  Since Habermas will only allow immanent 
sources of validity, he must insist upon translation.  However, there are several reasons 
why this requirement is problematic, even within the context of his philosophy. 
For example, Cooke notes that it is far from clear that Habermas can deliver on 
his promise of context-transcendent truth on the basis of exclusively immanent sources, 
and that even sympathetic commentators have questioned the success of his formal 
pragmatics for this purpose.  Moreover, he has waffled as to whether he favors a context-
transcending or contextualist position.180  In addition, it is difficult to distinguish ‘context-
transcendence’ from ‘metaphysical’ if the former is literally beyond any humanly 
accessible context.  For example, a pragmatist would argue that Habermas’s conception 
of an ideal speech situation is too metaphysical to be of much use.  As we will see later, 
Rorty criticizes Habermas along these lines and Cooke likewise points out this 
inconsistency.  For Cooke, these criticisms do not pose an insurmountable obstacle to 
Habermas’s project, but she does question his description of it as “postmetaphysical.”181 
To her initial objections, I would add that if Habermas is to maintain his 
postmetaphysical stance, he faces a further problem of consistency because it seems that 
once he makes truth as context-transcending validity a goal of deliberative democracy, he 
abandons a purely procedural model of communicative action.  I find it hard to imagine 
how one could talk about context-transcending validity and avoid talking about 
substantive commitments insofar as context-transcending validity, for many people, 
180 Cooke, 226.
181 Cooke, 226.
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involves the validity of substantive worldviews.  But in order to introduce these into the 
discussion, we would have to surrender the claim to be postmetaphysical.  The fact that 
Habermas sees deliberative democracy as “an epistemically demanding form of 
government”182 means that it is difficult in principle to suspend judgment, even for the 
purposes of public accessibility, on the epistemic validity of substantive worldviews. 
Thus, allowing only immanent sources of validity on the basis of publicly established 
truth sits uncomfortably with the suspension of judgment required by postmetaphysical 
thinking.  If this is the case, the translation requirement, construed as a complementary 
learning process, seems disingenuous.  Cooke also questions the translation requirement’s 
restrictiveness and suspects that it compromises the conditions of political legitimacy for 
many citizens, specifically those who credit transcendent or “otherworldly” moral 
sources: an unwelcome consequence for any political theory. 
Firstly, as Cooke persuasively argues, the translation requirement denies the 
transformative power of rational deliberation that Habermas elsewhere considers a central 
component of communicative action.  For example, he has argued that because consensus 
is achieved, not merely produced, and because all interlocutors in a democratic process, 
in order to be rational, must be willing to change their minds if reason warrants, rational 
deliberation has great transformative power.  When it comes to religion in the public 
sphere, however, his translation requirement preempts this transformative dialogue by 
having participants submit their arguments in a generally accessible, or secular, language 
at the outset.  If arguments were simply generally accessible to all participants prior to the 
deliberative process, the process itself would seem to be a moot point.  Moreover, 
182 Cooke, 224.
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because everybody is speaking the same language from the outset, transformation of 
perspectives is unlikely, indeed unnecessary.  Therefore, Cooke argues that a generally 
accessible language cannot be required at the outset of the deliberative process, otherwise 
the search for context-transcending validity would appear pointless; we would already 
have the answers we need. In other words, the translation requirement preempts the 
“complementary learning process” that Habermas wants to achieve among religious and 
secular interlocutors.  I would further add that it is very difficult to know what a generally 
accessible language would look like prior to deliberation.  Therefore, as a prerequisite for 
deliberation, translation into a generally accessible language – whatever this might look 
like – is self-defeating. 
Secondly, Cooke argues that neither “can general accessibility be understood as a 
condition that has to be satisfied in fact at the end of a process of argumentative 
deliberation.”183  Part of the intent of the translation requirement is to ensure that citizens 
come to decisions based on the same, rationally agreed upon, reasons.  Again, Habermas 
thinks that democracy is an epistemically demanding form of government, and that 
deliberation seeks to achieve rational consensus, rather than mere de facto accord, or 
modus vivendi.  Such a requirement is certainly demanding, indeed it is rigorous to the 
point of being unworkable.  In a pluralistic democracy, we can neither expect nor require 
that degree of consensus; nevertheless, we can often achieve a pragmatically workable 
solution.  If we seriously insisted upon all citizens offering the same reasons for their 
assent to a particular proposal, political deliberation would be interminable.  To be fair, 
Habermas probably does not seriously insist upon actual agreement of this kind; it 
183 Cooke, 229.
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remains for him an ideal type.  In fact, he recognizes the practical necessity of the 
principle of majority rule in official public deliberation.  However, majority rule does not 
terminate the ongoing epistemic process – the search for truth – but is simply the 
provision “that the fallible majority opinion may be considered a reasonable basis for 
common practice until further notice.”184  Again, the process of rational deliberation, 
precisely due to its fallibility, presupposes the transformative power of argumentation. 
Citizens of a democracy must stand ready to revise, abandon, or change their opinions as 
reason warrants.  However, should we expect this situation to be permanent or 
temporary?  In other words, will the epistemic process eventually come to an end or is it 
always in principle open to revision?  In Cooke’s judgment, there are severe problems 
attending the former option and there is evidence that Habermas favors the latter.185  The 
latter option coincides with his procedural account of communicative action: the type of 
consensus achieved is an agreement upon the norms and principles for reaching 
agreement, rather than on substantive agreement itself.  If this interpretation is accurate, 
Habermas would seem committed to the view that political legitimacy does not depend 
upon the kind of agreement the translation requirement seems to mandate.  Indeed, such 
agreement, in principle, is always beyond our power to achieve.  For example, one cannot 
expect substantive agreement on any issue in a pluralistic democracy, which is why the 
principle of majority rule is a fixture of democratic decision-making.  But even the 
184 Cooke, 229.
185 As Cooke says elsewhere, “Habermas asserts a connection between the justification of validity claims 
and the critical evaluation of reasons in argumentation; he emphasizes, in addition, that argumentation is 
essentially open. He explains: “… it belongs to the grammatical role of the expression ‘to justify’ 
(begründen) that we cannot once and for all place reasons, or kinds of reasons, in a hierarchy in which 
‘final’ reasons would stand at the top.” Language and Reason: A Study of Habermas’s Pragmatics 
(Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1994), 108. 
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majority cannot be expected to agree on every issue, much less agree for substantially the 
same reasons; everybody makes compromises and allowances.186  Therefore, political 
legitimacy cannot depend on substantive agreement.  Rather, political legitimacy, in 
Cooke’s words, “is dependent only on the orientation towards the idea of norms and 
principles that are the object of a discursively achieved general agreement.  But if this is 
the case, the achievement, through generally accessible reasons cannot be a condition of 
political legitimacy, and the translation requirement is redundant.”187  So we cannot 
reasonably expect generally accessible reasons to emerge even at the end of the 
deliberative process any more than we can make them a prerequisite for it. 
Thirdly, a related point is that Habermas fails to appreciate the way in which 
argumentation actually works in practice.  As Cooke points out, we are more often 
challenged by arguments that are significantly different from our own, arguments that are 
unexpected or unfamiliar.  Moreover, arguments that are challenging for this reason tend 
to result, not in one being converted to another perspective, but in the emergence of an 
entirely new perspective.  Habermas does not sufficiently grasp this Hegelian point.  
Thus, he is faced with a dilemma: if he makes translation into generally accessible 
language a requirement of deliberation at the outset, he rules out the possibility that 
perspectives might emerge that were unanticipated by any of the participants prior to 
deliberation.  If he makes generally accessible language a condition that must be satisfied 
at the end of the process, he denies the transformative power of unfamiliar arguments that 
186 As Phil Enns says: “Habermas is correct that enforceable political decisions must be in a language 
accessible to all citizens. Where Habermas goes wrong is in asserting that the justification for these 
decisions must be in the same language” “Habermas, Democracy and Religious Reasons,” The Heythrop 
Journal, LI (2010), 586. 
187 Cooke, “A Secular State for a Postsecular Society,” 229.
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might challenge existing opinions and offer new perspectives.  Both of these implications 
are problematic from the standpoint of decision making models, whether ideal or actual. 
Cooke’s criticisms aim to remedy what she sees as an unwelcome consequence of 
the translation requirement, namely, that it impairs the political autonomy of citizens who 
credit “otherworldly” reasons for political action rather than secular ones.  Habermas’s 
conception of political autonomy is based upon citizens’ rational insight into the validity 
of the laws to which they are subject.  Following Kant, citizens must see themselves as 
the authors and addressees of the law.  But, importantly, they can only do so through 
rational insight into the normative, context-transcending validity claims upon which it is 
based.  Moreover, these validity claims, though context-transcending, are secular or 
“innerworldly” to use Cooke’s term.  We can only credit immanent sources of validity in 
public deliberation.  Unfortunately, this qualification has the consequence of restricting 
the political autonomy of those citizens who do not see the legitimacy of their claims as 
resting on purely immanent sources of validity.  In other words, the translation 
requirement weakens the political autonomy of some, perhaps many, religious citizens. 
This is not to say that religious citizens who do not subscribe to purely immanent reasons 
cannot rationally discern the practical necessity of the formal secularism of public 
reasons.  Surely they can, and many do.  But it does not follow that they regard these 
reasons as true in a context-transcending way.  As Cooke summarizes: “Rational 
acceptance that secularly justified laws and decisions are pragmatically necessary in a 
given context (for instance in order to avoid religious strife) is not the same as rational 
insight into their validity.”188  But it is rational insight in precisely this sense that 
188 Cooke, 223.
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Habermas considers necessary for political legitimacy, according to Cooke.  Moreover, 
unless citizens see themselves as subject to laws “for the right reasons,” rather than on the 
basis of a mere modus vivendi, the constitutional state cannot secure social stability. 
Thus, any attempt to credit non-immanent sources of validity, in addition to carrying 
cumbersome metaphysical baggage, is potentially dangerous.  Therefore, religious 
citizens need to translate their reasons into secular ones in order to achieve the same 
rational insight into the validity of laws and democratic decisions as their secular 
counterparts. 
In my judgment, and that of Cooke, Habermas’s concern is overstated.  But I 
believe his point about the illegitimacy of “otherworldly” or transcendent reasons within 
public discourse is worth pursuing. In a pluralistic liberal democracy, it appears unfair, 
not to mention impractical, to insist that all citizens agree for the same reasons, even the 
same secular ones, and Habermas presumably knows this.  Moreover, he has 
acknowledged that the burden of translation that religious citizens bear should not be 
exacerbated by denying the existential and psychological pull that religious worldviews 
exercise over the entirety of their lives, not just their political decisions.  On this point, 
Cooke quotes Nicholas Wolterstorff, who reminds us that it is the conviction of religious 
citizens “that they ought to strive for wholeness, integrity, integration, in their lives: that 
they ought to allow the Word of God, the teachings of Torah, the command and example 
of Jesus, or whatever, to shape their existence as a whole, including then, their social and 
political existence.”189  Wolterstorff clearly sees “otherworldly” moral sources as 
admissible to public deliberation.  Indeed, in a recent book on justice, he goes much 
189 Quoted in Cooke, 232.
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further, arguing that only a theistic account can ground the human rights discourse that 
liberal democracies cherish.190  Although it is not necessary for my purposes to defend so 
strong a claim, I believe it is instructive for my project to present some aspects of 
Wolterstorff’s case that illustrate how “otherworldly” or what I will henceforth call 
‘transcendent’ moral sources can be rationally argued and rendered publicly accessible. 
Recall Taylor’s point that a sizable part of the philosophical project of modernity 
has been the attempt to find adequate immanent moral sources.  Since the nineteenth 
century, particularly Nietzsche, it is far from obvious that this task has borne much fruit. 
Wolterstorff also takes up “Nietzsche’s Challenge”: whether or not any objective basis 
for morality is possible after the demise of religion.  He quotes Raimond Gaita who 
alleges that we are “whistling in the dark” if we expect this challenge to be met.  He 
argues that all secular rationales for grounding human rights, claims such as “human 
beings are inestimably precious, that they are ends in themselves, that they are owed 
unconditional respect, that they possess inalienable rights, and, of course that they 
possess inalienable dignity” all lack the “simple power of the religious ways of 
speaking.”191  Of course, this claim is contentious.  But that is precisely the point: very 
few philosophers can agree on an adequate response to this challenge.  This fact alone 
does not necessarily prove that there is no adequate response, but it does suggest “given 
that, after many attempts, no one has succeeded in giving such an account, it seems 
unlikely that it can be done”.192  Wolterstorff’s skepticism is shared by philosophers who 
do not share his particular theological views.  Again, this is not proof positive that all 
190 Nicholas Wolterstorff, Justice: Rights and Wrongs (Princeton University Press, 2008).
191 Quoted in Wolterstorff, 324. 
192 Wolterstorff, 325.
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such secular attempts are “whistling in the dark”, but it does justify skepticism of the 
claim that religious resources are completely irrelevant to modernity’s task of developing 
adequate moral sources for liberal society.  Likewise, Habermas has come to appreciate 
that the semantic content of religious language is not completely exhausted. 
Wolterstorff argues that the Kantian grounding of human rights in human 
capacities has serious shortcomings.  It is not necessary to go into the details of those 
criticisms here.  Suffice it to say that Wolterstorff finds the Kantian grounding of human 
rights in the capacity of rational agency to be unconvincing for a number of reasons, 
including the fact that not all humans possess it and a number of non-human animals do. 
There is a sense in which Habermas, in my judgment, too readily translates the Judeo-
Christian notion of the image of God, for example, into universal human dignity without 
appropriating the conceptual resources needed to preserve the content of the claim. 
Although he never engages Habermas directly, I believe Wolterstorff would concur. 
Having sketched an account of the image of God and its implications for human nature, 
he poses the following question, suggested by the translation requirement: “Suppose that 
from the nature-resemblance construal of imago dei one drops the component of 
resembling God, keeping just the idea of human nature.  Does human nature as I have all 
too briefly explained it, suffice to ground natural human rights?”193  Wolterstorff argues 
that it does not, because it faces the same problems as the aforementioned Kantian 
approach: it reduces human dignity to the possession of capacities which some humans 
have and some do not.  In the Judeo-Christian version, however, the worth of human 
beings is not related to a capacity they may or may not possess, but is bestowed on the 
193 Wolterstorff, 351.
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basis of the relational property of being loved by God.  This is the crucial point that is left 
out of translation from ‘the image of God’ to the religiously neutral ‘equal dignity of all 
human beings’; and this difference is substantive, not merely procedural. Habermas’s 
suspicion that something important is indeed lost by modernity’s skepticism is exactly 
right, however, his strategy of translation to recover that semantic content falters 
precisely because it cannot credit the transcendent basis of that content. 
Wolterstorff claims –  as does Taylor to a lesser extent – that the genealogy of 
human rights discourse in liberal democracies, one that Habermas strives to affirm, “has 
its origins not in fourteenth century nominalism or seventeenth century political 
individualism but in the Hebrew and Christian Scriptures.”194  Perhaps this is why 
Habermas’s attempt to credit the language of human dignity but not its traditional 
transcendent explanation is dubious.  Habermas has indeed reflected on the question – 
although he offers a negative answer – “whether the pacified, secular state is reliant on 
normative presuppositions that it cannot itself guarantee.”195  Perhaps it is time to 
reconsider our collective answer to this question.  Wolterstorff in particular gives 
expression to an unsettling consequence of the failure to ground moral sources under 
secularism: “Suppose the secularization thesis is true, that modernization leads to 
secularization.  Suppose, in particular, that the framework of religious conviction that 
gave birth to our moral subculture of rights is destined, under conditions of modernity, to 
erode and be replaced by a variety of secular outlooks.  What must we then expect to 
happen to that subculture?”196   His prognosis is not optimistic.  He acknowledges that, in 
194 Wolterstorff, 388.
195 Habermas, 101.
196 Wolterstorff, 389 – 90. 
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the event that religion completely erodes, a secular outlook could, in principle, take its 
place.  Some secularists do not express any anxiety about replacing the originally 
religious foundation of liberal values, but others do.  Rorty, for example, admits that he is 
a free-loading atheist,197 whereas Habermas still sees the Kantian project as the most 
viable secular alternative for the creative salvaging of morality.  Wolterstorff also says 
that the Kantian basis for human rights, despite the problems he finds there, is the only 
viable secular alternative that could replace religious sources with minimal damage to our 
moral discourse.  But there would still be damage.  For example, if moral consideration 
depends upon certain capacities, those who lack those capacities would seem to be 
excluded with unfortunate moral consequences.  Furthermore, if the Kantian framework 
replaces the religious one en masse – a prospect Wolterstorff admits he finds highly 
unlikely – would it not erode our egalitarian intuitions by making rationality paramount 
to the extent that, to coin a phrase, ‘fortune favors the bright’?  I would also add that far 
from being accessible to everyone, Kantian morality is highly abstract. It lacks the simple 
power and imagination – the accessibility – of the religious vision.198  Sometimes 
rationality plays a smaller role in the practical extension of moral consideration than 
philosophers and theorists believe. As Wolterstorff observes “Uncle Tom’s Cabin, full of 
sentimentality, was far more effective in diminishing the violation of persons in the 
nineteenth century than was Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals.”199 
197 Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity. (Cambridge University Press, 1989), 74. 
198 Mark Johnson argues that despite Kant’s insistence on ‘pure reason’ as the ground for morality, Kant’s 
moral theory is largely imaginative and metaphoric. I am sympathetic to this interpretation, but would still 
contend that Kant exchanges the more accessible metaphors in the Judeo-Christian tradition for more 
abstract metaphors that probably have much less to do with the way most people, philosophers included, 
practice morality. See Mark Johnson, Moral Imagination: Implications of Cognitive Science for Ethics 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 75 – 76.
199 Wolterstorff, 392.
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However, this statement suggests another way of conceptualizing the problem of 
adequate moral sources, one favored by Rorty in particular.  Perhaps sympathy alone can 
sustain our liberal values.  Although these values might have emerged from a particular 
religious narrative, we can see narratives in general as valuable for expanding our 
sympathies for other human beings, as the example of Uncle Tom’s Cabin shows. 
However, Wolterstoff warns that sympathy, like rationality, is not a quality found in 
equal abundance across the human population.  Nevertheless, the point remains that 
rationality is not enough: one needs substantive and affective elements to sustain an 
adequate basis for morality.  In addition, the fact that Rorty concedes that the secularist 
lives off inherited capital from a substantive religious worldview, reinforces 
Wolterstorff’s worry about what happens when the capital runs out.  His grim prognosis 
is that erosion of our religious inheritance entails the erosion of our moral subculture of 
human rights. 
I am perhaps more optimistic about the prospects of secular morality than is 
Wolterstorff, and I am not defending the strong account of theistic grounding of human 
rights that he is, but his argument is instructive for a number of reasons.  First, he is not 
numbered among the “new traditionalists.”  On a number of issues he is what liberals 
would call progressive despite – or perhaps because of – his theological conservatism. 
Second, he is not naïve regarding the other options available to the philosophical tradition 
for adequately grounding moral sources.  He simply sees, like Taylor, that there is 
another, darker side to modernity that its rosier defenders seldom notice.  As mentioned 
above in reference to Taylor’s narrative, the search for adequate moral sources has been a 
133
preoccupation of modern thinkers especially given the challenge of the “immanent 
counter-Enlightenment”: that heroic misanthropy associated primarily with Nietzsche. 
Most secular Anglo-American philosophers, although there are significant exceptions, 
dismiss the charge that, after Nietzsche, morality is meaningless, and they continue to 
plug away at the task of grounding morality rationally with a minimum of metaphysical 
presuppositions.  Such attempts are contentious, evidenced by the fact that no free-
standing account has so far done everything we want it to.  But perhaps more 
importantly, and more subtly, such philosophers, trained as they are in rational analysis, 
simply fail to see how something like Nietzsche’s valorization of violence might be 
attractive to those who cannot handle – in the absence of religion – the disciplinary 
requirements of modern society, a point that Taylor makes to good effect.200  Wolterstorff 
also thinks that without strong substantive and affective ties, humanity’s experiment in 
universal human solidarity will be brief, that nothing will remain to hold our tribalism in 
check.  Again, even if one does not accept this narrative, or its implied pessimism from 
the perspective of the secularization thesis, I believe that its possibility permits one to say 
that religious resources, grounded as they are in transcendent points of reference, are not 
irrelevant to modernity’s search for adequate moral sources.  Moreover, we should not 
simply rule them out a priori, or translate their semantic resources into rationally purified 
secular “cognitive contents.”  We have already seen some of the weaknesses of such an 
approach. 
200 Taylor, 185: “[T]he concern about leveling, the end of heroism, of greatness, has also been turned into a 
fierce denunciation of the modern moral order, and everything it stands for, as we see with Nietzsche. 
Attempts to build a polity around a rival notion of order in the very heart of modern civilization, most 
notably the various forms of fascism and related authoritarianism, have failed. But the continued popularity 
of Nietzsche shows that his devastating critique still speaks to many people today. The modern order, 
though entrenched – perhaps even because entrenched – still awakens much resistance.” 
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From Wolterstorff’s account of religiously grounded human rights, I believe we 
can conclude that transcendent sources of morality have something to offer to 
contemporary moral debate, but are they legitimate from the perspective of 
communicative redemption?  In other words, are they publicly accessible?  I see no 
reason why not.  Firstly, one can make rational arguments in support of them; they are 
not simply suspended in mid-air, as it were.  One can argue rationally that transcendent 
points of reference make good sense in the context of moral and political deliberation on 
the basis of our experience as human beings and given the ends we want to achieve as 
citizens working toward a more just society.  Careful, analytical arguments can be made 
on behalf of this position, as should be clear to anyone who has read Wolterstorff’s book. 
One might object that the fact that religiously-based arguments terminate in transcendent 
points of reference is problematic from the standpoint of ‘public reason’.  But secular 
arguments, especially regarding morality, also terminate at a certain point in improvable 
premises which often involve appeal to principles that approximate ‘transcendence’ to 
human context and experience.  So I think such an objection will not do.  It is especially 
dubious when we remind ourselves that most bases for public morality entail some robust 
substantive or affective account of ourselves as human beings.  We are not, contra the 
Kantians, concerned exclusively with rationality.  But nevertheless, religious premises 
can be, and have been historically, sustained on the basis of rational argumentation. 
Canadian Jewish philosopher Jay Newman ably summarizes many of the points I have 
been making thus far:
The fact is that morality is not purely a matter of reason – or intuition – and it 
actually was around in the world that existed prior to the time that the ancient 
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Greeks “invented” systematic philosophy as we know it. Secondly, the fact that a 
Marxist materialist or non-Christian might be inclined to dismiss a point as 
irrelevant does not necessarily mean that the point is an insufficiently “general” 
moral consideration. For one thing, an appeal to something like the doctrine of 
creation or the gospel of redemption can conceivably be defended by arguments 
in natural or philosophical theology, in which case, ironically, it might ultimately 
have to be regarded even by the secularist as more “objective” than non-
theological moral appeals.201  
In other words, the fact that somebody or other dismisses transcendent moral sources is 
no measure of their rational defensibility or public accessibility.  As Phil Enns also 
reminds us, “People may differ on religious beliefs, but the rational grounds for those 
beliefs are available to all and open to rational discussion.  The justification and 
application of beliefs are never a private matter so that religious beliefs are always open 
to public scrutiny and subject to criticism on rational grounds such as coherence or 
consistency.”202  
To be clear, I am not here adopting a classical foundationalist position with 
respect to the grounding of religious belief. As I mentioned in the first chapter, we may 
be rationally entitled to at least some religious beliefs without explicit argumentation. We 
may treat some beliefs as innocent until proven guilty. This approach is common to both 
Wolterstorff’s Reformed epistemology and Stout’s pragmatism.203 However, we cannot 
treat our entitled beliefs as indefeasible in the way the classical foundationalist would; 
such beliefs can be proven guilty in principle and, thus, are not immune from criticism. It 
is in this respect that religious beliefs are open to rational critique just like any other 
beliefs. They are not uniquely private or inaccessible to public scrutiny. Where I part 
201 Jay Newman, On Religious Freedom (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1991), 126.
202 Enns, 588. 
203 Jeffrey Stout, “Comments on Six Responses to Democracy and Tradition,” Journal of Religious Ethics, 
33.4 (2005): 712
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ways with Habermas, and join ranks with Wolterstorff and Stout, is in thinking that the 
case against religion has not been made as decisively as its critics assume. Wolterstorff, 
of course, is a Christian whose philosophy often has apologetic intent, but even Stout, an 
unbeliever, recognizes that the critique of religion is “a harder and more complicated line 
of work than it has often been made out to be.”204 He continues:
It would be a simpler process if the dialectic that led from Hume to Feuerbach had 
essentially completed the critique of religion as such, as Marx thought it had. But 
the critique of religion is a trickier business than Marx thought it was. James 
raises the possibility that some of the religious reasoning that Hume and 
Feuerbach dismissed as merely wishful thinking is better understood as 
pragmatically justified hopeful thinking. And some types of religion – the ones 
Cornell West terms prophetic – function neither as social narcotics that disable the 
pursuit of justice nor as justifications for existing injustices. So the sweeping 
dismissals and all-purpose explanations of religion that remain a staple of critical 
theory do not persuade me.205
So it is not clear that religious rationales are simply indefensible or inaccessible to 
‘public’ reason. Of course, in practice it may require a lot of work to show that particular 
religious beliefs are rationally defensible and this work is usually carried out in 
specialized corners of academia rather than in full view of the public.  But the epistemic 
habits of philosophers with respect to religion are probably not much more commendable 
than those of the average citizen. To quote Stout again:
Philosophers who do not pay much attention to the philosophy of religion often 
assume that the case has long been closed on the question of rational entitlement 
and theistic belief. It would be too harsh to assume that such philosophers are 
sheltering their commitments from challenge, but I suspect that they behave 
epistemically more or less the way theists do. We all take some commitments for 
granted if they seem to be serving us well. Getting on with life often takes priority 
over inspecting all of the conceivably relevant arguments and evidence.206
204 Stout, 714. 
205 Stout, 714. 
206 Stout, 713. 
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As such, practical considerations get in our way when it comes to seriously evaluating 
religious claims and counter-claims. I doubt that these debates in philosophy of religion 
will be settled anytime soon, but we should remember that merely charging a religious 
rationale with being an insufficiently general claim or lacking public accessibility is to 
ignore a lot of important arguments that seriously attempt to render explicit the rational 
entitlement to those claims. Since it is impractical on the level of political praxis to 
cultivate the exacting epistemic standards that even philosophers fail to exemplify, 
perhaps the best we can do is to cultivate a generous attitude with respect to the epistemic 
entitlement of citizens to express their arguments in religious language. Again, I agree 
with the pragmatist intuition that we should widen our vocabulary and remain willing to 
engage the arguments of our interlocutors in whatever form those arguments take.  From 
the standpoint of political praxis, then, all sorts of reasons that are not strictly secular 
might be publicly accessible. I will have more to say about this in a subsequent chapter. 
But, secondly, as for the public accessibility of a secular grounding of human 
rights, for example, it is not clear that the Kantian account – Wolterstorff’s only secular 
candidate and the one Habermas favors – could practically replace religiously motivated 
grounds for the simple reason that it lacks the texture, imagination, and rhetorical power 
of the tradition it translates.  To quote Gaita once again, all secular expressions “lack the 
simple power of the religious ways of speaking” when it comes to articulating human 
dignity.  No doubt some philosophers will disagree with this, but there is also no doubt 
that religious ways of speaking have great semantic resources that may well be missing 
from modernity’s thinned-out Kantian translation and these religious ways of speaking 
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are themselves accessible to many citizens, religious or otherwise.  Habermas has 
increasingly recognized the potential of religious language.  For example, consider his 
following meditation on what “the image of God” regarding human embryos might mean 
to contemporary secular citizens:
In the controversy, for instance, about the way to deal with human embryos, many 
voices still evoke the first book of Moses, Genesis 1: 27: “So God created man in 
his image, in the image of God created he him.” In order to understand what 
Gottesebenbildlichkeit – “in the likeness of God” – means, one need not believe 
that the God who is love creates Adam and Eve, free creatures who are like him. 
One knows there can be no love without the recognition of the self in the other, 
nor freedom without mutual recognition. So, the other who has human form must 
himself be free in order to be able to return God’s affection. In spite of his 
likeness to God, however, this other is also imagined as being God’s creature …. 
This creatural nature of the image expresses an intuition which in the present 
context may even speak to those who are tone-deaf to religious connotations.207
Habermas’s caveat that one need not believe in God to understand the metaphor makes 
the point that this way of speaking has rhetorical power and accessibility not only to 
those familiar with the biblical tradition but also to those who are religiously tone-deaf. 
Therefore, Habermas seems very much open to the possibility that as-yet-untranslated 
religious language can be publicly accessible in precisely the way I have been arguing 
above.  Indeed, such language may be more accessible and efficacious than the Kantian 
translation of the same point, especially given the fact that one can hardly ground the 
dignity of human embryos on rational capacity.  Habermas goes on to elaborate on the 
implications of this non-secularized religious insight for the issue at hand:
Because he is both in one, God the Creator and God the Redeemer, this creator 
does not need, in his actions, to abide by the laws of nature like a technician, or by 
the rules of a code like a biologist or computer scientist …. Now, one need not 
believe these theological premises in order to understand what follows from this, 
namely, that an entirely different kind of dependence, perceived as a causal one, 
207 Habermas, “Faith and Knowledge,” 336.
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becomes involved if the difference assumed as inherent in the concept of creation 
were to disappear, and the place of God be taken by a peer – if, that is, a human 
being would intervene, according to his own preferences and without being 
justified in assuming, at least counterfactually, a consent of the concerned other, 
in the random combination of the parents’ sets of chromosomes …. Would not the 
first human being to determine, at his own discretion, the natural essence of 
another human being at the same time destroy the equal freedoms that exist 
among persons of equal birth in order to ensure their difference?208
Habermas’s novel use of biblical language is, I believe, a model of the way religious 
language can inform public debate by offering the kind of perspectives that have 
transformative power.  These languages cannot be expected to be ‘publicly accessible’ in 
the sense of secular; that would be to rob them of the transformative power Habermas 
elsewhere attributes to democratic deliberation.  Therefore, I believe that the criterion of 
‘public accessibility’ as coextensive with ‘secular’ needs to be rethought. 
However, Wolterstorff’s view can be criticized for compromising solidarity 
among citizens within pluralistic societies by making some sort of theism a prerequisite 
for the political values we all embrace.  Clearly, Wolterstorff thinks a robust 
metaphysical foundation – a theistic foundation – is necessary for grounding human 
rights discourse.  I do not think it prudent to defend this stronger contention. Stout, by 
contrast, is skeptical of any such grounding; he wants ethics without metaphysics.  He 
says:
The purpose served by pragmatic ethical theory … is to make clear that a society 
divided over the nature and existence of God is not thereby condemned to view its 
ethical discourse as an unconstrained endeavor. If the God of the philosophers is 
dead, not everything is permitted. There can still be morally valid obligations to 
constrain us, as well as many forms of excellence in which to rejoice. Pragmatism 
comes into conflict with theology in ethical theory mainly at those points where 
208 Habermas, 336.
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someone asserts that the truth-claiming function of ethics depends, for its 
objectivity, on positing a transcendent and perfect being.209
Clearly, Stout thinks that Nietzsche’s challenge is misguided, as is the quest to ground the 
objectivity of ethical discourse in a divine being.  On this point, he and Wolterstorff are 
deeply divided.  Since the latter thinks that Kantianism is the only viable candidate to 
replace a theistic grounding, he is suspicious of Stout’s pragmatism.  
For example, he critiques Stout’s Hegelian expressivism, whereby norms emerge 
in the course of practice.  According to Wolterstorff, expressivism offers an inadequate 
account of moral obligation.  Simply because a group has a set of practices that they 
regard as normative, it does not follow that one is thereby obligated to adopt those 
practices.  As Wolterstorff  puts  it, “The rabbit of moral obligation cannot be pulled out 
from the hat of moral practice.  The practices are simply too defective and incomplete for 
that.”210  He notes that philosophers who grant this point have essentially two options: one 
strategy posits a hypothetical, idealized moral practitioner and asks what such a person 
would require; the second strategy posits an actual morally perfect practitioner, i.e. God, 
and asks what this person does in fact require.  “The pragmatist,” however, “dislikes both 
options.  He wants to talk about our actual practices, not about some idealized version 
thereof.  The last thing he wants to do is commit pragmatism to theism.”211  Indeed, given 
the above block quote, Stout does want to avoid committing a pragmatic understanding of 
norms to any kind of theism.  But Stout is also aware that our practices do not guarantee 
209 Jeffrey Stout, Democracy and Tradition (Princeton University Press, 2005), 268.
210 Nicholas Wolterstorff, “Jeffrey Stout on Democracy and Its Contemporary Christian Critics” Journal of 
Religious Ethics, 33.4 (2005): 641.
211 Wolterstorff, 641. 
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moral obligation.  What if our practices are wrong?  What if nobody desires the good? In 
Wolterstorff’s estimation:
Stout both resists all attempts to provide metaphysical grounding for the good and 
resists all attempts to ground the good in human activities of some sort. As a 
pragmatist, he is content to say that the good is what is approbation worthy. 
That’s enough. Norms – the right norms, not the norms in force in some group – 
are then understood as specifying the means necessary for achieving whatever be 
the good in view. Norms are objective because the good is objective.212
Nevertheless, positing some goods as objective still does not obligate one to achieve 
those goods; there are many conceivable goods I could achieve that I am not morally 
obligated to achieve.  At the end of the day, the pragmatist must pick and choose.  For 
Wolterstorff, then, “The ethical substance and tradition of liberal democracy do not 
incorporate commitment to Stout’s expressive pragmatist account of moral obligations. 
Just as liberal democracy has to be pulled loose from the contractarian’s embrace, so too 
it has to be pulled loose from the pragmatist’s embrace.”213  He continues: “Democracy is 
hospitable to pragmatists; it does not require of its members that they be pragmatists.”214 
Stout admits that citizens of a democracy do not have to accept his account of 
moral obligation, but wants to defend the pragmatic notion that norms are the result of 
social construction in a way that even the Christian could countenance.  Here we see 
Stout’s aptitude for immanent critique at work:
When I say that such norms are creatures of social practices and social 
relationships in which persons participate, I take care to leave open, for the 
purposes of this discussion, what sorts of persons exist. Suppose God exists. 
Suppose that God’s inner life has the structure of two persons united in love, 
beheld by a third, whose person consists in their communal relatedness or spirit. 
Suppose further that the God whose inner life has this triune structure enters into a 
212 Wolterstorff, 642.
213 Wolterstorff, 643.
214 Wolterstorff, 643.
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practical social covenant with human beings. Suppose this covenant involves 
mutual accountability oriented around a practice of promising and promise 
keeping. Suppose that the resulting promises go hand in hand with commands 
issued by one existing person to others and that the promises and commands, 
taken together, give rise to ethical obligations. Then it makes sense to say that the 
ethical obligations just mentioned are creatures of social-practical doings. If this is 
so, then how does Christian theism conflict with the pragmatic thesis about the 
genesis of ethical norms that I have put forward?215
Of course, as Stout makes clear, these are not his suppositions.  However, they do 
demonstrate how a theist might be a pragmatist on a social level.  The theist simply 
includes another person(s) – albeit the supreme Person – in the relevant norm-forming 
community.  Therefore, although Wolterstorff’s criticisms of Stout’s theory of moral 
obligation have merit, Stout’s response indicates that the metaphysical grounding of 
norms in the strong sense that Wolterstorff defends is unnecessary.  Therefore, we need 
not compromise the solidarity of citizens in a democracy by committing them either to 
expressivism or theism.  
Despite their disagreements, Wolterstorff shares much of Stout’s pragmatism on 
the social level; both eschew a common basis and criticize moral restraints on offering 
religious reasons in public.  Moreover, Wolterstorff, unlike the new traditionalists, shares 
a commitment to democracy, as Stout acknowledges.216  Wolterstoff is not trying to 
achieve consensus, either on the liberal model or on the basis of religion, as would the 
new traditionalists.  Rather, I see his contribution as an example of a way in which 
religiously based ethics can be rigorously defended by philosophical arguments that are, 
in principle, publicly accessible.  They also, in an indirect way, test the limits of the 
translation requirement that both he and Stout reject. 
215 Jeffrey Stout, “Comments on Six Responses to Democracy and Tradition,” 720.
216 Stout, Democracy and Tradition, 298.
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As we have seen, Habermas has staked out an epistemic territory “between 
naturalism and religion.”  In other words, he sees postsecularism as requiring that secular 
citizens not take for granted metaphysical naturalism when offering their arguments in 
the public sphere.  He warns that the secular worldview should not be over-generalized; 
religious convictions must not be considered simply irrational compared to secular 
knowledge.  Neither should we see the process of translation from religious to secular 
language as the secularization thesis has conventionally interpreted it: as society’s 
emancipation from religion.  Such a process would not only ignore criticism of the 
subtraction story of secularization, but more importantly, it would violate the principle of 
state neutrality as surely as would the establishment of some particular religion because it 
would be tantamount to the establishment of secularism.  Thus, believers and unbelievers 
are involved in a complementary learning process: believers must translate their 
particularistic language into the publicly accessible language and unbelievers must treat 
religion as at least a potential source of insight and meaning with value for human beings 
generally.  However, once these epistemological points are granted, what remains of the 
normative weight of the translation requirement?  
The answer to this question rests on an important distinction, made by Habermas, 
between formal and informal public spheres.  The informal public sphere is the sphere of 
opinion formation, independent of the official political discourse.  Indeed, as our 
historical excursus shows, this was one of the defining features of the emergent modern 
public sphere.  In an informal or weak public sphere, at least in a democracy, a plurality 
of voices, including religious ones, compete for a fair hearing.  Of course, the fact of 
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pluralism may make some translation into the most accessible language necessary for 
practical purposes, but translation, strictly speaking, is not required.  For this reason, I 
believe one should interpret the translation requirement as a pragmatic consideration, 
rather than a formal requirement, in the informal public sphere.  In the case of formal or 
arranged publics, however, the translation requirement is applied more strictly.  This is 
the domain of democratic legislation, the official political discourse.  The translation 
requirement is in place here, because of the formal requirement of the neutrality of the 
state.  Certainly, it is important that the formal political deliberations take into 
consideration the informal debate in the public sphere; indeed the legitimacy of the 
opinion of the citizenry to inform and regulate the official political discourse is a defining 
feature of modern parliamentary democracy.  Nevertheless, the distinction is important 
for preserving the neutrality of the state and the integrity of the democratic process.
Thus, Habermas seeks to preserve the normative weight of the translation 
requirement in the official political discourse.  For example, members of parliament are 
not to appeal to religious arguments in their capacity as public representatives, regardless 
of whatever personal beliefs they may hold.  Cooke and Wolterstorff question even this 
condition on the translation requirement; however, in Habermas’s judgment, the absence 
of this qualification erodes the neutrality of the state by abandoning the need for at least 
some shared background assumptions and removing any restrictions on religiously-based 
arguments. Such a free-for-all strikes him as threatening democratic legitimacy.  As we 
have seen, he argues that legitimacy derives from citizens’ rational insight into the 
validity of the laws to which they are subject; a mere modus vivendi does not suffice. 
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Thus, in the domain of official public discourse, or will formation, the translation 
requirement retains its obligatory, deontological status.  If religious arguments entered 
into the formal public sphere, or were invoked in making the laws by which all citizens 
must abide and which state coercion must enforce, it would seriously undermine state 
neutrality. 
In the following chapter, I will more fully address  questions pertaining to state 
neutrality and the normativity of the translation requirement at the level of official public 
discourse. For my purposes in this chapter, I have endeavored to defend three main 
theses. Firstly, I have argued that the rationale behind Habermas’s translation 
requirement can be questioned even on his own methodological assumptions. As we have 
seen, he has recently become more critical of the disenchantment narrative of 
secularization he acquired from Weber, and instead has come to see the task of 
secularization, following Kant and the critical theorists, as more of a salvage operation 
than a demolition. Nevertheless, he maintains that religious worldviews bear heavier 
metaphysical baggage. I have argued that this strain in Habermas’s thought represents a 
remnant of the subtraction story of secularization, suggesting that Habermas’s self-
critique is not yet complete. A consistent extrapolation of his criticisms of Weber should 
culminate in something like Taylor’s phenomenological description of the substantive 
sources of secularism. If Taylor is correct about these sources, I argue that one must 
question Habermas’s assumption that secularism is the default language of ‘the public’. 
Precisely because a secularist outlook does not lack particular substantive commitments, 
it must forego its claim to universality, and therefore also its alleged potential to secure 
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political consensus. Once the assumption of secularism’s default publicity is called into 
doubt, the translation requirement no longer follows as simply normative. 
Secondly, I have argued in this chapter that the insight behind the translation 
requirement is better construed as a pragmatic concession to discourse in a democracy, 
rather than as a contractarian obligation. Religious citizens can certainly see the value in 
translating, when possible, the insights of their tradition into secular language in an effort 
to persuade their secular interlocutors. However, this practice is distinct from insisting 
that religious citizens must translate their religious language into secular language 
because the latter simply is the normative public language (by virtue of its rationality, 
epistemic normativity, or metaphysical ‘lightness’, etc.) I have suggested reasons for 
casting doubt on these assumptions and, consequently, on the strong construal of the 
translation requirement as well. 
Thirdly, I have argued that something is indeed lost through secularism’s 
evisceration of religious sources of meaning. Habermas has expressed this worry himself, 
and I have provided reasons to think that his skepticism regarding the capacity of 
secularism to sustain robust commitments to ‘sacred’ Western values, such as human 
rights discourse, is justified. Habermas also provides a striking example of what it means 
to exercise the semantic potential of religious language when dealing with contemporary 
political issues, such as the ethics of genetic engineering. I have argued that if Habermas 
can appropriate religious sources of meaning in this way, there should be no ban on 
religious citizens utilizing the resources of their own traditions in public discussion of 
such issues. 
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In the next chapter, I will continue to explore the translation requirement through 
an exposition of Habermas’s essay “Religion in the Public Sphere.” It will also be 
instructive to compare Habermas vis-à-vis Rawls on the rigidity of the translation 
requirement. In my judgment, the two positions are not simply equivalent, as is 
commonly assumed. I think Habermas offers a more nuanced account than Rawls, while 
staying within the broadly Kantian tradition in political theory. Nevertheless, even his 
more nuanced position is not immune from challenge. In what follows, I will continue to 
argue that the translation requirement should be relaxed. It is best construed as a 
pragmatic move in democratic discourse. Recently, Habermas has recognized that the 
strong construal of the translation requirement significantly impairs the political 
participation of religious citizens. His revised view in “Religion in the Public Sphere” is 
more generous with respect to religious language in public. However, Habermas is still 
concerned with the neutrality of the state and thinks that political legitimacy must be 
grounded in rational consensus rather than a mere modus vivendi. So while he contends 
that religious citizens can appeal to religious arguments in the informal public sphere, the 
realm of opinion formation, they ought not to do so in the formal public sphere, the realm 
of will formation. At the level of political will formation, i.e. Parliaments, religious 
arguments must be translated into secular language. Habermas believes that this revised 
translation proviso succeeds in extending to religious citizens the freedom to appeal to 
religious arguments while simultaneously safeguarding the neutrality of the state. While 
there is a genuine insight behind Habermas’s revised translation proviso, for practical 
purposes it means that religious citizens must submit all of their arguments to secular 
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translation if these arguments are to be politically efficacious. Habermas’s revised 
proposal is arguably only a nominal relaxing of the translation requirement; in practice it 
remains in full force. 
In chapter 3, I argue that even this revised proviso is too rigid. In order to preserve 
the neutrality of the state it suffices that the laws are parsed in as neutral a language as 
possible when drafted. It does not follow that those who debate these prospective laws, at 
the informal or formal level, need limit their arguments to secular ones. Again, if 
translation is useful with respect to brokering practical agreement, then so much the 
better. But it is problematic to assert the normativity of translation on the basis that 
secular arguments are public, and thus more likely to find assent, whereas religious 
arguments are private, and thus more likely to find dissent. The arguments that any given 
public finds persuasive is a matter of dialectical context, and defining some arguments as 
‘public’ and others as ‘private’ is often simply another way of saying ‘those arguments 
which secular citizens find persuasive and those which they do not’. The contest here is 
not between public reasons and private reasons, or secular reasons and religious reasons, 
but between those reasons that command universal assent by any rational person and 
those that do not. I will argue that, in political contexts, we do not have access, for 
practical purposes, to such universally compelling reasons. Instead, we have an array of 
reasons of varying degrees of controversiality. Unless we are willing to bar all 
controversial reasons from public debate, there seems to be no principled reason to single 
out religious reasons. Although religious reasons have served as the paradigm case for 
‘private reasons’ in liberal theory, they are in principle no different from other 
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controversial reasons. Through the use of more neutral examples, I try to demonstrate 
that pointing out that a reason is ‘religious’ or ‘private’ in this context is a red herring. 
The real issue is whether or not consensus is, or ought to be, a goal of democratic 
discourse. This question has been a theme throughout this project, but in the third 
chapter, I will deal with it in greater detail. 
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Chapter 3
Habermas vis-à-vis Rawls on Religion in the Public Sphere: 
Promissory Notes or Cognitive Contents?
In this chapter, we shall explore in more concrete terms the way that Habermas sees his 
translation requirement at work in political praxis. In an effort to elucidate his theory of 
public reason, I find it useful to compare it with that of John Rawls. Habermas and Rawls 
both propose theories of the way rational discourse should proceed in democracies. 
Although there are significant differences between the two, upon which I shall elaborate, 
both thinkers seem to consider the goal of discourse to be consensus, and thus the goal of 
any democratic discourse should be rational consensus. However, should consensus, as 
such, be the goal of democratic discourse? In what follows, I suggest reasons to question 
this assumption.
Both Habermas and Rawls insist that only ‘public’ or ‘publicly accessible’ 
reasons count as reasons in a secular democracy. Public reasons are, effectively, secular 
reasons; a paradigm example of a ‘private reason’ would be a religious reason, and such a 
reason does not count as justification in a secular democracy. The reason for this, 
according to Habermas and Rawls, is that citizens are both the authors and the addressees 
of the law; as such, every citizen, must understand (in principle) the justification of the 
law, and so this justification must be public, secular, and universal, rather than private 
and sectarian. This is especially true with respect to what Rawls calls the ‘principles of 
basic justice’, or when state coercion is invoked to restrict a particular liberty.
Habermas is aware that citizens in democracies may have religious justifications 
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for their political views, but he insists that they must translate these justifications into 
secular ones in order to participate in democratic discourse. Rawls also says that citizens 
have a moral obligation to offer public reasons, and that private, i.e. religious, reasons act 
as merely “promissory notes” for public, i.e. secular, justifications.
Both Habermas and Rawls seem to couch this requirement in Kantian terms as an 
obligation incumbent on all rational persons within democratic discourse, at least at the 
institutional level in which the coercive power of the state is brought to bear. In this 
chapter, I continue to argue that this requirement ought to be construed in weaker, 
pragmatic terms. In what follows, I will present arguments which attempt to show that 
this weaker construal of Habermas’s translation proviso secures all of the relevant 
protections afforded secular citizens and religious minorities under standard liberal 
theory, while significantly increasing the expressive freedom of religious citizens to 
couch their contribution to public debate in religious terms. 
Taking a pragmatist line with respect to discourse, I suggest that the translation 
requirement, at both the formal and informal level of political discourse, is best construed 
as a pragmatic move in the course of argument. Religious citizens are usually capable of 
offering some secular reason for their view, while presumably finding it less compelling 
than their motivating, religious rationale. However, if we construe the goal of democratic 
discourse as Habermas and Rawls arguably do, namely consensus, strongly construed, we 
must say that merely offering a secular reason is not enough. It does not suffice that a 
majority of citizens agree on some concrete policy for some stated secular reason. Rather, 
they must first agree on premises that would count as acceptable to any reasonable person 
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and then agree on the policy for the same reasons. 
Robert Audi makes this principle explicit in his revision of Rawls. He argues that 
in addition to whatever religious reasons a citizen has for support of a public policy, one 
must also have a “motivationally sufficient secular reason.” In other words, it is not 
enough for one to have a secular reason for pragmatic purposes, i.e. attempting to 
persuade a secular interlocutor, but one must have a secular reason that would motivate 
action in the absence of religious reasons. This seems like an undue burden to place on 
religious citizens as a condition for participation in public discourse.
In his more recent writings, Habermas has come to see this point and has offered a 
revision of his translation requirement. He now wants to say that citizens can appeal to 
whatever reasons they want in the informal public sphere (the domain of ‘opinion 
formation’) but must only appeal to secular, public reasons in the formal public sphere 
(the domain of ‘will formation’, i.e. Parliament). He thinks this institutional translation 
proviso solves the problem of excluding religious citizens in a democracy from political 
participation and preserves the neutrality of the state. 
So far, so good, but the distinction between public and private reasons can be 
questioned. Indeed, as Nicholas Wolterstorff points out, the distinction is not between 
public reasons and private reasons or secular reasons versus religious reasons, but rather 
between premises that would be universally accepted by all rational people, and those 
that would not. Again, this would seem to follow if the goal of rational discourse, and 
thus democracy, is consensus: we would ideally try to find universally assented to 
premises for use in our political arguments. But of course, such premises are in almost all 
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cases impossible to come by. So the distinction is not between premises that are public, in 
some mysterious sense of the term, and those that are private, but between universally 
accepted premises and contested premises. In what follows, I argue that the fact that we 
can’t find universally accepted premises is problematic for liberal theorists like Habermas 
and Rawls, because there is very much reason to doubt there are such premises; 
moreover, I think we lack any non-question begging criteria for figuring out what those 
premises might be. The best democratic discourse can do is to proceed pragmatically 
from premises that are dialectically useful with respect to persuading a given audience, 
hopefully the widest audience possible in a pluralistic society. 
Nevertheless, there is a sense in which Habermas’s institutional translation 
proviso has force. The laws as written in a pluralistic democracy should not credit a 
particular religious tradition. The language at the level of legislation should remain as 
neutral as possible with respect to competing religions and ideologies. 
Habermas has recently become more sensitive to the burdens that his translation 
requirement places on religious citizens. In the final part of this chapter, I look at his 
efforts to balance the burdens of religious and secular citizens such that the political 
participation of the former is unimpaired. I find much laudable in Habermas’s efforts, 
while arguing that the translation requirement should be relaxed. In doing so, I present a 
revised proviso that I believe accomplishes everything Habermas wants to accomplish 
with respect to securing the neutrality of the state, while greatly balancing the respective 
burdens of religious and secular citizens. I then offer an analysis of this model in terms of 
the costs and benefits of such a scenario, concluding that it is a better system than the 
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standard liberal model for all involved. I conclude the chapter by anticipating objections 
to my revisions of liberal theory and providing answers to them.  But before drawing any 
such conclusion, we must first turn our attention to a close reading of Habermas’s essay, 
“Religion and the Public Sphere.” 
Religion and the Public Sphere: Habermas and Rawls
Thus far, we have critically examined the role Habermas allows for religious arguments 
within the (mostly) informal public sphere.  Now, we turn to a more explicit engagement 
of his view on the place of religion and the translation requirement in the formal realm of 
political will formation.  The most fruitful place to begin is, unsurprisingly, an essay 
called “Religion and the Public Sphere.”217  Here, he argues for a middle ground between 
John Rawls and Robert Audi on the secular side and Nicholas Wolterstorff and Paul 
Weithman on the religious side.  The former do not take the existential pull of religious 
beliefs on the rationale of citizens seriously enough, and place unreasonable burdens 
upon religious citizens in the process.  The latter, in Habermas’s judgment, erode the 
neutrality of the state by abandoning the need for at least some shared background 
assumptions and removing any restrictions on religiously-based arguments.  Between 
these two positions, he opts for the complementary learning process model outlined 
above.  I want to unpack his arguments in this essay in more detail before critically 
engaging his position as it emerges. 
217 Jürgen Habermas,"Religion and the Public Sphere: Cognitive Presuppositions for the 'Public Use of 
Reason' by Religious and Secular Citizens," in Between Naturalism and Religion: Philosophical Essays 
(Polity, 2008), 114 - 47.
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Important in this regard is Rawls’s understanding of ‘public reason’ and ‘ethics of 
citizenship’, both of which inspire Habermas’s analysis.  Rawls’s understanding of the 
former is only superficially straightforward: the appeal to reasons which any rational 
person would accept regardless of comprehensive religious or philosophical doctrines.  In 
this way, Rawls hopes to achieve a wide “overlapping consensus”218 in the public sphere. 
To quote Rawls:
In discussing constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice we are not to 
appeal to comprehensive religious and philosophical doctrines – to what we as 
individuals or members of associations see as the whole truth …. As far as 
possible, the knowledge and ways of reasoning that ground our affirming the 
principles of justice and their application to constitutional essentials and matters 
of basic justice are to rest on the plain truths now widely accepted, or available, to 
citizens generally.219
I will have more to say about Rawls’s conception of public reason a little later.  
Regarding an ‘ethics of citizenship,’ Rawls claims that citizens of liberal democracies 
have “a duty of civility to appeal to public reason.”220  Of course, all citizens have the 
right in a liberal democracy to appeal to religious reasons for their political decision 
making. Such a right cannot be reasonably withheld from citizens in liberal democracies 
which value freedom of religion and freedom of expression; indeed, in liberal 
democracies such rights are legally protected.  Nevertheless, Rawls argues that civility 
requires that we not claim such rights when debating constitutional essentials or matters 
of basic justice.  We have a moral obligation to give exclusively public reasons.  To again 
quote Rawls:
218 John Rawls, Political Liberalism (Columbia University Press, 1993), 208.
219 Rawls, 224 – 25.
220 Rawls, 226.
156
The ideal of citizenship imposes a moral, not a legal, duty – the duty of civility – 
to be able to explain to one another on those fundamental questions how the 
principles and policies they advocate and vote for can be supported by the values 
of public reason. This duty also involves a willingness to listen to others and fair-
mindedness in deciding when accommodations to their views should reasonably 
be made.221
Thus we have a moral obligation to appeal only to public reasons, reasons that others 
would reasonably accept.  Needless to say there is a great deal of latitude in interpreting 
“reasonable” in these contexts and I will have more to say about that shortly.  But the 
upshot of Rawls’s claim is that as free and equal citizens in a liberal democracy we owe 
one another good reasons for the political positions we support, reasons that are 
independent of “the whole truth as we see it.”  If our political decisions were based upon 
comprehensive doctrines, state neutrality would be compromised, since the state could be 
construed as enforcing religiously based principles which not all reasonable citizens 
would accept. 
However, Rawls, like Habermas, later revised or qualified his views on this issue. 
After all, it seems odd to claim that while citizens have the right to appeal to any rationale 
they choose, including a religious one, they are never actually justified in claiming that 
right in practice.  What then does such a freedom actually mean?  Moreover, it does not 
seem obvious that we have a prima facie obligation to voluntarily surrender our rights in 
the way that Rawls claims.  Perhaps if we were to enter into a contract that specified as 
one of its conditions that civility requires divesting ourselves of religious rationales, we 
could be held to such a standard.  Indeed, this seems to be what Rawls proposes.  But 
there is no prima facie reason to think we should enter into such a contract, especially 
221 Rawls, 217.
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since it is more restrictive than the social contract assumed by most liberal democracies. 
Rawls’s unqualified restriction sounds more like a rule of decorum for debate rather than 
a moral duty incumbent upon members of existing liberal democracies.  Thus, Rawls’s 
restriction on what counts as ‘reasonable’ debate in the public sphere strikes me as 
counterintuitive.  As Wolterstorff queries, “given that it is of the very essence of liberal 
democracy that citizens enjoy equal freedom in law to live out their lives as they see fit, 
how can it be compatible with liberal democracy for its citizens to be morally restrained 
from deciding and discussing political issues as they see fit?”222  This is not to say that we 
do not owe each other some justificatory basis for our political claims, but the common 
justificatory basis that Rawls’s proposes is not itself embraced by all reasonable people. 
In response to these criticisms, Rawls revisited the notion of public reason with 
respect to the legitimacy of religious reasons informing political decisions.  His updated 
position says that reasonable comprehensive doctrines, religious or non-religious, “may 
be introduced in public reason at any time, provided that in due course public reasons, 
given by a reasonable political conception, are presented sufficient to support whatever 
the comprehensive doctrines are introduced to support.”223  In other words, religious 
reasons are only promissory notes for public reasons.  The relevance of this “proviso” to 
Habermas’s translation requirement is clear.  Stout puts the point this way, “The amended 
Rawlsian view is that religious reasons are to IOUs what contractarian reasons are to 
legal tender. You have not fulfilled your justificatory obligations until you have handed 
222 Nicholas Wolterstorff, “The Role of Religion in Decision and Discussion of Political Issues,” in Robert 
Audi and Nicholas Wolterstorff, Religion in the Public Square: The Place of Religious Convictions in 
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over real cash.”224  Despite finding this proviso more plausible than the original 
formulation, Stout still mentions some significant problems.  For example, he points out 
that the American abolitionists, including Abraham Lincoln, and later the civil rights 
movement under Martin Luther King Jr., couched their contributions to political debate in 
religious terms.  Rawls confesses that it is unclear whether they ever satisfied the proviso 
to supplement their religious rationales with secular ones.  For Stout, the fact that some of 
the most important political achievements in American history may not qualify under 
Rawls’s proviso is good reason to question its plausibility. 
Habermas also mentions the potential exclusion of King and the U.S. civil rights 
movement as a criticism that can be leveled even against Rawls’s modified position. 
Furthermore, he extends the scope of the data, saying that “the deep religious roots of the 
motivations of most social and socialist movements both in the Anglo-American and 
European countries are highly impressive.”225  Echoing Weithman, he then notes that 
under Rawls’s proviso “churches’ civic engagement would, however, wane, so the 
argument goes, if they constantly had to distinguish between religious and political 
values according to the yardstick laid down by Rawls’s ‘proviso’ – in other words, if they 
were obliged to find an equivalent in a universally accessible language for every religious 
statement they pronounce.”226  Therefore, as a practical matter, religious citizens in liberal 
democracies cannot be expected to meet Rawls’s proviso; to do so would be to seriously 
compromise their political participation.  But as Habermas notes, there is another, more 
central objection to the proviso, which he puts as follows: “the state cannot encumber its 
224 Jeffrey Stout, Democracy and Tradition (Princeton University Press, 2005), 69.
225 Habermas, 124.
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citizens, to whom it guarantees freedom of religion, with duties that are incompatible 
with pursuing a devout life – it cannot expect something impossible of them.”227  Since 
ought implies can, this is a more serious objection to the obligatory force of Rawls’s 
proviso.
Habermas pursues this objection further by way of introducing Robert Audi’s 
defense of the duty of civility.  Audi defends a modified version of Rawls’s proviso, 
albeit with some important differences.  Audi’s principle, called the principle of secular 
rationale, “says that one has a prima facie obligation not to advocate or support any law 
or public policy that restricts human conduct, unless one has, and is willing to offer, 
adequate secular reason for this advocacy or support (say for one’s vote).”228  This sounds 
very similar to Rawls’s duty of civility, although, as Habermas notes, Audi goes even 
further by introducing the principle of secular motivation which says “that one has a 
(prima facie) obligation to abstain from advocacy or support of a law or public policy 
that restricts human conduct, unless one is sufficiently motivated by (normatively) 
adequate secular reason.”229  In other words, it is not sufficient to simply offer a secular 
justification for political action, but that reason must be sufficient to motivate one’s 
action independently of whatever other reasons one might have.  Audi argues that his 
view represents an advance over other liberal theories in dealing with religious 
arguments.  His view states that “citizens have a prima facie obligation to have and be 
willing to offer at least one secular reason that is evidentially adequate and motivationally 
sufficient … This allows that one also have, for the law or policy in question, religious 
227 Habermas, 126.
228 Audi, “Liberal Democracy and the Place of Religion in Politics,” in Religion in the Public Square, 25. 
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reasons that are evidentially adequate and motivationally sufficient.”230  In other words, 
he does not exclude religious reasons from the public sphere, but says that religious 
citizens must have at least one good secular reason for their position when restrictions on 
liberty or state coercion are at stake.  Thus, Audi thinks that his view actually allows 
more space for religious reasons than the liberalism defended by Rawls.  The only 
asymmetry in Audi’s position is the absence of a counterpart requirement – that secular 
citizens must have at least one evidentially adequate and motivationally sufficient 
religious reason. However, because there is an alleged epistemic asymmetry between 
religious and secular claims, such a justificatory asymmetry, according to Audi, is 
nevertheless reasonable. 
Habermas is unwilling to go along with the principle of secular motivation: 
“Now, the link between the actual motivation for a citizen’s actions and those reasons he 
cites in public may be relevant for a moral judgment of the citizen, but it has no import 
for assessing his contribution to maintaining a liberal political culture.”231  For Habermas, 
secular justifications, not secular motivations, are what count for liberal democracy. 
Although Habermas is inclined throughout the rest of the essay to “ignore Audi’s 
additional requirement”,232  I think it is worth pursuing this line of argument further. Not 
only does difference on this score differentiate Habermas’s position from Audi’s, but 
also, in my judgment, from that of Rawls.
Remember that from Rawls’s perspective, the practice of public reason demands 
that we abstain from referring to the whole truth as we see it when formulating reasons in 
230 Audi, 123.
231 Habermas, 126.
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public debate.  This practice, however, leaves open the possibility that the reasons we cite 
in public may not be our real reasons, and thus in aiming to fulfill the duty of civility we 
may, ironically, be disingenuous.  Arguably, this is the hole in Rawls’s theory that Audi 
is attempting to fill with his principle of secular motivation or motivational sufficiency. 
But it is clear that in order to be consistent, Rawls must at least implicitly assume 
something like Audi’s principle.  Although it is ambiguous whether Rawls uses ‘reason’ 
both in a justificatory and motivational sense, I believe one can make a case that he at 
least implicitly affirms the principle Audi renders explicit.  For example, Rawls states 
that:
[Democracy] implies further an equal share in the coercive political power that 
citizens exercise over one another by voting and in other ways. As reasonable and 
rational, and knowing that they affirm a diversity of reasonable religious and 
philosophical doctrines, they should be ready to explain the basis of their actions 
to one another in terms each could reasonably expect that others might endorse as 
consistent with their freedom and equality.233
The words I have italicized surely indicate that motivationally sufficient reasons are in 
play in Rawls’s description of the duty we owe fellow citizens as free and equal members 
of a constitutional democracy.  If such reasons are not in play, Rawls seems to fall into 
the paradox of allowing citizens to meet their respective duties by offering disingenuous 
reasons.  But such a view would be in flagrant contradiction with Rawls’s insistence that 
we owe one another respect in offering public reasons.  If one were not offering a 
motivationally sufficient reason, but merely a secular rationale, in order to obfuscate 
one’s real reasons, that would surely qualify as disrespectful manipulation.  Thus, 
Rawls’s insistence on public reason may actually undermine the respect it seeks to 
233 Rawls, 217 – 18, italics added. 
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secure.  This is ironic, especially given his claim that respect requires that we appeal only 
to public reason and avoid any appeal to comprehensive doctrines.  It may be the case 
that respect requires the opposite.  Wolterstorff suggests a thought experiment: “Suppose 
that you offer to me reasons derived from your comprehensive standpoint; and that I, 
fully persuaded of the moral impropriety of such behavior by the advocates of the liberal 
position, brush your remarks aside with the comment that in offering me such reasons, 
you are not paying due respect to my status as free and equal.”234  He concludes that 
“such a response would be profoundly disrespectful in its own way.”235  Another way of 
putting the point, is that Rawls’s view “neglects the ways in which one can show respect 
for another person in her particularity.”236  Stout proposes his own thought experiment 
that reinforces the point in a more positive way: “Suppose I tell you honestly why I favor 
a given policy, citing religious reasons.  I then draw you into a Socratic conversation on 
the matter, take seriously the objections you raise against my premises, and make a 
concerted attempt to show you how your idiosyncratic premises give you reason to accept 
my conclusions.  All the while, I take care to be sincere and avoid manipulating you.”237  
Stout fails to see how this qualifies as disrespectful conduct, and so do I.  In fact, such 
immanent critique is a profound sign of respect if conducted along the above lines. 
Furthermore, he speculates that the reason Rawls neglects this form of respect “is that he 
focuses exclusively on the sort of respect one shows to another individual by appealing to 
reasons that anyone who is both properly motivated and epistemically responsible would 
234 Wolterstorff, 110.
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find acceptable.”238  Again, the words I have italicized suggest that Rawls needs both the 
notion of secular rationale and secular motivation to satisfy his requirement of public 
reason.  However, we have noted some serious problems with the latter that actually 
militate against proper respect for the individual.  In this regard, I believe Habermas 
differs from Rawls and is thus more open to the kind of immanent critique that Stout has 
in mind.  This difference could also be expressed by saying that Habermas does not see 
religious reasons as promissory notes but as expressing cognitive contents from which 
secular interlocutors can learn. 
A key to explaining this difference, in my judgment, is by way of an even more 
fundamental difference between the two thinkers, namely their conception of the role of 
truth in democratic deliberation.  Rawls is careful to distinguish his political liberalism 
from the comprehensive liberalism of, say, J.S. Mill.  Rawls’s version of liberalism 
allegedly eschews all comprehensive doctrines, both religious and secular.  Indeed, Rawls 
has expressed frustration with his critics for failing to make that distinction, and has 
emphatically denied that he is making “a veiled argument for secularism.”239   However, 
such a charge is not entirely groundless.  As Stout says, “The charge being made by both 
his secular and religious critics alike is that he is wrong to expect everybody to argue in 
the same terms, which just happen to be a slightly adjusted version of the same terms 
dictated by his comprehensive secular liberalism.”240  Habermas is arguably more 
forthright.  Despite his public agnosticism regarding metaphysical certainty, he realizes 
that truth is at stake in democratic deliberation.  Constitutional democracy, he says, is “an 
238 Stout, 72 – 73, italics added.
239 Quoted in Stout, 76.
240 Stout, 76.
164
epistemically demanding, ‘truth-sensitive’ form of government.”241  Therefore, there is no 
distinction between ‘secular’ reasons and ‘public’ ones as Rawls tries (implausibly) to 
maintain.  Rather, Habermas uses ‘secular’ and ‘public’ interchangeably.  It is tempting 
to see this aspect of his thought as counting against religious reasons in public; indeed I 
argued in the last chapter that we should question the priority of secular reasons in the 
public sphere.  But there may well be a hidden benefit to religion embedded in 
Habermas’s conception of the truth-sensitivity of liberal democracy.  As Cooke explains:
Habermas now also sees an important difference between ethical conceptions and 
religious convictions. Unlike conceptions of the good, which are always 
conceptions of the good “for me” (as a particular individual) or “for us” (as the 
members of a particular group), religious beliefs are deemed to have a cognitive 
content that is of potential relevance to everyone. This means that 
postmetaphysical philosophy, and postmetaphyscially-minded citizens, must be 
willing to learn from religious traditions and engage critically with their 
contents.”242
This willingness to learn from the cognitive contents of religious worldviews is the 
difference between seeing religious reasons as placeholders for secular reasons and 
seeing them as potential sources of insight that must be regarded as at least potentially 
true and relevant for all.  Rawls simply fails to see this difference between ethical 
conceptions and religious convictions. 
Habermas’s Institutional Translation Proviso 
Hence, for Habermas, all that is necessary for the standard conception of liberal 
democracy is that citizens be able to translate their religious convictions into publicly 
241 Habermas, 144.
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accessible secular language.  However, he notes that even this more lenient position is 
often countered by the argument that some, or perhaps many, religious citizens are not 
able to artificially separate their political lives from their religious lives; he is sensitive to 
the fact that only religious believers are asked to split their identities and that this 
requirement increases the burden that religious citizens bear within liberal democracies.  
It is not only the empirical fact that some religious citizens lack the imagination to find 
counterpart secular reasons for their religiously motivated political decision making, 
although, as Habermas notes, such a fact is unsettling enough since ought implies can. 
Rather, the point is precisely that from the perspective of some, perhaps many, religious 
citizens, one’s theological conceptions ought to inform the whole of one’s life.  
Habermas is aware that the request for secular reasons may well be incompatible with 
such a citizen’s right to live a devout life, to pursue the good as she sees fit.  He quotes 
Wolterstorff’s oft-quoted passage that for many religious citizens, it is their conviction 
“that they ought to allow the Word of God, the teachings of the Torah, the command and 
example of Jesus, or whatever, to shape their existence as a whole, including, then, their 
social and political existence.”243  Habermas continues, “If we accept this, to my mind 
compelling, objection, then the liberal state, which expressly protects such forms of 
existence as a basic right, cannot at the same time expect all citizens in addition to justify 
their political positions independently of their religious convictions or worldviews.”244 
Although we cannot expect all religious citizens to do so, Habermas argues that 
politicians and candidates for political office can reasonably be held to this stricter 
243 Wolterstorff, 105.
244 Habermas, 128.
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demand.  Again, the normative force of the translation requirement is preserved at the 
institutional level.  The separation of church and state is such an important principle for 
the free exercise of religion that Habermas still insists upon the translation requirement, 
but “to extend this principle from the institutional level to statements put forward by 
organizations and citizens in the political public sphere would constitute an over-
generalization of secularism.”245  In other words:
The liberal state must not transform the necessary institutional separation between 
religion and politics into an unreasonable mental and psychological burden for its 
religious citizens. It must, however, expect them to recognize the principle that 
the exercise of political authority must be neutral toward competing worldviews. 
Every citizen must know and accept that only secular reasons count beyond the 
institutional threshold separating the informal public sphere from parliaments, 
courts, ministries, and administrations …. Religious citizens can certainly 
acknowledge this “institutional translation proviso” without having to split their 
identity into public and private parts the moment they participate in religious 
discourses. They should therefore also be allowed to express and justify their 
convictions in a religious language even when they cannot find secular 
“translations” for them.246
The foregoing suggests that for Habermas, contra Rawls, the translation requirement is 
not to be construed as an obligation of the social contract in the informal political public 
sphere, or the domain of opinion formation.  In this domain, the translation requirement 
can be construed along pragmatic, rather than Kantian, lines, as necessitated by the fact 
of pluralism.  However, in the formal public sphere, parliaments etc., the domain of 
political will formation, in which the coercive power of the state is in play, he defends the 
“institutional translation proviso” (henceforth ITP) delineated above.  By contrast to the 
pragmatic understanding of translation with regard to the informal public sphere, the ITP 
is arguably a contractarian principle.  Some preliminary evidence for this interpretation 
245 Habermas, 129.
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comes just prior to the introduction of the ITP in the essay.  Habermas notes that “the 
conflict between one’s religious convictions and secularly justified policies or proposed 
laws can only arise because even the religious citizen is supposed to have already 
accepted the constitution of the secular state for good reasons.”247  In other words, the 
religious citizen has already entered into a social contract.  The benefits to the religious 
citizen of entering into such a contract are clear: since the religious citizen no longer lives 
in a religiously homogenous society with a religiously legitimated state, one’s freedom of 
religion depends upon a secular state, neutral toward competing worldviews.  Thus, one’s 
citizenship in a constitutional democracy and one’s enjoyment of religious freedom 
obligates one to accept the legitimacy of the ITP.  But as we have seen, Habermas does 
not see this requirement as too onerous because it does not place an unreasonable 
psychological burden on religious citizens; it recognizes the existential pull of religious 
reasons for many citizens, while maintaining that state neutrality necessitates secular 
reasons at the institutional level.  Since religious citizens benefit from this aspect of 
constitutional democracy, they can surely understand the reason for the ITP, and thus 
have a good reason for accepting the social contract.  Habermas continues:
Even if the religious language is the only one they speak in public, and if 
religiously justified opinions are the only ones they can or wish to contribute to 
political controversies, they nevertheless understand themselves as members of a 
civitas terrena, which empowers them to be the authors of laws to which they are 
subject as addressees. They may express themselves in a religious idiom only on 
the condition that they recognize the institutional translation proviso. Thus the 
citizens, confident that their fellow-citizens will cooperate in producing a 
translation, can understand themselves as participants in the legislative process, 
although only secular reasons count therein.248
247 Habermas, 129.
248 Habermas, 131.
168
According to Habermas, even the most devout citizens usually understand themselves as 
members of an earthly city – by contrast with the city of God – and as such understand 
themselves as the authors and addressees of the law in this terrestrial domain.  It is 
difficult to miss the Kantian language in this context.  Furthermore, Habermas makes 
recognition of the ITP as a condition of the freedom of religious expression.  Clearly, he 
understands the ITP in a contractarian way. 
This contractarian understanding is important and, on the surface, its application 
to the ITP seems plausible.  However, there are implications to even this revised proviso 
which count against its purported generosity towards public religious language.  For 
example, in order for religious citizens to make contributions to the legislative process, 
their religious reasons must be translated into secular reasons prior to the legislative 
process proper.  As Habermas says, “The truth contents of religious contributions can 
enter into the institutionalized practice of deliberation and decision-making only when 
the necessary translation already occurs in the pre-parliamentary domain, i.e. in the 
political public sphere itself.”249  Therefore, although religious citizens may speak in a 
religious idiom in the informal public sphere, and are not expected to be forthcoming 
with secular translations, if they want to actually affect the outcome of the legislative 
process, then they must offer secular reasons.  So, although citizens may appeal to 
whatever reasons they choose, they must appeal to secular reasons in order to be 
politically efficacious.  For practical purposes then, only secular reasons count.  
Habermas seems to take back with his left hand what he gives with his right.  The 
generosity with which he allows religious citizens to speak their own language in the 
249 Habermas, 131.
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informal public sphere has no direct practical consequences unless it is translated into 
secular language.  This proviso seriously impairs the efficacy of religious language in 
public.  It is unclear whether Habermas recognizes the extent to which his proviso, 
despite its apparent generosity vis-à-vis that of Rawls, impairs the political participation 
of religious citizens.  Habermas adds the caveat that the translation requirement must be 
construed as a cooperative task, in which secular citizens will assist those religious 
citizens who are willing to make the effort to translate their reasons.  He goes further, 
saying that “Even if the religious contributions are not subjected to self-censorship they 
depend on cooperative acts of translation.  For without a successful translation the 
substantive content of religious voices has no prospect of being taken up into the agendas 
and negotiations within political bodies and of gaining a hearing in the broader political 
process.”250  I find it naïve in the extreme to think that religious citizens can depend on 
the generosity of their secular counterparts to help them translate their substantive 
contents into admissible secular language.  Why should we not expect secular citizens to 
be instead hostile toward religious points of view or to take advantage of their monopoly 
on public power?  Habermas is surely talking about an ideal speech situation!  But I 
appreciate that he is trying to equalize the burdens borne by religious citizens.  In the 
essay currently under discussion, he makes an almost supererogatory effort to eliminate 
the asymmetry of burdens that many of his critics have noted.  Whether his noble attempt 
is successful or not, we will have occasion to address later.  Now, let us return to the 
plausibility of the ITP.
250 Habermas, 132. 
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Habermas notes that Wolterstorff wants to abandon even this modest (in 
Habermas’s view) proviso.  Naturally, Habermas sees this move as threatening the 
neutrality of the state toward competing worldviews.  He quickly draws what he believes 
are the illiberal consequences that follow: “Since no institutional filters are envisaged 
between the state and the public arena, this version does not exclude the possibility that 
policies and legal programs will be implemented solely on the basis of the specific 
religious or confessional beliefs of a ruling majority.”251  He accuses Wolterstorff of not 
only opening the door to this abuse, but to explicitly drawing this conclusion.  He 
continues: “What is illegitimate is the violation of the principle of the neutrality of the 
exercise of political power which holds that all coercively enforceable political decisions 
must be formulated and be justifiable in a language that is equally accessible to all 
citizens.”252  Wolterstorff, by contrast, does not see the need for a general background 
consensus.  Such a consensus is impossible to achieve, which is why all liberal 
democracies recognize the principle of majority rule. Wolterstorff says that there is a 
difference between a parliamentary session and a Quaker meeting, in which unanimity is 
required. Habermas takes exception to this characterization, charging Wolterstorff with 
“ridiculing the idealizing assumptions inscribed in the practices of the liberal state.”253  
Habermas also recognizes the principle of majority rule, but says that it “mutates into 
repression”254 if it imposes policies based on religious principles without justifying them 
to the minority on an independent basis. According to him, upon Wolterstorff’s view, 
251 Habermas, 133. Here, he simply fails to see that a non-neutral, secular majority can also be abusive, as in 
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democracy is reduced to “coexistence in an ideologically divided society based on 
majority decisions only as a reluctant adaptation to a kind of modus vivendi: ‘I do not 
agree, I acquiesce – unless I find the decision truly appalling.’”255  He continues by 
arguing that it is difficult to see how such a situation is not in constant danger of falling 
into religious strife.  Such a danger can only be avoided, according to Habermas, by a 
shared background consensus on constitutional principles which must be secularly 
grounded.  However, his characterization of Wolterstorff’s argument strikes me as unfair. 
Moreover, he seems to lack imagination regarding how one might avoid religious conflict 
even in the absence of the ITP.  Let us take each of these points in turn.
First of all, Wolterstorff lists the core concepts of a liberal democracy as follows: 
“Equal protection under law for all people, equal freedom in law for all citizens, and 
neutrality on the part of the state with respect to the diversity of religions and 
comprehensive perspectives.”256  He later adds, “an equal voice for all citizens within fair 
voting schemes.”257  So far, there seems to be little in this definition to which Habermas 
or any other liberal theorist would object.  Wolterstorff is quick to point out that his 
definition functions as an ideal type; nowhere is it fully exemplified. “No society is 
anything than more or less a liberal democracy.”258  Despite this pragmatist-sounding 
admission, he does not think that liberal democracy can be reduced to the competition of 
interests.  Rather, what qualifies the liberal position as liberal is its insistence upon 
securing justice for all.  To be sure, justice has to compete with a number of other 
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considerations; sometimes it loses, but sometimes it wins and we manage to bring the 
ideal a little closer to actualization.259  Already, we have gone a long way toward 
correcting Habermas’s mischaracterization of Wolterstorff’s position, which makes it 
sound as though it is unconcerned with constitutional democracy.  What the latter 
questions, of course, is the restraint that the liberal position places on religious reasons in 
the name of justice.  Again, his position is more nuanced.
For example, Wolterstorff admits that democratic citizenship involves restraint on 
the kind of legislation one advocates.  Certainly, he concedes, there are evangelical 
Christians in the U.S. “who believe that American society would be better off if only 
evangelical Christians were allowed to vote and hold public office.”260  And obviously, a 
liberal democracy, for the above reasons, places constitutional restrictions on the 
advocacy of such legislation.  We can call such restrictions restraints on content.  
Nobody even within a generously wide purview of liberalism advocates removing such 
restraints.  What Wolterstorff objects to are epistemological restraints on religious 
citizens when it comes to democratic deliberation.  He asks, “But what is the rationale for 
epistemological restraints on the decisions and debates of citizens?  That is, why should 
epistemological restraints be laid on a person when the legislation advocated by that 
person does not violate the restraints on content?”261  After looking carefully at the 
liberal position, he concludes there is no sound rationale for epistemological restraints, 
and I agree.  Since I have been dealing with the issue of epistemological restraints in one 
way or another throughout, and will do so again later, I will not linger too much on this 
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point. Furthermore, as we have seen, Habermas seems to appreciate the argument for 
loosening epistemological restraints on religious reasons in the informal public sphere, 
although he tightens them at the institutional level.  I want to suggest in what follows that 
the same reasons for loosening them in the former case extend to the latter. 
Bearing in mind that any society is only ever more or less a liberal democracy, we 
have to ask whether the epistemological restraint on religious reasons is either derived 
from or compatible with the liberal ideal above.  In Wolterstorff’s estimation, no liberal 
theorist has sufficiently answered either question.  Some, like Rawls and Audi, have 
insisted that there is a moral obligation to refrain from religious reasons even in the 
informal public sphere.  We have also seen reasons to think they are wrong. But either 
way, such a principle is not explicitly derived from the liberal ideal and there are many 
good reasons to think it is incompatible with it, such as the fact that the limits it places on 
freedom of religion and expression are more restrictive than those found in actual liberal 
democracies.  Yet nobody would deny that it belongs to the nature of liberal democracies 
to protect these rights.  It would be a strange situation indeed if the ideal of liberal 
democracy turned out to be less permissive than the imperfect exemplification of it in 
existing liberal democracies.  As Wolterstorff points out, the concept of liberal 
democracy originated, presumably, “not from the speculations of theorists concerning 
ideal types of social order, but from the attempts of theorists to single out certain extant 
societies from others as constituting a certain type, the liberal democratic type.”262  
Whether or not this genealogy of the concept of liberal democracy is correct, he is right, 
in my judgment, that we must pay attention to the historical contingencies of actual 
262 Wolterstorff, “Audi on Religion, Politics, and Liberal Democracy,” 158.
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liberal democratic societies, rather than limit our focus to the ideal type.  Speaking of 
whether or not the argument in favor of epistemological restraints on religious reasons is 
cogent, Wolterstorff answers that it depends, “on the particular society one has in mind 
and the particular stage in the history of that society.  For seventeenth-century England, it 
quite clearly was cogent: social peace did depend on getting citizens to stop invoking 
God, canonical scriptures, and religious authorities when discussing politics in public – to 
confine such invocations to discussions within their own confessional circles.”263  But he 
wants to say that now, in twenty-first century America, with a long history of religious 
tolerance behind her it is not obvious that civil society will collapse if citizens invoke 
religious reasons for their political decisions. 
None of this is to deny that the creation of liberal democracy in the seventeenth 
century was an historical achievement.  The hard lesson of this period was that the state 
must remain religiously neutral.  The cost of religious liberty, both positive, the freedom 
to live according to one’s own religious views or lack thereof, and negative, protection 
against interference from others, was the limiting of religious arguments to the private 
sphere.  Practical considerations, such as peace and security, meant that religious citizens 
had to make certain concessions.  I agree with Habermas in thinking that they still do, 
although I differ with him over the extent and type of concessions necessary for the 
smooth functioning of discursive democracy.  Nevertheless, the secular liberal state is the 
achievement of a long and bloody learning process in Western Europe’s history. 
However, it would be problematic to suppose that the learning process is now over. 
Cooke, taking her lead from Habermas, thinks that this learning process is inherently 
263 Wolterstorff, “The Role of Religion in Decision and Discussion of Political Issues,” 79.
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open-ended.  We must stand ready to revise our understanding of the place of religion in 
democratic politics if the standard secular paradigm becomes antiquated in the face of 
new challenges.  Habermas’s position, that political discourse is inherently fallible, would 
seem to suggest that no commitment is sacrosanct in the sense of being closed to revision. 
Indeed, to claim otherwise would fall prey to precisely the objection that Habermas 
makes against dogmatic religious claims.  So we must stand ready to modify the way in 
which liberalism is understood when encountering challenges in existent democracies and 
our often rough-and-ready political discourse. 
All of this discussion about the contingencies of existing liberal democracies 
speaks to Wolterstorff’s question of whether or not we need consensus, or what Rawls 
would call a common political basis.  Do we need an “abiding set of agreed-on principles 
to which all of us … can appeal in deciding and discussing political issues – at least the 
most important among them those that deal with ‘constitutional essentials and maters of 
basic justice’?” 264  In other words, do we need a common basis, other than the particular 
constitution itself, in order to decide these matters?  He denies that such a common basis 
is necessary on empirical grounds.  After all, no liberal theorist claims that any existing 
liberal democracy has achieved such consensus; rather they are submitting proposals for 
how such a society might achieve such consensus in principle.  But for Wolterstorff, there 
is no compelling reason to think that we need such a consensus, and even less reason to 
think that we can achieve one in practice.  Of course, we do aim for agreement in 
political discourse, but not upon some pre-established basis for political discourse from 
264 Wolterstorff, 114.
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which no reasonable person could dissent.  Rather, we aim to agree upon some concrete 
proposal, policy, or law. As Wolterstorff says:
Our agreement on some policy need not be based on some set of principles agreed 
on by all present and future citizens and rich enough to settle all important 
political issues. Sufficient if each citizen, for his or her own reasons, agrees on the 
policy today and tomorrow – not for all time. It need not even be the case that 
each and every citizen agrees to the policy. Sufficient if the agreement be the 
fairly gained and fairly executed agreement of the majority. 265
This is perhaps the best that actual functioning liberal democracies can realistically hope 
for, but it is enough for most practical purposes.  His point is so common-sensical that it 
would hardly bear mentioning if not for the counterintuitive requirements placed upon 
democracy by those who only study the ideal type.  Why these additional requirements 
by liberal theorists?  Wolterstorff provides some helpful insights into their motivations:
So-called ‘communitarians’ regularly accuse proponents of the liberal position of 
being against community. One can see what they are getting at. Nonetheless, this 
way of putting it seems to me imperceptive of what, at bottom, is going on. The 
liberal is not willing to live with the politics of multiple communities. He still 
wants communitarian politics. He is trying to discover, and to form, the relevant 
community. He thinks we need a shared political basis. For the reasons given, I 
think that the attempt is hopeless and misguided. We must learn to live with a 
politics of multiple identities.266
I agree that we must live with the politics of multiple identities.  Indeed, accommodating 
and facilitating such multiplicity is one of the main objectives the modern liberal 
democracy was designed to achieve.  I say again: the formal secularism of liberalism is 
best understood as a pragmatic response to the fact of pluralism.  Those citizens among 
us who are nostalgic for a religiously homogenous population where Christianity, say, 
was the only game in town have to learn to live with the reality of pluralism.  Habermas 
265 Wolterstorff, 114.
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is correct that the fact of pluralism requires reflexivity on the part of religious citizens.  
By the same token, secular citizens who yearn for a homogenous secular population long 
promised by the secularization thesis, in which nobody appeals to religious rationales for 
their political decisions, are being equally unrealistic.  Both camps need to embrace, or at 
least learn to live with, the politics of multiple identities.  They seem to be here to stay 
and it is among the virtues of liberal democracy that it can make such diversity work.  I 
am making a broader pragmatic point that we need to avail ourselves of the widest 
discourse, within constitutional limits, in making political decisions and this includes 
allowing religious and secular voices to speak their own language authentically in public. 
Those who resent pluralism, whether they are exclusive religionists or exclusive 
secularists will no doubt also resent this wider discourse.  But the rest of us need not. 
The fact that consensus of the kind hoped for by liberal theorists is not 
forthcoming is at least partly the point of Wolterstorff’s introduction of the admittedly 
“stylized”267 distinction between a parliamentary session and a Quaker meeting.  What he 
is getting at, is that no democracy achieves anything like the unanimity sought after by 
liberal theory of a Rawlsian persuasion.  Bracketing for the moment the issue of religion, 
such consensus is still practically impossible.  Addressing Audi, Wolterstorff notes that 
the classification of “religious reasons versus secular reasons … is misleading.  The 
classification that the [liberal] rationale calls for is that between reasons that would be 
accepted by all appropriately informed and fully rational citizens, and those that would 
not be accepted by all such.”268  We simply cannot find reasons belonging to the former 
267 Wolterstorff, “Audi on Religion, Politics, and Liberal Democracy,” 153.
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category, regardless of our religious beliefs or lack thereof.  Nor does the distinction 
between political and comprehensive liberalism seem to get us any closer as we saw 
above in criticism of Rawls. 
I should qualify that I am not against consensus per se, nor do I think Wolterstorff 
is.  Rather, I believe, along pragmatic lines, that we need to try to persuade the widest 
possible audience, but not on the basis of a presumed ideal rational acceptability, a 
common basis to which all rational people would assent.  Rather, persuading the widest 
audience, building consensus, requires that we use different arguments in different 
contexts.  The widest possible audience in a pluralist society will always include a subset 
of members who do not necessarily agree with a given policy or law for the same reasons 
as other members.  Again, we aim for agreement on particular issues, not on an idealized 
basis upon which to reach consensus on any conceivable issue for all time.  If Cooke’s 
analysis of Habermas’s position on finalist closure summarized in the last chapter is 
correct, then he would concur that we should be very cautious indeed in saying that a 
political issue is closed because the requisite rational consensus has been reached.  To the 
extent that we are committed to fallibilism in our political discourse we seem to be 
committed to the more modest pragmatic agreement outlined here.
We now return to the relevance of these arguments to Habermas’s ITP and 
Wolterstorff’s alleged abandonment of any and all restraints on religious rationales.  Is 
the ITP necessary for the kind of peaceful society Habermas, and presumably the rest of 
us, wants?  What would the abandonment of this principle as applied to public officials 
look like?  Habermas has made a slippery slope argument regarding the danger of 
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readmitting religious rationales into official chambers, but is what is waiting at the 
bottom of that slope as bad as he thinks? 
A Proposed Revision to the ITP
Thus far we have been concerned with the role that religious reasons should play in the 
duty of citizens.  What about public officials?  Habermas clearly denies that religious 
reasons should play any role, as he says “This strict demand can only be made of 
politicians operating within state institutions who have a duty to remain neutral among 
competing worldviews, in other words, of all who hold public office or are candidates for 
such.”269  Since I outlined his reasoning in greater detail above, I shall proceed to the 
question of whether or not such a “strict demand” is necessary.  First of all, Wolterstorff 
makes an important distinction between legislators on the one hand and executives and 
judges on the other.  Despite having the American context primarily in mind, I think this 
distinction is useful. “That divide” he explains, “is this: legislators play a pivotal role in 
the normal process whereby a democratic society reaches its decisions about the laws that 
shall govern the interactions of its citizens; executives and judges exercise their roles 
after the society has reached its decision.”270  The task, then, of executives and judges is 
to enforce and adjudicate the law.  If they have scruples in doing so, they best get out of 
the role.  Although each task involves interpretation, there is a stricter purview in which 
these tasks are performed; they are not asked for their personal opinion.  Indeed, in the 
case of a judge, for example, precisely the opposite: she is obligated to remain impartial.  
269 Habermas, 128.
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The legislator, by contrast, works with prospective laws and thus the question of the 
legitimacy of her own personal views in supporting or opposing the legislation at this 
stage certainly enters the picture.  Unsurprisingly, citizens of liberal democracies disagree 
on how to answer this question: Should the legislator, in her capacity as a representative, 
yield to the will of her constituents, either the majority or the most vocal, or, after taking 
such considerations into account, should she rely more heavily on her own judgment? 
This is one of the many issues upon which reasonable citizens reasonably disagree.  
Again, there seems to be no way of resolving this issue on the basis of a pre-established 
rational consensus. Is it then reasonable to say that it is never legitimate for a legislator’s 
personal views, including religious ones, to enter into political decision-making? 
Although the representative is not a private citizen, political decision making is not a 
mechanical process.  Should the epistemological restraints on religious reasons that 
Habermas concedes are unreasonable in the case of citizens be applied at the legislative 
level even if there is no violation of restraints on content?  Not in my judgment.  Despite 
Habermas’s concern that loosening such restraints will inevitably erode the separation of 
church and state, I find no reason to think that such an unwelcome outcome would obtain. 
Perhaps an example will help clarify why. 
Take a Christian socialist’s defense of the welfare state.271  Suppose her view is 
informed primarily by her understanding of the biblical writers’ injunction to care for the 
poor. Is such a basis politically legitimate?  It might well be objected that she could find a 
secular reason for the same principle.  But what counts as a secular reason in this 
context? One might say that one could formulate the principle as supporting equal rights 
271 Wolterstorff  “Audi on Religion, Politics, and Liberal Democracy,” 162.
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to adequate sustenance.  All well and good, but she still has an underlying religious basis 
for this belief in rights, despite the fact that it contains no explicit theological 
presuppositions. In other words, the new formulation does not constitute a secular reason 
for her.  As Wolterstorff points out, if finding secular reasons were this easy, “religious 
people would almost always automatically have secular reasons.  The religious person 
opposed to abortion because God says that abortion is wrong is perforce also opposed to 
abortion because abortion is wrong.”272  In other words, “[t]o determine whether or not 
someone’s reason is secular, one usually has to know the path by which it was arrived 
at.”273  So it is often difficult to tell, even from a first person perspective, whether one’s 
reasons are religious or secular.  What is the evidence in any case for one’s moral 
convictions regarding the poor?  Does compassion count as evidence?  Although it may 
be a good rhetorical device in argument, I fail to see how it might be evidential.  How 
about biblical texts that say we have an obligation to the poor?  It is unclear what 
evidence means here. One would have to establish some criteria for evidence before one 
could specify what reasons count as secular in such a context.  I am unconvinced that 
such criteria, ones that consistently admit only secular reasons and exclude religious ones 
can be found, but I leave it to those who disagree to produce such criteria.  Thus, the line 
demarcating religious from secular reasons is itself difficult to establish. 
However, there is a sense in which Habermas’s ITP does have force.  One can 
appreciate, for example, even as a religious believer, that the language of laws must be 
neutral with respect to any particular religion, otherwise they fail to represent the entire 
272 Wolterstorff, 162.
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citizenry.  Of course, this caveat does not entail that religious arguments should be barred 
from the process whereby deliberation becomes law, either in the informal public sphere, 
as Rawls argued, or in the formal public sphere of legislatures, as Habermas contends. 
The insight behind the ITP is that in order to preserve the formal neutrality of the state, 
there must be a domain of the state in which the language must be neutral regarding 
religion.  As Taylor elaborates:
This zone can be described as the official language of the state: the language in 
which legislation, administrative decrees and court judgments must be couched. It 
is self-evident that a law before Parliament couldn’t contain a justifying clause of 
the type: “Whereas the Bible tells us that p.” And the same goes mutatis mutandis 
for the justification of a judicial decision in the court’s verdict. But this has 
nothing to do with the specific nature of religious language. It would be equally 
improper to have a legislative clause: “Whereas Marx has shown that religion is 
the opium of the people,” or “Whereas Kant has shown that the only thing good 
without qualification is a good will.” The ground for both these kinds of 
exclusions is the neutrality of the state.274
As Taylor goes on to say, the secular state cannot be officially Christian or Jewish or 
Muslim although the laws, though neutral in their language, will likely reflect the views 
of actual citizens who may well credit religious rationales in their political decision 
making.  However, so long as the laws do not credit these sources, they are legitimate.  
Of course, minorities dissatisfied with the law are free to try and convince the majority 
that the law ought to be changed, or failing that, appeal to the judiciary if the 
constitutionality of the law can be challenged.  All of this is standard procedure in 
working democracies, and is relatively uncontroversial even among religious citizens.  Of 
course, citizens, both religious and secular, disagree about the respective roles of 
legislatures and judiciaries as reflected, especially in the U.S., in concerns over majority 
274 Charles Taylor, “Secularism and Critique,” 
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oppression of minorities feared by many secularists, and judicial activism feared by many 
religionists.  However, these are again issues upon which rational citizens disagree. The 
demarcation between a religious majority’s will and the officially neutral language of 
legislation is often difficult to draw and it is often the task of the courts to do so.  Such 
decisions seldom please everyone, but there seems to be no alternative in diverse 
democracies.  Again, citizens of a democracy, whether religious or secular, must be 
tolerant of losing the vote and judicial decisions. 
Thus, I would endorse a revised version of Habermas’s ITP which states that 
religious contributions to public debate, at both the informal and formal level, must be 
translated into as neutral a language as possible when legislation is drawn up, in order to 
preserve its legitimacy for a pluralistic citizenry.  That is not to say that all citizens will 
agree with the legislation, but they will recognize the legitimacy of the process by which 
it is drafted and passed into law.  In my judgment, this revised proviso accomplishes 
everything Habermas’s ITP intends without impairing the political participation of 
religious citizens who wish to couch their political contributions in a familiar language. 
Habermas, through the ITP, seeks to preserve the formal secularism of the state by 
ensuring that state coercion is never used to enforce an explicitly religious position. 
However, he wrongly thinks that in order to accomplish this goal he must restrict the 
kinds of arguments to which citizens, at both the pre-institutional level (since translation 
must occur prior to parliamentary deliberation) and in parliament, can appeal in making a 
case for a particular position.  I have argued above that to claim that translation must 
occur at the pre-institutional level would be to take back for practical purposes all of the 
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concessions Habermas has made to religious citizens.  Moreover, if there are good 
reasons for acknowledging the existential pull of religious convictions for private 
citizens, those reasons should, I argue, extend to their official representatives.  Indeed, it 
is not so clear cut where religious reasons end and secular ones begin; trying to specify a 
criterion to demarcate between them strikes me as unworkable and unnecessary for 
political praxis. Thus, all that we need to preserve the neutrality of the state is to maintain 
that the official language of the state be as neutral as possible with respect to any 
particular religion(s). This revised proviso addresses the legitimacy issues Habermas 
fears while allowing religious citizens to couch their contributions to public debate in a 
religious idiom. Naturally, such debates may lack the decorum of an ‘ideal speech 
situation’ but such is the case in a robust democracy that values freedom of speech and 
expression for all its citizens without favoring any particular religious or non-religious 
group when the laws are ratified.  In my judgment, this revised proviso addresses all of 
Habermas’s concerns and avoids all of the drawbacks of the ITP as outlined above.
Contestable Premises, Comprehensive Evidence, and Immanent Critique
In my judgment, the hesitancy on the part of liberal theorists, like Rawls and Habermas, 
to adopt such a pragmatic revision to their respective ‘provisos’ stems from two sources. 
Firstly, there is the issue of civility that Rawls raises.  There is a tendency among 
academics to expect democratic debate to emulate that found in the academy.  This 
observation leads Stout to say that Rawls’s duty of civility reflects a kind of decorum that 
a liberal professor would want to impose on discussion.275  But robust debate in a healthy 
275 Stout, 76. 
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democracy seldom conforms to such rules, nor does parliamentary deliberation for that 
matter.  The notion that a society can have genuine debate without friction is too 
idealized to be of much use.  I believe Habermas too falls prey to the same objection. 
This is not to say that we cannot debate issues in both a lively and respectful manner, but 
claiming, as Rawls and Habermas have at varying points in their careers, that only secular 
reasons count pre-empts debate by policing the expressive freedom of citizens.  This is a 
high price to pay to avoid the kind of friction indicative of healthy democratic discourse. 
The tendency of contemporary liberal theory is to be ‘frictophobic’.  I do not see the need 
for the kind of decorum – in the sense of limited expression – that contemporary liberal 
theory wants to impose.  Once again, we cannot expect consensus on every issue, but 
why should it matter?  So long as citizens have access to fair voting procedures and the 
courts, we can reach compromises.  In my judgment, echoing Mill, liberalism should err 
on the side of liberty rather than consensus. 
Secondly, there is an epistemological basis for such provisos.  This in turn is 
supported by two underlying assumptions: 1) religious reasoning is dubious or divisive or 
superfluous for the purposes of deliberation in pluralistic contexts; 2) secular reason 
provides an adequate normative basis for political deliberation.  I have already dealt with 
some of the objections based on the dubiousness of religious arguments in the first 
chapter, but I believe that it is worth reiterating the distinction between faith-claims and 
premises that are not universally accepted.  The former of these claims, those that appeal 
uncritically to faith or dogmatically to authority function in practice as conversation-
stoppers.  In other words, there are religious persons who are unprepared or unwilling to 
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offer reasons for their beliefs, which upon further examination are seen to rest on an 
uncritically held faith-claim.  If such persons cannot offer reasons, then discussion 
quickly breaks down.  Habermas, Rawls, and Rorty are quite concerned to show that the 
privilege of religion’s immunity from criticism in the private realm disqualifies it from 
the discursive democratic process which is inherently critical and argumentative.  If this 
were the only kind of religious contribution to public debate, I would have to agree with 
these liberal theorists.  However, I am unconvinced that this is the only religious 
contribution to debate.  As Stout reminds us, there is a difference between a faith-claim, 
as defined above, and a premise that not all rational people will accept.  Indeed, most 
premises, not just religious ones, are of this type. That is to say, one might be prepared to 
argue at great length for one’s religious conclusions on a particular issue, yet be unable to 
convince all interlocutors of the truth of the premises one uses in supporting such a 
conclusion.  For example, take the following argument: 1) All persons that come within 
the jurisdiction of the state are to be granted equal protection under the law; 2) a fetus is a 
person; 3) Therefore, a fetus ought to be granted equal protection under the law.  This 
argument is sound.  Of course, pro-choice advocates would simply dispute or deny the 
second premise.  It is not universally accepted and it seems that rational people can 
rationally disagree about the truth of premise two.  But we still have an argument as 
opposed to a faith-claim.  But one might object that this is still a secular argument 
because it contains no explicitly theological premises or conclusion.  As such, it would 
fall into the category of secular contributions by religious persons to political debate; in 
other words, as an example of translation.  However, I would reiterate that it is not easy 
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to demarcate religious justifications from secular ones even when no explicit theology is 
at play. 
For example, there are two kinds of evidence one could offer for the truth of 
premise two which I shall call ‘minimal’ evidence and ‘comprehensive’ evidence 
respectively.  Minimal evidence would be evidence that entails a minimal number of 
ontological or metaphysical commitments.  This is roughly what liberal theorists refer to 
as ‘secular reason’ or reason to which no rational person could object.  Thus, we are back 
to the problem of common basis, the assumption that there are premises which are 
universally acceptable.  Comprehensive evidence, following Rawls’s terminology, would 
be evidence that draws upon one’s comprehensive doctrine, or view of the world, with all 
of the attending metaphysical baggage.  Such an appeal, Rawls claims, is disallowed.  But 
why should this be so?  At the risk of belaboring the point, the criticisms of Rawls we 
have examined thus far and Habermas’s revised position on the issue make it difficult to 
justify such epistemological restraints on religious citizens.  Why should religious 
citizens not be allowed to draw on the whole truth as they see it despite the fact that the 
premises will not be accepted by all rational people?  The secularist is able to appeal to 
the whole truth as he sees it and I see no good prima facie reason why we should assume 
that he travels without metaphysical baggage.  The metaphysical assumption of 
materialism, for example, would seem to be as relevant in determining the moral worth, if 
any, of the fetus as would an explicitly theological formulation.  
However, one might object that the allowance of comprehensive evidence is 
simply a veil for the readmission of faith-claims into the discussion.  What would 
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comprehensive evidence for the personhood of the fetus look like?  Would one say that 
human life is sacred?  That it is made in the image of God?  That the fetus has a soul?  I 
list these in more or less increasing order of reliance on a faith-claim and most 
sophisticated pro-life arguments are not stated in so bald and flatfooted a manner.  But 
even if one cannot convince one’s interlocutor of the truth of certain premises on the 
basis of comprehensive evidence, what does this prove?  Unless the person appealing to 
such comprehensive evidence is unwilling to countenance criticism, such claims do not 
necessarily cease to be discursive.  For example, the avenue of immanent criticism 
remains open, despite the fact the conversation cannot proceed on the assumption of a 
common basis.  Of course not all rational people will be willing to accept the truth of 
these comprehensive claims, but so what?  It should be noted that liberalism offers no 
basis, secular or otherwise, upon which to resolve such disputes.  Stout cites a study by 
Kent Greenawalt who argues that in addition to the abortion debate, debates over welfare 
assistance, punishment, military policy, euthanasia, and environmental policy cannot be 
resolved on the basis of commonly held liberal principles.276  The absence of universally 
acceptable premises is something with which both secular and religious citizens in a 
democracy must contend. 
Moreover, religious arguments do not have a monopoly on comprehensive 
evidence.  Many secular premises implicitly appeal to such evidence or remain 
unsupported.  It is often very difficult to demonstrate one’s entitlement to moral and 
political convictions and reasonable people often differ.  This is especially true in cases 
where our beliefs have developed through acculturation rather than explicit reasoning. 
276 Stout, 88.
189
We may, in such cases actually have epistemic entitlement to such beliefs, but we may be 
incapable of practically justifying them to someone else.  If we were to exclude all beliefs 
of this kind from public expression, we would be compelled to silence on all of the 
important of issues listed above.277  According to Stout, when religious citizens find that 
their premises are not universally accepted they have three options: “(1) remain silent; (2) 
to give justifying arguments based strictly on principles already commonly accepted; and 
(3) to express their actual (religious) reasons for supporting the policy they favor while 
also engaging in immanent criticism of their opponents views.”278  Rawls’s proviso and 
Habermas’s translation requirement seem to force a false dilemma between (1) and (2). 
But Habermas, and even Rawls, have since recognized that silence is dangerous for 
democracy and it would be contrary to liberal principles to compel particular citizens to 
silence.  And as I have been arguing all along, (2) is usually off the table. In my judgment 
(3) is a viable way to proceed in such instances. 
But let us take yet another example in order to clarify some of these points.  Take 
the argument, alluded to above, for welfare assistance.  A religious person might argue as 
follows: 1) The Bible admonishes us to care for the poor; 2) welfare assistance is an 
effective way of doing so; 3) Therefore, we should support such initiatives.  Now, this 
argument does not enjoin that the Bible is the Word of God or sacred, but there is, 
nevertheless, a hidden premise that stated modestly would be “we ought to pay attention 
to what the Bible has to say regarding social policy.”  Once this premise is rendered 
explicit, it is clear that this is what the secularist will deny or at least qualify (maybe we 
277 Stout, 88.
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should pay attention to the Bible in this case, but not, for example, when quoted in 
opposition to gay rights).279  But as we have seen, simply because the premises are not 
universally acceptable, it does not mean that the argument should not be given a hearing 
in the public sphere.  It is, after all, an argument rather than merely a faith-claim that 
brooks no criticism.  As such, there seems to be no good prima facie reason why it should 
be disallowed.  To see why, we might substitute a different text in place of the Bible.  A 
secularist could argue thusly: 1) Marx admonished “From each according to his abilities 
to each according to his needs”; 2) welfare assistance is an effective way of achieving 
such transformation; 3) Therefore, we should support such initiatives.  The hidden 
premise, once again, is that “we ought to pay attention to what Marx has to say regarding 
social policy” and no doubt many citizens in liberal democracies will reject this premise.  
But so what?  Nothing prevents the secular socialist from bringing his favorite text into 
the public debate. Likewise, nothing prevents the religionist from bringing his favorite 
text.  Of course, legislation cannot specify the Bible or Das Kapital as inspiration for 
welfare policies, but we cannot reasonably expect people to check their favorite texts at 
the door when they enter the public sphere. 
Therefore, the claim that religious argument ought to be disallowed on the 
grounds of being dubious or divisive fails.  With the exception of tautologies, no 
argument appeals to premises that are universally acceptable or could not be denied by 
any rational person.  Moreover, we inevitably appeal to comprehensive evidence in 
support of our premises if challenged, which is why Habermas cautions against an 
“overgeneralization” of secularism as a worldview.  I simply fail to see how religious 
279 See the next chapter for a discussion of this issue. 
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arguments are unique in this regard.  We all appeal to what Rorty calls “final 
vocabularies”280 in the sense that we can offer no further noncircular justifications for 
them.  This is true of religious and secular citizens alike.  Rorty’s “final vocabulary” is 
similar to what I mean by comprehensive evidence in justification of premises: persons 
may be entitled to their premises but unable to demonstrate their entitlement in a non-
question begging way. 
I have not yet explicitly addressed the claim above that religion is superfluous for 
purposes of deliberation in pluralistic contexts because it segues into the second claim 
above: secular reason provides an adequate normative basis for political deliberation.  
One might in fact argue that either religious reasons fail to convince because of their 
dubious nature and are thus divisive or one can find secular reasons that support the same 
conclusions and thus religious reasons are superfluous.  Therefore, this trio of charges 
against religious arguments mutually reinforce one another.  Since I have already 
addressed the charges of dubiousness and divisiveness, the charge of superfluity 
essentially hangs on the claim that we have adequate secular reasons that do the same 
work that religious reasons do.  Such a claim is akin to Audi’s principle of secular 
rationale and motivation: religious citizens must find at least one rationally adequate and 
motivationally sufficient reason for their support of a policy or position in addition to 
whatever religious reasons they might have.  In other words, religious reasons for 
purposes of public deliberation are superfluous.  Of course, such an argument assumes 
that there are adequate secular reasons that can effectively replace religious ones and it 
seems far from obvious that this is true.  In my judgment, this is one of the reasons 
280 Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, 73.
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Audi’s proposal fails and why the translation requirement should be relaxed.  Habermas, 
despite still holding to the normative adequacy of secular reasons, has acknowledged the 
semantic potential of religious language to enrich public discourse. 
We have already seen reasons to doubt that secular reasons are adequate in the 
sense of being sufficient to convince any rational person regardless of comprehensive 
evidence.  One might argue that they are adequate in the sense of adequately explicable in 
exclusively “this-worldly” terms.  But it is not obvious that “this-worldly” explanations 
are adequate to sustain the kinds of political values we want to defend and promote and I 
have cited Habermas to this effect previously.  Moreover, as Taylor expounds:
The two most widespread this-worldly philosophies in our contemporary world, 
utilitarianism and Kantianism, in their different versions, all have points at which 
they fail to convince honest and unconfused people. If we take key statements of 
our contemporary political morality, such as those attributing rights to human 
beings as such, say the right to life, I cannot see how the fact that we are 
desiring/enjoying/suffering beings, or the perception that we are rational agents, 
should be any surer basis for this right than the fact that we are made in the image 
of God. Of course, our being capable of suffering is one of those basic 
unchallengeable propositions …. as our being creatures of God is not, but what is 
less sure is what follows normatively from the first claim.281
To be sure, as Taylor also concedes, it may be the case that religion is founded on an 
illusion as various strong versions of secularism contend, in which case the premises 
based upon it are less than credible.  But the claim that religion is fundamentally illusory 
is also one of those claims on which reasonable people disagree and barring some 
fulfillment of the secularization thesis, such debate is bound to be interminable.  In the 
meantime, it would be naïve to say that religion no longer sustains many citizens’ 
commitment to liberal political values.  It surely does.  So to claim that religious reasons 
281 Taylor, “Secularism and Critique.” 
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are superfluous because we have adequate secular replacements immediately prompts 
two questions: 1) adequate in what sense? 2) How could one claim such reasons are 
adequate without first demonstrating that religion is illusory or that some comprehensive 
account of secularism is true?  In terms of the first question, secular reasons are neither 
persuasively adequate nor necessarily adequate to ground our liberal commitments. 
Regarding the second question, the claim that they are adequate in an explanatory sense 
is also dubious, but even if one could make such a case, and many have tried, it is not 
clear that a political overgeneralization of secularism should follow especially given the 
importance of state neutrality and the pragmatic justificatory role that religion continues 
to play in sustaining many citizens’ liberal political values.  Following Taylor, the 
secularism of the state should be an “open secularism,”282 not a secularism that sees its 
task as the emancipation of society from religion.  Of course, even open secularism 
demands compromise on the part of religious citizens, such as respecting state neutrality, 
but it does not entail that religious citizens cannot avail themselves of religiously 
informed premises when making arguments in public.  In my judgment, Habermas’s 
evolving view on the place of religious language in public involves recognition of these 
points. 
282 Gérard Bouchard and Charles Taylor, Building the Future: A Time for Reconciliation, Abridged Report, 
The Consultation Commission on Accommodation Practices Related to Cultural Differences (Government 
of Québec, 2008), 46.
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Balancing Burdens: The Pragmatics of Translation
We thus return to the question: what remains of the normative force of Habermas’s 
translation requirement?  As indicated above, I think a revised version of his ITP is 
defensible, namely, that religious contributions to public debate at both the informal and 
formal level, must be translated into as neutral a language as possible when legislation is 
drawn up, in order to preserve its legitimacy for a pluralistic citizenry.  Beyond this fairly 
minimal requirement, I do not think the translation requirement carries any normative 
weight at either the informal or formal level.  Certainly, discursive situations arise in 
which some measure of translation is pragmatically necessary in order to keep the 
discussion going, but construed as a deontological, contractarian obligation, the 
translation requirement fails except at the level of legislation as drafted and ratified by 
parliaments or other elected bodies.  In my judgment, something like Stout’s option (3) 
above, candor combined with immanent critique, is really all Habermas needs to protect 
the neutrality of the state while allowing for the real existential and psychological pull 
religion exercises on many citizens. 
But since translation, even upon my revision, is still operative within liberal 
democracies the question remains: who should be expected to do it and does it still 
impose an asymmetrical burden on religious citizens?  In “Religion and the Public 
Sphere,” Habermas is very concerned to avoid imposing such an asymmetrical burden. 
Thus, we should look briefly at the burden Habermas thinks is reasonable for religious 
citizens to bear and how he attempts to balance it with that of secular citizens.  For 
example, he regards religious belief as entailing greater cognitive dissonance within 
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liberal society than its secular counterpart.  I would argue that such an assumption, 
though it may be empirically true, stems from a superficial evaluation of epistemological 
justification, as though secularism is based exclusively on evidence no rational person 
could dispute.  Since I have argued against this point at length, I mention it only to 
underscore how prominently the Enlightenment ideal of rational consensus figures in 
Habermas’s evaluation of religion vis-à-vis the secularity of the state.  Once this ideal is 
challenged, many of the conclusions that follow, including the translation requirement, 
cease to be necessary for the smooth functioning of democracy. 
However, with the assumptions of ideal rational consensus and the epistemic 
adequacy of secular reason in place, it follows that religious citizens must face cognitive 
burdens their secular counterparts do not.  Habermas cites, for example, the changing 
self-consciousness of religion itself since the Reformation and Enlightenment, the 
challenges of religious pluralism, and the rise of modern science, positive law, and 
secular morality.  Of course, none of this is news to reflective religious believers, many 
of whom have offered thoughtful responses to each of these historical developments that 
seek to preserve the viability of a religious worldview.  Nevertheless, Habermas asserts: 
“In these three respects, traditional communities of faith must process cognitive 
dissonances that either do not arise for secular citizens, or arise only insofar as they 
adhere to doctrines anchored in similarly dogmatic ways.”283  He then goes on to 
delineate what concessions religious citizens are required to make: they must develop a 
self-reflexive stance toward competing worldviews within a pluralistic society, accept the 
monopoly on knowledge enjoyed by scientific expert cultures, and accept the priority that 
283 Habermas, 136.
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secular reasons enjoy in the political arena.284  He acknowledges that such hermeneutical 
self-reflection in the face of pluralism, modern science, and secular morality and law is 
arduous work, which prompts him to wonder: “Within this liberal framework, what 
interests me is the open question of whether the revised concept of citizenship that I have 
proposed still imposes an asymmetrical burden on religious traditions and religious 
communities.”285 
He contends that secular citizens are not spared a cognitive burden of their own 
that goes beyond mere tolerance of religious worldviews.  Rather, we must expect from 
secular citizens “a self-reflexive overcoming of a rigid and exclusive secularist self-
understanding of modernity.”286  Moreover, “the admission of religious assertions into the 
political arena only makes sense if all citizens can be reasonably expected not to exclude 
the possibility that these contributions have cognitive substance – while at the same time 
respecting the priority of secular reasons and the institutional translation proviso.”287  As 
we noted above, this point, in my judgment, differentiates Habermas significantly from 
Rawls: religious assertions are seen as having cognitive content, not as mere promissory 
notes for secular reasons which alone have cognitive content.  In addition, Habermas 
claims that secular citizens must recognize “that they live in a postsecular society that is 
also epistemically attuned to the continued existence of religious communities … a 
change of mentality that is no less cognitively exacting than the adaptation of religious 
consciousness to the challenges of an environment that is becoming progressively more 
284 Habermas, 137.
285 Habermas, 138, italics in original.
286 Habermas, 138.
287 Habermas, 139, italics in original.
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secular.”288  In other words, the fact that the predictions of the secularization thesis have 
not come to fruition demands a cognitive dissonance on the part of secularists that 
transcends mere tolerance or accommodation of religious viewpoints within liberal 
society.  Rather, secular citizens should be open to investigating religion for any 
cognitive contents it might have to offer.  The epistemological challenge facing 
secularists, occasioned by the failure of the secularization thesis, is analogous to the 
challenge faced by religious persons in the wake of modernity.  For Habermas, “The 
secular counterpart to reflexive religious consciousness is an agnostic, but 
nonreductionist form of postmetaphysical thinking.”289  In his judgment, this requirement 
on the part of secular citizens equalizes the respective burdens of both secular and 
religious citizens.  In conclusion, he states:
The effort of philosophical reconstruction required shows that the role of 
democratic citizenship assumes a mentality on the part of secular citizens that is 
no less demanding than the corresponding mentality of their religious 
counterparts. This is why the cognitive burdens imposed on both sides by the 
acquisition of the appropriate epistemic attitudes are not all asymmetrical.290
There is much that is laudable in Habermas effort to equalize the burdens borne by 
citizens in democracies, and I agree with much of what he says in the above quotations. 
He goes much further than many liberal theorists in assigning cognitive contents to 
religious beliefs.  This concession alone goes a long way toward mitigating some of the 
post-religious, Enlightenment assumptions I criticize above.  Of course, all this talk about 
equalizing burdens is difficult to reconcile with the epistemological assumption, dealt 
with in the last chapter, that religious citizens necessarily travel with heavier 
288 Habermas, 139, italics in original.
289 Habermas, 140.
290 Habermas, 143.
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metaphysical baggage.  Nevertheless, these are important qualifications to the secularism 
inherent in, say, Rawls’s political liberalism.  Also, in an effort to equalize the translation 
burden, Habermas states, “A liberal culture can even expect its secular citizens to 
participate in efforts to translate relevant contributions from religious language into a 
publicly accessible language.”291  
However, some believers might still object that they bear an asymmetrical burden. 
After all, they must still translate their language into secular language, at least at the 
institutional level, if it is to have any public force.  There is no counterpart requirement 
on the part of secular citizens, nor is there an obligation to aid religious citizens in 
translation.  Although Habermas thinks one can expect secular citizens to do so, others 
are more skeptical of such a prospect.  James Bohman and William Rehg, however, claim 
that Habermas’s translation requirement actually entails the least possible burden on 
citizens.292  It is difficult, they argue, for secular citizens to translate religious reasons into 
secular ones, because they may not adequately understand the religious tradition(s) in 
question.  Therefore, the burden is logically on those who know it best: religious citizens. 
Moreover, to abandon the translation requirement would be to abandon any appeal to 
public reason.  The burden of translation is not obviated; rather it is exacerbated if each 
citizen has to translate his or her convictions into the language of every conceivable 
interlocutor rather than a shared public reason. 
In response to the first point, Habermas implies that it is part of the secular 
citizen’s epistemic responsibility to learn about other religious traditions in order to draw 
291 Habermas, “Equal Treatment of Cultures,” 310.
292 James Bohman and William Rehg, “Jürgen Habermas,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/habermas/#DiaBetNatRel. 
199
from them ‘cognitive contents’ that might have value to political discourse.  Moreover, it 
is expedient for secular citizens to learn as much as possible about their religious 
interlocutor’s point of view in order to facilitate immanent critique, Stout’s option (3) 
above, since this option is often the most promising tack to pursue when no common 
basis can be established.  Perhaps in learning about religious traditions, secular citizens 
can argue for their own position in a way that religious citizens would find persuasive on 
the basis of assumptions that they already hold.  So not only should secular citizens learn 
about religion out of sense of fairness and responsible citizenship, but also for pragmatic 
purposes. 
Regarding the second point, I do not abandon the translation requirement, but do 
question its stronger versions.  In my judgment, it has normative force only at the level of 
legislation and should be construed as a pragmatic gesture in both the formal and 
informal public spheres, rather than a deontological requirement as it is for Rawls.  But 
Bohman and Rehg imply that to weaken the translation requirement in this way is to 
abandon any claim to public reason.  Here I would distinguish between reasons that are 
publicly accessible and a common basis of secular reason; they should not be conflated.  I 
do reject the latter, but see no reason why this compels me to reject the notion of practical 
reasons that are accessible to a wide audience within a pluralistic democracy.  Such 
reasons can be either secular or religious and their accessibility lies in their rhetorical 
resonance rather than in meeting some abstract criterion, such as ideal rational 
acceptability.  It is certainly impractical to translate our convictions into the language of 
each and every interlocutor, but this is completely unnecessary.  While we do share a 
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common language, it draws from many sources and comes packaged in different ways.  It 
is the insight of pragmatic conceptions of discourse that reaching the widest possible 
audience does not depend upon the idealized universal acceptability of certain premises. 
Limiting one’s repertoire to a ‘public’ language that artificially excludes cultural realities, 
including religion, which could widen one’s base of argument, is counterproductive for 
building consensus on particular issues.  Better to draw upon that wider cultural base in 
aiming to reach a wider audience.  Thus, religion is only publicly ‘inaccessible’ to the 
extent that it no longer plays a role in the lives of citizens; in other words, if the 
secularization thesis is true.  But we have seen good reason to reject both its empirical 
and normative aspects.  Further complicating the notion of public accessibility is that no 
univocal account of it has emerged historically and is nowhere instantiated in working 
liberal democracies.  Therefore, rather than being an idealization or abstraction, public 
accessibility is something that is built dialectically and pragmatically. 
Balancing Burdens, again: A Utilitarian Analysis
So if the translation requirement, or something like it, is not to be mandated as a 
deontological requirement incumbent upon religious citizens alone, but as a cooperative 
endeavor that seeks to balance burdens, how should we approach this task?  If 
deontological approaches are problematic are we left with a utilitarian analysis?  I would 
suggest that even if one does not opt for deontology, Habermas’s translation requirement 
is still problematic on utilitarian grounds.  We might begin by asking: How do we 
decrease pain (the burdens citizens bear) and increase pleasure (the success of our 
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democratic discourse)?  Utilitarian calculations are rarely this simple and there are 
reasons to suggest that such an analysis is also problematic.  For example, although the 
notion of the “general happiness” is notoriously vague, it is difficult to determine exactly 
what arrangement would promote the general happiness of both religious and secular 
citizens.  Moreover, it seems that some of Habermas’s recommendations could actually 
make citizens unhappier than more familiar conceptions of liberalism.  For instance, 
some religious citizens might benefit from having their arguments taken more seriously 
in the public sphere, but others will no doubt feel uncomfortable that their particular 
religious views, previously insulated within private confessional circles, will no longer be 
immune to public scrutiny, criticism, and even ridicule. Under the current liberal 
arrangement, the private/public distinction serves to protect religious liberty, which 
includes the negative freedom from inference by others.  However, the public demands 
placed on religious citizens to subject their religious convictions to criticism may in fact 
lead to a net loss of happiness.  Also, although some religious citizens might benefit from 
increased public influence, they may be negatively affected by the expanded influence of 
religious groups with which they strongly disagree.  One can easily envisage this scenario 
in historically Christian Western nations with increasing Muslim populations.  In other 
words, the happiness Christians derive from their increased influence may be offset by 
the unhappiness they derive from increased Muslim influence. 
Or take, for example, the impact upon secular citizens.  Upon Habermas’s 
recommendation of ‘postsecular’ citizenship, secularists must work harder than in 
classical liberalism to understand and appreciate religious orientations.  Such work, as we 
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have seen, is analogous to the work that the religious must do in the wake of the cognitive 
dissonances associated with modernist challenges to religious orthodoxy.  However, the 
effort required to mine religion’s ‘cognitive contents’ may well make secular citizens 
unhappier than they are now, especially if they cannot bring themselves to take religious 
belief seriously in the way Habermas admonishes.  Despite the efforts of Habermas, 
Taylor, Stout and others, to aid their religiously unmusical fellows in this task, not all of 
them are able or willing to participate, just as not all religious citizens are capable of 
translation.  However, one might argue that secular citizens, and society as a whole, 
might benefit from religious citizens’ civic engagement.  Religious citizens who feel 
marginalized from the public sphere might participate under conditions of postsecularism 
and their contributions to public debate may in fact yield a net benefit.  But it is also 
possible, some would say likely, that such openness will only empower those religionists 
who are already vying for political power and will use the newly transformed public 
sphere to further advance obnoxious social policies that will infringe upon the freedom of 
minorities that they deem ‘sinful.’  Anxiety over this outcome, for a secularist, will no 
doubt counterbalance any benefits, hypothetical or actual, that are likely to result from 
increased religious participation in public debate. 
Furthermore, an increase in religion’s public presence has unpredictable 
outcomes. On the one hand, it might promote healthy societal pluralism and competition 
thereby enriching democratic debate.  On the other hand, it might lead to sectarian 
divisions that threaten the unity of the state.  Again, forecasting the consequences of these 
actions, and relative happiness of citizens, is exceedingly difficult.  Perhaps more 
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disconcerting is the prospect of such sectarianism breeding violence and discrimination.  
Despite Mill’s disdain of censorship in On Liberty, many contemporary liberals think he 
underestimated the extent to which some ideologies, such as sexism, racism, and other 
forms of intolerance, ought to be suppressed by the state.  Religion, sadly, is often used as 
a vehicle for the promotion of such illiberal tendencies, such as a constitutional ban on 
same-sex unions, and the thought of it gaining influence causes secularists no end of 
anxiety.  Less serious, but also problematic, is the notion that ‘fringe’ religions, such as 
Wicca or Scientology, will expect their arguments to be taken seriously rather than 
cursorily dismissed. Perhaps Pandora’s Box is best left closed. 
So it is not obvious that the practical implementation of Habermas’s postsecular 
proposals will bring about a net happiness for citizens, and it may well be the case that 
utilitarian analyses are not useful in this case. Certainly, Habermas is not a utilitarian and 
the fact that his requirements for democracy are more stringent than competing 
conceptions, does not constitute an objection for him.  Democracy is, after all, an 
epistemically demanding form of government.  Indeed, the fact that a reform is difficult is 
not a good reason for failing to implement it, even from a utilitarian perspective, because 
the net happiness may well be greater in the long run.  Of course, the ‘long run’ is 
notoriously difficult to calculate and probably would involve some consideration of 
posterity centuries, or even millennia, from now.  The practical pitfalls attending such an 
endeavor are obvious, not the least of which is the severe limitation of our foresight. 
Nevertheless, despite the problems I raise with such consequentialist calculations, it 
seems that any pragmatic approach to Habermas’s suggested revisions to contemporary 
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liberalism must take into account what the likely consequences would be for human 
flourishing.  If concrete implementation of the proposed revisions will likely detract from 
human flourishing, or simply balance what our current social arrangements provide, 
philosophers and ordinary citizens will have good prima facie reason to judge the cost too 
high.  In my judgment, however, the challenges facing societal organization today with 
respect to religion are not radically different from those of the early modern period when 
our current political compromise was forged.  The above revisions to that ‘Jeffersonian 
compromise’ do not radically modify liberalism; indeed, they follow from assumptions 
liberals already take for granted, as I shall argue below.  We must also bear in mind that, 
if Habermas is right and democratic forms of government participate in a continual 
learning process that is inherently fallible and revisable, then such alterations are to be 
expected.  We should not naively assume that seventeenth and eighteenth century 
conceptions of the relation between liberalism and religion should hold for all time.  We 
do not oppose economic reforms on the basis that it conflicts with the eighteenth century 
classical liberal understanding of the relationship between the state and private enterprise. 
Why should we oppose modifying our conception of the liberal state vis-à-vis religion on 
these grounds? 
Objections Answered
In what follows, I would like to briefly make the case that the negative consequences 
outlined above do not necessarily follow.  Moreover, many of the above objections are 
not so different from objections against the extension of religious freedom more 
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generally, many of which were dispatched in the seventeenth century.  Thus, allowing 
religion access to the public sphere does not inherently contradict principles most liberals 
already accept provided the secularity of the state can be maintained.  On the basis of my 
revised ITP, I think the secularity of the state can be maintained without further 
restrictions of the expressive freedom of religious citizens. 
So are we to expect dire consequences, such as those outlined above, to obtain if 
restrictions on religious language in public are relaxed?  Importantly, almost all of the 
fears mentioned apply to religious liberty more generally.  Upon the utilitarian criterion, 
one could make the case that religious liberty does not tend to promote the general 
happiness and the state is therefore justified in restricting it.  Jay Newman has in fact 
argued that utilitarianism does not provide unambiguous moral justification for religious 
freedom.293  For example, as Dostoevsky’s Grand Inquisitor claims, many people are 
happier if others do their religious thinking for them; the responsibilities, or burdens, 
associated with reflexively engaging one’s faith, or lack thereof, not to mention the 
myriad of other religious options, often leads to anxiety.  Moreover, the happiness a 
particular religious community derives from the right to, say, freely proselytize may be 
neutralized by its unhappiness when another religious community exercises the same 
right.  Moreover, the freedom to proselytize, while benefiting those adherents who 
believe they are carrying out God’s will, tends to irritate non-adherents who proselytizers 
inform are mistaken or even damned.  Yet this objection is rarely taken as a serious 
reason for the state to withhold religious liberty.  In addition, religious liberty can easily 
threaten the unity of the state, especially when historically Christian, or even secular, 
293 Jay Newman, On Religious Freedom (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1991), 131 – 32. 
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nations identify citizenship with a set of values not all religions unambiguously embrace. 
As stated, many of these fears were present when Locke proposed religious tolerance. 
Some of his contemporaries, following Augustine, believed that error has no rights and as 
such the state is justified in suppressing ‘error.’  The seventeenth century polemicist, 
Jonas Proast, responded to Locke’s Letter, arguing that the coercive power of the state is 
indeed justified in suppressing erroneous religious views.294  Of course, very few, if any, 
citizens of liberal democracies today would see this as an argument for suppressing 
religious freedom.  Yet parallels between this general case and the specific revisions to 
liberal theory that I propose clearly exist. 
But let me speak more concretely about the safeguards my proposal establishes 
against the aforementioned deleterious consequences.  Firstly, throughout this project my 
main concern has been the subject of religious beliefs and arguments, not religious 
practices.  This distinction is important.  Historically, in Anglo-American liberalism, 
religious freedom has been restricted in the case of the latter.  There are certain practices 
we simply do not allow even if done for ostensibly religious reasons. The free exercise of 
religion must be practiced within the purview of secular law and this proviso remains 
upon my revision.  Secondly, my revised liberalism does not give license to just any 
religious language whatsoever.  Again, dogmatic claims that brook no argument or 
criticism are prima facie disqualified from democratic discourse which is inherently 
fallible and critical.  Such language must remain within private confessional circles and 
religious citizens who cannot or will not offer arguments – religious or secular – should 
294 Patrick Romanell, introduction to A Letter Concerning Toleration by John Locke (New Jersey: Prentice 
Hall, 1950), 6. 
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not expect to influence the political process on the basis of appeals to the authority of 
sacred doctrines or texts.  Religious citizens who are willing and able to make an 
argument, regardless of whether or not the premises are commonly accepted, are free to 
participate, but they also thereby leave the safety of their confessional circles; their views 
are now fair game for criticism and religionists should not take offense or expect 
additional respect by virtue of the fact their views are religious.  As long as religious 
interlocutors offer arguments which are non-dogmatic and fallible then they should not 
necessarily be excluded from the public sphere. Under these conditions, the opportunities 
for abuse are limited; my proposal includes all of the checks and balances of traditional 
liberalism while expanding the expressive freedom of religious citizens.  Certainly, this 
expansion may be more modest than some religionists would hope – not to mention more 
generous than some secularists would like – but it is a significant advance over the 
“Jeffersonian compromise”295 that arguably impairs religious participation in public 
debate. 
So let us reexamine some of our hypothetical consequences to individual and 
societal flourishing and how a revised liberalism might in fact obviate such problematic 
outcomes.  Take, for example, the unhappiness Christians might experience as a result of 
the increased influence of, say, Islam.  The topic of Islam’s relationship to historically 
Christian nations and contemporary liberal values has received much interest in the 
popular media and the academy recently.  But Christians should not expect a net loss of 
happiness to result from allowing Muslims to participate authentically in public debate, 
295 Richard Rorty, "Religion As Conversation-stopper," in Philosophy and Social Hope (Penguin (Non-
Classics), 2000), 169.
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nor should we expect the kind of sectarian violence many secularists fear.  On the 
contrary, I would suggest that encouraging such engagement actually minimizes the 
potential for violence which is, of course, a net benefit.  For example, if a particular 
religious community feels disenfranchised by the state, if it cannot make its voice heard 
through words, it is more likely to make itself heard through violent acts.  Habermas also 
recognizes the point that silence all too often results in violence.  We should strive to 
avoid this fatal silence.296 
Thus I propose that we enlarge the domain of public discourse, which is, as I have 
argued, a relatively ‘low cost’ way to achieve a net gain in terms of human flourishing.  It 
is ‘low cost’ in the sense that it does not require us to sacrifice any of our liberal political 
values.  The checks and balances of classical liberalism remain in place: the restraints on 
content, the neutrality of law, restrictions on religious practice, and the disqualification of 
dogmatic claims.  These conditions make it very difficult for religious citizens to employ 
the coercive power of the state to enforce a particular doctrine to restrict the liberty of 
other citizens who do not share it.  I simply advocate, as do other contemporary 
philosophers, removing epistemological restraints on the kinds of reasons religious 
citizens can offer for their political decisions.  As I have argued, such epistemological 
restraints are based on a mistaken historical interpretation of the relevant thinkers, a 
mistaken epistemology, and are unnecessary for political praxis.  Arguably, these 
restraints are worse than unnecessary; they are ideologically imposed restraints that are 
an impediment to full democratic participation for many citizens and thus invite violence. 
296 Giovanna Borradori, Philosophy in a Time of Terror: Dialogues with Jurgen Habermas and Jacques 
Derrida (University Of Chicago Press, 2004), 35.
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A pragmatic approach to this situation calls for a reassessment of classical and 
contemporary liberal theory. 
The expansion of the public sphere to include certain kinds of religious discourse 
need not result in violence or disunity.  In fact, in my judgment, it is likely to decrease it. 
In evidence of this claim, one could contrast Islam in the United States with Islam in 
Western Europe.  Although a detailed empirical investigation of the relevant differences 
is beyond the scope of this chapter and my disciplinary competence, I would suggest that 
Islam has become more radicalized in Western Europe than in the U.S. because in Europe 
the overgeneralization of secularism has imposed a culture of silence on religion 
generally. In the United States, by contrast, there is more public space for religion and 
thus Muslims, even post-911, are invited to participate in the ‘civil religion’.297  The 
notion of civil religion and the role it plays in explaining the ‘American exception’ with 
respect to the secularization thesis is, likewise, beyond the scope of this chapter.  But a 
few cursory remarks are, I think, helpful.  Although the First Amendment prohibits the 
establishment of religion, religious devotion in America actually increased throughout the 
period known as the Enlightenment, as we saw in chapter one.  These religious 
communities were not homogenous, but they were understood as part of the broader 
church or civil religion.  At first, Catholics and Jews were not included. Gradually, 
however, the franchise extended to them.  The unity of faith amid pluralism is thus 
achieved through a perceived religious consensus, or civil religion.  On American ‘civil 
religion,’ Taylor comments:
297 Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2007), 524.
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[A] way that Americans can understand their fitting together in society although 
of different faiths, is through these faiths themselves being seen as in this 
consensual relation to the common civil religion. Go to the church of your choice, 
but go. Later this expands to include synagogues. When imams also begin to 
appear at prayer breakfasts, along with priests, pastors, and rabbis, the signal is 
that Islam is being invited into the consensus.”298 
To be sure, this does not mean that everybody who participates in this ‘civil religion’ is 
necessarily religious. Nor does it deny that secularization is also a factor in the American 
experience.  In the first chapter, I looked at how secularization became a pragmatic 
necessity in American political discourse despite growing religious devotion among the 
citizenry.  But it seems that Americans are less inclined than Western Europeans to see 
secularization as emancipation from religion.  Indeed, for the United States, religion was 
an important avenue to civic solidarity in a way that it arguably was not in most Western 
European countries with their history of religious warfare.  So it seems plausible that 
religious participation in public life does not necessarily lead to disunity and sectarian 
strife, but may actually promote solidarity.  Of course, the value of civil religion and 
religion in general, comes under attack in every generation by those secularists who do 
not consider it to be an unqualified good and perhaps even a great evil.  And some 
secularists worry that they will lose their political voice if religious points of view are 
encouraged to participate, although the barrage of recent anti-religious polemics makes 
this outcome seem unlikely.  Nevertheless, in a democracy we must learn to live with 
multiple voices, sometimes voices with which we stridently disagree; this is true of 
religious citizens also.  A robust democracy does not implore the agency of the state to 
suppress such voices, but rather tries to find a way to achieve unity pragmatically while 
298 Taylor, 524.
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ensuring that all responsible voices get a fair hearing.  I say “all responsible voices” 
because, as argued above, there are some voices, those of bigots, racists, etc. that should 
be disallowed if not by state action as in the case of anti-incitement laws, then by social 
disapproval and marginalization.299  There is nothing in my proposed revisions to 
standard liberal theory that would give license to such abuse. 
Finally, there is the ‘Pandora’s Box’ objection that, given what I say, anything 
claiming to be religious will expect to be taken seriously.  I have already noted that 
restraints on religious practice continue to be operative under my proposal.  But what 
about those religious beliefs that fall outside the purview of ‘civil religion?’  In other 
words, those fringe beliefs that are regarded as irrational by the majority of citizens, both 
religious and secular.  Bear in mind, however, as noted above in response to Bohman and 
Rehg, that I have not abandoned the notion of reasons that are publicly accessible; I 
simply deny that they should be identified with exclusively secular reasons.  We are not 
suddenly left without epistemological criteria because we acknowledge the empirical 
given that not all people find the same premises persuasive.  As I argued, we can still 
pragmatically build as wide a consensus as possible which sometimes requires 
translation, sometimes immanent critique, and at other times religious premises.  But by 
definition, publicly accessible premises will have wide rhetorical appeal, and the ‘fringe’ 
299 I do not mention hate-speech laws in this context, because I find their implementation problematic from 
the standpoint of free speech. Ironically, they are most often defended by secularists when abused by 
religionists who are offended when their views are criticized. Hate-speech laws are part of the problem 
because they encourage non-discursive religious attitudes. If one criticizes your sacred beliefs, the 
appropriate response is to offer a counter-argument, not charge him with hate speech as if religion enjoys 
special privilege, i.e. is sacred, in the sense that other beliefs are not.  It is unclear, however, whether 
Habermas agrees. Although he thinks that sacredness is disqualified from public deliberation, he makes 
heavy use of speech act theory, which is a major impetus for the rationale behind hate-speech legislation. I 
will briefly address Habermas’s appropriation of speech act theory in the next chapter. 
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by definition does not.  So we should not be overly worried, in my judgment, about the 
influence of marginal beliefs to which few subscribe.  Recall that under my proposal they 
would still need to offer an argument in order to be taken seriously and even then their 
premises would be unlikely to find wide support.  The Pandora’s Box objection assumes 
that anything merely claiming to be religious will automatically be given a hearing and 
that is emphatically not what I propose.  On my view, no additional respect (or 
disrespect) attaches to a claim simply by virtue of its being labeled ‘religious’.  So the 
objection is irrelevant.  But even if it were relevant, there are already legal criteria in 
many democracies for defining religion in practice; for the purposes of determining 
whether a particular group qualifies for tax exemption on the basis of religion, the state 
effectively defines ‘religion’.  Although the potential for arbitrary discrimination exists, 
there is a practical necessity for state agencies to determine what religions should be 
publicly recognized and which should not.  While I have no expertise in this area, it 
seems to me that we already have mechanisms for determining which religions should 
and should not have public standing, which should assuage fears about opening 
Pandora’s Box. 
Therefore, we have good reason to conclude that the above pragmatic revisions to 
contemporary liberal theory are, on balance, an improvement.  Moreover, they are, in my 
judgment an improvement over Habermas’s admittedly noble efforts to balance burdens 
among both religious and secular citizens.  Because we stand to lose none of the 
protections that state neutrality affords secularists and religious minorities and stand to 
gain increased political participation for religious citizens, we have good reason to 
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conclude that the aforementioned pragmatic revisions to contemporary liberal theory are, 
on balance, an improvement. Moreover, they are, in my judgment an improvement over 
Habermas’s admittedly noble efforts to balance burdens among both religious and secular 
citizens. 
In this chapter, I have attempted to demonstrate that the idealized liberal position 
as articulated by Rawls and Habermas is more restrictive than the liberalism that is 
actually instantiated in working democracies. Although Habermas is more open than 
Rawls to seeing religious concepts as having cognitive content as opposed to merely 
posing as promissory notes for such content, he arguably still places undue epistemic 
constraints on religious citizens in the public sphere. With Wolterstorff, I have argued 
that the liberal position is not justified in imposing these epistemic constraints insofar as 
religious arguments do not break the restraints on content established by the law of the 
land. I also argue, like Wolterstorff, that the liberal emphasis on consensus is 
overwrought. The kind of consensus aimed at by liberal theorists is probably not a live 
option in working democracies. If one defines the success of democratic discourse as the 
achievement of such consensus, then the project is doomed to fail. However, we don’t 
need to agree on a common basis prior to debate. It suffices for pragmatic purposes that a 
majority agree on some concrete proposal, policy, or law. The public sphere is not an 
endlessly discursive, consensus-building domain; practically speaking, the debate comes 
to an end through the democratic process of voting. I take seriously Wolterstorff’s insight 
that some liberal theorists seem to be uncomfortable with the politics of multiple 
identities. In this way, liberalism is not unlike communitarianism; the liberal theorist is 
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trying to create the ideal type of community – an ideal speech situation, one might say – 
in which rational consensus is achieved. However, like Wolterstorff, I suspect that such 
consensus is very difficult if not impossible to  achieve on the issues that matter most 
deeply. I am not opposed to consensus in principle; if it happens, all well and good. But I 
remain skeptical that the idealized version of consensus promoted in liberal theory is 
necessary for the smooth functioning of a democracy. 
The implications of the foregoing critique for religious arguments are clear. I have 
argued that religious arguments are not a special case that must be singled out as 
particularly problematic for democratic discourse. Granted, dogmatism is problematic, 
but insofar as we are dealing with religious arguments the fact that their premises are 
controversial does not immediately exclude them from public debate. There are, in fact, 
many controversial premises in many arguments, both religious and secular, in the public 
sphere. In other words, we disagree about what premises are reasonable and it is unlikely 
that we shall discover non-tautological premises that command universal assent in the 
near future. As such, a person who appeals to the Bible for support of a premise in a 
political argument is in principle no more idiosyncratic than a person who appeals to 
Marx. In a robust democracy, there are bound to be controversial premises. Thus, I have 
argued that it is useful to dispense with talk about ‘public’ versus ‘private’ reasons and to 
instead talk about universally accepted premises and controversial premises. Once one 
does so, one can easily see that the issue of religion in the context of liberal theory is a 
red-herring. Of course, the religious citizen may, for pragmatic reasons, translate the 
premises of her argument to make them more persuasive to her secular interlocutors. But 
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we must bear in mind that it is the particularities of the discursive context that make some 
reasons more ‘publicly accessible’ than others; they are not so simply by virtue of their 
being secular, or by being acceptable to all rational people in some abstract sense. 
I have also argued that Habermas’s qualification of the translation requirement at 
the informal level can be extended to the formal level without damaging the legitimacy of 
the laws  for all citizens. There is an insight behind Habermas’s ITP, but one can preserve 
that insight – that each citizen must in principle be able to understand the justification of 
the law – by ensuring that legislation is written in as neutral a language as possible with 
respect to comprehensive worldviews. But ‘neutral’ in this context does not necessarily 
mean secular. Just as one would not cite the Bible as justification for some law, one 
would not cite Marx either. However, nothing should bar citizens, or their official 
representatives, from citing the Bible or Marx when debating prospective laws in a 
democracy. I have argued that my proposed revision to Habermas’s ITP does everything 
he wants it to with respect to preserving democratic legitimacy, while relaxing the 
translation requirement at the formal level as well as the informal level. Again, 
translation may be useful for pragmatic purposes in such contexts, but we need not 
construe it as a formal requirement.
Although my approach is indebted to pragmatism, the question remains: do 
pragmatists object to allowing religious arguments into the public sphere? At first blush, 
the writings of Richard Rorty on this question don’t inspire much confidence in my 
efforts to use pragmatism to argue for the inclusion of religious arguments in public. 
Fortunately, pragmatism as a style of philosophy is not amenable to monolithic 
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interpretations. Nonetheless, Rorty being the primary proponent of pragmatism in the 
latter half of the twentieth century deserves to be taken seriously. In the next chapter, I 
will take up Rorty’s concerns over religion’s public accessibility in relation to his debates 
on related matters with Habermas, Wolterstorff, and Stout. Specifically, I will suggest 
that Rorty’s defense of the public/private schema rests on something very much like 
Habermas’s translation requirement. As a pragmatist, it’s a bit strange that Rorty cites 
Rawls and Habermas as model epistemologists on the issue of religion in the public 
sphere. In response to criticisms from Wolterstorff and Stout, which we shall examine, 
Rorty has reconsidered his position. I will also consider alternative pragmatist accounts 
of religion in public, such as Stout’s method of immanent critique, in order to see 
whether or not pragmatism can provide other resources more sympathetic to the project 
of defending the legitimacy of religious reasons and arguments in the public sphere. 
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Chapter 4
Religion as an Abnormal Conversation Starter: Considering 
Pragmatist Alternatives to Rorty
My critique of Habermas in the foregoing chapter rests on considerations that stem from 
the pragmatist tradition broadly conceived. One can use pragmatism to question the 
‘common basis’ on which liberal theorists justify the exclusion of religion from the 
public sphere. However, this is a somewhat indirect consequence of the application of 
pragmatism to political theory. Do pragmatists themselves see their view as offering 
resources to the religionist who seeks to cast political arguments in a religious idiom? 
Because pragmatism is far from monolithic, I suspect it depends on which pragmatist one 
asks. In this chapter, I will look at two representatives of pragmatism: Richard Rorty and 
Jeffrey Stout. Although neither thinker identifies himself as religious, Rorty is much less 
sympathetic to the prospect of religious arguments in public than Stout. 
In the proceeding section, I highlight some of the epistemic differences between 
Habermas and Rorty. While Habermas does draw on a certain strain of pragmatism in 
constructing his ‘formal pragmatics’, he wants to hold on to the concept of context-
independent truth and its importance for the modern political project. A consequence of 
this view is his insistence that rhetoric, or perlocutionary speech acts, are disallowed. 
Rorty, by contrast, abandons the notion of context-independent truth and is, 
consequently, more comfortable with employing rhetoric for political purposes. On the 
surface, Rorty’s pragmatism seems to offer  some comfort to the religionist who wants to 
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employ religious arguments in public. However, Rorty finds religious rhetoric to be in 
bad taste and cites Rawls and Habermas as model epistemologists on the issue. 
Especially telling is Rorty’s essay “Religion as Conversation-stopper”. In this 
essay, he argues that religion should be excluded from the public sphere. He does so by 
defending the well-worn public/private distinction; religion belongs to the latter. 
However, a careful analysis of Rorty’s distinction shows that he is using the term 
‘private’ to mean essentially ‘not shared by the public at large’. In other words, Rorty 
appears to be endorsing the standard liberal model. However, we have already looked at 
some problems with the notion of ‘publicly shared’ or ‘premises held in common’. 
Moreover, pragmatism itself questions the notion of an ideal consensus. Rorty, however, 
may be using ‘shared in common’, or ‘public’, to mean ‘actually shared’ rather than 
‘ideally shared’. But this view is also problematic; if we had to limit our political 
arguments to premises actually held in common, no argument could get off the ground. 
So the pragmatist knows that there is actual public disagreement about premises in 
political arguments, and presumably not all of these disagreements are in bad taste, even 
if some function as conversation-stoppers. After all, the public is not an endlessly 
discursive arena; conversation stopping always occurs as a result of one of our most 
cherished democratic practices, namely voting. It is difficult, then, to see why public 
disagreement over religion is in ‘bad taste’ if public disagreement in general is not. 
However, Rorty, in light of criticism from the likes of Wolterstorff and Stout, has 
reconsidered some of his more unguarded statements with respect to religion. He suspects 
that his disagreement with religious critics like Wolterstorff hang on empirical, rather 
219
than strictly philosophical, considerations. Religionists simply underestimate the harm 
that is caused by their forcing their religious views on the general public, particularly 
vulnerable minorities. As such, religionists ought to find another language to express 
their political point of view, one that has less potential for abuse. This recommendation 
sounds like a version of the translation requirement. Rorty is quick to note, however, that 
he can think of no principle that would commit religious believers to changing their 
rhetorical strategy. So, for example, when Christians cite Leviticus 18:22 in opposition to 
gay rights, Rorty cannot invoke a philosophical principle to stop them from doing so. 
Nevertheless, he thinks they should stop invoking such rhetoric, and hopes that the 
rhetorical strategies favored by secularists will continue to marginalize religious voices. 
In this chapter, I explore Rorty’s argument to see if it contains any lessons for politically 
engaged religious citizens, and offer an analysis of his recommendation that religious 
citizens switch rhetorical strategies with an eye to its pragmatic advantages and 
disadvantages. 
In providing this analysis, I also explore alternative rhetorical strategies, such as 
Jeffrey Stout’s ‘immanent critique’. While I suggest that Stout’s ‘immanent critique’ is a 
promising tack to pursue, I am aware that it is not without critics. Below, I examine how 
Habermas might evaluate Stout’s proposal, and how Stout’s affirmation of religious 
tradition in the course of critique may not satisfy the critical theorist’s demands. In order 
to clarify these issues, I discuss the differences between ‘critique’ as understood by a 
pragmatist like Stout and as understood by a critical theorist like Habermas. Important in 
this context is the relation of ‘critique’ to ‘tradition’ and whether democracy itself is to be 
220
understood as a substantive tradition. Stout and Habermas appear to disagree on this 
issue, but I still see ‘immanent critique’ as a pragmatically viable option within 
democracies. While Stout is sympathetic to religious language informing public debate, 
he offers a rigorous critique of more conservative traditions within Christianity. 
Moreover, for him, it remains to be seen whether or not Christian language is the best 
vehicle to express our shared commitments to democratic principles. 
I conclude the chapter by assessing whether or not pragmatism, as expressed by 
two prominent spokespersons for the movement, is compatible with the project of a 
public place for religion. But first, I turn to discussing the matter of Habermas’s 
differences with Rorty with respect to the place of rhetoric and context-independent truth 
in political discourse. 
The Three ‘R’s’: Reason, Rhetoric, and Reeducation 
My critique throughout the foregoing chapters of Habermas’s insistence on a common 
basis for publicly accessible, or secular, reasons is largely inspired by pragmatist 
considerations concerning the scope of argumentation and justification.  Among the most 
prominent of Habermas’s pragmatist critics is Richard Rorty.  Interestingly, although he 
differs with Habermas on whether or not there is a distinction between truth and 
justification, he is mainly in agreement when it comes to the discursive bankruptcy of 
religion in public debate.  However, Rorty’s criticism of religion in the public sphere is 
based on pragmatic considerations rather than any attempt to define an idealized common 
basis for rational deliberation.  Thus, when Rorty talks about premises held in common, 
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he refers to those that are held in common in practice rather than in principle.  As such, 
he makes a good foil for my argument in the last chapter that seeks to expand the scope 
of religious arguments along pragmatic lines.  Before we get to these concrete issues, 
however, it is helpful to establish the background of the debate between Habermas and 
Rorty over truth and justification.  This will enable us to see more clearly how a 
pragmatist can criticize the ideal of a common basis, but nevertheless advocate a 
shrinking of religion from the public sphere. 
Since his early work on the public sphere, Habermas has attempted to rigorously 
delineate the means by which we assess the validity of arguments, the process whereby 
opinion is transformed into knowledge.  In the first volume of TCA, Habermas takes up 
theories of argumentation or the question: “What makes some arguments stronger or 
weaker than other arguments?”300  He takes up three aspects of argumentation: “Rhetoric 
is concerned with argumentation as process, dialectic with the pragmatic procedures of 
argumentation, and logic with its products …. The fundamental intuition connected with 
argumentation can best be characterized from the process perspective by the intention of 
convincing a universal audience and gaining general assent for an utterance.”301  This 
approach is heavily indebted to Peirce’s pragmatism, later defended and fleshed out by 
Putnam.  Earlier, Habermas says that in order to enter argumentation, participants must 
presuppose “that the structure of their communication excludes all force … except the 
force of the better argument.”302  Later, Habermas makes it clear that this criterion also 
excludes subtle rhetorical force. All of these considerations are included in what 
300 Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 1: Reason and the Rationalization of 
Society, 24.
301 Habermas, 26.
302 Habermas, 25.
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Habermas refers to as an “ideal speech situation.” 303  In summary, the three purposes of 
argumentation are to 1) convince a universal audience; 2) to resolve disputes about 
hypothetical validity claims in rationally motivated agreement; 3) to ground or redeem a 
validity claim via reason.  Although these levels can be separated in abstraction, in 
practice they always occur together. 
Habermas distances himself from earlier theories of rational action, such as 
Weber’s, which consider only teleological action capable of rationalization.  This model 
deals only with strategic action, or action oriented to success; Habermas wants to develop 
a model oriented to reaching understanding, or communicative action.  He looks for 
resources in speech act theory in order to accomplish this task.  He claims that the 
difference between strategic and communicative action is structural rather than 
psychological.  He considers “reaching understanding” (hereafter RU) to be distinct 
“from merely de facto accord.”304  RU occurs when the propositional content of validity 
claims is differentiated and all participants understand and accept the validity of the 
claims.  This differs from ‘collective like-mindedness’ which can be influenced by other 
factors, such as rhetoric.  An implication for democracy is that solidarity in society must 
result from rationally motivated agreement as opposed to a mere modus vivendi.  
Already, the bar for RU is set high because agreement rests on common conviction which 
cannot be coerced or influenced by instrumental or strategic action.  Also, upon my 
reading, agreement is not necessarily equivalent to consensus.  The agreement of which 
Habermas speaks seems to be a very thin, formal (as opposed to content-full) agreement; 
303 Habermas, 25.
304 Habermas, 287.
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a procedural agreement.  Another interesting point is that Habermas seems to want to be 
both normative and descriptive here: we should aim for this type of normative 
understanding (Einverständnis) but it is also the case that “language with an orientation 
to reaching understanding is the original mode of language use.”305  He turns to Austin’s 
speech act theory to substantiate this claim and to differentiate actions oriented to success 
and actions oriented to RU. 
Very briefly, Austin distinguishes three speech acts: locutionary, illocutionary, 
and perlocutionary. These “can be characterized in the following catchphrases: to say 
something, to act in saying something, to bring about something through acting in saying 
something.”306  Glossing over much of Austin’s speech act theory and Habermas’s 
analysis of it, we can say that perlocutionary acts, oriented as they are to teleological 
action, cannot be part of RU.  For Habermas, the meaning of what is said is constitutive 
of illocutionary acts, whereas the intentions of the agent are constitutive for teleological 
actions.  Perlocutions lend themselves to manipulation, to the kind of strategic action that 
Habermas thinks precludes RU.  This account echoes, in a more sophisticated way, the 
debate between logic and rhetoric in ancient Athens.  Habermas seems to want to banish 
would-be sophists from exercising any influence on public consensus through their 
‘distorted communication.’ In some respects, this is a worthy goal, but I think it attributes 
disingenuous intentions to actors without sufficient justification.  Human beings do have 
goals and intentions – this is the descriptive side – and these do not necessarily rely upon 
distorted communication.  If I submit a paper that is below par and the professor asks for 
305 Habermas, 288, italics in original.
306 Habermas, 289. 
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a rewrite, she is trying to get me to act, to persuade me that it is in my interests to do a 
rewrite.  Is this a perlocutionary act?  Perhaps, but is it distorted communication?  Not 
necessarily.  Notice that it does not suffice to simply acknowledge the rationality of my 
professor’s position; she is trying to get me to take action, not merely say, “Yes, I 
understand your criticisms, but I like my paper the way it is.”  Now, perhaps this example 
is not entirely apt, but it shows what I take to be an unrealistic standard in Habermas’s 
model, especially if it purports to be descriptive as well as normative – rather than 
emphasizing rhetoric, dialectic, or logic at the expense of each other. 
In my judgment, this raises four problems with Habermas’s appropriation of 
Austin.  Firstly, he has to attribute intentions to everybody.  This is a very Kantian move, 
but it seems to belie his claim that the distinction between communicative and strategic 
action is not psychological.  Once one starts imputing intentions, it becomes at least 
partly psychological, although there may be structural elements as well.  Indeed, in his 
debate with Gadamer, Habermas invokes psychoanalysis as an example of the “depth 
hermeneutics” necessary for rooting out distorted communication.307  Is this move fully 
within the linguistic turn or does it reveal a latent return to phenomenology?  This is not a 
rhetorical question, but one which deserves careful attention, although I leave it to other 
scholars to pursue the implications.  
Secondly this model may well fail to motivate action, as in my above example.  I 
think Habermas is again echoing Kant, and saying that the rationality of the claim alone 
should be enough to motivate, or oblige, action.  Perhaps, ideally, but this does not 
307 See Habermas, “The Hermeneutical Claim to Universality,” in Contemporary Hermeneutics: 
Hermeneutics as Method, Philosophy, and Critique, ed. Josef Bleicher (London: Routledge and Kegan 
Paul, 1980), 181 – 211. 
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always happen and if Habermas is making, and I believe he is, empirical as well as 
normative claims – the demarcation of which is not always clear – this may be a serious 
shortcoming. 
Thirdly, human beings do have intentions and goals, and it is well nigh impossible 
to completely separate ourselves from them.  Habermas implicitly recognizes this when 
he admits that illocutionary acts may have perlocutionary effects, or elements not 
intended by the speaker.  In that case, do we not fully enter into psychologism and find 
ourselves in the unenviable position of having to psychoanalyze and root out the 
intentions, sometimes unbeknownst to the speakers, behind their actions?  Perhaps this 
critique is overwrought, but it is at least potentially problematic.  As the maxim goes, 
“ought implies can.”  In my judgment, Habermas has set the bar for RU too high; we 
cannot, by his own admission, dissociate ourselves from our goal-oriented action in the 
world. 
Finally, the type of agreement he aims for is too thin.  Throughout TCA, 
Habermas tenaciously adheres to the form/content distinction.  He is reticent to say 
anything substantive about how much agreement we can reasonably expect among 
rational agents.  Rational people often disagree on matters of great import and there are 
rational arguments on either side of many debates.  This is why rhetoric is employed in 
the public sphere sometimes subtly, oftentimes overtly.  I share Habermas’s (and Plato’s) 
frustration with some of these tactics, but see it as a necessary evil in a democracy.  What 
kind of substantive consensus – as opposed to mere accord – does Habermas think 
rational people can achieve on the basis of formal argumentation alone?  Habermas 
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acknowledges that not all fields of inquiry are captured by the propositional content of 
formal argumentation.  In this situation, in which conventional procedures are applied in 
different fields, often requiring a high degree of specialization – expert cultures to use 
another Habermasian term – which reasons count as publicly accessible?  Does the public 
exercise of reason, for the purposes of political praxis, not also include the consensus 
building power of rhetoric?  Or is the consensus achieved by rhetoric illusory? 
Richard Rorty takes up these questions in criticism of Habermas.  Although both 
employ elements and methods from the broadly pragmatist tradition, they differ with 
respect to justificatory practices.  More precisely, both agree on an anti-foundationalist 
understanding of justification, but disagree with respect to the implications of this view 
for establishing intersubjective validity.  Both thinkers also hold that the notion of 
publicly accessible reasons only comes to the fore with the linguistic turn – within 
modernity the epistemological turn’s presuppositions about the knowing subject could 
not allow the potential latent in communicative rationality to completely unfold.  The 
pragmatist would put the same point differently: the isolated subject promoted truth as 
correspondence, which resulted in skepticism, rather than construing truth as convincing 
the widest possible audience.  However, the contextualist implications of this position – 
that we cannot distinguish between truth and justification – is rejected by Habermas and 
embraced by Rorty.308  For Habermas, “Reaching understanding cannot function unless 
308 According to Maeve Cooke, Habermas “wishes to develop a pragmatic account of meaning that avoids 
what he sees as the main weaknesses of pragmatic accounts: the tendency to reduce validity to the 
conventional validity of given forms of life. He thus aims at developing a pragmatic account that holds on 
to an idea of validity that potentially transcends all accepted agreements in definitions or judgments. The 
idea that we understand an utterance when we know what makes it acceptable is intended as an attempt to 
make room for some notion of context-transcendent validity (‘truth’) within a pragmatic framework.” 
Language and Reason: A Study of Habermas’s Pragmatics (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1994), 97.
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the participants refer to a single objective world, thereby stabilizing intersubjectively the 
shared public space with which everything that is merely subjective can be contrasted.”309 
Habermas is not defending representationalism, but making an attempt to rescue our 
realist intuitions about the world: “What is at stake is not the correct representation of 
reality but everyday practices that cannot fall apart.  The contextualist unease betrays a 
worry about the smooth functioning of language games and practices.”310   However, this 
contextualist unease does not trouble Rorty: he is more than willing to treat everyday 
realism as an illusion and “wants to combat this illusion by rhetorical means and pleas for 
reeducation.  We ought to get used to replacing the desire for objectivity with the desire 
for solidarity and, with William James, to understanding ‘truth’ as no more than that in 
which it is good for ‘us’ – the liberal members of Western culture or Western societies – 
to believe.”311  Rorty likewise challenges the notion of reaching agreement in an ideal 
speech situation:
I cannot see what ‘idealized rational acceptability’ can mean except ‘acceptability 
to an ideal community.’ Nor can I see, given that no such community is going to 
have a God’s eye view, that this ideal community can be anything more than us as 
we should like to be. Nor can I see what ‘us’ can mean here except: us educated, 
sophisticated, tolerant, wet liberals, the people who are always willing to hear the 
other side, to think out all their implications, etc.312
Habermas objects by pointing out that the notion of an ideal community need not 
presuppose a ‘thick’ conception of one’s own culture, but rather is meant to include the 
formal, procedural practices that are universal to all argumentation.  Habermas’s 
formalism does not presuppose a correct picture of the world or specify what the content 
309 Habermas, “Richard Rorty’s Pragmatic Turn,” in  Truth: Engagements Across Philosophical Traditions 
ed. José Medina and David Wood (Wiley-Blackwell, 2005), 114.
310 Habermas, 114.
311 Habermas, 115.
312 Quoted in Habermas, 119.
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of our beliefs should be.  Thus rhetoric, the attempt to persuade people, by changing the 
language and ‘common sense’ assumptions inherited from Greek metaphysics and 
monotheism, as Rorty advocates, is too content-full for Habermas’s formal pragmatics. 
Rhetoric, in this capacity, is off limits.  But Rorty does effectively problematize the 
notion of ideal publicly acceptable reasons or ideal rational acceptability.  Again, it is 
debatable whether the ‘force of rational motivation’ or ‘rationally motivated binding’ 
(Bildung) is powerful enough to motivate action or build consensus.  Thus, Rorty thinks 
that a thicker conception of culture is necessary for fostering solidarity.  Formal 
argumentation alone is not sufficient: one must supplement one’s arguments with 
substantive and affective elements from the liberal tradition.  Hence, Rorty employs a 
distinction between arguing and educating.  The latter, often more effective than the 
former, consists of narrative and literature and other means of engendering sympathy. 
Many of the great civil rights movements have employed such means effectively in 
addition to offering compelling arguments.  The civil rights movement, as we have noted, 
did not shy away from specifically religious forms of rhetoric. Therefore, could not 
Rorty’s appreciation of narrative and rhetoric allow some space for religious language in 
the accomplishment of political goals?
On the surface, Rorty does not offer any comfort to the religious believer who 
wants to utilize the semantic power of her tradition in the public sphere.  On the contrary, 
Rorty defends the distinction between the public and the private sphere – religion belongs 
to the latter.313  When introduced into public discourse, religious arguments – or rhetoric 
313 For a critique, see Hendrik Hart, “The Consequences of Liberalism: Ideological Domination in Rorty’s 
Public/Private Split,” in Towards and Ethics of Community, ed. James H. Olthuis (Wilfred Laurier Press, 
2000), 37 – 50. 
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for that matter – act only as conversation stoppers.  One could certainly criticize Rorty for 
a certain inconsistency here.  After all, religious forms of argument often play precisely 
the rhetorical role Rorty advocates, despite the fact that they do not always ‘reeducate’ in 
the direction of the liberal values Rorty wants to defend.  But sometimes they do.  
Moreover, they frequently appeal to narrative (for example, how often was the story of 
the Exodus used by American abolitionists and civil rights leaders?314), an appeal which 
often widens the scope of solidarity more effectively than rational argument alone.  
However, before advancing the charge of inconsistency, let us look more closely at 
Rorty’s reasons for eyeing public appeals to religion with suspicion. 
Is Religion a Conversation Stopper?
Perhaps a natural place to begin is Rorty’s essay “Religion As Conversation-stopper.”  In 
what follows, I want to revisit in greater detail some of the material alluded to in my 
introductory comments in the first chapter.  It should be noted, however, that this essay is 
hardly Rorty’s most philosophically careful work – in fact at times it appears quite 
reckless – and he has publicly backed away from some of the hasty generalizations he 
makes while still defending a secular core.  Nevertheless, it is an important essay insofar 
as it clearly articulates common secularist attitudes toward religion in public and seeks to 
link them to their epistemological roots in the Enlightenment and American pragmatism. 
Interestingly, although Rorty contrasts these two streams in epistemology elsewhere, he 
314 See Eddie S. Glaude, Exodus!: Religion, Race, and Nation in Early Nineteenth-century Black America 
(University of Chicago Press, 2000).
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sees them as united on the practical question of the place of religion within a wider 
polity. 
As I mentioned in chapter one, Rorty’s essay is mainly directed against Stephen 
Carter’s book The Culture of Disbelief: How American Law and Politics Trivialize 
Religious Devotion.  However, Rorty introduces his essay with a few cursory remarks 
that are quite revealing.  Throughout the essay, Rorty defends the public/private dualism 
but begins by introducing a parallel distinction between the “typical intellectual” and the 
“typical nonintellectual.”315  Moreover, the typical intellectual, we are told, “does not find 
religion what James called ‘a live, forced and momentous option’.  She thinks of religion 
as, at its best, Whitehead’s ‘what we do with our solitude’, rather than something people 
do together in churches.”316   I am curious to know what Rorty thinks people are doing 
together in churches, but I let that pass.  More germane to the point is the fact that Rorty 
imbues this distinction with a lot of normative weight.  The intellectual is unlikely to find 
religion a live option, presumably due to her education, whereas the nonintellectual 
simply lacks the epistemological acumen to see that religion simply is, and should 
remain, a private matter.  One would be hard pressed to find a clearer statement of the 
textbook secularization thesis I have been criticizing throughout this volume.  So Rorty’s 
assessment is far from a neutral description of the facts.  But even stripped of its 
normative, and frankly, smug baggage, it is not an accurate description of the facts.  
There are some, if not many, intellectuals who do consider religion a live option and are 
not lacking in philosophical sophistication.  Moreover, I suspect that those who follow 
315 Richard Rorty, "Religion As Conversation- stopper," in Philosophy and Social Hope (Penguin, 2000), 
169.
316 Rorty, 169.
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Rorty’s line, whether intellectuals or not, do so for reasons other than purely 
philosophical ones, as he tacitly admits later. 
For example, he complains that Carter wants to bring religious considerations into 
public debate and says his hypothetical intellectual “is bound to be puzzled or 
annoyed”317 by Carter’s book.  I fail to see how annoyance is strictly speaking relevant in 
assessing an argument.  To paraphrase something Rorty says later in his essay ‘we didn’t 
ask about your private feelings; we were discussing arguments’.  Nevertheless, Rorty is 
annoyed by Carter’s effort to dissolve, in Rorty’s view, the “happy, Jeffersonian 
compromise that the Enlightenment reached with the religious.  This compromise 
consists in privatizing religion – keeping it out of what Carter calls ‘the public square’, 
making it seem bad taste to bring religion into discussion of public policy.”318  But one 
must wonder if ‘bad taste’ is all Rorty finds objectionable in religious language in public.  
Is it merely a sense of decorum that he wants to maintain, or is something more 
normative at stake, as in the case of Habermas and Rawls, whom he cites in support?  I 
would think that a pragmatist would not want to police the public sphere, ridding it of 
anything that could be deemed bad taste, but would rather want to foster a domain of free 
expression and robust discourse even if it must be rough and ready at times, as in a 
democracy it must.  Wolterstorff agrees: “Rorty’s comments about the role of religion in 
the democratic polity breathe a very different spirit from that of his comments on every 
other topic …. What Rorty praises in those other passages is imagination, openness, re-
description, self-creation; here, the talk is all about limits.  Religion is to limit itself to the 
317 Rorty, 169.
318 Rorty, 169.
232
private; the conversation is to be limited to premises held in common.”319  Here, Rorty 
seems close to a contractarian position.  Stout agrees, but comments, correctly, that Rorty 
does not theorize about universally valid principles; when he speaks of premises held in 
common, he means those that are in fact held in common in a given society, not an 
idealized one.  If this is the case, I wonder, with Stout, why Rawls and Habermas are 
cited as superior epistemologists.320  Regardless, Rorty’s pragmatism in this context is at 
best unclear, at worst inconsistent.  These difficulties are exacerbated when Rorty says 
that he and fellow atheists do their best to “enforce” the Jeffersonian compromise.  
Although his primary tool for doing so may be social pressure rather than social contract, 
the notion of enforcement implies a normative rule to be enforced.  This is why I think 
Stout is too quick to contrast contractarian or “moralistic” restraints on religious language 
in public with Rorty’s “pragmatic” restraints.321  Social pressure usually contains a heavy 
dose of moralism. 
Case in point, he then goes on to catalogue the indignities and injustices that 
atheists must endure in American society: they are unlikely to be elected to public office 
without pretending to believe in God and secular conscientious objectors go to prison, 
unlike those who object on religious grounds.  He concludes, “Such facts suggest to us 
(atheists) that the claims of religion need, if anything, to be pushed back still further, and 
that religious believers have no business asking for more public respect than they now 
receive.”322  But in my view, this statement misconstrues the real issue.  Indeed, for my 
argument, respect in this context is irrelevant.  I do not think that some arguments should 
319 Nicholas Wolterstorff, “An Engagement with Rorty,” Journal of Religious Ethics, 31.1 (2003): 134.
320 Jeffrey Stout, Democracy and Tradition (Princeton University Press, 2005), 86.
321 Stout, 85.
322 Rorty, 169.
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be afforded more respect simply by virtue of being religious; they must vie for respect 
critically and dialectically like all other arguments.  But to say that religious arguments 
should not be afforded more respect than other arguments is not to say that they ought to 
be excluded from the dialectical process at the outset.  Rorty gets it right, although 
without realizing it, when he says “moral decisions that are to be enforced by a pluralist 
and democratic state’s monopoly on violence are best made by public discussion in 
which voices claiming to be God’s, or reason’s, or science’s are put on a par with 
everybody else’s.”323  Putting voices that claim to be God’s on a par with other voices, is 
not tantamount to excluding voices that claim to be God’s, as Rorty is wont to do.  So he 
should drop the old canard about religious voices getting more respect than they deserve 
in liberal democracies.  Arguably, in recent years, the pendulum has swung the other 
way, as Rorty’s own condescending tone toward the ‘nonintellectual’ implies. 
Carter argues that “the legal culture that guards the public square still seems most 
comfortable thinking of religion as a hobby, something done in privacy, something that 
mature, public-spirited adults do not use as the basis for politics.”324  Rorty correctly 
notes that “Carter’s inference from privatization to trivialization is invalid unless 
supplemented with the premise that the nonpolitical is always trivial.  But this premise 
seems false.”325 He suggests that there are many things that are private, such as our family 
and love lives that are non-political, but are obviously not trivial.  I grant Rorty this point. 
However, his thesis is complicated when he includes pursuits such as poetry, which may 
be private, but may also express sentiments that have political implications.  He says, 
323 Rorty, 172.
324 Rorty, 170.
325 Rorty, 170.
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“the poems we atheists write, like the prayers our religious friends raise, are private, 
nonpolitical and nontrivial.”326  While this may be true in some cases, it is not necessarily 
true in every case.  After all, poetry and other forms of literature, as effective forms of 
rhetoric, can often broaden the sympathies of its audience and allow them to experience 
vicariously the plight of the disadvantaged.327  In such a way, good literature can have 
political entailments as can good prayers or sermons.  Rorty seems to be referring here to 
poems that never see a wide audience, those that are only shared with intimates.  But 
limiting the scope in this way seems ad hoc, serving only to make Rorty’s point.  But his 
argument is further complicated when he includes reading poetry as a private, and thus 
nonpolitical, pursuit.  Is he still referring to poetry that has not been published, poetry 
intended only for intimates?  If so, this is again ad hoc.  If not, who is to say that it cannot 
function rhetorically toward some political end?  Certainly not Rorty, since he defends 
this contention in another context.328  However, he provides a clue to his rationale when 
he says, “The search for private perfection, pursued by theists and atheists alike, is 
neither trivial nor, in a pluralistic democracy, relevant to public policy.”329 
As other scholars have noted, Rorty’s appeal to the classical liberal distinction 
between the public and private appears, at least on the surface, like a tired move.330 
However, Rorty’s rationale for maintaining this modern distinction is not particularly 
modern at all.  He believes that the public/private schema must be maintained lest we slip 
326 Rorty, 170.
327 Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, 141.
328 See especially the chapters on Nabokov and Orwell in Contingency, Irony and Solidarity. 
329 Rorty, “Religion As Conversation-stopper,” 170.
330 Ronald A. Kuipers, “Singular Interruptions: Rortian Liberalism and the Ethics of Deconstruction,” in 
Knowing Other-wise: Philosophy at the threshold of spirituality, ed. James H. Olthuis (New York: 
Fordham University Press, 1997), 111.
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back into the classical onto-theological project in Western philosophy.331  Our private, 
idiosyncratic attempts at self-actualization and our public responsibility to ameliorate the 
suffering of others are often at odds.  Attempts to reconcile both in theory are precisely 
the sorts of metaphysical projects pragmatists reject.  The fact is there is no grand meta-
narrative, no master vocabulary that can completely reconcile the conflicts between our 
public and private concerns.  Theory may be able to offer coping strategies for us to deal 
with some of these conflicts, but more often than not, it is unhelpful.  Literature provides 
a more helpful tool for helping us reconcile both public and private concerns, and it is by 
this means that the ‘ironist’ gains awareness of different vocabularies and narratives. 
Literature, in a piecemeal fashion, does the job that metaphysics used to do; provide a 
basis for solidarity.  However, this observation is not a guarantee that such reconciliation 
between public and private will be total; again, most of the time, there is a conflict 
between my public utilitarian calculus and my private will to power.  Rorty recognizes 
this as a necessary consequence of the failure of metaphysics and resultant secularization. 
As he acknowledges: “For a few such people – Christians (and others) for whom the 
search for private perfection coincides with living for others – the two sorts of questions 
come together. For most such, they do not.”332  I would agree with Ronald Kuipers when 
he says, commenting on this passage, that “Rorty paints a somewhat tragic picture of 
atheist society here, a society whose individual members are so selfish in their private 
pursuits that reconciling them with shared public concerns becomes the job of two 
different vocabularies.  Surely, however, many atheists would be unhappy with this 
331 In Contingency, Irony and Solidarity Rorty accuses Habermas of this tendency: “Habermas assumes that 
the task of philosophy is to supply some social glue which will replace religious belief, and to see 
Enlightenment talk of ‘universality’ and ‘rationality’ as the best candidate for this glue” 83. 
332 Rorty, 143. 
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picture.”333  Nevertheless, Rorty is suspicious of any metaphysical or teleological 
justifications for solidarity.  Hence, multiple vocabularies, both useful within in their own 
context, are necessary.  As Kuipers explains:
Simply put, Rorty is trying to describe a kind of society where public and private 
pursuits are no longer in conflict, not because they find synthesis under a common 
metaphysical rubric, but simply because they can operate side by side, like 
different tools for different purposes. Rorty puts as much stock in what liberal 
democracies have been able to achieve for individual freedom as he does in how 
they have helped maximize human solidarity and minimize public cruelty. It is by 
no means evident that he values one more highly that the other.334
Therefore, Rorty values the private ironist as offering valuable tools within the private 
domain.  In this regard, he acknowledges the power of poetry and other literature.  But he 
apparently judges it less useful when it comes to the equally important public task of 
building a just society.  Nevertheless, I still detect a tension here between these 
considerations and his conception of rhetoric as reeducation. 
But let us return to the problematic public/private distinction in reference to 
religion.  Rorty’s comments regarding religion are usually quite critical.  For example, 
when he says it would be best if religious institutions would “wither away” because they 
create “unnecessary human misery”335 it is quite easy to get the impression that Rorty 
thinks we would all be better off without religion, at least in its institutionalized forms.  
And, in broad strokes, this is what he believes, although with a few caveats.  To his 
credit, he is realistic enough not to expect that religion in every manifestation will 
disappear, however, he hopes that institutionalized religion will do so; in other words, he 
hopes that the privatization of religion begun in the modern period and embodied in the 
333 Kuipers, 113.
334 Kuipers, 114. 
335 Rorty, “Religion in the Public Square: A Reconsideration,” Journal of Religious Ethics, 31.1 (2003), 
142.
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‘Jeffersonian compromise’ will be someday total.  So religion must be privatized, which 
is not to say trivialized.  To restate, “The main reason religion needs to be privatized is 
that, in political discussion with those outside the relevant religious community, it is a 
conversation-stopper.”336 However, there are several problems with Rorty’s employment 
of the public/private distinction in this context.  One could, of course, question the utility 
of the distinction itself as does Wolterstorff. “I find the public/private dualism both 
obscure and ideologically loaded; I myself try to avoid placing any weight on it.  I am 
surprised to see Rorty, implacable enemy of dualisms, placing so much weight on this 
one.”337  But even granting the distinction for the moment, Rorty’s appeal to it does not 
do the work he wants it to.  Firstly, although religious reasons may stop conversation in 
some contexts, it is by no means clear that they have a monopoly on doing so.  Rorty 
acknowledges that the conversation has to stop somewhere.  Indeed, he acknowledges 
that his appeal to Darwinian, pragmatic, antirealist reasons begs all the important 
questions as do his opponents’ appeals to Platonic, idealist, and realist reasons.338  
Moreover, the reason these appeals stop conversation has nothing to do with being 
statements about private life. Rather, it has to do with the nature of argumentation; at 
some point we all return to what Rorty elsewhere calls ‘final vocabularies.’339  He even 
finds some common ground with Carter on this issue:
The best parts of his (Carter’s) very thoughtful, and often persuasive book, are 
those in which he points up the inconsistency of our behavior, and the hypocrisy 
involved in saying that believers somehow have no right to base their political 
views on their religious faith, whereas we atheists have every right to base ours on 
Enlightenment philosophy. The claim that in doing so we are appealing to reason, 
336 Rorty, “Religion As Conversation-stopper,” 171. 
337 Wolterstorff, 131. 
338 Rorty, Philosophy and Social Hope, xxxii. 
339 Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, 73. 
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whereas the religious are being irrational is hokum. Carter is quite right to debunk 
it.340
If this analysis is correct, then it is difficult to avoid stopping conversation at some point 
and this is so, by Rorty’s own logic, because of the final vocabularies we all appeal to at 
the end of the day, not simply because one side invokes ‘private’ reasons whereas the 
other has a monopoly on ‘public’ reason.  By his own admission, Rorty is quite 
pessimistic about the dialogical process, claiming that the best interlocutors can do is to 
restate their positions over and over, although, as Wolterstorff notes, this appears in 
tension with his hope for universal intersubjective agreement.341  But perhaps we can do 
more than state our positions ad infinitum; perhaps we can engage in immanent critique, 
as Stout advocates, even if we do appeal to final vocabularies in the last resort.  But this 
observation brings us back to the point that religion does not uniquely act as a 
conversation-stopper.  I think this point is sufficiently clear. 
Secondly, Rorty’s equates religious reasons with private ones although the 
examples he uses are quite unfortunate for his case and ultimately show dissimilarity 
between religious reasons and the ‘private’ reasons he cites.  To review, Carter’s appeal 
to the will of God when discussing the issues of abortion and pornography stops 
conversation, by his own admission.  Rorty thinks this is because an appeal to one’s 
private religious beliefs is out of place in political discourse. “The same goes” he says, 
“for telling the group, ‘I would never have an abortion’ or ‘Reading pornography is about 
the only pleasure I get out of life these days.’  In these examples, as in Carter’s, the 
ensuing silence masks the group’s inclination to say, ‘So what?  We weren’t discussing 
340 Rorty, “Religion As Conversation-stopper,” 170.
341 Wolterstorff, 129 – 30. 
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your private life; we were discussing public policy.  Don’t bother us with matters that are 
not our concern.”342  But it seems clear that these cases are not analogous.  As 
Wolterstorff queries in response, “So in what ways does King’s offering a religious 
reason in favor of outlawing segregation resemble revealing that one’s only pleasure 
nowadays comes from reading pornography, so that both are comments about one’s 
private life?”343  The question is clearly rhetorical.  This serves to confirm Wolterstorff’s 
suspicion about Rorty’s use of the public/private distinction:
So far as I can make out, Rorty’s reference to privacy is really a throw-away 
reference; it’s not doing any real work. A good example of my point about the 
uselessness in such discussions about the public/private dualism! My surmise is 
that the problem Rorty sees with offering religious reasons for political positions 
is not that such reasons are “private” in any clear sense of that term, but that they 
are not shared by the citizenry in general.344
We are again back to the problem of common basis, which I repudiated in the last 
chapter, and which Rorty himself rejects at least in its idealized versions.  As mentioned 
above, ‘public reasons’ need not imply that they must be universally acceptable by all 
rational persons; indeed, it could not, otherwise we would be forced to conclude that none 
of the reasons to which we commonly appeal in political discourse are public reasons.  Of 
course, this problem is only exacerbated if we take a pragmatic tack and only consider 
premises that are actually held in common, rather than an idealized common basis.  We 
would be left with precious few such premises indeed.  Again, some translation of 
religious premises may be pragmatically necessary to keep the conversation going, but 
342 Rorty, 171. 
343 Wolterstorff, 132. 
344 Wolterstorff, 132. 
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that is not to say that religious premises always automatically stop conversation in its 
tracks.
Rorty has a point, however, that faith-claims stop conversation.  To review 
Stout’s distinction, if I make a faith-claim, I do not accept the responsibility of 
demonstrating my epistemic entitlement to the claim.345  Clearly, such claims tend to 
terminate the exchange of reasons.  But as we saw in the last chapter, not all religious 
statements are faith-claims.  Many religious persons are prepared to offer reasons for 
their beliefs.  Rorty implicitly seems to recognize this, but nevertheless urges religious 
citizens to drop reference to the religious sources of their beliefs with regard to particular 
social issues.  Again in criticism of Carter, who urges liberalism to ‘develop a politics 
that accepts whatever form of dialogue a member of the public offers’346 Rorty responds:
What is a specifically religious ‘form of dialogue’, except perhaps a dialogue in 
which some members cite religious sources for their beliefs? What could a 
specifically religious argument be, except an argument whose premises are 
accepted by some people because they believe that these premises express the will 
of God? I may accept those same premises for purely secular reasons – for 
example, reasons having to do with maximizing human happiness. Does that 
make my argument a non-religious one? Even if it is exactly the argument made 
by my religious fellow citizen? Surely the fact that one of us gets his premises in 
church and the other in the library is, and should be, of no interest to our audience 
in the public square.347
My inclination is to say if such a translation of religious to secular premises can be made 
and consensus thus achieved, then all well and good.  In the situation Rorty describes, in 
which we already have consensus, it is of relatively little interest how we each justify our 
premises.  But such a situation seems to me to be ideal, and a pragmatist such as Rorty 
345 Stout, 87. 
346 Cited in Rorty, 172.
347 Rorty, 172. 
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presumably knows that his hypothetical scenario avoids all of the thorny issues of 
translation and justification which I have been addressing thus far.348  The problem is 
precisely that we disagree about the truth of premises, at least when it comes to the most 
contentious issues facing pluralistic democracies, and are thus pressed to give further 
justifications for them.  What recourse do we have, whether we are secular or religious, 
but to appeal to our final vocabularies?  Thus it is not a matter of simply “dropping 
reference to the source of the premises of the arguments”349 as Rorty admonishes.  As we 
saw in the last chapter in Wolterstorff’s response to Audi, if having secular arguments for 
beliefs based on religious sources were this easy, religious citizens would almost always 
automatically have such secular arguments.350 (If Carter is opposed to abortion because 
God says abortion is wrong, then he is ipso facto opposed to abortion because abortion is 
wrong.)  But these do not necessarily function for the religious person as adequate, 
independent secular rationales or motivations for political action.  Unlike Audi, however, 
Rorty is pragmatic enough not to expect peoples’ religious beliefs to have no influence on 
their political convictions, but thinks they should simply drop the references to the true 
source of their religious convictions.  This might be advisable, despite being 
disingenuous, when the desired consensus has already been achieved as in Rorty’s 
hypothetical scenario.  But it becomes practically impossible to obscure the source of 
348 G. Elijah Dann, commenting on Rorty, also takes a rather naïve view of what is involved in translation: 
[I]f religious believers wish to discuss, in the public square, their opposition to abortion, they must first 
translate their claim into a language suitable for discussion in the public square – the common language of 
democracy.” After Rorty: The Possibilities for Ethics and Religious Belief (London: Continuum, 2006), 64.
349 Rorty, 173. 
350 Dann evidently thinks it is this easy: “Some may be dubious about the possibility of translating religious 
concepts into secular terms, especially on the topic of abortion. This is largely the fault of the Pro-Life 
advocates who repeatedly have made their public opposition to abortion on the basis of religious platitudes. 
It is nevertheless possible to make the translation by speaking of ‘human dignity’ instead of the ‘sacredness 
of life.’ Whereas speaking of the sacredness of life carries a religious assumption, human dignity does not” 
64. Above and in what follows, I attempt to problematize this simplistic solution. 
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one’s premises when the argument is more contentious.  For example, if Carter is arguing 
that abortion is wrong, not because it is against the will of God, but because the fetus is a 
person and thus has a right to life, the contention that the fetus is a person could in 
principle have either a secular or religious justification.  If both parties to the discussion 
agree with the premise, it scarcely matters if one accepts it on religious grounds and the 
other on secular ones.  There is no practical reason to get into the reasons behind the 
premises if agreement has already been reached.  Of course, secular liberals like Rorty 
disagree with that premise and thus force a discussion of the sources of belief behind the 
premise.  This much seems obvious.  Now it seems practically impossible for Carter to 
follow Rorty’s advice and simply drop reference to the source of his beliefs and limit 
himself to premises held in common.  He has no recourse but to make reference to 
‘comprehensive’ (in Rawls’s sense) evidence that will not likely convince Rorty and the 
conversation may well end there, unless one of them can find a way to get inside the 
other’s way of thinking.  But that alone does not prove that religious sources of belief are 
in ‘bad taste’ when introduced into the discussion even if it happens that the two parties 
continue to disagree.  Is it always in bad taste to end up openly disagreeing with 
someone?  This is surely not what Rorty is claiming.  Of course the avenue of immanent 
critique, Stout’s option 3 from the last chapter, is still open and it is surprising that Rorty 
would not pursue it before saying ‘so what?’ and giving up on the conversation.  But 
even if Rorty and Carter end their discussion in disagreement, why is this outcome so 
bad?  What is wrong with Rorty simply declaring that he disagrees with Carter?  As 
Wolterstorff observes, “He, Rorty, does after all disagree with Carter.  He does not 
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believe that it’s against the will of God to legalize abortion.  What’s so bad about saying 
that, and thus winding up disagreeing with Carter in public?”351  As Wolterstorff also 
notes, there is a familiar mechanism for reaching a practical decision after our political 
discussion ends in disagreement, as it inevitably does: voting.  It is ironic that a 
pragmatist like Rorty overlooks this very pragmatic feature of politics in democracies, 
namely that since conversation-stopping is inevitable, there is a venerable process for 
overcoming such an impasse.  To quote Wolterstorff again: “Conversation-stopping is not 
some appalling evil perpetrated upon an otherwise endlessly-talkative public by religious 
people.  Stopped conversation is an all-pervasive feature of political debate in a 
democracy; and voting is a procedure for arriving at a decision of the body when 
conversation has stopped.”352 
Rorty’s Reconsideration
However, Rorty has since qualified his views on religion in the public sphere, so lest I 
seem unfair to him, I will now take up some of his more philosophically and rhetorically 
cautious reflections on the subject.  His ‘reconsideration’ of his earlier essay comes in 
response to, by his own estimation, impressive criticisms from Stout and Wolterstorff.353  
In my view, his more chastened comments amount to defending a more modest version 
of the secularization thesis than that suggested by his earlier treatment of the subject. 
Indeed, it is a more defensible version than that of Weber, for example, from which 
Habermas has distanced himself.  However, it might still be a stronger statement of it 
351 Wolterstorff, 136.
352 Wolterstorff, 136.
353 Rorty, “A Reconsideration,” 141. 
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than Habermas would be willing to endorse in light of his more recent writings, although 
nothing substantial rests on that suspicion. 
Rorty begins “back-pedaling” by making a distinction between religion at the 
parish level and ecclesiastical institutions.  The former, which, in Rorty’s view, provides 
pastoral care and meaning to peoples’ lives, is not, or at least should not be, the 
immediate target of secularists.  Rather ecclesiastical institutions which claim to speak 
with divine authority and seek to impose orthodoxy on the wider public through abuse of 
their tax exempt status are the real menace to liberal democracy.  Rorty provides some 
examples of who he has in mind, namely the usual suspects, “Catholic bishops, the 
Mormon General Authorities, the televangelists.”354  These institutionally supported 
religious authorities are what Rorty, and like-minded secularists, hope will eventually 
wither away.  He recognizes that, if his hopes are realized, such hierarchical religious 
bodies will be sorely missed by religious believers in the short-term.  The feeling of 
belonging to something greater than oneself, which religious institutions once provided, 
will be gone.  But, Rorty hopes, religious believers can compensate for that loss by 
working in common cause with secular citizens for the advancement of humanity as a 
whole despite the fact that increasing social justice and economic equality will weaken 
religion’s role; it will no longer be needed to keep the masses in check by threatening 
eternal punishment or excusing poverty by promising otherworldly rewards.  Thus 
religion’s role will be reduced to providing pastoral care to those who still find solace in 
354 Rorty, 141. 
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faith.  As Rorty informs us, “Religion will, in this secularist utopia, be pruned back to the 
parish level.”355 
He concedes that “the social ideals that we secular humanists champion are often 
cast in religious terms.  But we hope that they will eventually cease to be so stated.”356  
His reasons are two-fold.  Firstly, couching social ideals in a religious idiom gives succor 
to those ecclesiastical institutions that use such language as a vehicle for their bigotry. 
Secondly, the cause of leftist politics, including economic equality, is “strengthened just 
insofar as belief in a providential deity who will provide pie in the sky is weakened.”357  It 
is explicitly not the case for Rorty that religious belief in this context is intrinsically 
irrational or wrong-headed.  He shares the ethics of belief of William James and agrees 
with Wolterstorff about the vacuity of epistemological foundationalism.  In a bold 
statement, Rorty says “I view the struggle between utilitarians and homophobic Christian 
fundamentalists as no more a struggle between reason and unreason than is the Catholic-
Protestant struggle in Northern Ireland.”358  So the rationality of religious belief is not on 
trial; rather Rorty finds religious belief, especially above the parish level, as inexpedient 
given the goals he wishes to achieve.  This is not to say that religion has always been 
inexpedient.  But he thinks “that the occasional Gustavo Guttierez or Martin Luther King 
does not compensate for the ubiquitous Joseph Ratzingers and Jerry Falwells.”359  Thus, 
he thinks it best to treat religion as a ladder up which our ancestors climbed, but which 
should now be cast aside. 
355 Rorty, 142. 
356 Rorty, 142. 
357 Rorty, 142. 
358 Rorty, 144.
359 Rorty, 142. 
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Although retaining the language of ‘secularist utopia’ – with possible irony – this 
is a more modest articulation of the secularization thesis and one that is, in my judgment, 
more defensible on both normative and empirical grounds.  It does not forecast the 
disappearance of religion per se, but simply envisions it as something other than what it 
has been historically.  In my view Rorty does not go far enough, at least in this context, 
toward creatively envisioning what else religion might become, besides the threatening 
bastions of orthodoxy to which he objects.  Since he still tacitly clings to the 
public/private distinction, he fails to imagine that religion might become something more, 
might find another voice, evolve in a positive way rather than merely getting ‘pruned 
back’ to the private domain.  This failure of imagination is surprising, however, since he 
envisions a positive public role for religion in an imaginative essay called “Looking 
Backwards from the Year 2096.”  Written as a retrospective of twenty-first century 
American political history by a Hispanic female Jesuit and an Asian-Jewish American, it 
diagnoses what Rorty sees as the egregious social ills of our time and prophetically 
intones where they might lead if left unchecked.  The article chronicles a period of 
economic collapse, civil unrest, and martial law from 2014 – 44 called the Dark Years.  
This crisis comes about due to a breakdown of solidarity among the citizenry who are 
divided along economic and racial lines.  The liberal rights discourse with its inherent 
individualism could not restore solidarity and hence social order.  Therefore, a new 
political vocabulary had to replace it:
Here, in the late twenty-first century, as talk of fraternity and unselfishness has 
replaced talk of rights, American political discourse has come to be dominated by 
quotations from Scripture and literature, rather than from political theorists or 
social scientists.  Fraternity, like friendship, was not a concept that either 
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philosophers or lawyers knew how to handle.  They could formulate principles of 
justice, equality and liberty, and invoke these principles when weighing hard 
moral or legal issues.  But how to formulate a ‘principle of fraternity’?  Fraternity 
is an inclination of the heart, one that produces a sense of shame at having much 
when others have little.  It is not the sort of thing that anybody can have a theory 
about or that people can be argued into having.360
The means of restoring solidarity includes the rhetorical power of both religious and 
secular literature.  However, religion has an even more robust role in Rorty’s parable.  In 
2044, a coalition of churches and trade unions, The Democratic Vistas Party, topple the 
military dictatorship of the Dark Years and still hold Congress in 2096.  The social gospel 
is rediscovered and sermons focus on improving the plight of others instead of individual 
salvation.  Although reducing religion to either of these roles, in my judgment, is 
problematic, Rorty’s essay at least shows his capacity to imagine how religion might 
offer society something other than pie in the sky and why it might not be advisable to 
prune religion back too far.  Rorty’s vision in “2096” is hardly the secularist utopia he 
envisions in his “Reconsideration.”  However, the fact that he has made peace with some 
form of religion being around for awhile, does not entail that he has retreated from the 
Kulturkampf or plans to wage it with any less fervor. 
Rorty then takes up some of Wolterstorff’s criticisms.  Rorty is convinced that the 
religious believer should not be prohibited by law or custom from bringing his favorite 
texts into political discussion, any more than the secularist should be prohibited.  For 
example, Wolterstorff’s citing of Psalm 72 in support of redistributionist policies is just 
as legitimate as Rorty’s citation of J.S. Mill in support of the same measures.  As Rorty 
acknowledges:
360 Rorty, “Looking Backwards from the Year 2096,” in Philosophy and Social Hope, 248. 
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The fact that Psalm 72 belongs to a set of Scriptures claimed by various 
ecclesiastical organizations which I regard as politically dangerous is not a good 
reason to hinder Wolterstorff from citing this Psalm, any more than the fact that 
many people regard Mill’s utilitarianism as morally dangerous is a good reason to 
stop me citing On Liberty. Neither law nor custom should stop either of us from 
bringing our favorite texts with us into the public square.”361
However, it becomes more complicated when religious believers cite Scripture, not in 
favor of redistribution of wealth, but in opposition to gay rights, for example.  On this 
issue, Rorty does have a problem with citing religious texts.  Citing Leviticus 18:22, for 
example, as the final word on same-sex marriage, should be off limits.  According to 
Rorty: “Here I cannot help feeling that, though the law should not forbid someone from 
citing such texts in support of a political position, custom should forbid it.  Citing such 
passages should be deemed not just in bad taste, but as heartlessly cruel, as reckless 
persecution, as incitement to violence.”362  Interestingly, he confesses here what I 
suspected above: that his exclusion of religious expression from political debate rests on 
more than just bad taste; there is a normative core to his distaste toward religion. 
However, although there is a normative core, he is still unwilling to enforce it via the 
social contract.  He speaks a different language here than that of Jeffersonian compromise 
and clarifies his position vis-à-vis Rawls that remained fuzzy in “Religion as 
Conversation-stopper.”  Nevertheless, although not a contractarian, he feels that custom 
should forbid using religion to justify odious political opinions, such as criminalizing 
homosexuality.  In Rorty’s view, religious homophobes should be treated with the same 
contempt reserved for anti-Semites and white supremacists.  Though legislation was 
instrumental in improving the plight of Jews and African Americans, and likely will play 
361 Rorty, “A Reconsideration,” 143.
362 Rorty, 143.
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a substantial role in securing gay rights, Rorty recognizes, correctly, that the 
marginalization of anti-Semites and white supremacists from mainstream American 
society was accomplished without prohibiting freedom of speech. 
This brings us to a seeming inconsistency in Rorty’s position.  Why is it 
permissible to cite Scripture in support of liberal policies Rorty would espouse, but not in 
favor of those he would not?  At this point, Rorty is candid: he would like to have a 
principle which would disallow appeals to Lev. 18:22 but allow appeals to Psalm 72. 
Unfortunately, he does not.  Again, the problem for Rorty is not principally a 
philosophical problem, but a practical one.  The debate between fundamentalists and 
secularists cannot be framed, as some secularists affirm, as a battle between rationality 
and irrationality.  For Rorty, the vacuity of epistemological foundationalism is clear.  His 
epistemic stance leads him to believe that his disagreement with religious critics, like 
Wolterstorff, is primarily empirical rather than philosophical.  He simply thinks that 
Wolterstorff underestimates the danger to democracy posed by ecclesiastical institutions. 
As we saw above, Wolterstorff concedes that there was a certain rationale in the 
seventeenth century, in the context of religious wars, to limit the expression of religion in 
the public sphere.  But he believes that democracy in America, with a rich history of 
religious tolerance behind her, is mature enough to readmit religion into public debate, 
arguing that “liberalism’s myopic preoccupation with religious wars is outdated.”363  For 
Rorty, speaking also for persecuted minorities, the difference between the centuries is 
negligible.  He finds parallels between European Jews in the seventeenth century and 
American homosexuals in ours.  Although the church did not explicitly make war on 
363 Quoted in Rorty, 145.
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Jews, it encouraged anti-Semitism through its teaching, with pogroms as the result.  In 
much the same way, when American Christians declare that homosexuality is an 
abomination hated by God, gay-bashing is likely to result.  As Rorty summarizes, 
“Nowadays, the problem within most countries in which Christianity is still the majority 
religion is not the possibility of religious war, but the sort of everyday peacetime sadism 
that uses religion to excuse cruelty.”364 
For the sake of brevity, I must leave to one side the empirical and historical issues 
that divide Rorty and Wolterstorff which amount to the perennial question of whether 
religion is, on balance, a force for good or ill.  In my judgment, Rorty is too quick to 
claim that philosophical issues take a back seat to empirical matters in this context. 
He dismisses philosophical considerations by way of a professed agreement with 
Wolterstorff against Audi’s notion that religious citizens must have secular reasons for 
political decisions that are both motivationally sufficient and epistemologically adequate. 
Rorty confesses that he does not find these terms very useful and furthermore thinks we 
lack the criteria for determining their presence.365  But he seems to want to put the same 
point in different language.  One can detect a residual point from ‘Religion as 
Conversation-stopper’: that religious people, despite the secularist’s failure to hold them 
to a principle, really should try to find another way of expressing themselves publicly. 
For example, in his discussion of gay rights vis-à-vis Christianity, he comments, 
“They (gays and lesbians) are struck by the fact that religious reasons are now pretty 
much the only reasons brought forward in favor of treating them with contempt.”366  His 
364 Rorty, 145. 
365 Rorty, 144.
366 Rorty, 146, italics in original. 
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emphasis on ‘only’ here leads one to believe that he thinks that either religious reasons 
are not ‘real’ reasons or that religious citizens should really try to find a secular way of 
stating their position.  Given what he says earlier about reason and unreason being beside 
the point in such debates, I think Rorty is implicitly stating the latter position. 
Furthermore, he goes on to say that “Audi is not entirely wrong when he says that ‘the 
concept of a liberal democracy’ forbids certain moves being made in the course of 
political discussion.”367  Again, I think that Rorty wants to make substantially the same 
claim as Audi on a practical level, but thinks that Audi’s principle of motivational 
sufficiency and epistemological adequacy is dubious.  But saying that religious people 
should really find another language to express their views, or that custom should forbid 
certain religious appeals, puts the same requirements on religious people, in practice, that 
Audi wants to impose in principle.  Thus, the issue of translation comes to the fore again. 
One of the differences between Rorty and Audi is that the former is realistic enough not 
to pretend that religious people will have secular reasons sufficient to motivate them to 
act even in the absence of their religious convictions.  It may be the case, for Rorty, that it 
would be sound strategy on a pragmatic level for religious citizens to play the language 
game of the wider polity.  But his moralizing on gay rights leads one to believe that his 
desire that religious citizens stop invoking Scripture on this issue goes deeper than 
hoping Christians will adopt a different rhetorical strategy.  Certainly it would be 
beneficial if Christians who, say, oppose same-sex marriage did indeed adopt a different 
strategy than quoting Lev 18:22.  Despite Rorty’s hyperbole, I think most have.  But 
besides robbing gay-bashing thugs of justification for their actions, which is no small 
367 Rorty, 147, italics in original. 
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victory, translating the argument into a different moral rubric will probably not move the 
argument along much further. 
For example, the Christian argument, as derived from Romans 1, rather than Lev 
18:22 – space does not permit a careful exegetical or hermeneutical examination of these 
passages – against homosexual practice takes the form of a natural law argument.  This 
argument, hardly unique to Paul, also circulated among ancient pagan moralists.  It is 
asserted that homosexuality goes ‘against nature’, or humanity’s telos.  My point is not to 
defend this argument, but merely to point out that it’s not specific to a particular religion, 
or even theism, so far as I can tell, despite the historical fact that natural law theory as 
inherited from Aristotle and the Stoics was thought to be particularly amenable to 
Christian moral theology.  In any case, we have here an example of an argument, albeit 
contentious, rather than a mere appeal to authority.
From what Rorty says, it is difficult to tell whether or not this natural law 
argument would be allowable or not in democratic discussion.  He claims, along with 
Stout, that what should be discouraged in a democracy are mere appeals to authority, or 
faith-claims.  “It is one thing” he argues, “to explain how a given political stance is bound 
up with one’s religious belief, and another to think that it is enough, when defending a 
political view, simply to cite authority, scriptural or otherwise.”368  Likewise, Rorty thinks 
he would not be properly arguing with his interlocutors if he simply quoted J.S. Mill at 
them.  So Rorty’s problem with most religious language in public is that it simply appeals 
to authority.  Citing Lev 18:22 is an appeal to authority, and I would agree with Rorty 
that those who simply cite it as a divine command which brooks no argument do invoke a 
368 Rorty, 147.
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faith-claim that is likely to be a conversation-stopper.  Put in a different moral rubric, 
however, like that of natural law, one can at least see some discursive potential, although 
in my view, it will be short-lived.  A utilitarian like Rorty is not going be convinced by an 
argument from natural law, and vice versa, so consensus will not likely be achieved in 
this way.  (I see Stout as more helpful in his willingness to go quite a long way with his 
religious interlocutor’s argument.)369  His attempts to forestall invoking conversation-
stoppers ultimately fail. 
In short, convincing religious citizens to simply switch moral rubrics is not an 
effective solution to building practical consensus on such issues.  Presumably, Rorty 
would not see the debate between utilitarianism and natural law theory as a battle 
between reason and unreason any more than the debate between utilitarianism and divine 
command theory would be.  He simply hopes that the dominant language of public 
morality will continue to be couched in utilitarian terms, and is committed to waging that 
rhetorical battle.  But in that case, it seems inconsequential which moral rubric religious 
persons choose to give expression to their convictions.  What is the point of translation 
besides, perhaps, improving the decorum of the conversation?  To answer this question, I 
think one must part company with Rorty and side with Habermas. In my view, there is 
more discursive potential between arguments that have been couched in a moral language 
that does not merely appeal to authority because of the objective nature of language and 
argument.  What Rorty is grasping, correctly, is that citing Lev 18:22 in the way it’s 
commonly used, is not an argument.  It’s a different speech act, such as a threat.  To 
369 See Jeffrey Stout, “How Charity Transcends the Culture Wars: Eugene Rogers and Others on Same-Sex 
Marriage,” Journal of Religious Ethics, 31.2 (2003): 169 – 180. 
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threaten homosexuals with stoning or hellfire should be disallowed in civil political 
discourse.  Politicians and moral philosophers are right to dismiss it.  Sustaining this 
position logically, however, requires a more robust Habermasian view of the objectivity 
achieved by language.  Therefore, I think Rorty is inconsistent in saying that ideological 
conflicts have nothing more to do with rationality than the struggle between Irish 
Catholics and Protestants.  If that is the case, we lack any clear solution to achieving a 
workable consensus on contentious issues.  On Rorty’s view, so far as I can discern, there 
is no discursive point to translation.  The conversation might be elevated, but it’s not 
clear it will move forward in pragmatically relevant ways. 
Although I find Habermas’s translation requirement too stringent, there is a 
discursive point to it: interlocutors are supposed to agree to the secularized statements for 
rationally compelling reasons.  Like the pragmatists, however, I am skeptical that such an 
achieved consensus can be reached.  Moreover, translation as Habermas understands it 
lacks utility once certain pragmatic assumptions are made, i.e. anti-foundationalism.  For 
this reason, I think Rorty is inconsistent in expecting translation from his religious 
interlocutors in the absence of any principle that would establish secular language as 
rationally normative.  Habermas is at least consistent, but I think Rorty is right in 
regarding any attempt to formulate such a principle as highly dubious.  But we still need 
a discursive avenue to keep the conversation going, and if neither of our protagonists can 
offer a pragmatically viable solution, where else should we look?  We have already 
looked at Stout’s correctives to Rorty.  I would like now to turn to his differences with 
Habermas before considering his more positive suggestions for fruitful dialogue between 
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religious and secular interlocutors in a democracy.  We will then consider some criticisms 
of Stout’s approach. 
Immanent Critique and Translation
On the matter of translation, Stout does not engage Habermas directly, but from what he 
does say, we can glean some information about the differences and convergences of their 
respective approaches.  Stout draws attention to differences between the two over the 
‘secularization thesis’. Habermas’s disciple, Seyla Benhabib, criticizes Stout for not 
grounding his account of secularization in a social theory like Habermas’s.370  Stout, 
however, is suspicious of Habermas’s assumptions, via Weber, about the effects of 
rationalization on religious worldviews.371  Stout’s conception of secularization is much 
more modest: “What becomes secularized, according to my model, is a set of discursive 
presuppositions, not necessarily the worldview or state of consciousness of participants in 
the relevant form of discourse.”372 
Given my research, these comments apply more readily to Habermas’s early 
articulation of secularization.  Now that he has distanced himself from the most ambitious 
elements of Weber’s social theory, he might also be persuaded to accept that what has 
been secularized are the ‘discursive presuppositions’ of democratic societies.  However, 
the two thinkers would place different normative weight on that phrase.  For Stout, a 
pragmatist, discursive presuppositions are secularized because it does not often advance 
one’s rhetorical purposes to appeal to particular theological presuppositions.  But 
370 See Seyla Benhabib, Situating the Self: Gender, Community, and Postmodernism in Contemporary 
Ethics (New York: Routledge, 1992), 147. Cited in Stout, Democracy and Tradition, 175. 
371 Stout, Democracy and Tradition, 175. 
372 Stout, 175. 
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sometimes it does.  As he says in response to Rorty’s claim that religion is ‘essentially’ a 
conversation-stopper, “I would have thought the pragmatist line should be that religion is 
not essentially anything, that the conversational utility of employing religious premises in 
political arguments depends on the situation.”373  So our secular discursive 
presuppositions are normative in a dialectical, Hegelian sense that is open, as we saw 
before, to novel expressions.  By contrast, for Habermas, the secularity of our discursive 
presuppositions is normative in the Kantian sense, that is to say, their normativity comes 
from their being ‘transcendental’ or “already being presupposed by anyone who wishes to 
offer reasons to other people.”374  For this reason, translation, for Habermas, is incumbent 
on any rational party to the discussion.  Stout implicitly rejects translation in favor of 
immanent critique, because he rejects the Kantian assumptions that undergird it.  
Notwithstanding these philosophical differences, which are significant, I want to explore 
the potential for practical convergence between the two thinkers.  
I want to look now in greater depth at Stout’s avenue of immanent critique – the 
method of reasoning with one’s interlocutors from premises they might find convincing, 
thereby taking seriously their distinctive point of view375 – and consider whether this 
option is all Habermas really needs in order to overcome some of the tensions of 
translation.  It is also worth raising the question, as we did in regard to translation, 
whether immanent criticism is easier for some people than others.  For example, can a 
secularist engage in immanent criticism without insincerity?  Stout seems to think that 
one can, but there are serious questions to be raised here.  As Kuipers points out:
373 Stout, 86, italics in original. 
374 Stout, 175. 
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In putting forward his argument for the importance and efficacy of immanent 
criticism, however, Stout appears to ignore one of its most important implications. 
This implication has to do with the fact that, in order to work at all, immanent 
criticism must affirm more than it questions. That is, in questioning one aspect of 
a traditional perspective by appealing to others, the immanent critic must affirm a 
significant portion of the traditional source of meaning that motivates the 
interlocutor’s problematic stand.376
He goes on to observe that Stout does precisely this in response to the new traditionalists’ 
rejection of secular liberalism.  Stout’s understanding of the Christian tradition allows 
him to deftly draw out implications within Christianity that are friendly to his own liberal 
views.  There are two problematic entailments here from a Habermasian perspective: 
first, accommodating traditionalism to the extent that Stout does, rather than offering 
critique, gives his interlocutors no reason to question their assumptions; second, it invites 
the charge of manipulation through rhetoric since Stout ultimately rejects the views he 
adopts for the purposes of immanent critique.  Despite these hypothetical Habermasian 
criticisms, what Stout is proposing is, in many respects, the mirror image of what 
Habermas expects religious citizens to do via translation.  We will have occasion to 
return to this point, but I want to further press the question of whether Stout can 
authentically affirm more than he questions in religious points of view without being 
manipulative. 
The suspicion that immanent critique is just another rhetorical trick is voiced by 
even a sympathetic commentator like Kuipers.  Although he thinks Stout genuinely 
appreciates the insights of the Christian tradition he no longer accepts, one is still tempted 
to think that Stout either does not fully reject them or that his secularism is in some sense 
376 Ronald A. Kuipers, “Stout’s Democracy without Secularism: But is it a Tradition?” Contemporary 
Pragmatism, 3.1 (June, 2006): 94. 
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parasitic on them.  Through a detailed account of Stout’s migration from Christianity to 
‘Emersonian perfectionism’, Kuipers situates him as an “alienated theologian”377 or a 
“post-institutional Christian who pushes at its boundaries harder than most, but who does 
so with a desire to ensure that its best insights are not lost to the suffocation of dogmatic 
habituation.”378  From what Stout says about his religious odyssey and his persistent 
interest in religious ethics, I would concur that he is in a good position to engage the 
Christian tradition in a way that takes it seriously, while questioning the worst of its 
“dogmatic habituation.”  In his published work, for example, Stout is willing to go quite a 
long way with those he calls the new traditionalists, much further than most secular 
liberals would be willing to travel.  But although Stout may be in a position to engage in 
immanent critique authentically, it does not follow that everyone who engages in public 
discussion is so well situated.  As we saw with respect to translation, not all citizens may 
be equally equipped to engage in it.  
This applies also to intellectuals.  For example, could Habermas, as an atheist, 
engage in immanent critique legitimately?  Or does doing so apply only to those who find 
religious rationales genuinely compelling?  Despite Habermas’s appeal to the semantic 
potential of religious language, is immanent criticism really a live option for him?  Or 
does the semantic potential only become actual when it is translated into a secular idiom? 
Habermas, as we have seen, implicitly rejects immanent criticism for philosophical (and 
perhaps practical?) reasons and opts instead for translation of religious semantic potential 
into a universal secular language.  For him, translation, even at the informal level, is a 
377 Kuipers, 95. 
378 Kuipers, 97.
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one-way street.  Immanent criticism attempts to make it a two-way street, not because of 
any obligation on the part of secular citizens to translate their arguments, but for reasons 
of facilitating ‘abnormal conversations’ at precisely those points where we have reached 
an impasse due to differences in worldviews.  Thus the Habermasian objections to 
immanent criticism, namely that it fails to properly critique the tradition it engages and 
that it risks insincerity apply equally to the burden of translation adopted by religious 
persons.  The Habermasian fails, in my judgment, to consider that traditional perspectives 
might offer a critique of secularism that might have force for secular interlocutors.  And 
clearly, religious persons, although capable of translation, are not going to see secular 
reasons as rationally binding for them in the same sense a secularist would.  So unless 
something like Audi’s principle of motivational and epistemological sufficiency can be 
met – and we have seen reasons to doubt that it can – then the religious citizen runs the 
risk of rhetorical manipulation when offering translations.  The advantage that immanent 
criticism has over translation, as Stout construes it, is that it is a thoroughly pragmatic 
enterprise that does not appeal to an epistemic ‘transcendental’ high ground on which we 
must all be expected to agree.  
In my judgment, Habermas implicitly rejects immanent critique as a live option 
because he subscribes to a subtraction story of secularization.  For him, religious people, 
in order to participate in the secular language game, merely have to drop their particular 
‘discursive presuppositions’, whereas secularists would have to strain to affirm 
theological presuppositions they would otherwise reject.  Stout overcomes this problem 
with both his more modest model of secularization (towards which Habermas is now 
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moving) and his thick conception of democracy as a tradition embodying a number of 
substantive virtues rather than simply being a set of formal rules of engagement for 
persons of differing worldviews.  Whether democracy, as a tradition, is as thick a concept 
as Stout claims is an open question, but one need not accept his claim to pose the 
following question: In order to appreciate the semantic potential of religious points of 
view, does not Habermas have to be willing to travel as far as Stout with the 
presuppositions of his religious interlocutor?  To put this question differently, is 
Habermas unable to affirm in religious worldviews more than he questions rendering him 
incapable of feeling the force of the semantic potential of religious discourse despite his 
efforts to do so, or is it simply the case that he, as a secularist, is in a bad position to 
articulate these semantic potentials and incapable of engaging in immanent criticism?  
Of course, it is difficult to separate these questions in practice.  There may be 
those who simply cannot appreciate religious insights because they find the religious 
worldviews that house them to be inherently implausible or the institutions that promote 
them to be odious.  Some secularists simply lack the background in religious ways of 
thinking to make effective immanent critics.  But Habermas is not excused that easily, 
since he thinks secularists should aid translation and that democratic discussion at its best 
is arduous.  It is perhaps true that Habermas lacks the acculturation that makes Stout so 
adept at immanent criticism, although the former has dialogued with many of Europe’s 
most influential theologians over the course of his career.379  More important than his 
ability to articulate religious insights (which is considerable as we saw in relation to his 
379 See Jürgen Habermas and Joseph Ratzinger, The Dialectics of Secularization: On Reason and Religion, 
ed. Florian Schuller and trans. Brian McNeil, C.R.V. (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2006). 
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comments on biotechnology) is the priority he gives to critique – which in his social 
theory is the fundamental engine of democratic discourse and the solvent of various 
forms of oppression – at the expense of tradition.  This difference is evident in his 
exchange with Gadamer, to which I briefly alluded at the beginning of this chapter, but it 
is relevant in discussing the differences between him and Stout.  In other words, 
Habermas is unable, primarily for a priori philosophical reasons, to affirm more than he 
questions in whatever tradition he engages, whereas Stout, despite placing a high value 
on democratic questioning, does seem able to affirm enough of his religious 
interlocutor’s position to provide some discursive potential.  One is tempted to speculate 
that Habermas would not regard Stout’s immanent critique as authentic critique.  And to 
be sure, ‘critique’ will have different resonances for the pragmatist, especially in 
America, than it will for the critical theorist in largely post-Christian Europe.  Moreover, 
the utility of corrosive, as opposed to more sympathetic, criticism will vary from context 
to context.  What Stout has attempted to do, whether successfully or not, is to affirm the 
importance of critique while retaining the substantive contributions of tradition. 
He does so by treating democratic questioning itself as a substantive tradition. 
Again, this claim is open to question.  No doubt Stout has a narrative to tell about 
democracy, particularly in America, which, in his estimation, draws much of its 
intellectual and even spiritual content from Emerson, Thoreau, Whitman, and Dewey.  In 
his view, this inheritance is enough to constitute a tradition.  However, Kuipers, who is 
generally sympathetic to Stout, thinks that he fails to make the case.  He says, “While I 
agree with Stout that the practice of democratic questioning can be a valuable tool in 
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preventing such [traditionalist] enervation and ensuring the contemporary relevance of 
living traditions, this is not the same as saying that such a practice by itself characterizes 
the content of an independent tradition, or that it describes a tradition at all.”380  He goes 
on to quote a reviewer of Stout’s book who claims one can only consider democratic 
questioning a tradition if one makes the assumption that “a practice that recognizes no 
authority or mediation, and in which self-formation relies entirely on ‘employing one’s 
own standards of worth’ is properly called a tradition.”381  If these critics are right, and 
Stout’s narrative fails, it would seem that we are left with only a formal commitment to 
democratic questioning which looks very much like Habermas’s and the standard liberal 
model’s. 
But I may have overstated the stakes.  Perhaps even if Stout cannot convince us 
that democracy is yet another tradition, his strategy of immanent critique might well have 
utility in democratic debate.  I am inclined to think that is the case.  After all, Stout tells 
us that he resists embedding his pragmatic recommendations in a robust social theory or 
account of secularization.  Despite the tensions between this minimalism on the one hand, 
and the claim that democracy itself is a substantive tradition on the other, we are free to 
accept or reject his account of democracy’s content while still finding the practice of 
immanent critique quite useful.  Then it becomes less a theoretical matter and more a 
matter of developing certain skills, such as learning about traditions different from one’s 
own and developing a reflexivity about one’s own epistemic stance and finally being able 
380 Kuipers, 97.
381 Quoted in Kuipers, 97.
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to articulate religious perspectives in a manner that adherents could plausibly recognize 
as their own.  
But even Stout, who is more sympathetic to religion in public life than most 
secular philosophers, is ambiguous regarding the long-term utility of stating political 
virtues in the language of the monotheistic traditions.  Although he rejects robust versions 
of the secularization thesis, he seems to want to find a language – perhaps “Emersonian 
perfectionism” – that differs from, and may eventually replace, monotheism as a 
‘spiritual option’ to borrow Taylor’s phrase.  As much as Stout extols, for example, 
King’s contribution to American political discourse and admires the power of the 
language in which he framed it, Stout remains ambivalent.  For example, speaking of 
both Jesus and King as “persons of ethical interest,” Stout says: “Nowadays things have 
become more complicated, because I have learned more about these figures of virtue than 
their hagiographers and publicists wanted me to know.  Now that I am less innocent of 
the complexities, I am no less moved by love and justice, no less cognizant of the place 
of such traits in a virtuous character, and no less able to put these concepts to work 
discursively than I used to be.”382  In this passage, we hear Stout’s commitment to 
immanent critique.  However, now that he has lost his adolescent faith, exemplifying 
such virtues as love and justice “requires a different, less doctrinal, more improvisational 
kind of explication.”383  Although no explicit contradiction exists between this statement 
and the practical project of immanent critique, his statements leave open the possibility 
that this less doctrinal, more improvisational explication of virtue might be better 
382 Stout, 173. 
383 Stout, 173. 
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accomplished using a different language than that of, say, Christianity.  It might be the 
case for Stout, as for Rorty, that “the social ideals that we secular humanists champion 
are often cast in religious terms.  But we hope that they will eventually cease to be so 
stated.”384 
This suggestion that monotheism may not be the best vehicle for what Stout wants 
to say about virtue in public life comes up in an insightful interview by Kuipers.385  When 
asked to explain “Emersonian perfectionism” Stout conveys that it ties together various 
strands of religious thought, some of which Christians declare heretical, such as the 
rejection of original sin.  For this reason, Stout says, “It is easy to see why 
Emersonianism, despite the strongly religious content of its principal themes, rapidly 
moved outside the churches and in that sense became secular.”386  Nevertheless, he wants 
to preserve the notion of sacred value and thinks that religion can help protect it.  
Stout’s notion of the sacred is very close to that of the ‘sublime.’  He says, “Piety 
toward nature, because it perfects and expresses a sense of dependence, mainly connects 
with the sublime, which, as Edmund Burke pointed out, is deeply related to danger and 
precariousness.  It’s horrendous to respond to the intrinsic beauty, sublimity, and 
wondrousness of nature by spoiling it or reducing it to something that has merely 
instrumental value for us.  This has more to do with the sacred than with piety per se.”387 
Here Stout taps into a tradition that Taylor discusses as a move toward secularization.388 
384 Rorty, 142. 
385 Ronald A. Kuipers, “Excellence and the Emersonian Perfectionist: An Interview with Jeffrey Stout, part 
1,” http://www.theotherjournal.com/article.php?id=864.
386 Kuipers.
387 Kuipers. 
388 Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2007), 322 - 51.
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The concept of the ‘sublime’ arguably emerges from the seventeenth century 
attempts on the part of religious believers to combat deism.  As the post-Newtonian 
universe revealed its secrets, apologists crafted arguments that stressed the providential 
design of God.  Design, as such, was not necessarily disputed; the deists lauded the 
Creator’s technical prowess, but they questioned the details of the biblical account and 
the notion that nature is contrived exclusively for human benefit.  Against the 
anthropocentrism of apologists who insisted on a world specially crafted for humanity, 
some thinkers broke the mould, arguing that the awe-inspiring and genuinely dangerous 
power of nature served another purpose.  One such thinker was Thomas Burnet, 
mentioned briefly in the second chapter.  In agreement with the deists with respect to 
nature’s indifference to human comfort, he nevertheless believed that he could salvage 
the biblical account.  He interpreted the world that science had uncovered as a ruinous 
creation punctuated by divine judgments, the latest of which was the Genesis flood.  
Nevertheless, even such a ruinous creation can arouse in us appropriate religious feeling:
The greatest objects of Nature, are methinks, the most pleasing to behold … there 
is nothing that I look upon with more pleasure that the wide Sea and the 
Mountains of the Earth.  There is something august and stately in the Air of these 
things, that inspires the mind with great thoughts and passions; We do naturally, 
upon such occasions, think of God and his greatness; and whatsoever hath but a 
shadow and appearance of INFINITE, as all great things have that are too big for 
our comprehension, they fill and overbear the mind with their Excess, and cast it 
into a pleasing kind of stupor and admiration.389
Without using the word, Burnet is preparing the way for the sublime as a major aesthetic 
category of the eighteenth century.  Kant’s reflections on the sublimity of nature and also 
the religious feeling it occasions are prefigured here.  The fear characteristic of a 
389 Quoted in Taylor, 334. 
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mythological age is transcribed into an aesthetic key in a disenchanted world.  The fear 
evoked by nature is now aesthetically pleasing.  Joseph Addison, for example, remarks of 
the Alps that they “fill the mind with an agreeable kind of horror.”390  I mention these 
historical precedents because it is instructive to note in this connection that Burnet 
prototypically suggests at least two quintessentially modern themes: ‘the sublime’ and 
‘the state of nature’. In this respect, Kant’s parallel between our antagonism toward 
nature and the antagonism that exists among free persons in the state is not accidental.  
However, in the former case we are reminded of our limitations by nature’s raw power 
whereas in the latter, we are kept in our place by the authority of positive law.  Stout 
draws together the connection between the sacred/sublime and politics when he 
comments, “The concepts of the horrendous and the sacred are linked.  Something is 
sacred if it is worthy of reverence. We express reverence positively in certain forms of 
celebration and express it negatively in certain forms of protection or prohibition. 
Anything the violation or destruction of which would be horrendous is sacred.”391  Here 
the notion of the sacred, of which the sublime is a secularized version, is connected not 
only with the ‘horrendousness’ of nature but also protection and prohibition, presumably 
enforced by the state.  
In this regard, Stout’s reference to Burke is telling, since he is perhaps the first to 
articulate an explicit connection between the sublime and the political order.  Burke holds 
that terror and pain, below the appropriate threshold and at a distance, can invoke in us 
feelings of awe and respect.  Through such feelings of appropriate dread we experience a 
390 Quoted in Taylor, 337.
391 Kuipers. 
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delight that cannot be found in mere pleasure.  According to Burke, we should experience 
similar healthy dread in the face of political power.  Like other British moral theorists, 
Burke attaches great significance to the passions and quite naturally makes the transition 
from the sensations that produce feelings of the sublime to those that produce appropriate 
respect for authority.  Stout would likely repudiate Burke’s appeal to the sublime as 
justifying a hierarchical social order, but he does suggest a connection between the 
sublime and the sacred, the value of which should be upheld politically: “One reason for 
holding onto the notion of sacred value nowadays is that advanced capitalism tends to 
reduce everything, including the natural environment and human beings, to objects of 
merely instrumental value.  Religious, democratic, and artistic practices, at their best, 
help us counter that tendency.  Virtuous religion perfects our disposition to celebrate and 
protect sacred value.”392 
Although Stout speaks of religion as playing a role, his notion of the sacred, if the 
above analysis is correct, is already secularized.  This analysis is further reinforced a little 
further along.  When reflecting on whether there is an appropriate object of reverence that 
is not natural or social, perhaps God, Stout reveals: “My worry about monotheism is that 
it appears to conflate ideals and powers.  The monotheistic assumption is that there must 
be one object that can serve as the ultimate reference point for all of the positive religious 
attitudes.”393  Stout does not believe in God, but wants to create a space for sacred value. 
But this leads to my speculation above that perhaps, for him, a language other than that of 
monotheism would be better suited to this task.  I see Stout as pursuing one of the 
392 Kuipers.
393 Kuipers.
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proliferations of spiritual options available in ‘a secular age’.  He continues: “Maybe this 
is what people are trying to say when they respond to pollsters by saying they are 
spiritual but not religious.  They sense that some things are worthy of reverence, that 
some things are worthy of awe, and that some things are worthy of piety, but organized 
religion tends to come with big, unifying pictures that are hard to believe.”394 
Stout regards these big, unifying pictures as “ossified poetry.”395  The tendency 
toward ossification is inherent in all cultural formations, but especially evident in religion 
with its scriptures and creedal formulations.  Stout delineates the disadvantages of 
ossification: “Influential scriptures and traditions present horrors as divinely authorized.  
They promulgate taboos and conceptions of the sacred that made sense only in the 
context of patriarchal tribes struggling for survival in an ancient war of all against all. 
They drape a sacred canopy over myriad forms of domination.  They promote cruelty. 
Ossification tends to freeze all of the bad stuff, as well as the good stuff, in place.”396 
However, this rejection of ossified poetry does not necessarily lead to a rejection of 
sacred value.  Quite the contrary: “I think of myself as someone whose life is centered in 
trying to respond appropriately to sacred value and to horrendous assaults on it.  I 
consider my vocation to ascend into excellence and to help others do the same.  You 
decide whether that makes me religious.” 397
Ironically, Kuipers had already done so in an article on Stout’s pragmatic 
approach to religion in public:
394 Kuipers.
395 Stout, Democracy and Tradition, 41. 
396 Kuipers.
397 Kuipers.
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[N]o one can doubt that modern democratic questioning has had a profound effect 
on the current shape of religious traditions, including the increased freedom and 
discursive responsibility their adherents have come to enjoy. Stout considers both 
himself and the rest of us to be beneficiaries of this shift, which he credits for 
allowing him personally to carry forward important religious values while at the 
same time jettisoning soul-insulting lies. From the other side, Stout’s ability to 
engage in effective immanent criticism of the Christian tradition shows him to be 
less alienated from its store of meanings than he perhaps considers himself to be, 
as he deftly puts these to work in criticizing what he thinks are some distortions of 
Christianity in the views of his religious opponents.398
In regard to the question of whether or not Stout is religious, Kuipers offers the 
following:
In light of the foregoing, one is tempted to characterize Stout not as a secular 
democrat, but as a post-institutional Christian who pushes at its boundaries harder 
than most, but who does so with a desire to ensure that its best insights are not lost 
to the suffocation of dogmatic habituation. Even if this characterization of Stout 
(or am I implicitly using a too-loose definition of Christianity?) goes too far, 
Christians and members of other traditions can still be grateful to him for 
providing them with a valuable service in mounting a persuasive argument for the 
responsibility of members of different religious traditions to habituate themselves 
more democratically so as to avoid the enervation that results when a tradition 
succumbs to dogmatic stasis.399
In addition, Stout’s contribution, whether it is ‘religious’ or not, avoids Rorty’s 
assumption that religious discourse cannot be publicly accessible in the way secular 
discourse can.  Thinking of the religious and secular as absolutes instead of shifting poles 
on a continuum of public accessibility or utility is something that Stout’s analysis helps 
us to overcome.  Thus, Stout’s account of the discursive power of religion, despite his 
own unbelief, shows that religion is not essentially a conversation-stopper.  I have self-
consciously focused on religious argumentation, but a case could be made, and Stout 
implies, that perhaps broader rhetorical means could also be employed, provided that the 
398 Kuipers, “Stout’s Democracy without Secularism: But is it a Tradition?” 97. 
399 Kuipers, 97. 
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interlocutors remain willing to engage in democratic questioning, offering fresh 
perspectives that articulate to a wider polity what many of us, whether secular or 
religious, mean by ‘sacred value.’
To summarize, in this chapter I have argued that nothing in the tradition of 
American pragmatism disqualifies religious contributions to public debate. We have seen 
that Rorty’s charge that religion is a conversation-stopper only applies to faith-claims that 
rest uncritically on authority. But such claims do not exhaust religious contributions to 
public discourse. We have also seen that Rorty has reconsidered his initial sentiments 
toward religion in public. He now recognizes that the “Jeffersonian compromise” he once 
defended is untenable. He offers no principle whereby religion should be excluded from 
the public sphere and has dropped reference to Rawls and Habermas as model 
epistemologists on this matter. However, he believes that custom and habit should 
prohibit certain appeals to religion when discussing issues such as gay rights. He still 
wants to press religious citizens to find another way of expressing their arguments, a 
secular way. I have argued that such a call for translation, in the absence of any robust 
notion of rationality, has little discursive point and is, ironically, not the most pragmatic 
tack to pursue. I then argued, with caveat, that Stout’s approach of immanent critique is 
the more promising discursive avenue for the kinds of ‘abnormal conversations’ that we 
are bound to have in a pluralistic democracy. I also think it represents an improvement 
over Habermas’s translation requirement. I therefore conclude that pragmatism can be an 
ally of the thesis that religious citizens should be able to contribute to public debate in the 
language of their tradition. 
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In the final chapter, I will explore ways in which religious language may still be 
publicly permissible and even useful. As mentioned, Habermas is sensitive to the ways in 
which the monopoly of scientific expert cultures has the potential to erode our self-
understanding as autonomous agents. New research in biogenetics and neurology have 
given renewed impetus to the old philosophical debate over freedom and determinism by 
offering empirical evidence with which philosophers must grapple. This issue, among 
others generated by pushing the frontiers of biotechnology, leads Habermas to recognize 
that naturalistic challenges to our self-understanding threaten not only religious 
worldviews, but also the traditional bases of our political and legal frameworks in the 
West. Again, Habermas has hinted that we may need to salvage the semantic potential of 
religious language to meet these challenges, particularly to human autonomy.
Although Habermas stops short of ascribing transcendence to humanity – perhaps 
due to its ‘otherworldly’ connotations – I argue that his political vision can be read as 
anticipating transcendence of a kind. In order to elucidate this point, however, it will be 
necessary to examine what ‘transcendence’ might mean under the conditions of 
secularization. Again, I will draw upon Taylor’s analysis of the phenomenology of 
secularization as well as the insights of Jürgen Moltmann. Through an articulation of 
transcendence for the modern age, I shall endeavor to create a space in which religion can 
be seen as providing a redemptive critique of our current political organization in much 
the same way that Habermas sees the ideal speech situation as the end of our antagonistic 
politics and the beginning of intersubjective agreement. I will argue that Habermas, in the 
tradition of his predecessors in critical theory, has offered a secular eschatology that can 
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be usefully described as redemptive and ‘transcendent’. If this is a worthy goal of secular 
political theory, then I suggest it is also a legitimate goal for religious citizens to pursue. 
This interpretation allows us to imagine a positive role for religious engagement, rather 
than the dogmatic role against which Habermas cautions. If I am successful, Habermas 
should have no objection to religious citizens engaging in such redemptive critique in 
political contexts. 
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Chapter 5
Freedom and Future Transcendence: Beyond  Kulturkampf to 
Redemptive Critique
In this final chapter, I will attempt to extend the argument of the preceding chapters to the 
effect that Habermas, despite his concern with procedural matters, makes many 
substantive assumptions of his own. For example, Habermas’s political philosophy 
depends upon the assumption that persons are autonomous, rational agents. However, he 
is also acutely aware that the reigning materialistic paradigm, with its deterministic 
picture of the world, undermines the political notion of responsible agency. Thus, 
Habermas is concerned to reconcile the modern, scientific image of the person with the 
phenomenological experience of ourselves as rational agents, an experience upon which 
liberal political theory is based. In order to do so, Habermas opts for a non-reductive 
naturalism. However, the reconciliation he seeks remains promissory. As such, I argue 
that his commitment to autonomy functions for him as a substantive rather than 
procedural commitment—arguably a fiduciary commitment.
However, Habermas is reticent to say more about his substantive commitments 
because he is wary of encroaching upon metaphysics. Attempts to explain aspects of the 
human person, such as freedom, over and against the materialist  view run the risk of 
becoming  metaphysically  overdetermined.  Nonetheless,  some,  like  William J.  Meyer, 
argue that Habermas cannot consistently avoid metaphysics; the post-metaphysical stance 
is  untenable.  Moreover,  Meyer’s  position  entails  that  religion  cannot  be  post-
metaphysical in the way Habermas thinks it must in the modern world. After surveying 
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these arguments, however, I conclude that stressing ‘metaphysics’ plays into the hands of 
the subtraction story. I argue that conceiving of religion metaphysically, i.e. in terms of 
beliefs about what lies beyond the immanent frame, allows one to exclude religion from 
the public sphere. On this view, the presence of religion in the public sphere is seen as the 
presence  of  idiosyncratic  beliefs  rather  than  the  presence  of  religious  citizens  whose 
participation and arguments have value. 
Nevertheless, it is true that Western religions represent an ‘open’ interpretation of 
the immanent frame; religion is open to the transcendent in a way that secularism is not. 
However, is it possible to conceive of transcendence without the metaphysical 
overdetermination about which Habermas cautions? In hopes of answering this question, 
I follow Taylor in sketching a phenomenological account of the experience of 
transcendence under the conditions of secularization. Several interesting features emerge. 
Far from overdetermination, transcendence is expressed by moderns in terms of 
‘ontological indeterminacy’. There is a sense in which human beings experience certain 
‘boundary conditions’, but the immanence of the modern worldview makes it more 
difficult to interpret these along dogmatic religious lines. Instead, they are interpreted 
using a ‘subtler language’ that communicates the feeling of the transcendence in 
ontologically indeterminate ways. I believe that Habermas is gesturing toward this 
account in his talk of the semantic power still latent within religious language. I also 
suggest a way in which Habermas’s own political philosophy can be interpreted as 
looking forward to a future ‘transcendence’ in which the ideal speech situation breaks 
into our immanent antagonistic politics and thereby offers redemption of a sort. Perhaps 
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this is analogous to the kind of redemptive critique of modernity that religion might 
provide. If so, there is a role for religious language quite unlike the dogmatic habituation 
that Habermas criticizes.
Finally,  I make some practical suggestions about how religion might play this 
different  role in the future and how politics might remain open to insights from this 
quarter. I reiterate my point that one can maintain that which is distinctive about modern 
liberalism without adopting ideological secularism. The formal secularity of the political 
sphere is  a  valuable  aspect  of  liberalism.  However,  it  can  be affirmed without  naive 
secularism  on  the  part  of  citizens.  In  confronting  the  challenges  of  globalization,  I 
suggest that the global citizen should not be naively secular. Rather the global citizen 
must understand religious points of view and stand ready to engage in translation and 
immanent critique as needed. 
Soft Naturalism and Substantive Commitments 
Throughout the preceding argument, I have endeavored to demonstrate that the allegedly 
procedural  secular  assumptions  upon  which  Habermas  thinks  we  must  base  public 
arguments entail substantive commitments and thus a thicker conception of the world and 
our place in it than he is prepared to admit.  Therefore, it becomes arbitrary to disallow 
appeals to religious premises on the basis of their substantive commitments.  However, 
this  argument  can be  pressed further.   It  may be the  case,  as  Habermas  claims,  that 
secularism entails  fewer,  or  minimal,  assumptions  about  humanity  and the  world  by 
comparison with religious  worldviews, although I  would not necessarily concede this 
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point.  It may be the case also that the reductionism implied by a secular outlook is more 
easily justifiable, although I would not concede that either.  It may even be the case that – 
and I do not concede this for a moment – that secularism is simply a matter of subtraction 
of certain metaphysical beliefs, a process of negation rather than affirmation.  If these 
dubious theses turn out to be true, it does not follow that secularism, generalized as a 
worldview, can sustain our self-understanding as rational,  autonomous agents. In fact, 
Habermas is increasingly recognizing the conflict between a totalizing secularist outlook 
and the substantive, rather than merely procedural, claims about the human subject he 
must  espouse in  order to speak meaningfully about  rational  agency.   In other  words, 
secularism,  in  some of  its  manifestations,  may indeed be  thinner  than  some or  most 
religious outlooks, but such reductionism erodes much more than religious beliefs; it also 
undermines the political  and legal culture of modernity.   The image of the self as an 
autonomous, rational agent which has functioned so pivotally in political theory since the 
seventeenth  century  is,  I  would  argue,  a  substantive  assumption  about  humanity,  not 
merely a procedural one.  To be sure, reconciling our everyday self-understanding with a 
scientific  understanding  of  ourselves  as  subject  to  mechanistic  laws  has  been  a 
preoccupation  of  modern  philosophy,  but  Habermas  remains  optimistic  that  such 
reconciliation  can be  accomplished;  he does  not  for  a  moment  suggest  that  our  self-
understanding is  simply a political  fiction.   Rather  he thinks that it  belongs to a true 
picture of the world.  Insofar as it does, it functions for him as a substantive assumption, a 
part of his philosophical anthropology and not merely a methodological consideration. 
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I  have  frequently  referenced  Habermas’s  reservations  about  the  over-
generalization  of  a  secular  worldview  in  the  direction  of  a  scientism  that  robs  the 
individual of any real agency.  Here is yet another example of his misgivings:
In our everyday dealings, we focus on others whom we address as a second 
person …. The awareness of authorship implying accountability is the core of our 
self-understanding, disclosed only to the perspective of a participant, but eluding 
revisionary scientific description.  The scientistic belief in a science which will 
one day not only supplement, but replace the self-understanding of actors as 
persons by an objectivating self-description is not science, but bad philosophy. No 
science will relieve common sense, even if scientifically informed, of the task of 
forming a judgment, for instance, on how we should deal with prepersonal human 
life under descriptions of molecular biology that make genetic interventions 
possible.400
I take it as uncontroversial that Habermas views with suspicion any reductionist 
metaphysics and to this extent makes substantive assumptions of his own that may be 
secular but nevertheless fall under the rubric of an ‘addition story’ –  hence his efforts to 
articulate a position “between naturalism and religion.”  However, my point is that 
substantive issues inform and underlie any procedural consensus we can achieve.  Insofar 
as we can make progress here pragmatically, we do so because most parties to the 
discussion have not adopted the subtraction story to its logical extent.  But such voices do 
exist, which makes a defense of our substantive, normative self-understanding necessary.  
Habermas has recently realized this and has tried to elucidate a non-reductionist 
naturalism that preserves human autonomy. 
In an essay called “Freedom and Determinism” he advocates what he calls 
“nonscientistic or ‘soft’ naturalism.”401  By this he means a naturalism that does not 
400 Jürgen Habermas, “Faith and Knowledge,” in The Frankfurt School on Religion: Key Writings by the 
Major Thinkers, ed. Eduardo Mendieta (Routledge, 2004), 331 - 32.
401 Jürgen Habermas, "Freedom and Determinism," in Between Naturalism and Religion: Philosophical 
Essays (Polity, 2008), 151 - 80.
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simply reduce our thoughts and actions to neurophysiology, thereby making responsible 
agency an illusion.  Habermas wants to avoid the conclusion that our thinking and acting 
in the world can be explained entirely in terms of non-rational, causal factors, completely 
excluding the rational motivation upon which communicative action depends.  “In 
everyday life” he says, “we cannot avoid provisionally attributing responsible authorship 
for our actions to one another.”402  But he also realizes that scientific accounts of the 
world which describe phenomena in the language of scientific expert cultures often do 
clash with common sense.  Thus, the folk psychology by which we attribute responsible 
agency to each other may simply be another casualty of scientific progress. However, on 
the basis of the above block quote, Habermas is unwilling to accept this conclusion. 
Indeed, when he speaks of science never relieving common sense with respect to our first 
person experience, and when he further characterizes the sought-after idealized science 
that will provide third person descriptions of all mental phenomena as “not science, but 
bad philosophy,” he betrays a fiduciary commitment to human autonomy.  Therefore, it 
seems plausible to say that he has at least one substantive assumption upon which his 
philosophy depends.  In order to more fully defend this claim, I want to look more closely 
at how Habermas develops his critique of ‘hard’ materialism. 
If reductionist, materialistic accounts of human behavior are true, this would seem 
to leave no room for the kind of rational motivation Habermas defends as necessary for 
grounding justified action.  But he remains skeptical that such thoroughgoing materialism 
is a necessary assumption even for a methodological atheist like himself.  He asks, “But 
is determinism a scientifically founded thesis, or is it merely a component of a 
402 Habermas, 152.
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naturalistic worldview based on a speculative interpretation of scientific knowledge? I 
would like to continue the debate over freedom and determinism as a dispute concerning 
the right way to naturalize the mind.”403  Here he intimates that a metaphysically over-
determined naturalism is the wrong way to approach this debate.  He further states that 
“reality is not exhausted by the totality of scientific statements that count as true 
according to current empirical scientific standards.”404  Nevertheless, he does not think 
that the dualism that exists between our experienced self-awareness as agents and the 
data of empirical research should be ontologized into a dualism between mind and nature. 
He still seeks a naturalistic account of how these two aspects of our experience hold 
together.  In his view, the task is to reconcile what Kant has taught us about the 
transcendental conditions of knowledge, including freedom, and what Darwin has taught 
us about natural evolution.405 Although the details of Habermas’s strategy for 
accomplishing such reconciliation are beyond the scope of this chapter, I want to pursue 
his line of argument further for the purposes of showing that autonomy functions for him 
as a substantive rather than merely procedural assumption. 
He considers broadly compatibilist alternatives to the freedom and determinism 
polarity.  It is plausible to think of all decisions as conditioned, not necessarily by causes, 
but by reasons. “If an act of ‘free decision’ implies that the actor ‘binds’ her will ‘through 
reasons’, then the openness of the decision does not preclude its being rationally 
conditioned.”406 Although it remains difficult to explain how, upon a purely materialist 
view, reasons do not reduce to causes, a standard compatibilist response is available: the 
403 Habermas, 152.
404 Habermas, 153.
405 Habermas, 153.
406 Habermas, 156.
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opposite of ‘free’ is not ‘caused’ but ‘coerced’. We are free to the extent that our will is 
free from non-rational constraint. Such a response fits well with Habermas’s 
understanding of political freedom which is by no means libertarian, but rather 
‘epistemically demanding’. He summarizes:
The forceless force of the better argument that motivates us to take a “yes” or 
“no” position  must  be distinguished from the causal  constraint  of an imposed 
restriction that compels us to perform actions we do not want to perform: “If we 
experience a failure of agency, then it is because we fail to influence our will and 
doing  as  thinking  and  judging  subjects.  Freedom  in  this  sense  is  not  only 
compatible  with  conditionality  …;  it  requires  conditionality  and  would  be 
unthinkable without it.”407
These last lines quote Swiss philosopher Peter Bieri who further writes, “Reflection on 
the alternatives is on the whole an occurrence that will ultimately bind me and my history 
to a specific will …. I know that and it doesn’t bother me.”408  Habermas worries that 
such compatibilism collapses into determinism: “However, it would certainly bother me 
if my decision were determined by a neural event in which I was no longer involved as a 
person  who  takes  a  position;  for  then  it  would  no  longer  be  my decision.”409 
Furthermore,  he cautions:  “The correct  concept of conditioned freedom does not lend 
support to the overhasty ontological monism that declares reasons and causes are two 
aspects of a single phenomenon.”410  Therefore, just as dualism between mind and nature 
must not be ontologized, neither then should monism. However, the third way Habermas 
seeks remains elusive throughout the essay.411 
407 Habermas, 157.
408 Quoted in Habermas, 158.
409 Habermas, 158.
410 Habermas, 158.
411 Rorty, for example, does not see a problem here: “it is trivially the case that no phenomenal property can 
be a physical one. But why should this epistemic distinction reflect an ontological distinction?” Philosophy 
and the Mirror of Nature, Thirtieth Anniversary Edition (Princeton University Press, 2009), 29. 
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Habermas  wants  to  affirm  both  our  phenomenological  self-understanding  as 
autonomous,  rational  thinking,  judging,  and acting  agents  and also the  self-contained 
naturalistic picture of the world revealed by experimental science. These are, of course, 
difficult to hold in tension. However, it is not my purpose here to force Habermas to take 
a position on either the dualist or monist pole of the debate.  Nor do I seek to defend a 
metaphysically  over-determined  dualistic  view.   Although  such  a  perspective  has  its 
defenders, many of them motivated by religion, dualism between the mind, supposedly of 
like-substance with God, and the body, subject to mechanistic laws, is not necessary to a 
religious worldview.  Indeed, such a perspective tends to reinforce the rigid demarcation 
between  the  transcendent  and  the  ‘immanent  frame’  that  gives  rise  to  secularism. 
Therefore, I take Habermas seriously when he cautions against the over-determination of 
any particular metaphysical view.  But regardless of how post-metaphysical we are in our 
thinking, we run up against the limits of our procedural apparatus and must make some 
more  substantive  assumptions.   My  purpose  here  is  to  show  that  human  autonomy 
functions as such a substantive assumption for Habermas, even though he presently lacks 
a language that bridges the gap between the two language games of phenomenological 
awareness and empirical data.  In speaking about these respective language games, he 
maintains that we must, for the moment, hold both of them in tension, but he also betrays  
the limits of procedural assumptions and the longing for a more substantive grounding of 
his  intuitions:  “Granted  this  is  an  epistemic  dualism  [between  the  explanatory 
perspectives of subject and object] only in a methodological, not an ontological sense. 
However, it  is not yet  clear how it can be squared with a monistic conception of the 
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universe that would satisfy our need for a coherent picture of the world.”412 Nevertheless, 
he is quite candid that materialism poses serious problems for the defender of the efficacy 
of reasons, over physical causes, in motivating our action.  Therefore, his trust in our 
shared  experience  as  rational,  responsible  agents  who decide  and come to  consensus 
autonomously is presently based on a substantive, fiduciary commitment.  Again, here we 
run up against the limits of merely procedural assumptions and uncover the role that more 
substantive commitments play in the formation of our worldviews, whether religious or 
secular.  For Habermas, the explanatory dualism that we encounter “must not be conjured 
up out of transcendental thin air.  It must have emerged in the course of an evolutionary 
learning process …. On this assumption, the continuity of a natural history that we can 
conceive  at  least  on an analogy with Darwinian evolution,  though we cannot  form a 
theoretically satisfying concept of it, can ensure the unity of a universe to which human 
beings  belong  as  natural  creatures.”413  The  confidence  that  it  cannot  be  grounded 
transcendentally and that it must have emerged via an evolutionary process expresses a 
profoundly substantive,  rather  than merely procedural,  understanding of secularism as 
closed from any porously transcendent space; indeed such a buffered view of the world is 
bound  to  suffer  the  excesses  of  the  subtraction  story.   Of  course,  the  problem  for 
Habermas is that any appeal to transcendence is metaphysically over-determined.  While 
I  am  sympathetic  to  Habermas’s  postmetaphysical  stance,  it  is  worth  asking  at  this 
juncture whether it can be plausibly maintained.  Thus far, I have been operating in a 
postmetaphysical mode, choosing adjectives like ‘substantive,’ ‘heavy,’ ‘light,’ ‘thick,’ 
412 Habermas, 162.
413  Habermas, 166.
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and ‘thin’ to express what I take to be the latent fiduciary commitments embedded in 
both  religious  and  secular  worldviews.   However,  there  are  surely  those  who  think 
Habermas should drop his agnostic, postmetaphysical stance, and be more explicit about 
where his commitments lie. 
Is Postmetaphysical Thinking Untenable? 
One  writer  who  thinks  that  Habermas  is  forced  by  his  own  logic  to  abandon  his 
postmetaphysical  stance  is  William  J.  Meyer.414  He  does  a  good  job  summarizing 
Habermas’s early view on religion, namely that religious mythology and metaphysics are 
insufficiently reflexive on their own first principles.  They thus preserve a sacred core 
that is immune to rational criticism.  By contrast, the type of rationality that develops 
with modernity is free to criticize all foundational assumptions.  In Meyer’s words: “Put 
simply,  Habermas believes that modern communicative rationality,  unlike mythologies 
and metaphysical worldviews, enables one to examine validity claims free from dogmatic 
constraints.”415  In addition, “[b]ecause religious and metaphysical worldviews limited the 
claims  that  were subject  to  rational  criticism,  they served an ideological  function.”416 
Although Meyer acknowledges that Habermas has moved with respect to religion, his 
incredulity toward metaphysics  remains  intact.   I  would concur with this  assessment; 
regardless  of  how  much  room  Habermas  has  made  for  religion,  it  must  remain 
postmetaphysical.   Meyer  thinks  that  given  Habermas’s  movement  on  the  issue,  his 
postmetaphysical position has become untenable. 
414 William J. Meyer, “Private Faith or Public Religion? An Assessment of Habermas’s Changing View of 
Religion,” The Journal of Religion 75. 3 (1995): 371 – 391. 
415 Meyer, 373.
416 Meyer, 374. 
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As  we  have  discussed,  Habermas  has  acknowledged  that  religion  may  have 
semantic  contents  that,  at  least  presently,  resist  translation  into  the  language  of 
communicative rationality.  From passages like those we have already considered, Meyer 
draws the conclusion, “it is evident that Habermas now views religion more tolerably, if 
not favorably, insofar as it is able to provide resources to help human beings come to 
grips with the shattering experiences that crash in on the profane character of everyday 
life.  Religion, he suggests, in spite of its nonrational content, still offers something that 
eluded  the  differentiated  character  of  modern  communicative  reason  and  culture.”417 
Meyer interprets Habermas as claiming that religion is useful here in an existential sense, 
as a source of private meaning.  Such religious language does not rise to the level of 
making public, cognitive claims.  However, theological language tries to rise to this level 
by making a fourth kind of validity claim (in addition to science, morality and law, and 
art).  Habermas recognizes this, but insists that in the wake of the death of metaphysics 
such a validity claim cannot be fully realized.  Meyer summarizes: “Because metaphysics 
is dead, Habermas reasons, theology cannot publicly or rationally justify its truth claims 
and,  therefore,  should  stick  to  the  dogmatic  task  of  interpreting  and  explaining  the 
religious  experiences  and  practices  distinctive  to  its  own culturally  specific  form of 
life.”418  Arguably, Habermas has moved closer to a public role for religion in the fifteen 
years  since  Meyer  wrote  his  piece.   However,  in  his  judgment  one  cannot  uphold 
religion’s public role, i.e. its public validity claims, without metaphysics.  If Meyer is 
417 Meyer, 376. 
418 Meyer, 378.
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right, we must conclude that Habermas’s postmetphysical stance is still wrongheaded as 
it stands. 
According to Meyer, Habermas has two main objections to metaphysics: 1) since 
metaphysics makes claims about totality,  it  necessarily homogenizes the differentiated 
spheres achieved by modernity;  2) metaphysical  claims cannot  be rationally  justified. 
Meyer  argues  that  Habermas  is  mistaken on both counts.   On the  first  point,  Meyer 
claims:  “The  cognitive  claims  of  religion  and  metaphysics  can  speak  coherently  of 
totality inclusive of diversity (i.e. without collapsing differentiation) because the religious 
dimension or horizon emerges at the limits of our common human experience – as found 
in  everyday  life  and  in  the  various  cultural  spheres  (science,  morality  and  law,  and 
art).”419  When we reach the limits of these discourses, it is legitimate, argues Meyer, to 
invoke religious  or  metaphysical  accounts.   For  example,  he asks  us  to  consider  the 
question “Why be moral?” which is not a question that can be answered within the moral 
discourse  itself.   “[A]n answer  to  this  type  of  limit  question  must  come  from some 
underlying  evaluation  of  the  whole  of  reality  – some fundamental  affirmation  of  the 
worthwhileness  of  existence  or  some  basic  affirmation  of  order  and  value.”420  For 
Habermas,  however,  this  question  “does  not  arise  meaningfully  for  communicatively 
socialized individuals.”421 For Meyer, this response simply presupposes an affirmation of 
life’s  meaningfulness  –  in  other  words,  an  answer  to  the  ‘limit  question’  about  the 
totality.  In addition, Meyer believes that Habermas uses a double standard in evaluating 
totality  claims:  “Habermas  suggests  that  our  fundamental  evaluations  of  totality  are 
419 Meyer, 381. 
420 Meyer, 382. 
421 Quoted in Meyer, 382.
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intuitive, prereflexive, and private, as opposed to cognitive, reflexive, and public.”422 He 
quotes Habermas as follows: “This background [i.e., the lifeworld], which is presupposed 
in  communicative  action,  constitutes  a  totality  that  is  implicit  and  comes  along 
prereflexively – one that crumbles the moment it is thematized; it remains a totality only 
in  the  form  of  implicit,  intuitively  presupposed  background  knowledge.”423 Meyer 
concludes:
It is interesting to note that Habermas, who places so much value and importance 
on reflexivity as one of the gains of modernity,  strongly denies the need for it 
when it comes to evaluations of totality. We all operate with some evaluation of 
the whole, he suggests, but this evaluation must remain implicit and prereflexive, 
for “it crumbles the moment it is thematized.” Of course, the reason why he thinks 
it  crumbles and the reason why he downplays  the importance of reflexivity is 
because he denies the possibility of metaphysics, which is to say, he believes that 
all evaluations of totality are culturally specific.424
Furthermore,  Meyer  alleges  an  inconsistency  between  Habermas’s  concession  that 
religion  can  be  existentially  efficacious  and  his  claim  that  under  postmetaphysical 
conditions it  cannot address the whole of reality.   For what else could the existential 
efficacy of religion mean,  Meyer  asks,  if  not  that  religion  provides  answers  to  those 
existential  questions that arise in life’s “boundary situations” – “such as illness, guilt, 
anxiety,  or  the  recognition  of  one’s  own  mortality”425 –  situations  upon  which  our 
rationally  differentiated  discourses  offer  no  consolation?   But  if  it  is  the  case,  as 
Habermas suggests, that religion does address such existential questions, then he must 
presuppose that religion provides an overarching context in which such questions can be 
rendered meaningful – as he admits they cannot from the standpoint of communicative 
422 Meyer, 383. 
423 Habermas, Postmetaphysical Thinking: Philosophical Essays, trans. William Mark Hohengarten 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992), 51. Quoted in Meyer, 383. 
424 Meyer, 383.
425 Meyer, 384. 
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rationality.   “In  other  words,”  says  Meyer,  “Habermas’s  current  affirmation  of  the 
existential usefulness or necessity of religion, suggestively points, it seems to me, to the 
limits and weaknesses of his own postmetaphysical view.”426  He elaborates: “insofar as 
one gives existential meaning to human experience, one implicitly affirms or claims that 
this meaning is adequate because it is true or authentic (i.e., because it is in conformity 
with  the  way  things  really  are).  Hence,  Habermas’s  affirmation  of  the  existential 
usefulness  of  religion  implicitly  points  to  the  importance  of  metaphysics  and  the 
metaphysical question.”427  Habermas, of course, may deny that he is using ‘existential’ to 
point to anything other than the private comfort religion provides, however, Meyer argues 
that the power of religious language to provide such solace comes from truth-claims that 
take themselves to be universal and comprehensive, not merely private: “to ignore this 
[comprehensive character]  is  to eviscerate  them, to do them the disservice of making 
them other than what they take themselves to be.”428 
Meyer then moves to Habermas’s second objection to metaphysics, namely that 
metaphysical assertions about totality cannot be rationally justified in public discourse as 
can the claims of science,  for example.   Habermas “is convinced that the question of 
metaphysics has been put to rest and that a postmetaphysical understanding of existence 
is  sufficient.”429  Meyer  thinks  that  Habermas  simply  misunderstands  the  nature  of 
metaphysical  claims.   Meyer  thinks  there  is  a  form  of  validation  appropriate  to 
metaphysical claims:
426 Meyer, 384. 
427 Meyer, 384. 
428 Meyer, 385. 
429 Meyer, 387. 
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[V]alid  metaphysical  assertions  refer  to  those  characteristics  or  aspects  of 
existence that are logically necessary, as opposed to those aspects that are merely 
logically  contingent.  Therefore,  since  valid  metaphysical  claims  refer  to  those 
traits that are logically necessary, they are validated by showing that their denials 
are  self-contradictory  (i.e.  by  showing  that  their  absence  is  logically 
inconceivable).  Hence,  metaphysical  claims  are  self-validating  because  they 
cannot be denied without contradiction.430
When Habermas takes  an agnostic  stance  – e.g.  ‘we can’t  know the truth of totality 
claims’  – he  is  nonetheless  making a  totality  claim.  In making  such a  claim,  Meyer 
alleges,  Habermas is  contradicting  himself  by making the very sort  of claim he says 
cannot  be  validated:  “In  sum,  negative  claims  about  totality  are,  nonetheless,  claims 
about totality that require their own distinct kind of validation. Hence, Habermas’s denial 
of metaphysics is self-contradictory because it requires a metaphysical form of validation. 
In short, his denial presupposes what it explicitly denies.”431 
Postmetaphysical Responses to Meyer
There  is  much  to  unpack in Meyer’s  criticisms.   Firstly,  his  point  that  claims  about 
totality do not necessarily homogenize difference is well taken.  However, his execution 
of this point leaves much to be desired.  In elucidating the “limits” or the “boundary 
situations” of our everyday experience and rational discourses, I believe he chooses a 
rather unfortunate example.  Although the question ‘why be moral?’ is not itself a moral 
question,  and  cannot  be  answered  in  that  universe  of  discourse,  upon  a  pragmatist 
interpretation it is simply wrongheaded.  The question as it stands, devoid of context, 
suggests the person asking it is a sociopath who simply does not intuitively grasp the fact 
430 Meyer, 387 – 88.
431 Meyer, 389. 
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that we are social animals who live in communities that must take a certain shape.  I 
suspect this is why Habermas says that the question “does not arise meaningfully for 
communicatively socialized individuals.”432  An immanent basis for morality is adequate 
for pragmatic purposes.  Whether or not we have, as it were, ontologically prior reasons 
for being moral is an open question; whether or not we need them in order to be moral is 
less debatable.  In my judgment, a negative answer to the question as to whether we need 
such ontologically prior reasons is justified by the empirical fact that we live in largely 
successful  pluralistic  societies  that  do  not  presuppose  an  answer  to  the  ontological 
question. To be sure, we do not moralize in a vacuum; morality comes packaged in very 
culturally specific ways and some of those ways include obligations that go beyond the 
community, to God, for example.  However, even – perhaps especially – morality that 
comes religiously packaged must justify itself discursively.  Meyer seems to assume that 
Habermas, by failing to consider “limit questions” like ‘why be moral?’ and relate them 
to  a  totality  claim,  can  only  ground  them  subjectively  and  intuitively,  rather  than 
intersubjectively and communicatively.  In fairness, Habermas leaves himself open to this 
charge when he says that “[w]e acquire our moral intuitions in our parents’ home not in 
school.”433  This  suggests  that  our  acquisition  of  morality  is  prereflective  and Meyer 
pounces on the opportunity to point out the inconsistency. Of course, our acquisition of 
morality is largely prereflective when we are children, but presumably it should not be 
when we are adults.  In any case, reflection on the totality of Habermas’s corpus does not 
lead one to the false dichotomy that Meyer erects between metaphysical grounding and 
432 Quoted in Meyer, 382. 
433 Quoted in Meyer, 382. 
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subjective intuition. After all, justifying our claims intersubjectively is a major theme for 
Habermas. 
Secondly, I am not persuaded by Meyer’s allegation that Habermas is inconsistent 
in  affirming  the  existential  meaningfulness  of  religion  and  denying  the  metaphysical 
ground to which it points.  Simply put, I can see no contradiction, implicit or otherwise,  
between affirming religion as a source of private meaning, even if this meaning gains its 
purchase in  part  from totality  claims  that  are  taken as true by its  adherents,  and not 
recognizing the validity of those totality claims. Habermas’s point is surely that these 
claims  cannot  in  fact  be  legitimated  discursively  and are  thus  not  public  claims.  Of 
course, Meyer disagrees with this assertion, which brings us to our next point.
Thirdly,  I  appreciate  the  suggestion  that  Habermas  has  not  exhausted  all  that 
philosophers  have  meant  by  ‘metaphysics’:  according  to  Marc  P.  Lalonde,  “By 
‘metaphysics’ Habermas intends the tradition of philosophical idealism extending from 
Plato to Hegel, or from Iona to Jena as Franz Rosenzweig neatly put it.”434  For Meyer, 
Habermas has in mind only the pre-modern conception of metaphysics criticized by Kant. 
Metaphysics before Kant took for granted the idea of a necessary being, a being whose 
existence  could  not  be  logically  denied.   However,  Kant  argued  that  all  existential 
statements are synthetic – existence is not a predicate – and statements about a necessary 
being were mistaken; existential statements are always logically contingent and thus can 
be denied without contradiction.  Meyer recognizes this Kantian critique:
By calling for renewed attention to the metaphysical enterprise, I am not calling 
for a return to classical metaphysics or the premodern worldview that Habermas 
434 Marc P. Lalonde, Critical Theology and the Challenge of Jürgen Habermas (New York: Peter Lang 
Publishing, 1999), 30. 
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rightly dismisses. The classical metaphysical concept of a completely necessary 
being – one that is immutable and necessary in all respects – has indeed been 
shown by Kant and others to be incoherent. Rather I am suggesting that there is a 
coherent alternative, namely, neoclassical process metaphysics.435
Meyer  contends  that  process  metaphysicians  such  as  Franklin  Gamwell  and  Charles 
Hartshorne have convincingly shown that one can identify logically necessary existential 
claims.436  If  this  is  so,  I  wonder  why  Meyer  credits  Kant  with  demonstrating  the 
incoherence of classical metaphysics, since he disagrees with him precisely on the crucial 
question of whether there are any existential statements that can be denied without self-
contradiction.   It  seems  to  me  that  either  Kant  is  right  in  claiming  that  existential 
statements are always contingent, and thus Meyer’s claim that metaphysical claims are 
valid insofar as their denials are contradictory is false, or Kant is wrong and existential 
statements  can  be  necessarily  true,  in  which  case  he  has  failed  to  demonstrate  the 
incoherence of classical metaphysics.  Introducing process theology really only muddies 
the waters here.  In describing process metaphysics as a “coherent alternative” he says: 
“On its dipolar account, the divine reality must be, in differing respects, both contingent 
and necessary, changing and unchanging, temporal and eternal, relative and absolute, etc. 
It is this process alternative that Habermas has, thus far, failed to address adequately.”437 
But why would Habermas need to address this view if process metaphysics concedes the 
thrust of Kant’s critique?  Moreover, the alternative Meyer proposes does not seem prima 
facie coherent, nor does it do much to combat Habermas’s (or Kant’s) claim that the 
underlying structure of reality is unknowable.  How would we know what aspects of the 
435 Meyer, 389. 
436 Meyer, n. 50, 390.
437 Meyer, 389.
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divine  reality  are  necessary or  contingent  etc.  and what  practical  difference  would  it 
make? 
To be fair, there are post-Kantian efforts to re-define metaphysics, but Meyer, in 
my  view,  fails  to  press  Habermas  on  this  point  because  either  Kant’s  critique  of 
metaphysics is sound or it is not, and Meyer’s waffling on this point leaves Habermas 
with no obligation to critique a position that is so ill-defined.  Moreover, if Meyer means 
something different by ‘metaphysics’ than what Kant and Habermas do, which he does, 
having conceded the incoherence of classical metaphysics, then it is simply not relevant 
to  Habermas’s  critique.   Process  theology  is  not  Habermas’s  target,  nor  is  process 
theology the standard understanding of “metaphysics,” the connotations of which are still 
largely classical and pre-Kantian.  For these reasons, I think it is best to dispense with the 
terminology of metaphysics rather than try to redefine it.  In my judgment, “metaphysics” 
places  God over  and against  the  world,  sealing  transcendence  off  from the  world in 
deistic fashion. Presumably,  process theology would want to avoid this  preconception 
too. However, simply because I advocate leaving behind the language of metaphysics, 
does not mean I think that Habermas’s “postmetaphysical” stance necessarily imposes the 
kind of limits on religious language that he thinks it does.  I would want to tease out 
space for the language of transcendence within a postmetaphysical context.  I will have 
more to say about this later. 
With  respect  to  arguing for the legitimacy of  religious  perspectives  in  public, 
which I want to defend along with Meyer, I do not think that pressing the metaphysical  
question is the best strategic move for accomplishing this goal.  Although I have hinted at 
293
some of the reasons for this assessment already, let me say a few more words about it 
because I believe it cuts to the heart of the issue between secularists and religionists.  As I 
have mentioned, the connotations of “metaphysics” in the modern world tend to reinforce 
the secularism of the immanent frame that Taylor talks about.438 The world is experienced 
as buffered from any inbreaking of the transcendent.  There is a rigid,  as opposed to 
porous, boundary between sacred and secular.  This conception leads first to a deistic 
interpretation  of  God,  and  in  time  allows  modernity  to  dispense  with  the  divine 
altogether.  It also buttresses the notion one finds in Habermas that religious perspectives 
have  “heavier  metaphysical  baggage”439 than  do  secular  perspectives.   Modernity 
construes  religion  as  mainly  a  set  of  beliefs  about  reality,  beliefs  which  cannot  be 
affirmed  according  to  the  standards  of  evidence  found  in  science,  for  example. 
Secularists  tend  to  think  of  religious  people  primarily  as  having  beliefs  that  are  not 
ratified by the evidence.  That is, in addition to believing that there are chairs, flowers, 
and atoms, religious people also believe in God, as though God were one more item in 
the inventory of reality,  and a superfluous one at  that.  The secularist  sees himself  as 
simply lacking this belief.  But this is to give an account entirely from the perspective of 
the subtraction story that Taylor criticizes. 
Moreover, such a story makes the task of marginalizing religion from the public 
sphere easy because it sees the presence of religion there as the presence of idiosyncratic 
beliefs rather than the presence of religious persons who may have good arguments.  Of 
course, religious people often do little to discourage this secular perception of them, but 
438 Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2007), 539 - 93.
439 Habermas, “Religious Tolerance as Pacemaker for Cultural Rights,” in Between Naturalism and 
Religion, 263. 
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invoking the language of metaphysics, in my judgment, only exacerbates the problem. 
Rather than speaking of metaphysical beliefs, I find it a useful strategy to speak about the 
premises  we use  in  arguments.  If  we concede that  the  premises  we use  to  construct 
political arguments are non-trivial – that is, do not express a tautology – then it becomes 
clear that we all, regardless of religious commitment, appeal to premises that are not held 
in common.  Once we realize this, the exception made for religious premises in these 
contexts is seen for the red herring that it is. The difference is not between idiosyncratic 
beliefs and ordinary ones, but between premises that are universally accepted and those 
that are not.  In my view, the former category is simply an empty domain, so we are all 
engaged in appealing to controversial premises and we should not expect universal assent 
on the basis of an idealized rationality.  I think one can make this crucial point without 
appealing to metaphysics. 
A consequence of showing that religious and secular interlocutors are in the same 
position with respect to their premises is that secularists might become aware of their 
own substantive commitments.  They may be forced to countenance the fact that their 
assumptions are not simply methodological, but deeply substantive.  I argued above that 
Habermas’s commitment to human autonomy functions for him as a substantive, rather 
than  merely  procedural,  commitment.   And  secularists  no  doubt  have  many  such 
substantive  commitments.   They  certainly  have  a  philosophical  anthropology  –  the 
fundamental unit of humanity is the individual who is by nature free and autonomous – as 
we saw in the case of Habermas.   Taylor is quite right to point out that the modern,  
secular  perspective  came  to  ascendency,  not  because  the  ancient,  religious  view fell 
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away, but because of the positive attractions of the new worldview.  Even someone like 
Weber,  in  telling  the  secularization  narrative,  leaves  the  reader  with  the  distinct 
impression  that  moderns  did  not  abandon  religious  ways  of  thinking  so  much  as 
reinterpret them against the success of science and technology.  For Weber, the anxieties 
of the human condition remain the same: our fragility and fear in the face of nature, and 
our desire to propitiate and control these forces.  But the object(s) of our trust has shifted. 
Therefore, even on the standard Weberian telling of the secularization story, secularism 
can be seen for what it  is: a substantive story that seeks to provide better  answers to 
religious questions.  I would argue that it is, in fact, an immanent religion.  Of course, this 
claim opens me to the charge that  this  is  an overly broad stipulative  re-definition  of 
religion.  However,  I  believe  such  a  criticism  is  also  indebted  to  a  metaphysical 
understanding of religion. In other words, it implies that in order to be called “religious” 
a  position  must  have  “metaphysical”  beliefs,  i.e.  beliefs  about  what  is  “outside”  the 
immanent order that science observes.  Again, such an approach is wrongheaded.  Giving 
any kind of essentialist definition of religion is a fool’s errand and to suggest that religion 
is  necessarily “metaphysical”  in  some sense is  to beg the question at  hand.  In such 
contexts, it might be advisable to dispense with the term “religion” too, because it too 
often prejudices the parties to the discussion in one direction or another and forecloses on 
the  possibility  of  articulating  a  new  way  of  recognizing  our  deeply  substantive 
commitments.  Although generally good on this point, I think that even Taylor missteps 
in adopting Bruce’s definition of religion, even though it is more generous than most.440 
440 Taylor, 429: “Actions, beliefs, and institutions predicated upon the assumption of the existence of either 
supernatural entities with powers of agency, or impersonal powers or processes possessed of moral 
purpose, which have the capacity to set the conditions of, or to intervene in, human affairs.”
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Better to use language like that of “anticipatory confidence”441 which stays away from 
metaphysics  and  endeavors  to  articulate  a  phenomenological  description  in  which 
everyone can recognize themselves as adopting some substantive “spin”442 on issues of 
ultimate concern.  Nevertheless, it is important to differentiate an open spin from a closed 
spin.   Although  both  exercise  anticipatory  confidence,  the  former  is  open  to 
transcendence whereas the latter is not.  I now want to return to the task alluded to above: 
articulating what transcendence might mean within a postmetaphysical context in which 
many  people,  due  to  the  aura  of  the  obvious  that  surrounds  the  closed  spin,  have 
difficulty imagining reality in other than purely immanent terms. 
Transcendence Today
One of the difficulties is defining transcendence in a way that is not metaphysically over-
determined in the way that Habermas,  and many other moderns,  suspect  is  untenable 
under such secular conditions as the explanatory power and technical success of natural 
science, and the autonomy and universality of secular morality and law.  Therefore, I 
want  to  continue  to  offer  a  phenomenological  account  of  the  possible  experience  of 
transcendence  under  conditions  of  secularization.   As  for  definitions,  I  find  Jürgen 
Moltmann’s particularly helpful in its simplicity:
We generally use the word ‘transcendence’ for whatever exceeds the immanence 
that is present and open to our experience – for whatever goes further, into what is 
beyond immanence …. Conversely, there is no concept of immanence which does 
not imply an understanding of transcendence …. There is no dichotomy between 
441 Taylor, 551.
442 Taylor, 551. 
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immanence and transcendence. There is only a distinction and a relationship in 
the experience of ‘the boundary.’443
He suggests that secularization, including the closed universe and the rise of atheism as a 
live  option  in  the  Western  world,  has  not  necessarily  eliminated  transcendence,  but 
merely  changed  how  we  experience  the  boundary  between  immanence  and 
transcendence:
We  are  merely  being  faced  with  transformations  of  transcendence  and 
transformations  in  the  boundary  experience  of  immanence.  The  experience  of 
transcendence, the experience of the boundary and religion in the general sense of 
the word are just as relevant today as they ever were. It is just that we no longer  
find them in the places where they used to be.444
In a very general way, Moltmann is making a point that Taylor and others have made at 
greater length: on the one hand, secularization does not bring an end to religion because 
religion  continues  to  speak to  an  irreducible  aspect  of  humanity’s  phenomenological 
experience, but on the other hand secularization does make it more difficult to experience 
this qua religious. Rather, the thrust of secularization is to subsume all experience under 
the immanent frame.  In this respect, it historically shifts the boundary conditions for the 
experience of anything extra-immanent.  It is now more difficult for modern people than 
for their forebears to find the margins of the immanent frame.  In order to delve deeper 
into this historical shifting of these boundary conditions, we must again turn to Taylor’s 
exhaustive analysis. 
In the last chapter of Taylor’s  A Secular Age, he tries to articulate what he, and 
others, find attractive about the “open spin” orientation to the “immanent frame.”  Here, 
443 Jürgen Moltmann, "The Future as a New Paradigm of Transcendence," in The Future of Creation: 
Collected Essays (Fortress Press, 2007), 1.
444 Moltmann, 5.
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he  wants  to  describe  phenomenologically  a  sense  of  “fullness”445 that  could  be 
appreciated by moderns regardless of religious belief or lack thereof.  Although he admits 
that his “full-disclosure … seems to have polluted the entire book for some people,”446 he 
does  much more  than speak in  a  confessional  mode.   As I  read  him,  he is  striving, 
sometimes at the margins of language, to articulate a paradigm of the transcendent that 
makes sense to modern people.  He speculates that we moderns have difficulty imagining 
our way outside the “internal economy of the immanent theory”447 in which our selves 
have become “buffered” against  any extra-physical  or extra-mental  effects  or agency. 
Unlike our ancestors, who experienced the visible world as only a fraction of the totality,  
many  of  us  moderns  have  difficulty  imagining  what  it  would  be  like  to  experience 
anything else.   For this  reason, Taylor  is  particularly interested in the experiences  of 
modern  ‘converts’  from  immanent  to  transcendent  perspectives.   Whereas  earlier 
generations of converts to, say, Christianity – as in Taylor’s examples – lived within a 
more porous paradigm, where the transcendent was only thinly veiled,
[b]y  contrast,  these  moderns  are  all  breaking  beyond  systems  which  their 
opponents see as totalities in a new sense; they are systems of immanent order 
which can be explained and accounted for in their own terms. That is what the 
modern idea of the “natural,” counterposed to the “supernatural” means.   It  is 
possible, even tempting to make a claim on behalf of this, that there is no need 
whatever to go beyond it to understand our world.448
What  is  attractive  about  the  naturalist  worldview is  its  neat  and  tidy,  self-contained 
picture  of  reality;  everything  is  rendered  predictable  at  least  in  principle.  Thus,  any 
445 Taylor, 729.
446 Ronald A. Kuipers, "An Interview with Charles Taylor," in 'God Is Dead' and I Don't Feel So Good 
Myself: Theological Engagements With the New Atheism, Andrew David, Christopher J. Keller, and Jon 
Stanley, eds. (Cascade Books, 2010), 122.
447 Taylor, 731. 
448 Taylor, 732.
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inbreaking of the transcendent into this picture upsets this  predictable  paradigm.  For 
Taylor, the “rage for order”449 is one of the main motivations for keeping the immanent 
frame  intact  and,  conversely,  the  reason  many  moderns  have  difficulty  making  any 
conceptual room for the transcendent.  In addition, because of the self-contained nature of 
the  immanent  view,  moderns  have  difficulty  experiencing  the  ‘boundary’  between 
immanent and transcendent; everything abides within our scientific purview.  Therefore, 
part of the challenge for those, like Taylor, who see open perspectives as live options, is 
to articulate what such a boundary might look like to the children of modernity. However, 
the language we use within the immanent frame makes this project difficult:
The terms in which the paradigm shift can be made are suspect, and difficult to 
credit; they either belong to outlooks which can be discredited as “premodern” 
(e.g.  God,  evil,  agape);  or  else  one  has  to  have  recourse  to  a  new  “subtler 
language,” whose terms on their own don’t have generally accepted referents, but 
which can point us beyond ordinary, “immanent” realities. Indeed, what may have 
to be challenged here is the very distinction between nature/supernature itself.450
At the risk of oversimplification, one might think of this distinction as conceiving of the 
immanent/transcendent  boundary  along  a  vertical  axis,  which  has  now  largely  been 
abandoned  by  moderns.   Perhaps  the  boundary  should  be  conceptualized  along  a 
horizontal axis, as it were, within time and history.  Although in my judgment, there is 
mileage in this suggestion, there are also challenges to such ‘horizontal’ thinking within 
our modern social imaginary.   Of course, earlier generations had both a ‘vertical’ and 
‘horizontal’ boundary, although doubtless expressed in richer metaphorical language.  In 
addition to the boundary between heaven and earth they also keenly felt the boundary 
449 Taylor, 63. 
450 Taylor, 732.
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between this age and the age to come.  However, through the course of modernization, 
even this latter distinction has been weakened. 
In the medieval period, as Taylor notes, the distinction between the current age 
and the eschaton was more deeply engrained in the social imaginary and functioned as a 
boundary between the immanent and the transcendent.   For example, assumptions about 
the homogeneity of time, in which any future is seen as an extension of the immanent 
order, were not part of the general background assumptions of the era.451 Rather, they saw 
the  future  as  continuity  and  discontinuity,  the  latter  being  largely  hidden  until  the 
transcendent breaks into history at the Parousia.  For Taylor, the flattening out of time 
and  history  began  long  before  modern  secularism  became  a  cultural  competitor  to 
Christianity.  Rather, the religious and ethical attitudes that led to the Reformation played 
a major role in bringing it about.  In his estimation, the medieval church largely took it 
for  granted  that  “the  full  demands  of  Christian  life  would  never  be  met,  outside  of 
isolated pockets of sanctity, in history, but only … at the end of time.”452   However, the 
“thrust of Reform was to make a Church in which everyone should show the same degree 
of personal commitment and devotion which had hitherto been the stance of a dedicated 
elite.”  Furthermore, “this couldn’t help but bring about a definition of the demands of 
Christian faith closer into line with what is attainable in this world, with what can be 
realized  in  history.  The distance  between the  ultimate  City  of  God and the  properly 
Christian-conforming earthly city has to be reduced.”453 The conflation of the two orders, 
for Taylor, inevitably invites deism and then an impersonal natural order in which God is 
451 See Taylor, 195 – 96 for a discussion of ‘homogenous’ and ‘profane’ time. 
452 Taylor, 735.
453 Taylor, 736.
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rendered superfluous. Therefore, the boundary between transcendence and immanence is 
obscured on both the vertical and horizontal axes. 
Despite these shifts in the boundary conditions, Taylor thinks it is still possible for 
moderns to experience such a boundary and relate to it.  Indeed, many people, even in the 
secularized  West,  whether  or  not  they  profess  any  particular  faith,  have  a 
phenomenological sense of something ‘beyond’ mundane experience although they may 
express  it  in  ontologically  indeterminate  ways.   This  indeterminacy  is  a  crucial 
component  of  the  secularization  story for  Taylor,  and one  that  is  often  neglected  in 
narratives  that  speak  of  secularization  only  in  terms  of  disenchantment  and 
rationalization.  For example, Romanticism stresses neither of these aspects of the story – 
and actually reacts against them – despite the fact that it moves away from traditional 
metaphysics and institutionalized religiosity.  It is suspicious of the language in which we 
traditionally cast what we might call transcendent experiences and thus develops what 
Taylor calls a “subtler language”:
What  is  crucial  to  the  new  “subtler”  languages  of  post-Romantic  poets,  as  I 
argued  in  an  earlier  chapter,  was  that  they  permit  a  kind  of  suspension  or 
indeterminacy of ontological commitments …. The language can be taken in more 
than  one  sense,  ranging  from  the  fullest  ontological  commitment  to  the 
transcendent to the most subjective, human-, even language-centred.454
Of course, there is a chance that such an inward focus can contribute to the immanent 
picture since those experiences which would have been ascribed to forces beyond us in 
traditional religious accounts now retreat into the inner depths of our psyche.  However, 
according to Taylor, such subjectivism is not a necessary outcome: “Reflexive awareness 
454 Taylor, 757.
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can bring about subjectivism, and a collapse of transcendence, but doesn’t need to.”455  As 
such, one is tempted to say that these subtler languages allow us to harvest the semantic 
potential of religious language while maintaining a post-metaphysical stance regarding 
the ontological truth or falsity of religious worldviews. 
Although this indeterminacy seems to be similar to the post-metaphysical position 
Habermas takes,  one must  be cautious in ascribing these post-romantic  views to  him 
without qualification.   For example,  although he has moved toward a more favorable 
position  with  respect  to  religious  language,  he  still  insists  that  it  be  translated  into 
language that can be vindicated rationally and discursively.  It remains unclear whether 
the  “subtler  languages”  Taylor  speaks  of,  with  their  “ontological  indeterminacy”  are 
capable  of  such translation.   Moreover,  Habermas  is  no friend of  Romanticism.  One 
thinks of his critique of Adorno’s and Horkheimer’s Dialectic of Enlightenment in which 
he  accuses  them  of  retreating  into  non-discursive  aestheticism  and  jettisoning  the 
potential for communicative rationality already latent in the Enlightenment.456  Although 
his interpretation of the relevant passage is suspect, as other scholars have pointed out,457 
Habermas is suspicious of anything resembling aestheticism or Romanticism, which he 
regards as an escape into the ineffable.  For Habermas, the value of art is its capacity to 
expand communicative discourse.  His disciple, Albrecht Wellmer, continues in this vein 
and  criticizes  Adorno  specifically  for  positing  a  radical  disconnect  between  the 
pathologies of modernity and a promised utopia achieved by an aesthetic reconciliation to 
455 Taylor, 757.
456 Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, Vol. 1, trans. Thomas McCarthy (Boston: 
Beacon Press, 1984), 384.
457 Lambert Zuidervaart, Social Philosophy after Adorno (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 
114 – 15.
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nature.458  Again,  this  reading  of  Adorno  is  highly  problematic  on  its  own  terms; 
however, it serves to make the point that Habermas resists any aesthetic articulation of 
what I have been calling the boundary.  He sees his predecessors in critical theory as 
essentially placing the boundary at the ineffability of aesthetic experience and he rejects 
this move as non-discursive and non-communicative. Thus any “subtle” language would 
have  to  demonstrate  itself  capable  of  communicative  redemption;  as  such,  its 
“indeterminacy” must give way to the more determinate terminologies of secular science, 
law, and (critical) art. 
However, even Habermas is not immune to experiences of the boundary.  If I read 
him correctly, he feels acutely the attraction of transcendent orientations to the 
“immanent frame,” despite having reservations about the ontologies in which many of 
these are embedded.  His recent stance between naturalism and religion marks a middle 
path between scientific reductionism on the one hand and the ontologizing of our 
phenomenal experience on the other. In this respect, he is speaking a “subtler language” 
than either of these discourses.  Despite the polarizing voices on either side of the debate, 
this indeterminate centre may well be the majority experience under contemporary 
secularism.  Certainly Taylor makes such a case.  In a review of A Secular Age, Vittorio 
Hösle captures the dynamism of our contemporary experience of the boundary:
Modern science indeed offers an immanent framework, but one that is open to 
various  interpretations.  It  is  a peculiarity of our time that we are subjected to 
influences from opposing directions, seek out a middle path between orthodoxy 
and atheism (deism being the first of these), and try to make ontological sense of 
the phenomenal experiences of freedom, of the moral law and of beauty.459
458 Albrecht Wellmer, “Adorno, Modernity, and the Sublime” in The Actuality of Adorno, ed. Max Pensky 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 112 – 134.
459 Vittorio Hösle, “Review Essay: A Metaphysical History of Atheism,” Symposium, 14. 1 (Spring, 2001): 
54.
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Although modern people may remain indeterminate in their ontological commitments, or 
be suspicious of traditional articulations of transcendence, these phenomenal experiences 
can still function as boundary conditions for them.  I agree with Taylor on this score: it is  
the plethora of loosely ‘spiritual  options’ regarding these experiences,  rather  than the 
wholesale  adoption  of  a  naturalistic  worldview,  that  motivates  contemporary 
secularization.   Habermas’s  methodological  atheism  notwithstanding,  he  does  not 
advocate  the  overdetermination  of  a  naturalistic  worldview  which  would  reduce  our 
phenomenal  experiences  to  brain  chemistry,  as  we  have  seen.  Nevertheless,  these 
experiences alone do not exhaust potential boundary conditions.460
Death as a Boundary Condition
Even  for  moderns  –  perhaps  especially  for  them  –  death  functions  as  the  ultimate 
boundary condition.  Religion is most conspicuous when we are coming to terms with 
death,  even  in  public  contexts  where  the  presence  of  religion  would  otherwise  be 
unwelcome.  This fact has, more or less, remained constant throughout the secularization 
process.  This is not to say that attitudes toward death have not changed under conditions 
of secularization – they certainly have – but it is to say that despite a decline in religious 
belief and practice, death still functions as a unique boundary condition and one about 
which religion is still expected to have something to say. Nevertheless, I should say more 
about the changing attitudes simply to highlight  the resiliency of religious  thought in 
spite of them. 
460 Karl Jaspers, Way to Wisdom: An Introduction to Philosophy, trans. Ralph Manheim (New Haven, CT: 
Yale University Press, 1954), 19. 
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For  example,  one  might  think  of  death  as  the  ultimate  negation  of  human 
flourishing, one that must be avoided at all  costs, usually through the technocracy of 
modern science and medicine.  This is a common contemporary view, shared by both the 
religious  and the  secular.  Taylor  identifies  it  with  the  position  of  modern  humanism 
which  roughly emerges  during the  Enlightenment.   However,  such humanism has  its 
critics, as Taylor explains:
Against  this,  there  have  developed  a  whole  range  of  views  in  the  post-
Enlightenment world, which while remaining atheist, or at least ambivalent and 
unclear about transcendence, have seen in death, at least the moment of death, or 
the standpoint of death, a privileged position, one at which the meaning, the point 
of life becomes clear, or can be more closely attained than in the fullness of life.461
He goes on to mention thinkers such as Heidegger, Camus, and Beckett, and concludes 
that “[s]trangely, many things reminiscent of the religious tradition emerge in these and 
other writers, while it is also in some cases clear that they mean to reject religion, at least 
as it has been understood.”462  Thus, there is in these thinkers an implicit critique of the 
kind of humanism that considers any understanding of death as a boundary to be a form 
of ‘otherworldly’ thinking that distracts us from maximizing human flourishing in this 
world.   Related  to  this  attitude  is  the  notion  that  longing  for  anything  beyond  the 
boundary is infantile wish fulfillment.  Ironically, this condemnation of wish fulfillment 
seldom discourages the humanist from trying to avoid the inevitability of death or failing 
that, as indeed he must, ignore it. 
This  latter  strategy  often  involves  eschewing  the  traditional  rites  of  passage 
associated with death.  To quote Taylor again, “Sometimes the dying will ask that their 
461 Taylor, 320.
462 Taylor, 321.
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loved ones make no fuss over them, hold no ceremony, just cremate them and move on; 
as  though  they  were  doing  the  bereaved  a  favour  in  colluding  in  their  aversion  to 
death.”463  However, most people feel that this is inadequate.  The bereaved feel the need 
to  “struggle  to  hold  on  to  the  meaning  they  have  built  with  the  deceased,  while 
(unavoidably) letting go of the person. This is what funeral rites have always meant to do, 
whatever other goals they have served.”464  Even atheists feel the need to eulogize and 
‘live on’ in some sense even if it is a weaker substitute for the traditional religious sense. 
One sees this for example in the arch-atheist Richard Dawkins’s eulogy for colleague 
William Hamilton who wished upon his death “to be laid out on the forest floor in the 
Amazon jungle and interred by burying beetles as food for their larvae.  Later in their 
children,  reared with care by horned parents out of fist-sized balls  moulded from my 
flesh, I will escape. No worm for me, or sordid fly: rearranged and multiple, I will at last 
buzz from the soil … out into the Brazilian wilderness beneath the stars.”465  Regardless 
of the fact that no consciousness is preserved on this materialist account, one detects a 
longing for transcendence;  even for the materialist,  death acts  as a boundary through 
which one realizes new possibilities.  Nevertheless, the surrogate immortality of being 
transformed into beetles  is  probably not  going to  appeal  to  most  people  as  much as 
traditional conceptions of what lies beyond.  For Taylor:  “even people who otherwise 
don’t  practice  have  recourse  to  religious  funerals;  perhaps  because  here  at  least  is  a 
language which fits with the need for eternity,  even if you’re not sure you believe all 
463 Taylor, 723. 
464 Taylor, 722. 
465 Quoted in Taylor, 606.
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that.”466  In a recently published dialogue with four Jesuit academics, Habermas reflects 
on precisely this issue.  As Stanley Fish comments in his New York Times review:
Habermas  begins  his  initial  contribution  to  the  conversation  by  recalling  the 
funeral of a friend who in life “rejected any profession of faith,” and yet indicated 
before his death that he wanted his memorial service to take place at St. Peter’s 
Church in Zurich. Habermas decides that his friend “had sensed the awkwardness 
of non-religious burial practices and, by his choice of place, publicly declared that 
the  enlightened  modern  age  has  failed  to  find  a  suitable  replacement  for  a 
religious  way  of  coping  with  the  final  rite  de  passage.”  The  point  can  be 
sharpened:  in  the  context  of  full-bodied  secularism,  there  would  seem  to  be 
nothing to pass on to, and therefore no reason for anything like a funeral.467
Habermas echoes here in a more personal register what he has said elsewhere: “religion, 
which  has  largely  been  deprived  of  its  worldview functions,  is  still  indispensable  in 
ordinary life for normalizing intercourse with the extraordinary.”468  This “intercourse 
with the extraordinary” I take to be akin to what I have, following Karl Jaspers, been 
calling  ‘boundary  conditions’.  Furthermore,  he  says:  “On  the  premises  of 
postmetaphysical  thought,  philosophy  cannot  provide  a  substitute  for  the  consolation 
whereby  religion  invests  unavoidable  suffering  and  unrecompensed  justice,  the 
contingencies of need, loneliness, sickness, and death, with new significance and teaches 
us to bear them.”469  In other words, religion invests  these events with meaning,  and 
perhaps allows us to see our lives as more porous, open to extra-mundane insight.  This is 
perhaps especially true of death: “A need for meaning, a desire for eternity, can press us 
against the boundaries of the human domain.  But death in another way can offer a way to 
escape the confinement of this domain, to breathe the air beyond.”470  This impulse is not 
466 Taylor, 723.
467 Stanley Fish, “Does Reason Know What It Is Missing?” 
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/04/12/does-reason-know-what-it-is-missing/?emc=etal.
468 Quoted in Meyer, 376.
469 Quoted in Meyer, 376.
470 Taylor, 723.
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specific  to  an  explicitly  religious  point  of  view  either,  as  Taylor  shows.  Rather,  it  
attempts to capture a sense of fullness that all moderns can recognize as permeating their 
experience.
The sense of meaning that we have touched upon is closely bound up with the 
theme of  hope.   Ironically,  in  recent  years  Habermas  has  been moving  closer  to  his 
predecessors in the Frankfurt School insofar as his Enlightenment optimism has waned. 
Adorno, for example, presciently reflected on how the death of metaphysics has disrupted 
our equanimity toward our own individual deaths: “In the socialized society, however, in 
the  inescapably  dense  web  of  immanence,  death  is  felt  exclusively  as  external  and 
strange.   Men have lost  the illusion  that  it  is  commensurable  with their  lives.   They 
cannot absorb the fact that they must die.”471  Moreover, as Adorno also reminds us, the 
meaning of our individual deaths is inseparable from the meaning of history: “Death and 
history,  particularly  the  collective  history  of  the  individual  category,  form  a 
constellation.”472   After the horrors of the twentieth century, particularly the death camps, 
the critical theorists are pessimistic that any meaning to history or hope for the future can 
be salvaged.  Habermas also questions his earlier optimism in the adequacy of secular 
reason and, in conversation with his predecessors, recognizes the semantic power of the 
religious traditions that have been lost:
When sin was converted to culpability, and the breaking of divine commands to 
an offense against human laws, something was lost. The wish for forgiveness is 
still bound up with the unsentimental wish to undo the harm inflicted on others. 
What is even more disconcerting is the irreversibility of past sufferings – the 
injustice inflicted on innocent people who were abused, debased, and murdered, 
reaching far beyond any extent of reparation within human power. The loss of 
471 Theodor Adorno, "Meditations on Metaphysics," in The Frankfurt School on Religion, 181.
472 Adorno, 182.
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hope for resurrection is keenly felt as a void. Horkheimer’s justified skepticism – 
“The slaughtered are really slaughtered” – with which he countered Benjamin’s 
emphatic, or rather excessive, hope for the anamnestic power of reparation 
inherent in human remembrance, is far from denying the helpless impulse to 
change what cannot be changed any more.473
At this point, one might question how far ‘ontological indeterminacy’ can take us toward 
coming to terms with suffering and death.  Taylor, having reflected on various secular 
strategies for wringing some meaning out of death, such as the “eternity” of “the clan, the 
tribe, the society, the way of life”474 concludes that these all fall short of a genuinely 
theological response: “And of course, this eternity can’t preserve those who are really 
forgotten, or those who haven’t left their mark, or those who have been damned, 
excluded.  There is no general resurrection in this ‘eternity’ of grateful posterity.  This is 
what exercised Benjamin, the unfilled need to rescue those who were trampled by 
history.”475  Also in conversation with the Frankfurt School, no less a theologian than 
Benedict XVI, in his encyclical Spe Salvi (Saved by Hope), questions whether theological 
language can be separated from the ontology in which it is traditionally at home:
Max Horkheimer  and Theodor W. Adorno were equally critical of theism and 
atheism. Horkheimer radically excluded the possibility of ever finding a this-
worldly substitute for God, while at the same time he rejected the image of a good 
and just God …. Adorno also firmly upheld this total rejection of images, which 
naturally meant the exclusion of any “image” of a loving God.  On the other hand, 
he also constantly emphasized this “negative” dialectic and asserted that justice – 
true justice – would require a world “where not only present suffering would be 
wiped out, but also that which is irrevocably past would be undone.” This would 
mean, however – to express it with more positive and hence, for him, inadequate 
symbols – that there can be no justice without a resurrection of the dead.  Yet this 
would have to involve “the resurrection of the flesh, something that is totally 
foreign to idealism and the realm of Absolute spirit.”476
473 Habermas, "Faith and Knowledge," in The Frankfurt School on Religion, 333.
474 Taylor, 721.
475 Taylor, 722.
476 Benedict XVI, Spe Salvi, section 42 
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/encyclicals/documents/hf_ben-xvi_enc_20071130_spe-
310
For Benedict, any meaningful interpretation of history is anchored to an eschatological 
hope in the future.  But modern people, who are not innocent of the philosophical critique 
of religion, will be hard-pressed to fully embrace the ontological categories in which this 
eschatology is expressed.  Nevertheless, for moderns, whether secular or religious, the 
future and the promise (or threat) it entails functions as a boundary condition, the 
possibility for the inbreaking of something new into our experience.  This is readily seen 
in the many modern utopian narratives of progress that have emerged since the 
Enlightenment, which function as secular eschatologies. The critique of these narratives 
can perhaps open up some space to see the future as ‘a paradigm of transcendence’ as 
Jürgen Moltmann has suggested.477  I want to return now to develop the concept of 
transcendence along a horizontal axis.  I hope to use Moltmann, in conversation with the 
critical theorists, to craft a language of the transcendent that Habermas would recognize 
as offering a legitimate critique of the pathological narratives of modernity.  If successful, 
this in turn will also articulate a public role for religious language that moves beyond the 
Kulturkampf and has genuine critical and redemptive significance. 
 
The Future as Possibility
As mentioned, the early Frankfurt School did not share Habermas’s optimism about the 
progress inherent in the Enlightenment.  For Adorno, the myth of progress was shattered 
in  the  twentieth  century,  first  in  the  death  camps  of  Auschwitz  and  second  in  the 
salvi_en.html.
477 Moltmann, 1 – 14. 
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‘progress’ that culminated in humanity’s capacity to destroy itself.478  Thus, we can only 
speak  of  progress  in  any  meaningful  sense  if  we  can  avoid  unmitigated  disaster,  if 
humanity has a future.  An ‘established’ humanity can no longer be taken for granted: the 
non-existence of humanity is a real possibility.  Unlike previous generations, we have the 
power to actualize this possibility.   We can destroy ourselves not only atomically,  but 
also biologically,  chemically,  demographically, ecologically, and this only brings us to 
the letter ‘E’. Therefore, the future only has meaning if we can avoid annihilation.  For 
the critical theorists, “progress obtains legitimation in the doctrine that the idea of the 
happiness  of  unborn  generations  –  without  which  one  cannot  speak  of  progress  – 
inalienably includes the idea of redemption.”479 Adorno goes on to say that “the aspect of 
redemption,  no  matter  how  secularized,  cannot  be  removed  from  the  concept  of 
progress.”480  If this is the case, we need to explore how the future might be redeemed 
from the pathological secular myth of progress. 
For  Adorno,  a  major  theme  in  the  progress  narrative  of  modernity  is  the 
domination of nature.  Progress is motivated by coming to terms with fear, specifically 
the fear of nature’s power over us.  Despite achieving various means to exercise control 
over nature, technological progress has not delivered on its promised liberation.  Rather, 
it has served to increase humanity’s alienation from both the natural and social world. 
According to Moltmann, the modern man is far from liberated:
But instead he is surrounded by an ever denser web of his own works – social 
institutions,  political  organizations,  giant  industrial  firms  –  like  a  new quasi-
nature.  The natural cosmos, which man sees through and dominates  more and 
478 Theodor Adorno, “Progress” in How Can One Live after Auschwitz, ed. Rolf Tiedemann (Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 2002), 141.
479 Adorno, 128.
480 Adorno, 132. 
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more, is being replaced by a new cosmos of his own objectifications; and this 
cosmos is increasingly harder to see through, and harder still  to dominate and 
control …. They are taking on autonomous form, are running away from him, 
acquiring power over him.481
The longing for freedom and emancipation promised, but not delivered, by secularism is 
once again opening up possibilities for experiencing the boundary.  Many moderns have 
seen through the myth of freedom supposedly achieved by the endless exploitation of 
material  resources  and  domination  of  nature.   In  addition  to  the  natural  disasters 
exacerbated  by  this  strategy,  we  are  also  faced  with  social  and  political  disasters. 
Contrary to Habermas’s early optimism for the emancipation of rationalization, “now the 
creations  dominate  their  creators,  and  rationalized  conditions  exercise  irrational 
dictatorship  over  people.  This  is  the  new ‘boundary’  at  which  people  reach  out  for 
transcendence. It is a transcendence of an existing system. It is therefore directed to ‘the 
future.’”482  Thus, any sense of hope for the future cannot simply be conceptualized as an 
expansion  of  the  immanent  order  of  things,  those  events  and  processes  within  our 
immediate  horizon  of  experience.   Rather,  it  must  transcend  the  limitations  of  such 
experience.  Therefore, hope oriented toward the future must look for an ‘age to come’ 
and  this  expectation  functions  as  a  boundary  condition  for  the  experience  of  the 
transcendent. To further quote Moltmann:
If the ‘boundary’  of present immanence is experienced in the fact that man is 
alienated from his world and that this world is alienated from man, transcendence 
will  be  experienced  at  the  point  where  critical  perspectives  open  up  for  our 
present conflicts, where new possibilities emerge for a meaningful incarnation of 
man, and new potentialities for a humanization of his alienated conditions – in 
481 Moltmann, 5.
482 Moltmann, 9.
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short, where a future of reconciliation and alteration wins the upper hand over this 
situation.483
Interestingly,  Habermas  also  wants  to  realize  this  future  through  the  ideal  speech 
situation.   He wants  to  form the  relevant  ‘incarnation’  of  humanity in  a  harmonious 
community  of  communicative  individuals  which  transcends  the  currently  antagonistic 
public sphere and culminates in perfect rational consensus.   However, as Adorno, and 
Kant before him, have noted, the engine of progress in modernity is conflict.  And this is 
not only the case in political contexts, but such conflict is ontologized, it goes all the way 
down, as it were, to the way the world fundamentally is.  Habermas realizes that his ideal  
speech situation stands in tension with the reductionism typical of naturalism which holds 
the struggle for survival to be the driving force behind evolutionary progress.  He states 
the problem as follows:
If reasons and the logical processing of reasons do not play any causal role from a 
neurobiological point of view, it becomes mysterious from the perspective of the 
theory of evolution why nature allows itself the luxury of a “space of reasons” 
(Wilfrid Sellars) at all.  Reasons do not swim about like globules of fat on the 
soup of consciousness. On the contrary, judging and acting are always associated 
with good reasons for the subjects concerned. If the process of “giving and asking 
for reasons” had to be dismissed as an epiphenomenon, there would not be much 
left of the biological functions of the self-understanding of subjects capable of 
speech and action. Why do we have to demand justifications from each other? 
What  purpose  is  served  by  having  a  whole  superstructure  of  agencies  of 
socialization that drill into children causally superfluous habits of this sort?484
Here, Habermas recognizes that if this scenario is the last word, if reductionism is true on 
an  ontologically  fundamental  level,  then  this  has  grave  implications  for  a  theory  of 
communicative action that aims at being normative.  Although Habermas wants to resist 
such reductionism,  the  question  remains  whether  his  methodological  atheism has  the 
483 Moltmann, 9 – 10. 
484 Habermas, “Freedom and Determinism,” 163 – 64. 
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resources to do so. If the pathology to be overcome by communicative action, namely 
antagonism and conflict, is the driving force of the entire evolutionary process, including 
the origination of illusory “reasons,” then how can such an epiphenomenon eradicate the 
cause?   Ironically,  Habermas  falls  prey  to  a  criticism  he  levels  at  Dialectic  of  
Enlightenment.   In  TCA,  he  charges  Adorno  and  Horkheimer  with  claiming  that 
reification is fundamental to human consciousness, rather than arising with the advent of 
capitalism  as  in  orthodox  Marxism.   A  consequence  of  this  idea  is  that  reason  is 
fundamentally instrumental.  In order to undo the pathologies wrought by instrumental 
reason they “have to rely on a reason that is before reason (which was from the beginning 
instrumental).”485  In  other  words,  if  reason  is  part  of  the  problem,  how can  reason 
possibly provide a solution?  However,  Habermas faces  an even greater  difficulty.  If 
reason is only an epiphenomenon of causes, and these causes are driven by the pathology 
of  instrumentality,  namely  the  struggle  for  survival,  how  can  reason  eradicate  the 
pathology?  How does  Habermas  find a  “reason that  is  before reason” from within  a 
naturalistic ontology? He realizes that he must abandon such reductionism, opting for 
“soft naturalism” instead. 
Thus the kind of reconciliation Habermas hopes for cannot be achieved by simply 
projecting the failed promise of modernity coupled with an antagonistic ontology into the 
future.  The fact that he does not suggest that we do so and, in fact, suggests we should 
not, is perhaps evidence that he realizes the futility of envisioning the future exclusively 
along an ‘immanent’ axis.  To do so would be to perpetuate the pathologies of modernity 
485 Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 1, trans. Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon 
Press, 1984), 382. 
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and to close the future off to possibilities rather than open it.  However, to think of the 
future as a horizon of hope and possibility, as Habermas does, is precisely to conceive of 
it transcendently, as a ‘boundary’. It is also to conceive of it eschatologically rather than 
teleologically.   In my judgment,  Habermas’s critique of religion is valid insofar as it 
rightly  criticizes  the  overly  determinate  teleology  inherent  in  many  theologies.   To 
elaborate, teleology, as its etymology suggests, implies a determinative end, purpose, or 
goal.  Religious thinking that claims to know in no uncertain terms what that end is, is 
bound to preserve a sacred core that is identified with the plan of God and therefore claim 
that this core is immune from rational criticism.  Ironically, as Adorno notes, it colludes 
with  secularism because  such theology also  has  a  very immanent  perspective  on  the 
current world; the conflict  – expressed not only in the culture war but also in actual, 
bloody conflict – is necessary to bring about God’s plan, culminating in the ‘end of the 
world.’486  We are not, then, merely speaking here of ‘end’ in the sense of telos, but also 
in  the  sense  of  terminus.   Upon  this  model,  the  inbreaking  of  transcendence  is  not 
imagined unless it is thematized metaphysically; as radical discontinuity with the world 
of space and time.  Such a determinative teleology is closed, as is the immanent order, to 
the future as a horizon of hope, the boundary through which we transcend the present 
historical moment of conflict.   Therefore, I would conclude that what often passes for 
eschatology in Christian theology is more accurately described as a form of teleology. 
True eschatology opens future possibilities rather than determining them.  Faith in such 
contexts is, as Kuipers puts it, “the art of the possible.”487 
486 Adorno, 131.
487 Ronald A. Kuipers, "Faith as the Art of the Possible: Invigorating Religious Tradition in an Amnesiac 
Society," in 'God Is Dead' and I Don't Feel So Good Myself, 145 - 56.
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The realization of a novel future seems to be the thrust of what Habermas wants 
to achieve through the ideal of rational consensus. However, under the current conditions 
of  secularism,  with  its  insistence  upon  the  immanent  frame  and  the  ontology  of 
antagonism that  it  presupposes,  such an achievement  does not have the philosophical 
space  in  which  to  grow.   I  would  suggest  that  Habermas  does  view  the  future 
transcendently,  although  he  does  not  use  that  language,  insofar  as  he  envisions  a 
transformation of current political systems, an end to the contest of ideologies, and the 
triumph of rational consensus.  Unfortunately, as I have argued in earlier chapters, his 
strategy of trying to establish secular criteria for political discourse closes the possibility 
for dialogue at precisely those points where we should be opening it.  Granted, religious 
language can be problematic,  but  at  its  best  it  facilitates  abnormal  conversations  that 
bring  us  closer  to  the  ideal  that  Habermas  upholds:  reaching  genuine  understanding, 
rather than unending ideological battles.  But the use of religious language is not confined 
to facilitating abnormal dialogues.  There are other appropriate ways it can inform our 
politics. 
First, I should address some misconceptions that might arise given what I have 
been saying about the future as transcendence.   Some might be inclined to think that 
investing the future with eschatological potential could only encourage political quietism. 
From the perspective of the earliest Christian traditions, contrary to their later Platonic 
interpretations, this conclusion could not be more wrongheaded.  Christian expectation 
for  the  future,  if  it  is  to  be  understood at  all,  must  be  conceived  as  an  inaugurated 
eschatology.  In other words, there is tension between the novelty already begun and its 
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completion  yet  to  come.   Moreover,  due  to  this  tension,  Christian  eschatology  is 
collaborative:  humanity  has  a  role  in  bringing it  about.  Therefore,  conceiving  of  the 
boundary eschatologically does not imply that there is no work to be done in the present 
age, as it were, to the contrary.  
Secondly, openness to future transcendence does not imply a static future, the end 
of history in which political organization itself is transcended.  Again, the eschatological 
vision  I  am proposing is  not  about  closure.   Quite  the  contrary,  it  is  about  opening 
previously foreclosed possibilities.   This task cannot be projected completely into the 
future – which, remember, only functions as a boundary – but must begin in the present. 
To repeat, inaugurated eschatology means that there is work to do in the present which 
contributes to the inbreaking of novelty in the future.  However, in speaking about the 
present and the future rather artificially, as discrete moments, there is a danger that we 
will neglect the past.  This, in large measure, is what modernism does in its eschewing of 
religious tradition and in so doing not only fails to be self-conscious of its own history, 
but fails to appropriate any insights such traditions might have to offer.  Kuipers writes 
persuasively about this ‘amnesiac’ element in modern culture through engagement with 
Paul Ricoeur:
For Ricoeur,  the condition of “being-affected-by-a-past” forms a pair  with the 
futural  intending  of  a  “horizon  of  expectation.”  That  is,  our  hopes  and 
expectations  relative  to  the  future  inform and thus  have  repercussions  on our 
reinterpretations of the past. One major repercussive effect, he suggests, is to open 
up  “forgotten  possibilities,  aborted  potentialities,  repressed  endeavors  in  the 
supposedly closed past.” The same effect occurs in the opposite direction: through 
our attempt to interpret a textual tradition inherited from a distant past we create a 
space in which to subject our present reality to critical scrutiny, and thus, imagine 
a better future.488
488 Kuipers, 153.
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Thus, there is a robust role for redemptive critique within an eschatological framework. 
Consequently, an important task for religion qua religion within broadly secular systems 
of political organization is to critique the surprisingly uncritical, and often pathological, 
progress narrative that still  predominates much of our political  discourse in the West. 
Moreover,  this  is  a  task  that  Habermas,  even  if  not  fully  endorsing,  should  at  least 
recognize as a legitimate,  critical  contribution to public debate.   However, the task of 
religion is not purely negative.  As Habermas says of the theology he witnessed during 
his student days:  “With an undogmatic understanding of transcendence and faith,  this 
engagement took seriously this-worldly goals of human dignity and social emancipation. 
It joined in a multivoiced arena with other forces pressing for radical democratization.”489 
Therefore, the religious critique of modernity is also, importantly, a redemptive exercise: 
it offers a new construal of progress, a way of imagining the future otherwise.  Working 
out this novel vision of a transcendently-oriented future in practical terms will require a 
great deal more work and reflection, but I have endeavored throughout this project to 
gesture toward some of the ways religious and secular interlocutors can make room for 
conversations that push ‘the boundary’, as it were, of our mundane, and often moribund, 
public  discourse.   Now,  I  want  to  continue  in  this  vein  by  addressing  some  of  the 
challenges put to the kind of post-secular democracy I have been advocating, and how the 
redemptive mode of critique I have been describing can help us meet them. 
489  Jürgen Habermas, "Transcendence from Within, Transcendence in this World," in Religion and 
Rationality: Essays on Reason, God and Modernity, ed. Eduardo Mendieta (The MIT Press, 2002), 69.
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The Future as Praxis
Having  spoken  about  the  future  as  possibility,  I  now want  to  talk  about  it  in  more 
practical terms. Since this project began with an historical analysis of the conditions of 
secularism,  it  is  only fitting  that  it  end with an analysis  of how those conditions are 
changing and probably will change in the coming decades.  It goes without saying that we 
must be cautious in speaking about the future, and so my remarks should be construed as 
more tentative than usual.  But I think we serve ourselves well if we try to anticipate and 
prepare for, and even aspire to change, what lies ahead. Therefore, this will be less an 
exercise in predicting the future and more an exercise in expanding our expectations of 
what is possible. 
In a recent interview with Eduardo Mendieta, Habermas reflects on the 
amorphous collection of cultural forces summarized under the rubric of 
“globalization.”490  One of the points to emerge from the discussion is the recognition 
that, globally speaking, the processes of modernization have now outrun the governing 
institutions of modernity.  For this reason, globalization entails a number of problems.  
For example, there seem to be no mechanisms with which to regulate the forces of 
modernization, especially the market capitalism which is superseding the power of 
nation-states to control, and the distorting communication of mass media which is 
arguably producing an uncritical appropriation of consumer culture and reducing public 
opinion to a tool of market research which then bleeds into politics.  As public discourse 
increasingly transcends national boundaries, the question of how to order it along 
490 Habermas, “A Conversation About God and the World: Interview with Eduardo Mendieta,” in Religion 
and Rationality, 147 – 67.
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rational-communicative lines becomes all the more pressing.  Clearly, the public sphere, 
as a meta-topical phenomenon, was never limited to the nation-state, but the emergence 
of new communication and information technologies has facilitated an unprecedented 
expansion of the public sphere globally; and with this new expansion come new 
challenges.  For example, the global public sphere is an amorphous collection of voices 
that cannot be mediated by the same institutions established for this purpose in the 
context of nation-states.  This global public discourse seldom conforms to the ideals of 
communicative action; rather, it is a wild frontier in which a myriad of voices compete 
without criteria for genuine consensus.  International media corporations now 
increasingly attempt to filter and distill this rough and ready ‘discourse’.  However, the 
transformation of the public sphere from a realm of intersubjective consensus to one of 
mass media and ‘public opinion’ (in the pollster’s sense of ‘market research’) threatens to 
further distort an already cacophonous discourse.  Habermas is aware of these challenges 
and observes, “[i]n a world still dominated by nation-states, there is no single regime 
capable of the kind of political action that could assume the ‘global responsibility’ 
demanded by moral points of view.”491   In The Postnational Constellation, he points 
toward a possible ‘regime’ capable of reining in the power of private corporations over 
public opinion and strengthening the power of the institutions of the traditional nation-
state globally.  But Habermas insists that we must do so via responsible political action, 
not through a missionary zeal to spread Western liberal ideals.492 
491 Habermas, 166. 
492 Habermas, 154. 
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Yet the desire to tame the global public discourse risks unilateralism if not 
undertaken carefully.  And the increasing importance of religion as a cultural factor in 
this global discourse, and the ‘clash of civilizations’ rhetoric that often accompanies it, 
lends itself to a not-so-thinly veiled cultural imperialism found among many of the 
proponents of the global state.493  This impetus grows largely out of the assumption, latent 
in the globalization narrative, that modernity and now globalization “is the continuation 
of the Christian civilizing project, and that whatever stands in its way is ‘oriental’ 
despotism, Muslim fundamentalism, etc.”494   In other words, globalization is the 
secularized inheritance of Christianity that now confronts other religious forces that have 
not undergone enlightenment and are now unwilling to translate their political aspirations 
into publicly accessible, rational discourse.  More often than not, unfortunately, the 
ensuing silence is interrupted with violence.  Habermas, although more cautious in his 
appropriation of the civilizing narrative of modernity than others, nevertheless 
acknowledges the religious heritage of the project he is undertaking.  In reflecting upon 
globalization and its links to Europe’s Christian history he says, “This legacy, 
substantially unchanged, has been the object of continual critical reappropriation and 
reinterpretation.  Up to this very day there is no alternative to it.  And in light of the 
current challenges of a postnational constellation, we must draw sustenance now, as in 
the past, from this substance.  Everything else is idle postmodern talk.”495  Nevertheless, 
it is vital, for Habermas, that this substance be translated into a universalistic language 
that can, in a non-authoritarian, multilateral way, present the Western accomplishments 
493 Mendieta, the interviewer, mentions Fukuyama and Huntington as representative of this view. 
494 Mendieta in Habermas, 152. 
495 Habermas, 149. 
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of human rights and liberal democracy to the rest of the world.  The consequence of 
failure in this regard is further economic exploitation and violence.  As Habermas 
emphasizes: “The mode for nondestructive secularization is translation.  This is what the 
Western world, as the worldwide secularizing force, may learn from its own history.  If it 
presents this complex image of itself to other cultures in a credible way, intercultural 
relations may find a language other than that of the military and the market alone.”496 
Under conditions of globalization, the ideal of the global citizen is relevant 
especially in connection with emergent religious voices in Western democracies.  The 
narrative of globalization may well be different from the normative definition of ‘global 
citizen’ required to meet the above challenges.  For example, the goal of globalization 
and presumably global citizenry is, ostensibly, to unify.  We want to build consensus, 
tolerance, and stability. We tend to think that this paradigm is in everyone’s best 
interests.  The universalizing discourse of modernity is still with us, despite its more 
radical postmodern critics.  The global citizen, as a part of this totalizing discourse, is 
optimistic about the prospects of enlightened self-interest and rational communication to 
build a better world.  The question remains, however, whether such a totalizing discourse 
can accommodate particularity of the kind found in religious communities. In other 
words, must the global citizen be a secular citizen?
Like Habermas, I believe it is imperative to spread the liberal ideals of human 
rights globally in a way in which religious interlocutors can affirm.  Religion is not 
necessarily a hindrance to this task if the global citizen is not construed as a secular 
496 Habermas, “Faith and Knowledge,” in The Frankfurt School on Religion: Key Writings by the Major 
Thinkers, 336.
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citizen.  That is to say, if we do not uncritically assume the broad contours of the 
secularization thesis in both its empirical and normative forms.  In addition, religion may 
even be helpful within the global public discourse by dissipating the false aura of the 
obvious that surrounds secular worldviews and enshrines the priority of secular reasons in 
the public sphere.  The assumptions of the secularization thesis are by no means 
universal, and sensitivity to religious concerns could go a long way toward fostering 
dialogue and building solidarity.  I reiterate that this does not entail that one cannot 
advance the liberal ideals of human rights and the non-sectarian state, those formally 
secular aspects of our Enlightenment heritage defended by Habermas.  Indeed, we need 
to articulate these values, defend them, and persuade others of their worth.  It is my 
contention that sensitivity toward and dialogue with religious traditions will make this 
task more fruitful.  As such, overcoming naïve secularism is crucial in a globalized 
world.  Although, in my judgment, Habermas’s delineation of postsecularism does not go 
far enough in the direction of including religious rationales for action within public 
debate, it does indicate, however indefinitely, the possibility of a formal secularization 
without naïve secularism.  The global citizen, in our increasingly global public discourse 
with those who do not necessarily share our presuppositions, will be able to endorse the 
former only by overcoming the latter.  Therefore, the global citizen should be a self-
consciously postsecular citizen, but in even broader terms than Habermas allows.  Not 
only should the postsecular citizen be able to translate religious language into the widest 
possible discourse, pragmatically construed, but she should also be able to equalize the 
burden that religious citizens bear in public discourse, thereby allowing them to 
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participate without naïve secularism being a requirement of admission to public debate.  
Only then will the goal of a postsecular society – to allow both religious and secular 
citizens to conceive of secularization as a “complementary learning system” inclusive of 
a plurality of discourses in the public sphere – be accomplished.
This point brings us to the increasing saliency of religious diversity.  Building 
solidarity with those of robust religious convictions is going to be a major task for 
Western democracies over the coming decades.  In Canada, the deliverances of the 
Bouchard-Taylor Commission497 in Quebec remind us that we may not be as tolerant and 
multicultural in practice as we like to imagine.  It also reminds us that philosophy can 
perhaps offer legislators some guidance when it comes to handling issues pertaining to 
religious diversity and its apparent conflict with Western democratic values.  This simply 
reinforces the need for more philosophically informed analyses of our political culture.  
Again, liberal democracies cannot afford to be dismissive of religion in our current global 
climate.  The secularization thesis in its strong articulation has not come to pass and we 
must deal with the current reality of religious pluralism.  I believe that this pragmatist 
insight is a helpful corrective to Habermas.  Again, this is not to say that the 
Enlightenment project is to be abandoned.  Like Habermas, I think that we need to 
continue extending the liberal ideals realized only imperfectly since the Enlightenment.  
But we should bear two points in mind whether we are sympathetic to religion or not.  
First, the Enlightenment is not as secular as we might think.  Habermas recognizes that 
497 Gérard Bouchard and Charles Taylor, Building the Future: A Time for Reconciliation, Abridged Report, 
The Consultation Commission on Accommodation Practices Related to Cultural Differences (Government 
of Québec, 2008).
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many liberal ideals such as individual rights, liberty, and equality are secularized notions 
of ideals that originated, at least partially, in Christianity.  Second, secularization is not as 
anti-religious as we might think.  If secularization is a pragmatic response to religious 
pluralism, it does not necessarily presuppose or produce citizens with no religious 
commitments.498 
However, the shape those commitments take are changing and will likely continue 
to do so.  We have already noted some of these mutations via Taylor’s useful terminology 
of “ontological indeterminacy” and “subtler languages,” but there is more to be said in 
this regard. There are, no doubt, as Taylor notes, a plethora of spiritual options that do not 
conform to any particular orthodoxy or institutional affiliation.  Ecclesiastical institutions 
may be called upon to perform various rites of passage, but the moral instruction they 
offer is less likely to find unquestioning allegiance in an age that is more suspicious of 
authority.  Granted, this is a generalized statement and probably admits some exceptions, 
nevertheless, I think it more or less accurately describes mainline Catholic and Protestant 
believers’ attitudes since the 1960s. (I can do no better than direct readers to Taylor’s 
chapter “The Age of Authenticity” in A Secular Age for more detail.)  If my assumption 
is correct, we encounter a trend toward the de-institutionalization of religion.  In chapter 
4, we saw that Rorty envisions a future in which religion is pruned back to the parish 
level.  In other words, religion will not disappear; it will simply cease to be a purveyor of 
public morality.  Thus, religion will be more like poetry; it will provide a means of 
expressing the numinous in our lives.  This qualified form of secularization is certainly a 
possible outcome of the de-institutionalizing trend, even though the presence of parishes 
498 See Jeffrey Stout, Democracy and Tradition (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), 98.
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implies that there is still a place for communal worship, instead of the purely private, 
romantic expression of religiosity.  However, I am not sure that such an outcome is 
inevitable.  As we have seen, Rorty himself provides an alternative vision in “Looking 
Backwards from the Year 2096.”  In the preceding, I have tried to articulate a public role 
for religion that moves beyond the Kulturkampf rhetoric; a religiosity that neither 
enforces orthodoxy on a pluralistic public nor dictates a morality that claims inherent 
superiority.  Still, it is difficult to see how such a transformed religiosity could speak to 
the wider public without some institutional structure, although it would need to change 
significantly.  Nevertheless, the trend toward de-institutionalization is real and invites 
speculation about how religiosity in the West might survive the atrophy of the institutions 
that have housed it for so long.  We know that religion is remarkably resilient and it has 
already surpassed the half-life predicted by the atheists of the nineteenth century.  
Moreover, movements toward de-institutionalization within Christianity are nothing new. 
As Habermas observes, “All the great world religions were familiar with anti-clerical 
revival movements that criticized existing institutions, or with mystical movements, or 
the subjectivism of highly emotional forms of devotion, of which Pietism is an example 
for us.”499  However, the rise of information technologies exacerbate this trend by linking 
people together through ever vaster networks of meta-topical ‘space’, making the idea of 
assembling in a particular topical location almost quaint, especially among youth for 
whom the internet is the preferred delivery system for just about everything, including 
spirituality. 
499 Habermas, 152.
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The communications landscape has certainly changed since 1962 when Habermas 
wrote The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere.  In my first chapter, I quoted 
James Bohman who claims that globalization and new information technologies “make it 
at least possible to consider whether democracy is undergoing another great 
transformation, of the order of the invention of representative democracy and its 
institutions of voting and parliamentary assemblies in early modern European 
societies.”500  The volume in which Bohman’s essay appears is especially concerned with 
how to think about communication not only “after Habermas” but also after the 
telecommunications revolution.  Importantly, these changes to the public sphere, the vast 
expansion of the meta-topical space to which I alluded, also affect religion because it too 
may be understood, as Mendieta suggests, “as a form of human communication, and as 
such … impacted by the transformations in the means and modes of communication.”501  
He asks: “Is it possible that we may be witnessing the obsolescence of older forms of 
human interaction, and the birth of new ones that might catalyze the birth of new 
religions, new churches, new forms of piety and prayer?”502  Habermas is reticent to 
answer this question, because he says it can only be answered “from within.”503  As one 
who has been an insider, it is my judgment that the future that Mendieta envisions is 
already upon us.  If we are not witnessing completely new religions, we are at the very 
least witnessing mutations of the old ones.  Whether these mutations are desirable or not 
is, of course, an open question.   For his part, Habermas is dismissive of most new forms 
500 James Bohman, “Expanding dialogue: the Internet, the public sphere and prospects for transnational 
democracy” in After Habermas: New Perspectives on the Public Sphere, ed. Nick Crossley and John 
Michael Roberts (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), 131.
501 Mendieta in Habermas, 151. 
502 Mendieta in Habermas, 151. 
503 Habermas, 151. 
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of spirituality as “a symptom of ego weakness and regression, the expression of a 
yearning for an impossible return to mythical forms of thought, magical practices, and 
closed worldviews, that the Church overcame in its battle against ‘the heathens.’”504  
Here, I surmise, he has in mind what is usually called “New Age” spirituality and not 
specifically new forms of Christian religious expression facilitated by the new media. 
However, contemporary Christianity is not immune from the kind of magical thinking to 
which he alludes.  Some very influential manifestations of Christianity today – usually 
branded as ‘charismatic’ – are combinations of de-institutionalization, subjectivism, 
pietism, and supernaturalism.  In effect, they combine the various trends under 
discussion.  They also tend to be more media and technology savvy than their more 
traditional counterparts.  In my judgment, this correlation is significant and supports the 
notion that the changes within communication, and the public sphere itself, will manifest 
themselves in religious organization and devotion.  If not all of these changes are 
positive, there is at least potential in the coming decades for a more socially aware, 
politically engaged, and less strident Christian public presence.  Even Habermas admits 
that “history teaches us that religious sects can be very innovative. So maybe not 
everything on the market is Californian claptrap and neopaganism.”505  It is heartening to 
see Habermas so eloquently defending the achievements of Christian civilization!  
Nevertheless, his point about the dangers of the market mentality with respect to religion 
is well taken. Furthermore, he notes that “In a homogenizing media society, everything 
loses its gravity, perhaps even institutionalized Christianity itself.”506  Ironically, for 
504 Habermas, 152. 
505 Habermas, 152. 
506 Habermas, 152.
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Habermas currently, if secularization wins the day, it will not be the achievement of 
atheistic intellectuals, or even rationality, but yet another conquest by the market.  I agree 
with him.  However, I remain optimistic that religion will survive as a form of culture 
long into the future.  What form it will take is a matter of speculation, but I hope that it 
will continue to play a redemptive role.  Perhaps part of this role, as I have suggested, 
will be to offer a critique of the processes of modernization that tend to dehumanize us.  
And this would also involve asking the question: are the mutations in religiosity 
facilitated by new technological means of communication an unqualified good?  It is 
ironic that a secularist like Habermas should remind us that there is much within the 
Christian tradition that ought to be preserved.  Again, I find myself in agreement with 
him.
In this chapter I have tried to articulate a role for religious language in public that 
even Habermas would recognize as offering a redemptive critique of the pathologies that 
he locates within modernity. In the course of articulating such a role, I have argued for a 
number of points. Firstly, I contend that Habermas, despite his emphasis on the 
form/content distinction and his effort to confine his theorizing to procedural matters, 
nevertheless employs a number of substantive assumptions of his own. These 
assumptions include the autonomy and rationality of agents upon which his normative 
theory of communicative action and also his political theory depend. These assumptions 
function, for Habermas, as substantive commitments and rest uneasily with many of the 
totalizing, metaphysically overdetermined assumptions of materialism. Habermas’s 
attempt to reconcile the materialistic picture of humanity with our phenomenological 
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experience of ourselves as rational actors remains promissory. Insofar, as he maintains 
his commitment to the indispensability of these phenomenological features for any 
coherent account of rationality, his commitment to the assumption that we are in fact  
autonomous, rational actors can be aptly described as a fiduciary commitment. 
Secondly, I have argued that we need not do metaphysics in order to talk 
meaningfully about the substantive commitments that both religious and secular citizens 
share. Here I express some sympathy with Habermas’s postmetaphysical perspective over 
and against Meyer’s criticisms. I argue that construing the differences between religious 
perspectives and secular ones in metaphysical terms—as ‘heavy’ and ‘light’ for example
—plays into the hands of the subtraction story of secularization. Moreover, when it 
comes to the public sphere, such a construal helps justify the exclusion of religious 
language. Too often the presence of religion in the public sphere is seen as the presence 
of idiosyncratic beliefs about what lies ‘beyond’ the immanent frame, rather than the 
presence of religious citizens who are capable of giving arguments. However, even if the 
premises in their arguments are perceived as idiosyncratic by secularists, religious 
arguments certainly enjoy no monopoly on idiosyncratic premises, as I have argued at 
length. Therefore, they ought not to be excluded simply on that basis.
But there is a sense in which religious views are open to transcendence in a way 
that secular views are not. However, this ‘transcendence’ need not be construed 
metaphysically, as necessitating a reality or realm ‘beyond’ the immanent frame. Rather, 
one can speak phenomenologically about ‘boundary conditions’ that both secular and 
religious people experience, albeit articulated in different ways. It is not the case that 
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modernity makes it impossible for people to experience these boundary conditions; it 
simply makes it more difficult to experience them as religious. Nonetheless, Taylor has 
identified articulations of these experiences in ‘ontologically indeterminate’ ways in 
many modern thinkers. Simply because one does not express these experiences in the 
language of dogmatic religion, it does not follow that one cannot express them by means 
of a ‘subtler language’. I suggest that Habermas, insofar as his understanding of the ideal 
speech situation can be described as ‘transcendent’ under our revised definition, is also 
describing this collective phenomenology in subtle, ontologically indeterminate ways. As 
such, the role his theory plays, namely that of redemptive critique, shares many 
commonalities with the way some religious citizens understand their own societal role. 
Finally, I suggest some practical ways in which religion can more fully embrace 
this role in the near future, ways that avoid the dangers of dogmatism that Habermas 
rightly criticizes. Perhaps those with religious imagination can envision ways that they 
can contribute to public discourse without dogmatism or institutional heavy-handedness. 
In other words, I am sympathetic to Habermas’s criticism of religious dogmatism. I 
simply urge him to consider that there are other ways to imagine a public role for 
religion, including some that are in the spirit of his own project of redemptive critique. 
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Conclusion: The Way Forward
In this project, I have attempted a sympathetic critique of Habermas and other liberal 
theorists with respect to the role of religion in public discourse.  In my judgment, the 
standard liberal view – that religion ought to be disallowed on contractarian grounds or, 
at the very least, that its expression be frowned upon by civically responsible citizens – is 
rapidly becoming antiquated in a globalized context.  Nevertheless, I have sought to 
preserve the valuable insights of contemporary liberalism, namely state neutrality with 
respect to religion and the secular monopoly on power.  Every citizen, regardless of 
religious adherence or lack thereof, must in principle understand the justification of the 
law, and maintaining the secularity of the state has historically been an affective measure 
for achieving such an outcome. Moreover, citizens should justify their reasons for 
supporting or opposing the exercise of public power.  However, unlike many liberal 
theorists, I doubt that citizens will always agree or even agree for the same reasons, 
reasons that enjoy consensus for being ‘secular’ in some sense. As I have argued above, it 
is not clear to me in what sense secular reasons count as more ‘public’ or ‘accessible’ 
than any reasons, religious or otherwise, deemed ‘private.’ These terms do not seem to be 
doing any real work, aside from signaling in an ad hoc way which premises are likely to 
find support from secular liberals and which are not. But such disagreement over 
premises is much deeper and cannot be adequately captured by merely labeling reasons 
either ‘public’ or ‘private.’ A larger narrative needs to be told, and I have attempted to 
flesh out some of that narrative above. 
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Similarly, one cannot simply demarcate secular from religious reasons by 
claiming that the former are prima facie rational whereas the latter are not. Given the 
phenomenological factors in the way that secularists and believers experience the world, 
which I have outlined, it appears naïve to say that the secularist person appeals to pure 
reason, unconditioned by history and the shift in worldviews felt especially since the 
Enlightenment. The narrative that Taylor and others have articulated, in my judgment, 
casts doubt on the primacy of reason in the ascent of secularism; other factors, affective 
and normative, played a more heightened role than the typical self-portrait of secularism 
would lead one to believe. Again, to say that secular reasons are uniquely rational, and 
therefore public, is to oversimplify the case and underestimate the role that so-called 
private affections and moralizing play in justifying the secular outlook. Historically, 
liberalism has had the advantage of mining the best affective and moral traditions of both 
humanism and Christianity and neither should be identified as its exclusive provenance.  
Secularism, in oversimplifying its own narrative and claiming exclusive access to the 
public sphere, runs the serious risk of impoverishing liberalism by cutting it off from 
traditions that have sustained it historically. This is not to say that secularism is simply 
parasitic on a more substantive tradition, like Christianity. On the contrary, I have argued 
that secularism is itself a substantive tradition that is by no means as thin as many of its 
proponents suggest. And the contributions of this substantive tradition to liberalism have 
yielded some genuine insights, such as the formal secularity of the state. What I want to 
maintain, however, is that all of the best insights of the secular tradition can be preserved 
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without imposing secularism. Ironically, democracy without secularism leaves us with a 
more liberal public sphere. 
Let me say some more about rationality and argument. I am not defending the 
position that secularists and religionists mean something different by ‘reason’ such that 
there is no way to adjudicate among various arguments in the public sphere. Nor am I 
suggesting that secularists and religionists necessarily disagree about the importance of 
giving reasons in public debate. In practice, such may be the case at various times, but 
nothing I have argued suggests a necessary incommensurability. Rather, what I have said 
is in line with standard argumentation theory: namely, that when it comes to non-trivial 
arguments it is exceedingly difficult find premises that are held in common. Consensus 
on the most interesting philosophical and political issues, perhaps especially the ones we 
care about most deeply, is going to be a rarity. As such, it seems strange to stake the 
success of liberalism on consensus, as liberal theorists like Habermas and Rawls seem to 
do.  In those terms, the dialectical process is always going to be a failure. I have 
suggested that we abandon the notion of consensus, especially with respect to religious 
arguments, as a criterion for ‘publicly accessible reasons.’ In the case of religious 
reasons, such a criterion is a red herring because religious reasons enjoy no monopoly on 
being disputed.  There are many disputed premises that are explicitly non-religious, say, 
Marxist premises or libertarian premises to take two ends of the political spectrum. But, 
of course, the fact that they are disputed is not an adequate reason to disqualify them 
from public debate.  Therefore, they have the right to vie for support just like more 
335
mainstream political views. I fail to see a relevant difference in the case of religious 
premises. 
To be sure, there are religious citizens who are content to have their views remain 
‘private’ and have no interest in arguing for them. And there are others who want to 
impose their views on a diverse polity without offering any reasons for them. I have 
argued that if religious citizens want to fully participate in public debate they must offer 
something by way of argument for their position. Here I agree with Habermas and most 
liberal theorists. But I think religious citizens should feel free to couch their reasons in 
religious language, whereas Habermas insists on translation. Since I have argued at 
length for why I think the translation requirement should be relaxed, I will not repeat 
those arguments here. I simply want to clarify what I see to be the role of rational 
argumentation in public debate. I do not see the goal of argumentation to be consensus as 
such, not that I am opposed to consensus in principle; I just think it unlikely in most 
cases. Because I do not think that consensus is likely to emerge from debate, I certainly 
do not think it will emerge prior to debate when we all translate our premises into a 
universal language that commands rational assent. It is a fact that we are going to have 
different reasons and different premises in our arguments regardless of whether we are 
religious or secular. Clearly this does not entail that religious citizens who enter into the 
exchange of reasons ascribe less value to the exercise of reason in public debate than 
their secular counterparts. Reason, after all, is largely a formal discipline that most of us 
understand and follow albeit imperfectly in practice. We typically do not disagree on the 
question of whether or not we owe each other reasons or arguments. Rather it is the type 
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of reason, or the content of the argument (what the premises say) that is often 
controversial. It is at this level where our arguments can reach a dialectical stalemate. 
Nevertheless, there are moves we can make to attempt to overcome these stalemates. 
Pragmatically speaking, translation, where possible, is a worthwhile strategy for 
religious citizens to employ. If one can faithfully preserve the content and force of one’s 
argument by translating it into terms that one’s interlocutor might find more convincing, 
all well and good. I am quite happy to concede the utility of translation where it exists, 
although I recognize that such translation is often trickier than Habermas and Rawls and 
Rorty seem to assume. But the pragmatist will employ translation when useful. Thus, I do 
not object to translation into secular terms per se, rather I have argued specifically against 
conceptualizing it as a contractarian obligation. Instead, I argue it should be construed 
pragmatically, a position I read Habermas to actually support in some of his more 
nuanced statements of the translation requirement. 
Another useful strategy to avoid conversation-stopping is Stout’s immanent 
critique. This strategy is advantageous because, unlike the way translation is typically 
employed, immanent critique makes allowance for all manner of premises and recognizes 
that reasons come rhetorically packaged in ways that are not simply incidental to the 
argument, but essential to it. Thus, a secularist can appreciate that a religious person’s 
political position on a given issue is deeply rooted in a theological tradition. Immanent 
critique also gives the secularist motivation to become familiar with that theological 
tradition in order to better understand her religious interlocutor’s position and so also to 
mine the theological tradition for reasons that might be uniquely persuasive to someone 
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informed by that tradition. So the giving of reasons plays a central role, but reason is not 
construed as set of secular premises to be enforced on a pluralistic discourse, but as a 
dialectical process that works pragmatically with that pluralistic discourse. Again, the 
goal is not to bring about some idealized rational consensus, but to achieve a workable 
basis for political praxis that satisfies the need to give reasons while recognizing the 
legitimacy of diverse reasons within the polity. 
In this project, it has not been my intent to defend any particular religion or even 
the ideal of ‘religion’ in general, whatever that might mean. Nevertheless, I do make 
points that are often made in a more explicitly apologetic context. I do think that 
Christianity has played an influential and positive role in the formation of modern 
liberalism. I do not gloss over the wars of religion or the various problematic theologies 
that contributed to Christianity’s alienation from the public sphere. But I do think that 
many of the virtues espoused by liberalism find their precedent in the New Testament and 
that the religious tolerance that Locke advocated, for example, did not emerge as a novel 
secular creation, but was indebted to Christian thinkers, particularly theological 
minorities, that had made the case even earlier. But this seems to be a modest point, one 
to which a secularist could easily assent in the interest of intellectual honesty. 
 Also with respect to the secularization thesis, the point I make is fairly modest. I 
do not claim that religions are resilient because some particular religion or aspect of 
religion generally, is true, although one cannot rule that possibility out entirely. I 
speculate that religion continues to offer something to humanity and that is why it 
persists. But an atheist like Habermas can also state that religion has an existential pull 
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that eludes even the best secular accounts of our humanity. This point may be more 
controversial, but I think it is defensible and have offered various versions of it above. 
I also make the point that religion, particularly Christianity, is more rationally 
respectable than many secularists seem to assume. I think that something like Reformed 
epistemology, spoken of mostly in relation to Wolterstorff, is sound; namely that 
religious persons are entitled to their religious belief in the absence of successful 
defeaters. This position informs how I construe rational entitlement and provides a 
healthy corrective, in my judgment, to the evidentialism presupposed in a liberal theory 
like that of Rawls. Moreover, it fits quite well with a pragmatist understanding of how we 
justify our beliefs. Of course, the proponent of the secularization thesis may be correct 
that religion is irrational and will eventually be upstaged by a complete science, but a lot 
of work would have to be done to show that. Judging from the contemporary scene in 
philosophy of religion, however, there is not the debate over the rational propriety of 
religious belief that there used to be. Both believers and atheists have taken the position 
that religious belief is rational in the absence of successful defeaters. Of course, there is 
still lively debate about potential defeaters and whether they succeed (variations on the 
problem of evil are popular candidates), but there is a rare consensus on the rational 
propriety of belief that does not seem to be reflected outside philosophy of religion. Part 
of what I have sought to do in this project is to make the fruit of contemporary 
philosophy of religion relevant to political philosophy. Wolterstorff has made some 
important headway here, but the application of religious epistemology to political 
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philosophy has remained largely unexplored. I hope to have made some contribution to 
that effort. 
I also suggest that Christianity continues to make a contribution to the moral 
underpinnings of the liberal state in a way that some secularists deny. Again, the point 
here is exceedingly modest. I do not claim that Christianity is the best or the only moral 
foundation for liberal society. Nor do I argue the more conservative position that 
liberalism is simply parasitic on its religious legacy as do some neo-traditionalist 
thinkers. I give due weight to Stout’s suggestion that a moral foundation other than 
Western monotheism may be the preferred vehicle for the sustenance of the liberal 
virtues, and I am quite a bit more optimistic than Wolterstorff about the prospects of a 
secular morality that can do more or less everything that Christian morality has done 
historically, namely provide a hospitable environment for what he calls the culture of 
human rights. However, it is also undeniable in my judgment that Christianity has made 
significant contributions to liberal democracy. If I have overstated Christianity’s 
contribution at all in my narrative it is only to compensate for the understatement, or 
indeed, absence of statement, that I find in shorthand secular narratives that often serve as 
the basis for political theory. 
None of this is to let religion off the hook for some of its more problematic 
features, such as the dogmatism in which much of religion trades. Democracy does not 
have any room for the dogmatism often exhibited by religious adherents. As an inherently 
open-ended and revisable system, democracy must subject all ideas to scrutiny and 
criticism; no ideology is immune in the marketplace of ideas.  As such, religious persons 
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who are sensitive to the democratic process must abandon dogmatism and consent to 
have their beliefs placed on equal footing with other ideologies. This means that they 
must also abandon any privilege of privacy their beliefs might have enjoyed before entry 
into the public sphere. I agree with the secularist that surrender of dogmatism and the 
privilege of privacy are reasonable demands for participation in the democratic process. 
But religion need not be dogmatic. 
I am aware that some who defend religion are guilty of defining religion in such 
abstract terms that it escapes the charges of its critics but fails to resemble anything that 
anyone actually believes or practices. I have tried to avoid this moving target fallacy in 
what I have written.  I am realistic about what religion actually looks like in practice, 
while also being open to what religion could be; a religiosity that transcends the culture 
wars and transforms itself into something less dogmatic and authoritarian. I have 
articulated what I think such a religion would look like and what redemptive role it could 
play in the political realm. We all have a stake in hoping that this more liberal form of 
religion ultimately replaces various forms of fundamentalism. In this respect, liberalism 
itself is a powerful moderating force and needs to be supported as a means of overcoming 
tribal ways of thinking. But enforcing secularism will only strengthen those elements 
within religion that are antagonistic to liberalism and prolong the culture war mentality 
that infects much of the political discourse when it comes to the discussion of religion in 
public. Therefore, it is also in the interests of secularists to foster a more open dialogue.
The wider cultural context in which I have written this thesis is one of religious 
resurgence in the public consciousness and a secularist backlash against it. Both sides in 
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the debate are frequently dogmatic and often lack a rudimentary understanding of the 
others’ point of view. The current wave of atheistic propaganda is particularly culpable in 
this regard. Although it presents itself as the vanguard of science, the goal of much of this 
literature, in my judgment, is political; it seeks to paint religion as irrational because such 
a strategy, in their view, pays politically. They can say, in effect, “if the religious believe 
nonsense about science, we can’t trust them to think clearly about public policy. We 
should just tell them to keep out of it.” I think such a strategy backfires and simply 
reinforces the polarization that exists between religious and secular citizens. If secularists 
and religionists made a more honest effort to understand each others’ positions, 
arguments, motivations, hopes, fears, and convictions, we might make some progress 
toward solidarity, not because we blithely ignore each others’ differences, but because we 
are willing to argue about them in good faith.  This project, in a modest way, strives to be 
such an honest effort and hopefully it succeeds.
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Samenvatting
Democratie zonder secularisme: een pragmatistische kritiek op Habermas.
Deze dissertatie is een onderzoek naar de plaats van religieuze taal in publieke discussies. 
De consensuspositie is dat het goed is voor zowel religie als de politiek wanneer de twee 
domeinen gescheiden blijven. De staat behoort seculier te zijn, d.w.z. neutraal te staan 
tegenover verschillende religies. Dit voorkomt dat één religie een monopoliepositie krijgt 
en biedt aan het individu de gelegenheid om zijn eigen religie, indien aanwezig, te 
praktiseren. Hoewel een idealisering, is dit een algemeen principe dat de meeste 
voorstanders van een liberale democratie op een of andere manier anvaarden. Echter, 
onder het dunne vernis van deze consensus liggen diepe en complexe onderwerpen 
verscholen waarover overtuigde democraten  met elkaar van mening verschillen. Dit 
onderzoek gaat over precies zulke onderwerpen.
Meer specifiek gaat het over deze onderwerpen ‘in gesprek met’ het werk van 
Jürgen Habermas. Habermas staat in filosofische kringen bekend wegens zijn theorie van 
communicatief handelen, die een uitgewerkte articulatie en verdediging biedt van de 
principes van de Verlichting. Habermas is overtuigd van de kracht van het geven van 
redenen, van het vermogen van de menselijke rationaliteit om een consensus te bereiken 
door de dwangeloze dwang van het betere argument. Voor hem is het rationele argument 
de enige legitieme kracht in de politiek. Echter, wil rationaliteit haar werk kunnen doen, 
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dan moet zij publiek toegankelijk zijn en moet haar legitimiteit erkend worden door alle 
burgers, ongeacht hun religie.
Recentelijk heeft Habermas zijn positie met betrekking tot religieuze taal in het 
publieke domein echter afgezwakt. Mijn dissertatie traceert deze ontwikkeling en ik 
verbind daar verdergaande conclusies aan.
Hoofdstuk 1 biedt een correctie op de ‘subtraction theory’ (om Charles Taylors 
term te gebruiken) aangaande moderne secularisatie. Ik betoog dat secularisatie niet 
identiek is aan Habermas’ stelling, die hij ontleent aan Max Weber, over de ‘onttovering 
van de wereld’. Mijn stelling is dat secularisatie het beste begrepen kan worden als 
antwoord op het gegeven van het religieuze pluralisme. Om dit te onderbouwen neem ik 
de lezer mee op een historische excursie door de vroeg moderne periode—de periode 
waarin Habermas en anderen het ontstaan van het publieke domein situeren. Omdat 
Habermas zichzelf plaatst in de traditie van het Verlichtingssecularisme, is het nuttig de 
vraag te stellen of het seculiere criterium voor participatie aan de politiek wel echt van de 
Verlichting afkomstig is. Ik betoog dat dit niet zo is en dat de stelling dat secularisme 
voortkomt uit de Verlichting, of zelfs dat de Verlichting de terugtrekking van religie uit 
het publieke leven heeft bevordert, voorbijgaat aan belangrijke feiten betreffende de 
grondleggers van het Verlichtingsdenken en de politieke nazaat daarvan, het liberalisme.
Na in hoofdstuk 1 te hebben betoogd dat Habermas’ vroege kritische theorie de 
‘subtraction theory’ van secularisatie aan boord neemt, ga ik in hoofdstuk 2 door op dit 
thema omdat deze theorie op gespannen voet staat met Habermas’ vertalingsvereiste 
(‘translation requirement’) volgens welke religieuze individuen hun particuliere 
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geloofstaal dienen te vertalen in een verondersteld universele seculiere taal. Habermas 
stelt dat seculiere taal ons verplicht tot minder overtuigingen, en dus een betere garantie 
biedt voor consensus in het publieke domein. En dit is zo, volgens hem, omdat religieuze 
individuen additionele commitments hebben, zwaardere metafysische bagage met zich 
meetorsen, wat hun epistemische situatie lastiger maakt dan die van de secularist. Mijn 
betoog hiertegen is dat deze positie de ‘subtraction theory’ veronderstelt en dat deze 
theorie geen oog heeft voor de substantiële commitments van de secularist.
In hoofdstuk 3 onderzoek ik meer concreet hoe Habermas zich de 
vertalingsvereiste voorstelt in de politieke praktijk. Ik doe dat door een vergelijking te 
maken met Rawls, die, net als Habermas, een normatieve theorie heeft ontwikkeld over 
hoe in een democratie rationele discussies zouden moeten worden gevoerd. Ondanks 
verschillen, beschouwen beiden consensus als het doel van elke discussie en het doel van 
democratische discussies moet volgens hen rationele consensus zijn. Ik breng een aantal 
redenen naar voren om te denken dat dit onjuist is.
Zowel Habermas als Rawls insisteren dat uitsluitend ‘publieke’ of ‘publiek 
toegankelijke’ redenen tellen in een seculiere democratie. Bovendien stellen ze dat 
publieke redenen seculiere redenen zijn. Een paradigmatisch voorbeeld van een ‘private 
reden’ is een religieuze reden, en zulke redenen hebben geen rechtvaardigende potentie in 
een seculiere democratie. Dit stellen zij zo, omdat burgers zowel de scheppers als de 
geadresseerden zijn van de wet. Iedere burger moet als burger de rechtvaardiging of 
onderbouwing van een wet kunnen begrijpen—en dus moet die 
rechtvaardiging/onderbouwing publiek, seculier en universeel zijn, en niet privaat en 
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sektarisch. Dit geldt m.n. voor wat Rawls de ‘principles of basic justice’ noemt, maar ook 
voor de onderbouwing van het recht van de staat om bepaalde vrijheden in te perken.
Zowel Habermas als Rawls vatten de vertalingsvereiste in Kantiaanse termen als 
een verplichting die geldt voor alle rationele personen in een democratie, minstens op 
institutioneel niveau, waar de staat dwingmacht heeft. In hoofdstuk 3 betoog ik dat dit 
vereiste op een zwakkere manier moet worden geconstrueerd, meer in pragmatische 
termen. Ik ontwikkel argumenten die beogen aan te tonen dat dit zwakkere vereiste 
enerzijds evenveel bescherming biedt aan zowel seculiere burgers als aan religieuze 
minderheden als de standaard liberale theorie dat doet, maar anderzijds de ruimte 
vergroot voor religieuze burgers om hun bijdrage aan het publieke debat te vatten in 
religieuze termen. 
Blijkens zijn meer recente werk heeft Habermas dit punt erkend en heeft hij zijn 
vertalingsvereiste herzien. Hij zegt nu dat burgers in de informele publieke sfeer (d.w.z. 
de sfeer van de opinievorming) ook religieuze redenen naar voren mogen brengen, maar 
dat zij zich in de formele publieke sfeer (het parlement) dienen te beperken tot seculiere 
redenen. Hij denkt dat dit ‘institutional translation proviso’ het probleem voorkomt dat 
religieuze burgers in een democratie worden uitgesloten van politieke participatie, terwijl 
het tevens de neutraliteit van de staat waarborgt. In een bepaald opzicht heeft dit proviso 
kracht. De wetten in een pluralistische samenleving moeten niet een bepaalde religieuze 
traditie bevoordelen. De taal in de wet moet zo neutraal zijn als mogelijk.
In het laatste deel van hoofdstuk 3 onderzoek ik Habermas’ poging om een 
zodanig evenwicht te vinden tussen religieuze en seculiere burgers, dat de politieke 
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participatie van de eersten niet wordt aangetast. Veel in wat hij zegt, acht ik loffelijk, 
maar betoog tevens dat zijn bijgestelde vertalingsvereiste verder dient te worden 
versoepeld.
Mijn kritiek op Habermas in de voorgaande hoofdstukken is geïnspireerd door de 
pragmatistische traditie. Dit roept wel de vraag op of pragmatisten zichzelf zien als 
denkers die ruimte bieden aan religieuze burgers om hun politieke argumenten te gieten 
in een religieus idioom. In hoofdstuk 4 onderzoek ik twee pragmatisten: Richard Rorty en 
Jeffrey Stout. Geen van beiden beschouwt zichzelf als religieus, maar Rorty staat veel 
minder open voor het idee van religieuze argumenten in het publieke domein dan Stout. 
Illustratief hiervoor is Rorty’s essay “Religion as a Conversation Stopper” waarin hij 
betoogt dat religie moet worden geweerd uit het publieke domein. Hij doet dat door het 
bekende publiek/privéonderscheid te verdedigen en religie in het privédomein te plaatsen. 
Na nauwkeurige analyse blijkt echter dat Rorty de term ‘privé’ gebruikt in de betekenis 
van ‘niet gedeeld door het brede publiek.’ Anders gezegd, hij omarmt het standaard 
liberalisme. Echter, ik laat zien dat er problemen kleven aan de notie van ‘publiek 
gedeelde’ of  ‘gezamenlijk aanvaarde’ premissen. Bovendien stelt het pragmatisme de 
notie van een ideale consensus ter discussie. De pragmatist weet dat er feitelijk verschil 
van mening is over de premissen in politieke argumenten, en vermoedelijk zijn niet alle 
meningsverschillen verkeerd, ook al functioneren sommige als conversatiestoppers. 
Immers, het publieke domein is niet een eindeloze discussiearena. Conversaties worden 
gestopt, en één van de hoogst geprezen democratische praktijken, namelijk: stemmen, is 
een conversatiestopper. Het is daarom moeilijk in te zien waarom publiek verschil van 
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mening over religie wel een slechte zaak zou zijn, terwijl publiek verschil van mening in 
het algemeen dat niet is.
Ik concludeer daarom dat niets in de traditie van het Amerikaanse pragmatisme 
religieuze bijdragen aan het publieke debat diskwalificeert. Ik betoog dat Rorty’s claim 
dat religie een conversatiestopper is, alleen geldig is voor geloofsuitspraken die 
onkritisch op gezag teruggaan. Rorty erkent nu ook dat het “Jeffersonian compromise”, 
dat hij ooit verdedigde, onhoudbaar is. Hij biedt geen principe waarmee religie uit de 
publieke sfeer kan worden geweerd en heeft de verwijzing naar Rawls en Habermas als 
voorbeelden laten vallen. Hij is echter niettemin van mening dat gewoonten en gebruik 
een beroep op religie in sommige gevallen moeten zien te voorkomen, bijv. wanneer het 
gaat om de rechten van homo’s. Hij wil nog steeds de religieuze burger ertoe pressen zijn 
argumenten op een seculiere manier te verwoorden. Naar mijn oordeel heeft zulk een 
oproep tot vertaling weinig zeggingskracht zonder een robuuste notie van rationaliteit. En 
die notie is er niet. Ik betoog vervolgens, met een voorbehoud, dat Stouts methode van 
immanente kritiek meer mogelijkheden biedt voor de ‘abnormale conversaties’ die 
onvermijdelijk zijn in een pluralistische democratie. Ik concludeer daarom dat 
pragmatisme een bondgenoot kan zijn voor de stelling dat religieuze burgers de 
gelegenheid moeten krijgen om deel te nemen aan het publieke debat in de taal van hun 
traditie.
In het slothoofdstuk verbreed ik het argument van de voorgaande hoofdstukken in 
deze zin dat ik betoog dat Habermas, niettegenstaande zijn focus op procedures, zelf 
menig substantiële assumptie maakt. Zijn politieke filosofie, bijvoorbeeld, hangt aan de 
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assumptie dat personen autonome, rationele actoren zijn. Tegelijk is hij er zich van 
bewust dat het heersende materialistische paradigma, met haar deterministische 
wereldbeeld, de politieke notie van verantwoordelijk handelen ondermijnt. Daarom geeft 
Habermas zich moeite om het moderne wetenschappelijke beeld van de mens te 
verzoenen met de fenomenologische ervaring van onszelf als rationele actoren—een 
ervaring waarop de liberale politieke theorie is gebaseerd. Om dat doel te bereiken, kiest 
Habermas voor een niet-reductief materialisme. Maar de verzoening die hij zoekt, is 
vooralsnog slechts een belofte. Ik betoog daarom dat zijn commitment aan autonomie 
eerder substantieel is dan procedureel—en dat het daarom als een geloofscommitment 
kan worden beschouwd.
Tenslotte doe ik enkele praktische suggesties over hoe religie deze andere rol zou 
kunnen spelen in de toekomst en hoe de politiek open kan blijven voor inzichten uit deze 
hoek. Ik herhaal mijn punt dat men datgene wat distinctief is aan het moderne liberalisme 
kan handhaven zonder een ideologisch secularisme te hoeven aanvaarden. De formele 
seculariteit van het politieke domein is een waardevol aspect van het liberalisme. Maar 
die kan worden geaffirmeerd zonder naïef secularisme aan te hangen. Ik sta positief 
tegenover Habermas’ kritiek op religieus dogmatisme. Wel geef ik hem te overwegen dat 
er andere manieren zijn om zich de publieke rol van religie in te denken dan dogmatisme, 
waaronder ook enige die goed passen bij zijn eigen project van bevrijdende kritiek. 
Bijvoorbeeld, religieuze burgers kunnen gebruik maken van pragmatische vertaling en 
immanente kritiek en daardoor abnormale conversaties mogelijk maken. Ze kunnen ook 
een correctief bieden voor de pathologische aspecten van de moderniteit die Habermas 
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zelf ook kritiseert—en aldus bijdragen aan bevrijdende kritiek. Ik concludeer dat geen 
van deze activiteiten een bedreiging vormt voor discursieve democratieën. Integendeel, 
deze activiteiten zijn verenigbaar met Habermas’ eigen project om het huidige 
antagonistische politieke discours te overstijgen. Hoewel we misschien nooit een ideale 
communicatieve situatie zullen bereiken, kunnen we wel leren om te gaan met de politiek 
van veelvoudige identiteiten zonder religieus sektarisme of ideologisch secularisme.
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